2022年10月28日金曜日

2022/10/27 ケルトンpodcast Buy now, pay forever? - Best New Ideas in Money - MarketWatch

Buy now, pay forever? - Best New Ideas in Money - MarketWatch
Buy now, pay forever?
Best New Ideas in Money

A type of installment payment plan has surged by ten-fold over the past two years. But a new report from a leading consumer watchdog is raising red flags about so-called "buy now, pay later" loans. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Apple Podcastでお聴きください: https://podcasts.apple.com/jp/podcast/best-new-ideas-in-money/id1587222768?i=1000584057757

https://www.marketwatch.com/podcasts/best-new-ideas-in-money/buy-now-pay-forever/4b137217-fea2-42a7-aa48-b700aa820976 

Buy now, pay forever?

A type of installment payment plan has surged by ten-fold over the past two years. But a new report from a leading consumer watchdog is raising red flags about so-called "buy now, pay later" loans.

A type of installment payment plan has surged by ten-fold over the past two years. But a new report from a leading consumer watchdog is raising red flags about so-called "buy now, pay later" loans. ★


完全なトランスクリプト

このトランスクリプトは、トランスクリプションサービスによって作成されました。このバージョンは最終的な形式ではない可能性があり、更新される可能性があります。

マーシャル・ラックス:それは火薬樽です。人々が責任ある信用を学ぶのを助けることを目的とした製品は、実際には、かなり危険な方法で人々の手に信用を委ねています。

ステファニー・ケルトン: MarketWatchのポッドキャスト、お金のベストニューアイデアへようこそ。私はステファニー・ケルトンです。私はストーニーブルック大学の経済学者兼経済学と公共政策の教授です。

チャールズ・パッシー:私はマーケットウォッチの記者チャールズ・パッシーです。

ステファニー・ケルトン:毎週、私たちは、私たちの生き方、働き方、支出、貯蓄、投資方法を再考する経済、金融、技術、政策の革新を探ります。

チャールズ・パッシー:ステファニー、最後にオンラインで買ったものは何でしたか?

ステファニー・ケルトン:最後にオンラインで買ったものああ、私はそれが何だったか知っています。それは40ポンドの鹿の餌の袋でした。

チャールズ・パッシー:私はそれと競争できません。私にとって、それは3枚のシャツでした。しかし、私が実際に知りたいのは、チェックアウト時にますます新しいオプションに気づいたかどうかです。全額を毎月の4回の支払いに分割する別の支払いオプションを希望するかどうかという問題。それは「今すぐ購入」と呼ばれ、後で支払います。

カールトン英語:今すぐ購入し、後払いの企業は基本的に、数十年前に存在していたレイアウェイプログラムで見た機能のいくつかを使用してクレジットカード購入から得られるインスタント満足感の間のスイートスポットです。

チャールズ・パッシー:それはカールトン・イングリッシュです。彼女はバロンの記者で、銀行とフィンテックをカバーしています。過去数年間で最大の新しい金融技術の1つは、BNPLとして知られる今すぐ購入し、後で支払うことです。用語自体はかなり自明ですが、実際には、このように機能します。

カールトン英語:新しいコンピュータを買いたいと言ってください。販売時にその支払いを行っている場合、オンラインであろうと店舗であろうと、通常は価格の約4分の1の頭金を下ろすことに同意し、通常約6週間から約3ヶ月の期間にわたって残りの3回ほどの支払いを行うことに同意します。

ステファニー・ケルトン:今すぐ購入し、支払いは後にオーストラリアとニュージーランドで人気になりました。しかし、それはそれ以来グローバルになり、さらに大きくなると予測されています。消費者金融保護局は、この資金調達オプションを提供する5つの主要なプロバイダーとして、Affirm、Afterpay、Klarna、PayPal、およびZipを特定しました。しかし、それはまだ成長しています。2025年までに、商品のオンライン販売の12%を占める予定で、680億ドルに達すると予測されています。その主要な引き分けの1つ...

カールトン英語:今すぐ購入し、後で支払うプログラムはしばしば0%の資金調達を提供し、それが買い物客に少し明快さを与えるので、彼らはとても人気が高まっている理由です。あなたはラップトップを買っていることを知っています、それは1,000ドルです。あなたはそれが4回の支払いになることを知っています。約2ヶ月かそこらで完済されることを知っていますが、クレジットカードではクレジットカードに5,000ドルの制限があるかもしれません。

ステファニー・ケルトン:多くの人々にとって、今購入の魅力の一部は、後で支払うことは、それがクレジットカードではないということです。BNPLを使用するための消費者の理論的根拠の研究では、ユーザーの39%がクレジットカードの利息を避けるために製品に目を向け、クレジットカードの使用を嫌い、クレジットカードの承認を得ることができず、クレジットカードが他の理由としてすべて最大になったことがわかりました。リストされている他の動機のいくつかは、今購入し、後で支払い、銀行口座を持っていない、信用調査なしで借りることができ、予算外で購入する消費者がリストの残りの部分を構成していることを示唆しています。

チャールズ・パッシー:だから、今買うことの人気は、後で支払うことは、クレジットカードを使いたくないだけではありません。その人気が集中する場合、若い消費者、従来のクレジットラインへのアクセスが少ない消費者、および信用格付けの悪い消費者の間で、この新しい金融商品が離陸するにつれて、これらの消費者に潜在的な害を及ぼします。

ステファニー・ケルトン:エピソードの後半で検討しますので、オンラインショッピングの増加から支払いの心理学まで、多くの要因がすべて技術の爆発に貢献しています。私が爆発と言うとき、私は爆発を意味します。昨年、5つの主要なBNPL貸し手は、224億ドルの1億8000万の融資を開始しました。2019年から21年にかけて、ローンの全体的な量とローンの規模の両方が200%以上増加しました。新しい技術を使用することは、一部の顧客にとってもエキサイティングかもしれません。しかし、今買うことになると、後で支払うと、それは本当に新しいとしか感じません。

