デビッド・M・ゴードン

アメ型成長戦略

賃金主導型

利潤主導型

ムチ型成長戦略

参考：

山田鋭夫

https://love-and-theft-2014.blogspot.com/2020/12/ryouji-ishizuka.html?m=1

経済教室　戦略編

第２章 二つの成長戦略 「アメ型」成長戦略 　あまり知られていませんが、一国の成長戦略には、二つのタイプがあります。 　一つは、賃金の上昇によって経済成長を実現しようという「賃金主導型」成長戦略です。 　そして、もう一つは、企業の利潤の増加によって経済成長を実現しようという「利潤主導型」成長戦略です。 　この「賃金主導型」成長戦略と「利潤主導型」成長戦略を、アメリカの経済学者デイヴィッド・Ｍ・ゴードンにならって、それぞれ「アメ型」成長戦略（「ハイ・ロード」）と「ムチ型」成長戦略（「ロー・ロード」）と呼んでおきましょう（注２）。

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注２　デイヴィッド・Ｍ・ゴードン『分断されるアメリカ：「ダウンサイジング」の神話』シュプリンガー・フェアラーク東京、１９９８年

David M. Gordon

FAT AND MEAN: The Corporate Squeeze of Working Americans and the Myth of Managerial "Downsizing"

https://www.amazon.com/FAT-MEAN-Corporate-Managerial-Downsizing/dp/0684822881

Free Press; 1st edition (May 15, 1996)☆

https://www.amazon.co.jp/dp/4431707670

FAT and MEAN

デイヴィッド・M. ゴードン and 2 more

分断されるアメリカ―「ダウンサイジング」の神話

内容（「BOOK」データベースより）

本書は経済社会システムを根本的に問い直し、真の経済成長と繁栄をもたらす具体的政策案を提示している。

内容（「MARC」データベースより）

所得格差の拡大や賃金圧縮、企業官僚の負荷といった経済問題の源泉が、「ダウンサイジング」の名の下で肥大化した狭量な企業活動にあることを実証。ダウンサイジングの神話を崩し、真の経済成長への具体的政策案を提示する。

「ダウンサイジング」の成果が喧伝される一方で, アメリカ国内では所得格差の拡大や賃金圧縮, 企業官僚の重荷といった問題が深刻化している. 本書は,それらの経済問題の源泉が「ダウンサイジング」の名の下で肥大化した狭量な企業活動にあることを確かな実証に基づき明晰に論証している. アメリカ経済が実質賃金の低下に伴う管理と懲罰に基づく「ロー・ロード」から、協調と実質賃金の上昇という労働者への報償に基づく 「ハイ・ロード」 へ転換し, アメリカ企業の生産組織と労使構造がどのように再編されるべきか, 本書は経済社会システムを根本的に問い直し, 真の経済成長と繁栄をもたらす具体的政策案を提示している.

☆

About the Author

David M. Gordon is Dorothy H. Hirshon Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Economic Policy Analysis at the New School for Social Research. He is the author, with Samuel Bowles and Thomas Weisskopf, of After the Waste Land: A Democratic Economics for the Year 2000 and Beyond the Waste Land: A Democratic Alternative to Economic Decline. He lives in New York City.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

Chapter 1

THE WAGE SQUEEZE

For years Craig Miller had been a sheet-metal worker at a major airline. After he lost his job in 1992, he and his wife -- parents of four kids -- had to scramble. Craig took on two lower-paying jobs and started a small sideline business. His wife worked nights as a stock clerk. They were patching together, counting his business, four part-time jobs and they were still earning less than half Craig's previous paycheck.

"Sure we've got four jobs," Craig told a reporter. "So what? So you can work like a dog for $5 an hour?"

The Miller family saga is hardly unique. Since the mid-1970s, more and more U.S. workers and their families have been suffering the wage squeeze, enduring steady downward pressure on their hourly take-home pay. The wage squeeze has afflicted not merely the unskilled and disadvantaged but the vast majority of U.S. households, not merely the poor and working class but the middle class as well. Most people in the United States used to be able to look forward to a future of steadily rising earnings. Now they have to race merely to stay in place.

The wage squeeze has even broader consequences. It not only pinches workers and their immediate families. It sends tremors through entire communities, eroding their stability, ripping their social fabric. The frustration and anger it provokes begins to attack the body politic like a plague, spreading virulent strains of cynicism and discontent, of disaffection from government and hatred toward "others" like immigrants who are often blamed for the scourge. Many observers in the United States are inclined to turn their heads, viewing falling wages as somebody else's problem. But the effects are too far-reaching, too extensive. It won't work to play the ostrich, sticking one's head in the sand. The sand is eroding all around us.

Back to the 1960s

The public receives mixed signals about the wage squeeze. On the one hand, more and more observers have taken note of the vise closing around workers' earnings -- citing the pressure to work longer hours, the "disappearing middle class," the increasingly elusive American Dream, the mounting gap between the rich and the poor. Personal stories of declining fortunes abound. Statistical studies of stagnant earnings and soaring inequality have become a growth industry. In my research for this book, finding journalistic accounts and scholarly analyses of the wage squeeze was as easy as following the trail of Newt Gingrich's newfound notoriety.