マーシャル・ラックス:分割払いの概念は非常に長い間存在しています。人々がシアーズで冷蔵庫や洗濯機を買っていた頃から、彼らは分割払いで支払いました。

ステファニー・ケルトン:それはマーシャル・ラックスです。彼は長年の金融サービスコンサルタント兼エグゼクティブであり、春にBNPLに関する論文を発表したハーバードケネディスクールのフェローです。彼は、チェックアウト時の技術と現在の提供の遍在性は新しいですが、この種の資金調達はまったくないと言います。60年代、アメリカン・エキスプレスとアメリカン航空はサイン・アンド・フライと提携し、航空会社のフライトにPOS融資を提供しました。POSファイナンスとは、チェックアウト時にすべてを1回で支払う以外のオプションを意味します。レイアウェイのようなサービスは、大恐慌までさらにさかのぼります。アイテムをレイアウェイに置くと、頭金を支払い、店に戻って定期的な分割払いを行い、完済時に最終的に家に持ち帰ります。1980年代、上昇するクレジットカードは当初はレイアウェイを脅かしましたが、今日でも広く利用可能です。カールトン・イングリッシュが指摘しているように、今すぐ購入し、後で支払うことは明確な利点を提供します。

カールトン英語:あなたは実際にあなたと一緒に製品を家に持ち帰るか、それを注文し、すぐにあなたに出荷することができるインスタント満足感を得ます。一方、レイアウェイ製品では、古い方法は、2週間ごとに店に入り、コンピュータを見て、別の支払いを下に置き、去り、1週間か2週間後に戻ってきて、支払いを下ろすことでした。実際にすべての支払いを完了するまで、アイテムを所有することはありませんでした。

ステファニー・ケルトン:企業へのインセンティブもあります。彼らは利息を請求しておらず、延滞料は通常かなり低いので、今すぐ購入し、後払いの企業は、通常、約4%から10%弱のサービスを使用する小売業者に請求することでお金を稼ぎます。それはBNPLを使用している企業にとって悪いように思えるかもしれませんが、顧客を引き付けるため、より多くの売り上げをもたらしています。昨年、ある研究では、今すぐ購入し、後で支払うと、コンバージョン率が20%から30%増加することがわかりました。コンバージョン率とは、ブラウジングから実際に購入する人を意味します。

チャールズ・パッシー:現在、購入の使用が大幅に増加しており、過去数年間で支払いが遅れています。2019年から昨年まで、5つの主要なBNPLプロバイダーにとって、米国のローン数は970%増加しました。パンデミックによって拍車をかけられた電子商取引の増加は、その大きな部分を占めた。オンライン販売は2020年に約20%増加した。COVID-19が襲ったとき、BNPLは特に魅力的になった。

カールトン・イングリッシュ: たくさんの人がオンラインで買い物をしていました。政府からの経済刺激策、600ドルの小切手、延長された失業手当があったにもかかわらず、あなたはまだ多くの経済的不確実性に対処している人々がいました。したがって、不確実な時期に現金を保持するために、より長い期間にわたって支払いを分散できるという快適さが重要だったと思います。

チャールズ・パッシー:しかし、職場ではパンデミックを超えた力があります。私たちがどのように、なぜ私たちがどのように支払うのかの背後にある心理学は、なぜ今購入し、後で支払うなどのオプションが非常に魅力的であるのかに大きな役割を果たしています。

Merle van den Akker: 人々は、これらの異なる種類の支払い方法で過ごすとき、かなり異なる振る舞いをするようです。さて、問題はそれがなぜなのかということです。

ステファニー・ケルトン:それはメルル・ヴァン・デン・アクカーです。彼女は、人々がさまざまな支払い方法を通じてお金を管理する方法を研究した行動科学者です。

チャールズ・パッシー:彼女はBNPLが増加している理由を理解するために、支払いの痛みと呼ばれる理論を詳しく見るのに役立つと言います。

ステファニー・ケルトン:私はその音が好きだとは言えません。

チャールズ・パッシー:私もです。しかし、ここに行きます。この用語は1996年にまでさかのぼり、哲学論文が同じタイトルのオフェラー・ゼラーマイヤーから来ています。彼の研究は、購入時に人々が抱えていた否定的な感情を調べた。Zellermayerが見つけたのは、購入が難しいほど、取引をやりたがる人が少なくなるということでした。好ましい支払い方法に関しては、明確な勝者がいました。

Merle van den Akker: だから、明らかに現金で支払うのはそれほど簡単ではありません。チェックアウト時に正しい宗派を取得するプロセス全体を経る必要があります。それから、あなたはコインをかきろい調べます。クレジットカードでこれを行うと、ワンタップまたはスワイプで、それがトランザクションです。それです。

チャールズ・パッシー:言い換えれば、カードで支払うことは痛みを取り除きました。

Merle van den Akker:取引全体は本質的に痛みがなく、それはリソースが限られているためです。カードを用意するだけです。あなたは本当にあなたが失っている価値にあまりさらされることはありません。同時に、これはクレジットカードにとって大きなもので、購入しているもののコストは、その瞬間に実際に発生していません。したがって、リソースの損失は、実際にクレジットカードの明細書を返済するたびに発生します。

ステファニー・ケルトン:ヴァン・デン・アクカーは、多くの支払い方法が消費者にとってそれをより簡単にするように設計されていると言いますが、彼らは本当に痛みを延期し、それをさらに鋭くしています。

Merle van den Akker:タップすると、購入したばかりのものは何でも出て行き、実店舗にいると仮定して、それだけです。脳が登録する時間がほとんどないほどの迅速なプロセスなので、リソースを失ったばかりです。この良いアイデアやサービスを得たばかりで、この良いサービスやサービスのために支払わなければならなかったという考えを解くことができれば、それは速くて簡単なので、より多くの人々が費やす可能性が高くなります。その結果、それはまた非常に忘れがちなので、特定のリソースが残っていると考える人もいます。例えば、彼らは銀行口座にさらに1,000ドルあると思っていました。しかし、彼らはさらにいくつかの取引をしましたが、それは非常に簡単で、非常に迅速で、その結果、非常に忘れが容易になったため、実際には銀行口座に800ドルしか残っていませんでしたが、彼らはまだ1,000ドルを持っているかのように行動しています。したがって、多くの人々がより頻繁に費やし、より多くを費やし、その結果、頭の中で実行する銀行残高ではなく、実際の銀行残高にまだ持っているものを十分に更新していないため、借金になる可能性があります。

ステファニー・ケルトン:今すぐ購入し、後の製品を支払うこととクレジットカードの区別にもかかわらず、ヴァン・デン・アクカーは、行動的な経済の観点から、BNPLはそれほど違いはないと言います。

メルル・ヴァン・デン・アクカー:心理的には、これは痛みを伴う方法ではありません。なぜなら、私たちがやっていることは、あなたにすべての報酬、すべての喜びを前もって与えているからです。のように、あなたはすぐに商品やサービスを購入することができます。あなたはそのすべての楽しみを持つことができ、実際にそれを支払う方法とお金がどこから来るかを理解しなければならないという痛みはありません。そしてもちろん、資源の即時損失も。だから、私たちはそれらを完全に切り離しています。

チャールズ・パッシー:それが今購入して、後で支払うことでどのように起こるかを見るのはさらに簡単です。あなたが最初の支払いをするとき、あなたはそれが何のためにいるのか知っています。では、2週間後に別の支払いリマインダーが入ってくるとしましょう。あなたは少し混乱しているかもしれませんが、それから「ああ、私はそれを借りています」と思います。次の支払いをする頃には...

マール・ヴァン・デン・アクカー:あなたは「これが何のためにあるのかわからない」という感じです。現在負担しているコストと、購入から最初に持っていた喜びとの間には関連性はありません。これは完全に切り離されています。元の購入はそれほど顕著ではなかったので、支払いの痛みがなかったので、このお金が関連付けられているものを実際に取り出すことは非常に困難です。これは、購入したものや購入したサービスが衝動買いだった場合に特に当てはまります。あなたは「はい、欲しい」ではなく、「私はこれについて長い間考えてきました」という感じでした。いいえ、ただ「今すぐ欲しい」だけです。その結果、製品に費用がかかると、返済しているものの実際の関連付けなしに、すべての痛みが経験されます。心理的には、それは非常に問題です。

チャールズ・パッシー:心理的に問題があるだけではないかもしれません。今後の予定、消費者金融保護局は、今購入、後で支払うことについて何を言わなければなりませんか?それは休憩の後です。

ステファニー・ケルトン:お金で最高の新しいアイデアへようこそ。休憩の前に、私たちは今購入の起源、後で支払うこと、それがどのように機能するか、そしてなぜ心理的に、それが消費者として私たちにアピールするのかについて学びました。しかし、ほぼすべての技術革新には、新しいサービスや製品が利益よりも害を及ぼすという潜在的な脅威も伴います。今すぐ購入する場合は、後で支払います。消費者金融保護局またはCFPBが最近探求しているものです。

スピーカー6:今すぐ購入し、今日ヒットした後株を支払う。消費者金融保護局は、これらの名前のいくつかについて調査を開始します。CFPBディレクターのチョプラは、今すぐ購入し、後で支払うことは古いレイアウェイプランの新しいバージョンですが、消費者がすぐに製品を得るが、すぐに借金を得る現代的で速いひねりを加えています。

チャールズ・パッシー:昨年末、CFPBは現在5つの主要な購入に市場監視命令を発行し、後の貸し手に支払い、AFfirm、Afterpay、Klarna、PayPal、およびZipに情報を提出するよう命じ、CFPBは業界の慣行と消費者にリスクを評価できるようにしました。今年9月、CFPBは収集したデータに基づいてレポートを発表した。誰がBNPLを使用しているか、何のために使用しているか、借り手がローンを返済する際にどのように達成したかなどの重要な指標を分解します。

ローレン・サンダース:CFPBレポートのハイライトは、これが急速に成長している市場であるということです。それは飛躍的に拡大しています。

チャールズ・パッシー:ローレン・サンダースです。彼女は、低所得消費者のための市場正義に焦点を当てた非営利団体である国立消費者法センターのアソシエイトディレクターです。その急速な拡大の背後にある人については、CFPBの報告書によると、すべての借り手の約半分は33歳以下で、18歳から24歳は昨年の借り手の約17%を占め、25歳から33歳は約33%を占めています。バロンの記者カールトン・イングリッシュです。

カールトン英語:今すぐ購入し、後で支払うことは、ミレニアル世代とZ世代の消費者にかなり人気があります。それにはいくつかの理由があります。1つは、おそらくキャリアの開始時に、物を買う必要があるかもしれない人々です。彼らは新しいアパートに引っ越し、新しい仕事を始めているので、キャリアを始めたばかりで、可処分所得があまりない時期に物を買っています。それはそのようなことのためのオプションを提供します。それがそのコホートに人気がある理由を説明しています。また、人気についていくつかの懸念がある理由も説明しています。

マーシャル・ラックス:私が最初にしたことは、子供たちに電話して「あなたがこれを使わないことを願っています」と言ったようなものでしたが、彼らはそうではありません。でも、知ってる?これを使っている子供たちはたくさんいます。