By late 1995, as I was completing the manuscript, the issue was becoming inescapable. Business Week, often a leader in tracking changes in the economic climate, devoted a cover story to "The Wage Squeeze" in July 1995. Surveying the atmospheric conditions they reported:

Four years into a recovery, profits are at a 45-year high, unemployment remains relatively low, and the weak dollar has put foreign rivals on the defensive. Yet U.S. companies continue to drive down costs as if the economy still were in a tailspin. Many are tearing up pay systems and job structures, replacing them with new ones that slice wage rates, slash raises, and subcontract work to lower-paying suppliers.

"Although the problem [of slumping wages] has been plaguing Americans for years," wrote New York Times economics reporter Louis Uchitelle that same summer, "it is just now rising to the level of a major campaign issue." "Nearly everyone by now knows the situation," economic columnist William Greider wrote in November 1995, "either from the headlines or from their own daily lives: the continuing erosion of wage incomes for most American families." Commenting on yet another twelve months of stagnant wage growth, Robert D. Hershey Jr. wrote in late 1995: "The frustration and insecurity that have resulted are expected to play a major role in shaping next year's Presidential race as politicians of both parties try to portray themselves as the best choice to provide economic growth that will benefit the middle class."

On the other hand, many pundits, economists and business leaders seem not to lament the wage squeeze but rather to praise it. Instead of wringing their hands about working households' living standards, many express relief about the moderation of wage pressure on prices and profits -- a trend they hope will dampen inflationary pressure, keep U.S. firms competitive in global markets, and protect small enterprises against business failure. When journalists report monthly data on workers' hourly earnings, they are much more likely to celebrate wage moderation or decline than to worry about its consequences for the millions who depend on that labor income.

Take the New York Times' report in April 1994 on real wage trends in the first quarter of the year. Noting that nominal wages and prices had grown at roughly the same rates, leaving real wages flat, the story appeared to welcome this "relatively benign reading on wages and benefits...": "American workers are obtaining less in pay and benefit increases from employers these days...," with the result that "...price pressures remained subdued." The reporter observed hopefully that "bond prices rallied at the news." Nowhere in the story did he wonder how workers themselves might regard these "relatively benign" developments.

So there are, indeed, two sides to the news about wages. "The good news is labor costs are under control," economic forecaster Michael Evans put it in 1992. "The bad news is that employees are broke."

More often than not, however, the good news for business seems to blot out the bad for nearly everyone else. I was recently struck by the prevalence of these priorities at a conference about macroeconomic policy in Washington, D.C. in the spring of 1994. At lunch we heard from a Presidential economic adviser. A distinguished scholar, the speaker had been an economic liberal, more to the left than to the right of the mainstream of economic discourse. In a recent policy book, he had expressed concern about a polarized society in which the economic extremes of the 1980s had made the rich richer and set the rest adrift.

The economist lauded the progress of the economy in the spring of 1994 and the continuing signs, in the Administration's view, of a decent economic recovery. He noted with approval the evidence of (modest) growth in consumer spending, investment, and exports. He applauded the Federal Reserve's and the markets' continuing restraint in interest rates and pointed proudly to the tepid pace of inflation. He projected 1994 real wage growth at zero percent.

What is notable about this presentation is what was not said. A projection of zero real wage growth, but no reflections on the hardships experienced by ordinary working people. No lament about the twenty-year decline in real earnings. And this from a key economic adviser to the president who had promised, in his initial economic message to Congress, that "our economic plan will redress the inequities of the 1980s."

This widespread inattention to workers' living standards even shows up in the preferences of government data collectors. For decades, since the end of the Depression and the spread of the union movement, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics had kept track of the living standards of the average American worker with published data on spendable earnings. The series measured the real after-tax value of workers' weekly take-home pay. But in 1981 the Reagan Administration discontinued the index, citing conceptual and measurement problems. They proposed no replacement, leaving us without any official series intended specifically to monitor the effective purchasing power of workers' earnings.

Had the government data apparatchiki actually cared about illuminating the trends in workers' income, the statistical problems they cited would not have been especially difficult to overcome -- hardly so vexing that they warranted dropping this kind of series altogether. But their priorities lay elsewhere. At more or less the same time as the discontinuation of the weekly spendable earnings series, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, reflecting the Reaganites' ever-extending solicitude for the needs of business, was expanding the range and variety of its employment cost indices, tracking the hourly costs to corporations of their wage-and-salary employees. As a result, in recent years, corporations need merely dial the phone to get up-to-date data about changes in labor costs faced by them and their competitors.