ステファニー・ケルトン:今年初めにBNPLに関するワーキングペーパーを書いたハーバード大学のフェロー、マーシャル・ラックスです。彼は、これらの顧客の相対的な若さは、特にほぼ記録的なインフレの中で、警戒すべきものだと言います。

マーシャル・ラックス:人々は物を買うのが難しいと感じています。それは火薬樽です。人々が責任ある信用を学ぶのを助けることを目的とした製品は、実際には、かなり危険な方法で人々の手に信用を置いています。

ステファニー・ケルトン:私たちは、BNPL技術が十分な審査なしに消費者の手に信用を委ねているかどうかについてコメントするために、Afterpay、Klarna、PayPal、およびZipを代表するグループである金融技術協会に連絡しました。FTAの代表者は、「今すぐ購入し、後で支払うことで、消費者は財政をより良く管理し、高額な手数料や利息を負うことなく少額の短期購入をすることができます」と述べた。彼らは、クレジットカードとは異なり、BNPLは当初「通常250ドル未満の1つの取引に基づいてクレジットを延長し、将来の購入を承認する前に返済状況を評価する」と指摘した。これらの機能により、多くの借金を積み上げることがより困難になります。

チャールズ・パッシー:しかし、ラックスのような批評家は、人々がどのカテゴリーで費やしているかについて、CFPBレポートの別の部分を指摘しています。アパレルと美容は長い間、消費者の大多数のカテゴリーであり、2019年の購入のほぼ3分の2を占めています。しかし、新しいデータによると、CFPBが毎日呼んでいること、時間の経過とともに心配なカテゴリーが急増しています。ローレン・サンダースです。

ローレン・サンダース:それが成長している最も憂慮すべき場所の1つは、ガスや食料品、必需品、毎週、そして確かに毎月買わなければならないもののための日常の使用です。だから、今週は食料品を買う余裕がなく、来週は費用の一部を延期しますが、来週はもっと食料品を買わなければならない場合、それは問題です。それは、潜在的に手頃な価格で使用されていることを示しています。

ステファニー・ケルトン:マーシャル・ラックスは同意します。

マーシャル・ラックス:元リスクマネージャーとして、人々が食料品を買うためにストレッチを始めるとき、それは大きな問題です。

ステファニー・ケルトン:このレポートでは、BNPLプロバイダーが信用力をどのように評価するかも調査しました。彼らはソフトプルと呼ばれるものを使用します。これは、ローンまたはより多くのクレジット、ローン、支払い履歴、公的記録またはコレクションを申請するときに出てくるのと同じタイプの情報を表示しますが、ハードプルのようにクレジットを損なうことはありません。ソフトプルは通常、自分の信用報告書を確認したとき、または事前審査を受けている場合に発生します。BNPLに関しては、昨年の信用承認率は73%でした。しかし、借り手の中には苦労している人もいます。報告書によると、昨年10%以上が少なくとも1回の延滞料が請求され、会社によって条件や金額が異なる可能性があります。信用力に関する決定がどのように行われているかに関しては、それはまだ少しパズルです。

Marshall Lux:CFPBは報告書で、アルゴリズムを尋ねず、テストしていないと述べました。つまり、どのモデルを使用しているのか理解できず、どのデータを使用しているのか理解していません。

ステファニー・ケルトン:それをクレジットカードや他の金融商品と比較すると、それは大きな違いです。

マーシャル・ラックス:これは金融サービスの規制されていない部分です。したがって、金融サービス会社はモデルを見てもらいます。なぜなら、他の規制当局が尋ねるからです。これらはそのようにテストされていません。

チャールズ・パッシー:それはおそらくレポートからの大きな教訓です。そのような規制が来ています。今、今購入することに関しては規制がないとは言いません、後日会社に支払います。金融技術協会は、すべてのBNPL製品は、マネーロンダリング防止、公正融資、信用報告、債権回収、プライバシー、処理、電子資金移転など、消費者保護法および規制に従っていると指摘しています。しかし、今向かっている変化は、より多くの規制です。CFPBは、レポートで見つかったものに基づいて、クレジットカード会社が従うものと同様の、今すぐ購入のための特定のルールを発行し、後で支払うプロセスを開始すると述べました。代理店はまた、データに関するガイダンスを発行し、信用報告慣行を開発します。国立消費者法センターのローレン・サンダースにとって、規制は大歓迎です。

ローレン・サンダース: 規制が必要です。誰もが製品が安全であることを知り、自分の権利が何であるかを知っているように、すべての人に適用される明確なルールが必要です。本当に、今すぐ購入し、後で支払うことはクレジットカードの一種です。商品やサービスを購入するために使用するクレジットの形式です。クレジットカードの法的保護は、まさに私たちが今購入するために必要なものです、後で支払います。借り手がローンを返済する余裕があることを確認するために貸し手が必要です。支払ったものが手に入らない場合は、チャージバック保護が必要です。延滞料がある場合は、合理的である必要があります。すべての購入品を1か所で収集する明細書が必要です。したがって、クレジットカードのルールを適用して今すぐ購入し、後で支払うことは非常にうまくいくと考えており、自発的なポリシーや、異なる購入とは異なることを伝え、後でプロバイダーに支払う細かい印刷のミッシュマッシュを当てにすることはできません。

ステファニー・ケルトン:BNPL企業の一部も規制に賛成しているようです。報告書の発表後、ある会社は「レビュー後のCFPBの結論に励まされた」という声明を発表した。金融技術協会の代表は、この報告書は今すぐ購入を確認し、後で支払うことは他の信用商品に代わる競争力のある代替手段であり、「CFPBのような規制当局と協力して消費者の肯定的な成果を促進する」と述べた。マーシャル・ラックスです。

マーシャル・ラックス:良いニュースは、これらの人々の多くは、規制が来ていて、より良い自己規制であるというジョークを得たということです。だから、彼らが行う必要がある変更は、うまくいけば彼らの多くにとって驚きではないでしょう。

ステファニー・ケルトン:ラックスは、潜在的な変化のスピードを心配していると言います。言い換えれば、私たちはウサギよりもカメを見ているかもしれません。

マーシャル・ラックス:政府はゆっくりと動き、テクノロジーは急速に動きます。私の懸念の1つは、彼らがこのレポートを行ったことです。コメント期間があると思います。では、選挙を行います。選挙には結果が生じる。これは、他の多くのESGと比較して、暗号に関連して非常に心の底にある問題ではありません。だから、それは少し後部座席を持っていると思います。

ステファニー・ケルトン:しかし、ローレン・サンダースは、最初のステップとして、クレジットカードのルールの適用は比較的迅速に発生する可能性があると述べています。

ローレン・サンダース:クレジットカードのルールを適用して今すぐ購入し、後で製品を支払うために、消費者金融保護局は、これらがクレジットカードの一形態であることを明確にするガイダンスを発行する必要があります。今、それはそれほど長くはかからないでしょう、潜在的に来年以内に。今すぐ購入するために監督を適用し、後で支払うには、いくつかのプロセス、いくつかのルール作成が必要ですが、それもそれほど時間はかかりません。

チャールズ・パッシー:私たちはその規制が来るのを待っている間、あなたが何かを支払うための最良の方法について疑問に思っているなら、メルル・ヴァン・デン・アクカーはこのアドバイスを持っています。支払いの痛みを覚えておいてください。

マール・ヴァン・デン・アクカー:その理由はわかります。人々は便利さを望んでいる。人々は安らぎを望んでいる。会社が、この場合、フィンテックやネオバンクが、使用するのが非常に難しい支払い方法を置く場合、最善の意図を持っている可能性があり、心理的または行動的、科学的な観点から多くの意味があると思います。では、より簡単な支払い方法を持つことは必ずしも前向きなことだと思いますか?いいえ。私たちもそれから逸脱すると思いますか?いいえ。だから、これは残念ながら私たちが立ち往生している開発だと思いますが、それは私たちがそれに対処できないという意味ではありません。

チャールズ・パッシー:今物を買うのは簡単です。そうでなければならないという意味ではありません。ヴァン・デン・アクカーは、休暇とマークされた封筒にお金を片付けるような古き良き方法はまだ機能していると言います。あなたが本当にそれを極端にしたいのなら、購入のたびにクレジットカードを返済するのを止めるものは何もありません。

Merle van den Akker:だから、クレジットカードをすぐに返済しなければならないという習慣に身を身につけることができれば、実際に利用可能なリソースを持っている必要があります。これはまた、もはやワンクリックだけではないため、購入体験全体が少し面倒になったことを意味します。ワンクリックで、携帯電話をつかむ必要があり、クレジットカードまたはオンラインバンキングアプリにログインし、お金を移動する必要があります。その後、あなたは実際にあなたの財政状況をすぐに見ており、あなたはそれに何度も直面しています。これは楽しいですか?いいえ。しかし、それがポイントです。

ステファニー・ケルトン:お金で最高の新しいアイデアを聞いてくれてありがとう。ポッドキャストを聴くところならどこでも番組を購読できます。あなたが聞いたことが気に入ったら、私たちに評価やレビューを残してください。今後のエピソードのアイデアがある場合は、bestnewideasinmoney@MarketWatch.comまでご連絡ください。カールトン・イングリッシュ、マーシャル・ラックス、マール・ヴァン・デン・アクカー、ローレン・サンダースに感謝します。今すぐ購入の詳細については、後で支払う場合は、MarketWatch.comにアクセスしてください。私はステファニー・ケルトンです。

チャールズ・パッシー:私はチャールズ・パッシーです。お金のベスト・ニュー・アイデアは、MarketWatchのポッドキャストです。プロデューサーはマイケル・マクダウェル、マティ・ルクショフ、ケイティ・ファーガソンです。このエピソードはメーガン・オターマットによってミックスされた。メリッサ・ハガティはエグゼクティブプロデューサーです。ジェレミー・バンクスは私たちのニュース編集者であり、マーク・デカンベリーはこのエピソードを編集しました。お金のテーマで最高の新しいアイデアは、サム・レッツァーによって作曲されました。ステファニー・ケルトンはストーニーブルック大学の経済学者であり、経済学と公共政策の教授であり、MarketWatchニュースルームの一部ではありません。来週、別の新しいアイデアを持って戻ってきます。


Full Transcript

This transcript was prepared by a transcription service. This version may not be in its final form and may be updated.

Marshall Lux: It's a powder keg. A product which was intended to help people learn responsible credit, has, in fact, put credit in the hands of people in a pretty dangerous way.

Stephanie Kelton: Welcome to the Best New Ideas in Money, a podcast for MarketWatch. I'm Stephanie Kelton. I'm an economist and a professor of economics and public policy at Stony Brook University.

Charles Passy: And I'm Charles Passy, a reporter at MarketWatch.

Stephanie Kelton: Each week, we explore innovations in economics, finance, technology, and policy that rethink the way we live, work, spend, save, and invest.

Charles Passy: Stephanie, what was the last thing you bought online?

Stephanie Kelton: The last thing I bought online? Oh, I know what it was. It was a 40-pound bag of deer food.

Charles Passy: I can't compete with that. For me, it was three shirts. But what I actually want to know is if you've noticed more and more a new option when you're checking out. The question of whether you'd like a different payment option, one that divides the full amount into just four monthly payments or so. It's called buy now, pay later,

Carleton English: Buy now, pay later companies are basically the sweet spot between the instant gratification that you would get from making a credit card purchase with some of the features that we saw in layaway programs that existed decades ago.