More than a decade ago, in response to this change in priorities, my collaborators Samuel Bowles, Thomas E. Weisskopf, and I proposed an alternative version of the spendable earnings index, with modifications designed to address each of the specific problems raised about the traditional indicator. Where the traditional series on weekly earnings had conflated movements in hourly earnings and changes in hours worked per week, we proposed relying on a much simpler index of hourly earnings. Where the traditional series had relied on a somewhat implausible adjustment for the taxes paid by the "average" worker, we suggested a much more immediate and direct calculation. We called our proposed alternative an index of real spendable hourly earnings.

Our proposal was graciously published in the Bureau of Labor Statistics official journal, but, hardly to our surprise, the Reagan Administration ignored our advice, persisting in providing no official record of trends in workers' take-home pay. So we have continued ourselves to maintain and update what we consider to be the most salient indicator of workers' earnings.

Our index of real spendable hourly earnings provides a straightforward measure of the real value of the average production or nonsupervisory worker's take-home pay. "Production and nonsupervisory" workers, as they're defined in the official BLS surveys of business establishments, comprised 82 percent of total employment in 1994. They represent that group in the labor force that is most clearly dependent on wage and salary income. They include both blue-collar and white-collar workers, both unskilled and skilled. They cover not only laborers and machinists but also secretaries, programmers and teachers.

I focus primarily on these "production and nonsupervisory" employees at least partly to avoid distortions in the data from the huge increases during the 1980s in the salaries of top management -- a group covered by the earnings data for the other fifth of employees excluded from our measure, a category called "nonproduction or supervisory" employees. In further discussion in this chapter and throughout the rest of the book, in order to avoid the cumbersome terminology used by the BLS, I shall refer to the "production and nonsupervisory" category in the establishment data as production workers and to the other grouping as supervisory employees, respectively.

Spendable hourly earnings measure the average production worker's hourly wage-and-salary income minus personal income taxes and Social Security taxes. These earnings are then expressed in constant dollars in order to adjust for the effects of inflation on the cost of living. They measure how much per hour, controlling for taxes and inflation, the average production worker is able to take home from his or her job.

Figure 1.1 charts the level of average real hourly spendable earnings for private nonfarm production employees in the United States from 1948 to 1994.

The data show a clear pattern. The average worker's real after-tax pay grew rapidly through the mid-1960s. Its growth then slowed, with some fluctuation, until the early 1970s. After a postwar peak in 1972, this measure of earnings declined with growing severity, with cyclical fluctuation around this accelerating drop, through the rest of the 1970s and 1980s. The average annual growth of real spendable hourly earnings reached 2.1 percent a year from 1948 to 1966, slowed to 1.4 percent between 1966 and 1973, and then dropped with gathering speed at a shade less than minus one percent per year from 1973 to 1989.

Despite the recovery from the recession of 1990-91, real spendable hourly earnings were lower in 1994 than they had been in the business-cycle trough of 1990. Even though the economy had been growing steadily for three years from the bottom of the recession, they continued to decline at an average annual rate of-0.6 percent from the peak in 1989 through 1994.

By 1994, indeed, real hourly take-home pay had dropped by 10.4 percent since its postwar peak in 1972. More dramatically still, real spendable hourly earnings had fallen back to below the level they had last reached in 1967. Growing massively over those nearly three decades, the economy's real gross output per capita in 1994 was 53 percent larger than it had been in 1967, but real hourly take-home pay was four cents lower. Referring to these trends since the early 1970s as "the wage squeeze" is polite understatement. Calling it the "wage collapse" might be more apt.

These harsh winds have continued to blow through the recent recovery. Most economic meteorologists have described them in similarly cloudy terms. But a few have recently tried to present a sunnier weather report.

In one highly visible piece in late 1994, for example, the New York Times published a long news story beginning on its front page. Sylvia Nasar, the Times reporter, broadcast a considerably more sanguine view about wage trends: "it is practically gospel that the growing American economy cannot deliver the higher pay that American workers want," she wrote. But she claimed that wage changes during the early 1990s appeared to suggest a turnaround, with the majority of new jobs paying above-average wages. "As a result," she concluded, "average hourly pay for all employees, adjusted for inflation, is slowly rising."

The source of Nasar's discrepant conclusions was not hard to find. Unlike all the data reviewed thus far in this chapter, which cover production employees -- accounting for roughly four-fifths of the wage-and-salary workforce -- Nasar was looking at wage trends for all workers. These data cover those at the top of the earnings distribution, including top-level executives whose total compensation has continued to soar straight through the mid-1990s. Those who have long pointed to the wage squeeze have never denied that the top 10 to 20 percent of the earnings distribution has fared much better than everyone else. If you mix together those in the middle and bottom with those at the top, you're bound to get a different and ultimately misleading story. Nasar's story was effectively demonstrating a penetrating glimpse into the obvious -- that supervisory employees have continued to enjoy rising real hourly compensation.

In his recent book Values Matter Most, commentator Ben J. Wattenberg makes the same mistake. Hoping to create the space for his argument that we should concentrate on social values, not the economy, he seeks to cast doubt on the economic pressures cited by many. He notes that many highlighting the wage squeeze focus on real earnings series for production and nonsupervisory workers. He argues that this series gives an "inaccurate" picture because it "concerns cash only, ignoring benefits." Then, almost quicker than the eye can blink, he shifts our attention to the same series Nasar reported, the index for total employee compensation per hour. "That line," he observes hopefully, "is clearly trending upward...," lending support to his ultimate conclusion that "our economic situation is somewhat less than grievous." But while the eye was blinking, Wattenberg switched to a series that differed from the first in two respects, not just one: including benefits, it traced total compensation; and, tracking all workers, it included those at the top who have been feeding at the trough. As I show in the Appendix to this chapter, just including benefits in our series, while continuing to focus on production and nonsupervisory workers, tells almost exactly the same story as earnings without benefits. Whether we look at earnings or full compensation, the wage squeeze for production workers remains severe.

For the vast majority of workers, then, these have been hard times indeed. In 1994, the average production employee working thirty-five hours a week and fifty-two weeks a year was able to take home about $16,833 after taxes, barely above the official poverty standard for a family of four. An earlier generation had expected that their earnings would rise over their working lifetimes and that their children could anticipate higher living standards than their own. For the past two decades, however, more and more workers have had to adjust their expectations, reconciling themselves to toil at what are sometimes derisively called "McJobs."

One Michigan woman, talking in a pollster's focus group in the early 1990s about deflated expectations, lamented:

I think about when I was married, a week of groceries cost me $13 and my husband thought that was entirely too much money to spend for a week's groceries. Now I spend $150. I feel like I'm always running -- and this big snowball is behind me getting bigger and bigger -- and just trying to keep it from running over me.

Another focus group participant talked about shifting expectations across generations. "[Our kids]'ll have to be good to us if they want to have a home to live in, because the only way they'll get one is if we will them ours. They're never going to be able to buy a house."

You don't have to organize your own focus groups to get a strong whiff of these kinds of economic concerns. Recent national polls repeatedly reveal such fears about economic pressure and the cloudy future for this and future generations. In a 1992 Gallup poll, for example, more than three-fifths said they were dissatisfied with "the opportunity for the next generation of Americans to live better than their parents" 58 percent were dissatisfied with the "opportunity for a poor person in this country to get ahead by working hard." In a June 1993 LA Times/CNN poll, 39 percent of participants described their personal finances as "shaky," while more than half -- 51 percent -- said they "expect the next generation of Americans will have a worse standard of living than the one we have now." Even though the economy was well into its recovery, in a November 1993 LA Times/CNN poll two-thirds reported that job security was "worse for Americans now, compared to two years ago" and 53 percent that they felt this "greater job insecurity will occur over the long term, for many years." Even further into the recovery, a March 1994 New York Times poll found that two-fifths of respondents expressed "worry" that during the next two years they might be laid off, required to work reduced hours, or forced to take pay cuts. Nearly two-fifths also reported that in order "to try to stay even financially" during the last two years they had had to work overtime or take on extra jobs. In a March 1995 Business Week/Harris poll, people were asked whether "the American Dream...has become easier or harder to achieve in the past 10 years." Two-thirds answered that it has become "harder." Participants were also asked if it would be "easier or harder to achieve in the next 10 years." Three-quarters chose "harder."

A Crowded Boat

Andrew Flenoy, a twenty-one-year-old living in Kansas City, did better in 1994 than many, holding down a steady job paying a cut above the minimum wage. In fact, he had even enjoyed some recent promotions, rising at a food catering firm from dishwasher to catering manager. Through that sequence of promotions, however, his earnings had increased from $5.50 an hour to only $6.50 an hour -- the equivalent of only about $12,000 a year working fulltime year-round. Whatever satisfaction he had enjoyed from his promotions had quickly paled. "Now he is tired of the burgundy and black uniform he must wear," a reporter concluded, "and of the sense that he works every day from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. just to earn enough money so that he can come back and work some more the next day." "My resolution for 1994," Flenoy remarked, "is that if nothing comes along, I'll relocate and start from scratch somewhere else."

Flenoy attended only a semester of community college after high school and suffered the additional employment disadvantage of being African American. Many are inclined to assume, indeed, that the wage squeeze has mostly afflicted the young, the unskilled, and the disadvantaged.

Although some have suffered more than others, however, a much wider band of the working population has been caught in the vise. For most Americans, the wage squeeze has been a profoundly democratizing trend.

Indeed, the data on the breadth of the wage squeeze seem finally to have persuaded skeptics not normally known for their empathy with workers. Recently confronted with some of these data, for example, Marvin Kosters, a well-known conservative economist at the American Enterprise Institute who had earlier challenged reports about trends toward growing inequality, admitted surprise at the variety of subgroups affected by wage erosion. "It's really quite amazing," he acknowledged The data would scarcely seem "amazing," of course, to those who've been directly feeling the pinch.

In order to assess the breadth of the wage squeeze, we need to turn to data from household surveys, which unlike the establishment surveys afford considerable detail on workers' personal characteristics. We can look at trends in real hourly earnings between 1979 and 1993 for a variety of different groups in the private nonfarm workforce, since it is trends in the private sector with which I am most concerned in this book.