Charles Passy: That's Carlton English. She's a reporter for Barron's and covers banks and fintechs. One of the biggest new financial technologies over the past few years is buy now, pay later, known as BNPL. The term itself is pretty self-explanatory, but in practical terms, it works something like this.

Carleton English: Say you want to buy a new computer. When you're at the point of sale making that payment, whether it's online or perhaps even in-store, you make an agreement to put one down payment down, usually about a quarter of the price, with an agreement to make the other three or so remaining payments over a period that's typically about six weeks to maybe about three months.

Stephanie Kelton: Buy now, pay later initially became popular in Australia and New Zealand. But it's since gone global, and it's projected to get even bigger. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has identified Affirm, Afterpay, Klarna, PayPal, and Zip as the five major providers offering this financing option. But it's still growing. By 2025, it's projected to account for $680 billion or 12% of online sales of goods. One of its major draws ...

Carleton English: Buy Now, pay later programs often offer 0% financing, and that's why they've become so popular, because it gives shoppers a bit of clarity. You know you're buying a laptop, say it's for $1,000. You know it's going to be four payments. You know it's going to be paid off in about two months or so, whereas with a credit card, maybe you have a $5,000 limit on your credit card.

Stephanie Kelton: For many people, part of the appeal of buy now, pay later is that it's not a credit card. A study of consumer rationale for using BNPL found that 39% of users turned to the product in order to avoid credit card interest, dislike using credit cards, can't get approved for credit cards, and credit cards maxed out all featured as other reasons. Some of the other motives listed hinted at the consumers who might find themselves drawn to buy now, pay later, not having a bank account, being able to borrow without a credit check, and making purchases outside of their budget made up the rest of the list.

Charles Passy: So the popularity of buy now, pay later goes well beyond just not wanting to use a credit card. Where that popularity concentrates, among younger consumers, those with less access to traditional lines of credit, and those with worse credit ratings, represents a potential harm to these consumers as this new financial product takes off.

Stephanie Kelton: As we'll explore later in the episode, a number of factors from the increase in online shopping to the psychology of payments have all contributed to the explosion of the technology. When I say explosion, I mean explosion. Last year, the five major BNPL lenders originated 180 million loans to the tune of $24.2 billion. From 2019 to '21, both the quantity of loans overall and the size of the loans have increased by over 200%. Using a new technology might also be exciting for some customers. But when it comes to buy now, pay later, it really only feels new.

Marshall Lux: The concept of installment payments has been around for a very long time. From the days that people were buying refrigerators or washing machines at Sears, they would pay in installments.

Stephanie Kelton: That's Marshall Lux. He's a longtime financial services consultant and executive, and a fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School who published a paper on BNPL in the spring. He says that although the technology and current ubiquity of offerings at checkout is new, this type of financing is anything but. Back in the '60s, American Express and American Airlines partnered on Sign and Fly, which offered point-of-sale financing for airline flights. Point-of-sale financing means options other than paying all in one go at checkout. Services like layaway go back even further, all the way to the Great Depression. When you put an item on layaway, you make a down payment and return to the store to make periodic installments before finally taking it home when it's paid off. During the 1980s, the rising credit cards initially threatened layaway, but it's still widely available today. As Carleton English points out, buy now, pay later offers a distinct advantage.

Carleton English: You get the instant gratification where you actually can take the product home with you or order it and have it shipped to you right away. Whereas with the layaway product, the old way was you were going into the store every two weeks and looking at the computer and putting down another payment on it, leaving, coming back in a week or two, putting down the payment. You weren't getting to possess the item until you actually completed all of your payments.

Stephanie Kelton: There's also an incentive for businesses. Since they aren't charging interest and the late fees are typically fairly low, buy now, pay later companies make money by charging retailers for using their service, typically about 4% to just under 10%. That may seem like it would be bad for the businesses using BNPL, but because it attracts customers, it's bringing in more sales. Last year, a study found that buy now, pay later increases conversion rates by 20% to 30%. By conversion rate, we mean people who go from browsing to actually buying.

Charles Passy: There's been a major increase in the use of buy now, pay later over the past few years. From 2019 to last year, for the five major BNPL providers, the number of loans in the US increased by 970%. The rise in e-commerce spurred on by the pandemic was a big part of that. Online sales were up about 20% in 2020. BNPL became especially attractive when COVID-19 hit.

Carleton English: You had a lot of people shopping online. Even though we had economic stimulus from the government, the $600 checks, the extended unemployment benefits, you still had people dealing with a lot of economic uncertainty. So the comfort of being able to spread out payments over a longer period of time just to hold onto cash in a time of uncertainty, I think, was important.

Charles Passy: But there are forces beyond the pandemic at work. The psychology behind how and why we pay the way we do plays a big role in why options like buy now, pay later are so attractive.

Merle van den Akker: People seem to behave quite differently when spending with those different types of payment methods. Now the question is why is that?

Stephanie Kelton: That's Merle van den Akker. She's a behavioral scientist who studied how people manage their money through different payment methods.

Charles Passy: She says to understand why BNPL is on the rise, it can be helpful to look closer at a theory called the pain of paying.

Stephanie Kelton: I can't say I like the sound of that.

Charles Passy: Me either. But here it goes. The term goes all the way back to 1996 and comes from Ofer Zellermayer, whose philosophy dissertation had the same title. His research looked at the negative feelings people had during a purchase. What Zellermayer found was that the more difficult the purchase, the less a person wanted to go through with the transaction. When it came to preferred payment methods, there was a clear winner.

Merle van den Akker: So obviously paying with cash is not that easy. You have to go through the entire process of getting the right denomination out whilst you're at the checkout. Then you rummage through your coins. Now if you do this with a credit card, it's one tap or one swipe and that's the transaction done. That is it.

Charles Passy: In other words, paying with a card took away the pain.