Looking at this universe, we find that real hourly earnings for all private nonfarm employees, including those at the top, remained essentially flat from 1979 to 1993 -- barely rising from $11.62 to $11.80 (in 1993 prices). (Government workers did somewhat better.)

But we know that those at the top did fairly well. The more telling comparison looks at real wage trajectories for the bottom four-fifths of the real wage distribution and for the top fifth. As anticipated from the data for production workers reviewed in the previous section, it was the bottom 80 percent that experienced actual real wage decline, with the 1993 level dropping by 3.4 percent below the 1979 figure. For the top 20 percent times were not so harsh; they enjoyed a healthy rate of increase, with their real hourly earnings rising by 1993 to almost three times those for the bottom four-fifths.

We can also compare workers by race and ethnic origin. Looking at workers in the bottom 80 percent of the overall wage distribution, it is true, not surprisingly, that African Americans and Hispanics fared less well than whites. But even among whites in the bottom 80 percent, real hourly earnings dropped by nearly 3 percent. (Of course, a much larger percentage of African Americans and Hispanics were situated in the bottom four-fifths of the wage distribution than of whites.) Not just the disadvantaged but the advantaged racial group joined the wake.

Looking at wage trends by gender, we find a major difference in the impact of the wage squeeze. While male workers in the bottom 80 percent of the distribution experienced devastating declines in their real hourly earnings -- facing a decline of close to 10 percent -- women workers in the bottom 80 percent enjoyed modest real wage growth, with a total increase over the full period of 2.8 percent. Despite these gains, however, women's wages still lagged substantially behind men's. In 1993, the median female hourly wage had reached barely more than three-quarters of the median male wage, at 78 percent. Women were gaining on men, to be sure, but their gains occurred primarily because real male wages were plummeting, not because real female earnings were themselves growing rapidly. Indeed, almost three-quarters of the decline in the wage gap between men and women from 1979 and 1993 can be attributed to the decline in male earnings -- a trend which undoubtedly contributed to the widespread frustration which many males have apparently been feeling and venting.

A final comparison looks at the experience of workers with different levels of education. It was the bulk of workers on the bottom, those with less than a college degree, who experienced actual wage decline. Only those with a college degree or better were able to gain some measure of protection against the unfriendly winds. And the most recent trends have been harsh even for a large number in that group. From 1989 to 1993, for example, even male workers with just a college degree, but no postgraduate education, were hit with declining real earnings.

Table 1.1 pulls together these separate tabulations for different groups of workers. The wage squeeze has caught a huge proportion of U.S. workers in its grip.

In better times, of course, workers in a pinch often pulled up stakes and migrated in search of greener pastures -- in Andrew Flenoy's words, "to relocate and start from scratch somewhere else." But the greener pastures have mostly turned brown. New York Times reporter Louis Uchitelle tells the story about workers in Peoria, Illinois, where layoffs and givebacks at Caterpillar had cast long shadows over the local economy:

Today the adventurous search for opportunity is no longer rewarding. For generations, Americans migrated -- going West, so to speak -- when jobs in their communities became scarce or failed to pay well. But income stagnation is a nationwide phenomenon. Migration has become futile. Peorians, for example, uprooted themselves by the thousands in the early 1980's, when recession and then massive layoffs at Caterpillar and the numerous local companies that supply Caterpillar pushed the unemployment rate here above 16 percent. By the late 1980's, they were trickling home again.

"When they got to Oklahoma and Texas, they found that the promise of good wages was a lot of talk; they worked hard and had little to show for it," said David Koehler, executive director of the Peoria Area Labor Management Council. "Now, many have come home to jobs that pay less than they once earned, but they have returned because this is where their families are to help them."

Slipping Behind

Some readers may be inclined to view the wage squeeze as par for the course at the twilight of the twentieth century. The world economy is becoming more and more tightly integrated. Developing countries, where wages are much lower than the advanced economies, have been expanding their exports. Low-wage import competition has been intensifying. Isn't wage pressure in the advanced economies to be expected?

There is no denying that import competition from lower-wage developing countries has grown more intense over the past twenty years or more. But it does not necessarily follow, for a variety of reasons we shall explore in later chapters, that workers in the advanced economies must inexorably face the wage crunch as a result.

Quite to the contrary. In fact, the most striking conclusion that emerges from comparing wage trends in the advanced countries is how isolated, how relatively unique has been the U.S. experience.

Careful compilations by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics allow us to compare wage trends across twelve of the leading advanced economies -- including the G-7 powers of the United States, Germany, Japan, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Canada as well as five other smaller European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden). Their data provide comparable information on trends in real hourly compensation for all manufacturing employees, with compensation deflated by the consumer price index for each country to provide an insight into trends directly affecting workers' living standards. I look here at the period from 1973 to 1993, the most recent year for which the data were available at the time of writing.

This measure matches the series for real spendable hourly earnings in the United States, presented above in Figure 1.1, with three differences. The comparative numbers are before-tax rather than after-tax, and focus just on compensation in manufacturing, rather than the much larger nonfarm private sector. And they include all employees, not merely production workers.

By this measure, real hourly compensation for all manufacturing employees in the United States was fiat rather than collapsing in the period between 1973 and 1993. It barely changed over that period, rather than declining substantially as for the data presented in Table 1.1. The principal reason that this index of hourly wages does not show decline is that it includes nonproduction workers as well as production employees and this group at the top, as the data on the top 20 percent in the previous section suggest, was the one group whose wages stayed ahead of inflation over the past two decades. (The difference in coverage between the manufacturing and private nonfarm sectors matters less since trends in the two sectors were roughly comparable over this period; and Appendix A shows that before-tax and after-tax measures move closely together.)

If by this measure, real hourly compensation in manufacturing was roughly fiat in the United States between 1973 and 1993, how did workers fare in the other eleven advanced economies?

Figure 1.2 allows us to pursue this comparison. It presents the average annual percent change in real hourly compensation for all manufacturing employees in the United States (on the far right) and in eleven other advanced economies (arranged in alphabetical order). Wage stagnation in the United States stands out like a sore thumb. It is the only country with wage change close to zero. Only two other countries -- Canada, which feels the wage competition from its near North American neighbor, and Denmark -- feature wage growth rates less than 1.5 percent a year. Workers in Japan and Germany, our two major trading competitors, fared markedly better than U.S. workers, with real wage growth at 2.2 percent and 3.1 percent respectively.

Indeed, the average for the other eleven countries altogether is 2.1 percent per year, seven times more rapid than for the United States over the same period. Import competition from low-wage developing countries may have been intensifying, but workers in other advanced economies seem to have escaped its wrath much more effectively than workers in the United States.

Later chapters will explore some of the reasons for this huge discrepancy in wage growth between the United States and most other advanced countries and will consider the possibility that many of the other advanced economies paid a substantial price for their more rapid wage growth with relatively higher unemployment rates.

But one possible explanation deserves immediate attention. Perhaps wage growth in the United States has been relatively slow because U.S. wages have historically been so high compared to our advanced competitors and, therefore, competition with those other advanced economies has forced U.S. corporations into tough bargaining with their employees.

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Fat and Mean: The Corporate Squeeze of Working Americans and the

David M. Gordon — 1996 · Business & Economics

More effective worker voice TABLE 9.1 Five Steps Toward the High Road Provisions Increasing minimum wage to $6.50 by year 2000 Indexing ...

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第6章 ロー・ロードを歩むアメリカ合衆国

　1980年代初頭の国際競争はアメリカ合衆国に全面的な打撃を与えたが,「ビジ ネス・ウィーク』は1992年のある特集記事のなかで, 「たいていの製造業者は譲 歩を引き出すか、あるいは仕事を海外へ移すことによって労働コストを削減し た」と述べている.
　ゼネラル･エレクトリック (GE) はそうした会社の1つであった。その電 動モーター部門は,アメリカ合衆国にある低賃金のライバル企業, および海外 にある工場の双方から仕掛けられる熾烈な競争に直面していた.多くのアメリカ企業と同様に, GEは攻撃的方針をとった. 大幅な賃金譲歩を要求し,さら に2つの工場を閉鎖した.おびえた労働者は11%の賃金カットを受け入れ,予定 されていた時間当たり1ドル30セントの昇給をあきらめた. 「ビジネス・ウィー ク」の特集記事はつぎのように続ける.1

　 GEは, 昔はうまい取引のように見えたものを、今ではばかげた間違いだったと考えている.実際, 賃金カットは年間2,500万ドルの節約になった. そして工場 閉鎖は, 1,000の働き口を削減した。 しかし会社側の幹部も労働組合の役員も口 をそろえて, 労働者の志気(モラール)は完全に低下したと語っている. 「生産性はおだぶつになった」 と [GEの労使関係担当副社長は] 語っている....... 