Merle van den Akker: The entire transaction is essentially painless, and that is because there's no limited amount of resources. You just need to have the card available. You don't really get a lot of exposure to the value that you are losing. At the same time, and this is a big one for credit card, is the cost of whatever you are purchasing isn't actually incurred at that very moment. So the loss of resources happens whenever you're actually repaying the credit card statement.

Stephanie Kelton: Van den Akker says that a lot of payment methods have been designed to make it easier for consumers, but they're really just deferring the pain and making it even more acute down the line.

Merle van den Akker: You tap, you walk out with whatever you've just purchased, assuming that you are in a physical store, and that is it. It is such a quick process that the brain barely has any time to register that you've just lost resources. The further you can disentangle this idea of I've just obtained a good or service versus I have had to pay for this good or service, the more people are likely to spend, because it is quick and it is easy. As a result, it's also very forgettable, which makes that some people think they have certain resources left. For example, they thought they had another $1,000 in their bank account. However, because they've had a couple more transactions, which were very easy, very quick, and, as a result, very forgettable, they've actually only had $800 left in their bank account, but they're still acting as if they had $1,000. So what we see that a lot of people, they spend more frequently, they spend more, and, as a result, very often can also just get into debt because they don't sufficiently update what they still have in their actual bank balance rather than the bank balance that they run in their head, which these two things tend to be very different quite often

Stephanie Kelton: Despite the distinction between buy now, pay later products and credit cards, van den Akker says that from a behavioral economic standpoint, BNPL isn't that different.

Merle van den Akker: Psychologically, this is not a painful method to use, because what we're doing is we're giving you all the rewards, all the pleasure upfront. As in you can buy the good or service immediately. You can have all that enjoyment and none of the pain of actually having to figure out how to pay for it and where the money is going to come from. Then, of course, also the immediate loss of resources. So we're disentangling those completely.

Charles Passy: It's even easier to see how that can happen with buy now, pay later. When you make your first payment, you know what it's for. Then let's say two weeks later, another payment reminder comes in. You might be a little confused for a second, then think, "Oh yeah, I do owe that." By the time you make the next payment ...

Merle van den Akker: You're like, "I have no idea what this is for." You have no association between the costs that you're now incurring versus the pleasure that you originally had from the purchase. This is completely decoupled. Because the original purchase wasn't super salient, because there was no pain of paying, it is very difficult for memory to actually retrieve what this money is associated with. This is especially true if the thing that you bought or the service that you purchased was an impulse buy. You were like, "Yes, I want it," not, "I need it," not like, "I've been thinking about this a long time." No, just, "I want it now." As a result, down the line, when you're incurring your cost for the product, all the pain is experienced then without the actual association of what you're repaying. Psychologically, that's very problematic.

Charles Passy: It might not just be psychologically problematic. Coming up, what does the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau have to say about buy now, pay later? That's after the break.

Stephanie Kelton: Welcome back to the Best New Ideas in Money. Before the break, we learned about the origins of buy now, pay later, how it works, and why, psychologically, it appeals to us as consumers. But just about every technological innovation also comes with a potential threat that the new service or product will cause more harm than good. When it comes to buy now, pay later, that's something the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau or CFPB has recently been exploring.

Speaker 6: The buy now, pay later stocks taking a hit today. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau opening an inquiry into some of these names. CFPB Director Chopra saying buy now, pay later is a new version of the old layaway plan, but with modern, faster twists where the consumer gets a product immediately, but gets the debt immediately, too.

Charles Passy: At the end of last year, the CFPB issued market monitoring orders to the five major buy now, pay later lenders, ordering Affirm, Afterpay, Klarna, PayPal, and Zip to submit information so the CFPB could assess industry practices and risks to consumers. This September, the CFPB released a report based on that data it collected. It breaks down important metrics like who is using BNPL, what they're using it for, and how borrowers fared when repaying their loans.

Lauren Saunders: The highlights of the CFPB report is that this is a rapidly growing market. It is expanding in leaps and bounds.

Charles Passy: That's Lauren Saunders. She's the associate director of the National Consumer Law Center, a nonprofit focusing on marketplace justice for low-income consumers. As for who is behind that rapid expansion, the CFPB report found that roughly half of all borrowers were 33 and under, with 18 to 24-year-olds accounting for about 17% of borrowers last year and 25 to 33-year-olds accounting for about 33%. Here's Barron's reporter Carleton English again.

Carleton English: Buy now, pay later is pretty popular with millennial and Gen Z consumers. A few reasons for that. One, people who are maybe at the start of their careers who they may need to buy things. They're moving into new apartments, they're starting new jobs, so they're buying things at a time when they're just starting out in their careers and maybe don't have a lot of disposable income. It provides an option for things like that. That explains why it's popular for that cohort. It also explains why there's some fears about the popularity.

Marshall Lux: The first thing I did was like call my kids and said, "I hope you're not using this thing," and they're not. But you know what? There are plenty of kids who are using this thing.

Stephanie Kelton: That's Marshall Lux, the Harvard fellow who wrote a working paper on BNPLs earlier this year. He says the relative youth of these customers is something to be wary of, especially amid near-record inflation.

Marshall Lux: People are finding it difficult to buy things. It's a powder keg. A product which was intended to help people learn responsible credit has, in fact, put credit in the hands of people in a pretty dangerous way.

Stephanie Kelton: We reached out to the Financial Technology Association, a group that represents Afterpay, Klarna, PayPal, and Zip for comment on whether BNPL technologies were putting credit into the hands of consumers without sufficient vetting. A representative for the FTA said, "Buy now, pay later empowers consumers to manage their finances better and make small dollar short-term purchases without incurring high fees or interest." They pointed out that unlike credit cards, BNPL initially "extends credit based on a single transaction, typically less than $250, and assesses the status of repayments before approving future purchases. These features make it more difficult to rack up a lot of debt."