　先進経済を比較している多くの人は,2つの異なる経済管理戦略に言及して いる. 「ハイ・ロード」 戦略は,協調と労働者への効果的な報償 (実質賃金の比 較的急速な上昇を含む) を通して経済成長と繁栄を築き上げようとする. 「ロー・ロード」 戦略は、対立と不安定, 管理と厳しい労働者の懲罰に依拠して おり,しばしば実質賃金の相対的な停滞ないし低下を特徴とする. これら2つ とも首尾一貫した戦略であり、両者共におそらく実行可能である. たいていの合衆国企業は、過去20年間にスピードを加速させながら 「ロー ロード」を歩んできた。先行する2つの章で見たように、個々の労働者とその家 族は高い代価を支払ってきた。しかし、われわれすべてが,おそらくそれと同じくらい厳しいもう1つの代価を支払ってきた。 急速で安定的な経済成長に至るマ クロ経済の経路として, 「ロー・ロード」は「ハイ・ロード」よりもずっとひど デコボコ道であると論じることは理にかなっている. 何千万人ものアメリカ人 がその生活と生計のなかで, ムチ戦略のコストを負担してきた. われわれはみ な, それが課す厳しいマクロ経済的コストの重みを背負ってきた. 「ロー・ロード」は企業が歩む,もっともらしい経路ではある.しかしアメリカ経済全体は もっとうまく、おそらくはもっとずっとうまくやることができるだろう. 読者は以下の議論のこうした予告に抵抗を覚えるかもしれない. かつては, たとえば1970年代 80年代には, アメリカ合衆国は主要な競争相手の一部に遅 れをとっていた.しかし今は1990年代である. アメリカ合衆国経済は復活を遂 げ,他方でヨーロッパ各国経済は動脈硬化症を患い始めていると多くの人が考 えている. アメリカ合衆国の 「雇用の奇跡」 はどうであろうか. ヨーロッパの 大量失業はどうであろうか. アメリカ合衆国は「ロー・ロード」 を歩んでいる のかもしれないが, それは繁栄への近道ではなかったのだろうか.
　これは広く受け入れられている見方であるが, 的外れである. ヨーロッパ諸 国の間には大きな相違が存在するのであり, それはアメリカ合衆国と日本との 相違に劣らぬほどである. 「ヨーロッパ」 の内部にある諸国をより詳しくみれば わかることだが、協調の「ハイ・ロード」 を明確に追求し、 ムチ戦略よりもアメ戦略に明確に依拠してきた国々は, アメリカ合衆国よりも失業率がはるかに 低いという特徴を維持し続けている. 労使関係があまり協調的でない他のヨー ロッパの国々はつまずきを見せている. ヨーロッパ内部で比較しようと,大西 洋の両岸を比較しようと, 「ハイ・ロード」がかなり順調に歩みうる道であることに変わりはない.

生産性という落とし穴 

 
　急速な生産性上昇はマクロ経済の安定にとって決定的に重要であり、この見 解にはほとんどすべての経済学者が同意している。 スタンフォード大学の経済 学者ボール・クルーグマンは「不況、止めどないインフレーション, あるい は内戦は国を貧しくさせる。 生産性上昇だけが国を豊かにできる」と述べて

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第8章
振るわれるムチ 284~285

たのは, 主として, 企業が生産物 1単位当たりで上げる利潤, 多くの経済学者 が 「利潤シェア」 と呼ぶ数値が低落したからであるが食っ 原則として,説明上というより) 単純な会計上の意味において、利潤シェア は、時間当たり賃金の上昇あるいは生産性の低下(あるいは双方)によって低 下しうる。この場合,すなわち1966年から73年の景気循環では,生産性上昇の 低下が主要な原因であった!? 工場や事務所で、 摩擦が拡大していった。労働 者の労働努力は弱まり,無断欠勤が増加した。 「ウォールストリート・ジャー ナル」は1970年に次のように報道した。


　労使関係の現状を知っている人々は･････現在の状況は記憶しているかぎり最悪で あると声を揃えて主張している. ・・・・･･多くの作業工程で志気がひどく落ち込み、 意図的な作業の遅延が頻発し、 無断欠勤が急激に増加している. ･･････ オーチス [エ レベータ社] のバーク氏のような人々は, [労働者の生産性低下という]問題は広 く蔓延しており、 目下最大の頭痛の種であると断言している。

　そのような環境のもとで,少なくとも理論的には, アメリカ企業は収益性を 回復するために, ハイ・ロードあるいはロー・ロードのいずれかを採ることが できた. ハイロードに移行するには,労働者をより全面的かつ協調的に生産 に参加させることによって直接的に生産性の低下に取り組むだけでなく, 労働 者に対して実質賃金の改善と職務保障の回復という ｢アメ」 を与える必要が あった。個々の企業がロー・ロードを選択する論理は、 先験的には,次のよう なものであったろう.すなわち, 企業は、時間賃金の引き下げによって利潤 シェアを引き上げることができるし, また「経済価値に対する健全な尊敬の念」 の再建によって,少なくとも解雇の威嚇の確実性を回復することによって、労 働者の努力を改善できるであろう.
　1960年代後期から70年代初期を出発点として,ほとんどのアメリカ企業は 「ロー・ロード」を選択していった。なぜこのような選択をしたかについての十 全な説明は容易ではないが、2つの要因が重要な役割を果たしたことは確かで ある。アメリカの労使関係はすでにトップダウン方式で組織されており、管理 者による厳しい監督に依拠していた。すなわちムチを十分に効かせる方が、労 使システムの基本構造を変革するよりもずっとたやすいように思われた。そし して アメリカ合衆国の労使関係に影響を与えている一般的環境分権化された団体交渉の容認, 労働組合の組織化への重大な障害,労働者に対する付加給 付と権利の法律による保障の限界は、企業がハイ・ロードを選択するよう 奨励しなかったし, またローロードに沿って生活しようという誘惑をそぐも のでもなかった.
　十全な説明なるものが何であれ、企業は喜んでロー・ロードを選択したので ある。 経営者の攻勢は, 当然のことながら, 労働組合の存在する企業と労働 組合不在の企業では戦略を異にしていた. 企業がより攻撃的な目的をうまく達 成できたか否かは, 1974~75年の景気後退の深さのような多くの要因に影響を 受けた. しかし, 組織された労働者と未組織の労働者の双方に対して 企業が かなり優勢な立場に立とうと決意していたことはほとんど疑いない。 多くの企業は、 直接に労働組合を付け狙ったが, その目的は組合を手なずけ るか あるいは骨抜きにすることにあった! 企業は、時に 「現代版ピンカー トン探偵社」として知られる熟達した経営コンサルタントを迎え入れて,反労 働組合活動の立案を助けてもらった. 企業は, 多くの労働組合の認証取消を要 求した。 労働組合の指導者とオルグを解雇した. 労働組合とその組合員が「行 儀よく」 振る舞わなければ, 工場を移転するぞと威嚇した. この戦略は1960年 代後期に採用され始め, 1970年代後期にはきわめて強力に実施された. ある試 算によれば, 労働組合員1人当たりの認証取消申立件数の指数は, 1960年代と 比べて, 70年代後期から80年代初期にかけては約3倍も高くなった. そして企 業の「不当労働行為」 に対する労働者の苦情申し立ても急増し、同じ期間に3倍 になった.マイケル･L・ヴァクターとウィリアム・H・カーターは次のよう に述べている。12

　1960年代後期から70年代初期に始まる不当労働行為の申し立ての急激な上昇トレ ンドは,労働組合に対する経営者の敵対行為が大幅に増加したのは1960年代後期 以降であるという仮説に、確固とした実証的証拠を提供する. ・・・・・・一部の人は, 労働組合に対する経営者の敵対行為が強まっていったのは、レーガンが 「全国労 働関係委員会 (NLRB)」 を任命してからだと主張しているが, この証拠はそ の主張を支持していない｡ [われわれの] データでは,不当労働行為の大幅な増加 が始まるのは, 1980年代初期ではなく, 70年代後期である.

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322
　国際比較も、頭でっかちの企業官僚制を説明する「ロー・ロード」説を支持 している。 第3章では、各経済を対比して,より対立的な労使関係とより頭 でっかちの経営構造との間にかなり密接な関連があるように見えるという証拠 が検討されたこの関連性は、企業官僚の重荷の国別の相違に影響を与えうる 他の要因に注目する時にも支持されるだろうか.
　先進16カ国のパターンを検討すると,他の考えうる影響要因を考慮に入れて も,労使システムが企業官僚の重荷に及ぼす影響力は相変わらず強いことが示 唆されている.116 まさに,これらの分析は,労使関係を含む諸要因が, 第3章 で明らかにされた単純な検証よりもはるかに重要であることを示唆しているの である.
　データの利用可能性という理由のために, 私が研究するのは1980年代初頭の 時期であるーーこの時期までに 「強いムチ」 局面はアメリカの企業官僚の重荷 を急激に増加させていた。 他の諸要因を考慮したとしても, 労使関係の協調的 性格を測る私の合成的尺度 (第3章を見よ) は, 全雇用者に占める管理・監督 的雇用者の比率の国ごとの相違に強い影響力を保持している.すなわち, ある 国の労使システムが協調的であればあるほど, 必要な上司の数は少なくなるの である.さらに, 失業コストアメリカ合衆国における時間の経過に伴う変 化のパターンにかなり重大な効果を及ぼしたと思われる, 雇用主による管理の 程度を測る尺度も, 国ごとの企業官僚の重荷に対して強い正の影響を与え ている.すなわち労働者にとって職を失ったならば被るであろうコストが大き くなればなるほど, 少なくとも限界的には, トップダウン方式での労務管理が ますます有効になってくる.
　重要かもしれない他の要因も考えうるが,それらは大きな相違をもたらさな いように思われる. 例えば, アメリカ合衆国の企業官僚層が相対的に大きいも う1つの原因は, アメリカ合衆国を本拠とする多国籍企業が巨大な帝国を管理 している本社が膨大な本部スタッフを必要とすることだと考える者が いるかもしれない. しかし, ひとたび労使関係の効果が考慮に入れられるなら ば、ある国民経済の規模あるいはグローバル貿易への関わりの相対的規模が, 企業官僚の重荷に何らかの効果をもっているという証拠は存在しない.117

　そのような比較研究はきわめて予備的な段階にとどまっているので,示唆的 な結果以上のものを提示することはできない. しかし, 国際比較が示す証拠はアメリカ合衆国が示す証拠と整合的である. ムチ戦略が支配的な国ではムチ を振るうためにより多くの管理職層が必要になるようだ。 そして経営者の攻勢 が開始される時がそうであったように, ムチ戦略が強化される時には、ムチ打 ち人の軍団が増強される. 太りすぎのマラソン走者のように, アメリカの企業 は「ハイ・ロード」 を歩む競争相手に張り合えるだけの速さで走ることができ ないのだ.

 第8章 振るわれるムチ 323