Charles Passy: But critics like Lux point to another piece of the CFPB report as concerning, what categories people are spending in. Apparel and beauty has long been the category with the majority of consumers, accounting for almost two-thirds of purchases in 2019. But according to the new data, a worrying category has surged over time, what the CFPB calls every day. Here's Lauren Saunders.

Lauren Saunders: One of the most alarming places where it's growing is everyday use, for gas and groceries and necessities and things that you have to buy every week and certainly every month. So if you can't afford to buy your groceries this week and you put off part of the expense the next week, but then you've got to buy more groceries next week, that's a problem. That's an indication of it being used in a potentially unaffordable way.

Stephanie Kelton: Marshall Lux agrees.

Marshall Lux: As a former risk manager, when people start stretching to buy groceries, it is a huge problem.

Stephanie Kelton: The report also looked into how BNPL providers assess credit worthiness. They use what's called a soft pull, which shows the same type of information that comes up when you apply for a loan or more credit, your loans, payment history, any public records or collections, but it doesn't ding your credit like the hard pull does. Soft pulls typically happen when you check your own credit report, or if you're being pre-screened. When it comes to BNPL, the credit approval rate was 73% last year. But some of the borrowers are struggling. The report found that over 10% were charged at least one late fee last year, which can vary in terms and amounts from company-to-company. When it comes to how decisions on credit worthiness are being made, it's still a bit of a puzzle.

Marshall Lux: The CFPB, in its report, said they did not ask and do not test their algorithms, which means that we don't understand what models they used and we don't understand what data they're using.

Stephanie Kelton: If you compare that to credit cards or other financial products, that's a big difference.

Marshall Lux: This is an unregulated part of financial services. So financial service companies would have their models looked at, because then other regulators will ask. These are not being tested in that way.

Charles Passy: That's perhaps the big takeaway from the report. That kind of regulation is coming. Now it's not to say there are no regulations when it comes to buy now, pay later companies. The Financial Technology Association points out that all BNPL products follow consumer protection laws and regulations, including anti-money laundering, fair lending, credit reporting, debt collection, privacy, treatment, and electronic fund transfers. But the change that is on the way is more regulation. The CFPB said it will begin the process of issuing specific rules for buy now, pay later, similar to the ones that credit card companies follow, based on what it found in its report. The agency will also issue guidance on data and developing credit reporting practices. For Lauren Saunders of the National Consumer Law Center, regulation would be welcome.

Lauren Saunders: We need regulation. We need clear rules that apply to everybody, so everybody knows that the products are safe and they know what their rights are. Really, buy now, pay later is just a form of credit card. It's a form of credit that you use to buy goods and services. The legal protections we have for credit cards are really exactly what we need for buy now, pay later. We need lenders to ensure that the borrower can afford to repay the loan. We need chargeback protections if you don't get what you paid for. If there are any late fees, they should be reasonable. You need statements that collect all of your purchases in one place. So we think that it would work quite well to apply credit card rules to buy now, pay later, and we cannot count on voluntary policies and a mishmash of fine print that tells you different things from different buy now, pay later providers.

Stephanie Kelton: Some of the BNPL companies also seem to be in favor of regulation. After the release of the report, a firm issued a statement saying it was "encouraged by the CFPB's conclusions following their review". A representative for the Financial Technology Association said the report confirmed buy now, pay later is a competitive alternative to other credit products and that it would "continue working with regulators like the CFPB to advance positive consumer outcomes". Here's Marshall Lux again.

Marshall Lux: The good news is that a lot of these folks, one, got the joke, which is that regulation is coming and they better self-regulate. And so, the changes that they'll need to make are not going to be a surprise for hopefully many of them.

Stephanie Kelton: Lux says he worries about the speed of any potential changes, or, in other words, we may be looking at more of a tortoise than a hare.

Marshall Lux: Government moves slowly and technology moves quickly. One of my concerns is they did this report, there'll be, I suspect, a comment period. Then we're going to have an election. Elections have consequences. This is not an issue that is so top of mind relative to crypto, relative to a lot of other things, ESG. So I think it's got a little bit of a backseat.

Stephanie Kelton: But Lauren Saunders says, as a first step, applying the credit card rules could happen relatively quickly.

Lauren Saunders: In order to apply the credit card rules to buy now, pay later products, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau needs to issue guidance clarifying that these are a form of credit card. Now that wouldn't take that long to do, potentially within the next year. Applying supervision to buy now, pay later requires some process, some rulemaking, but that also wouldn't take that long.

Charles Passy: While we wait for that regulation to come, if you find yourself wondering about the best way to pay for something, Merle van den Akker has this advice. Remember the pain of paying.

Merle van den Akker: I understand why. People want convenience. People want ease. I think if a company, most likely in this case, a fintech or neobank, if you will, were to put in a payment method which is just incredibly difficult to use, although they may have the best intentions, and it makes a lot of sense from psychological or a behavioral, scientific perspective. So do I think it's necessarily a positive thing to have easier payment methods? No. Do I think we're going to deviate from that also? No. So I think this is a development that we're just, unfortunately, stuck with, but that doesn't mean that we can't deal with it.

Charles Passy: Buying things now is easy. That doesn't mean it has to be. Van den Akker says good old-fashioned methods like putting away money in an envelope marked vacation still work. If you really wanted to take it to an extreme, there's nothing stopping you from paying off your credit card after every purchase.

Merle van den Akker: So you actually have to have the resources available if you can get yourself into the habit of immediately having to repay the credit card. This also means that the entire purchasing experience has become a bit of a hassle, because it's no longer just one click. It's one click there and then you have to grab your phone, and then you now have to log in to your credit card or your online banking app, and you have to move money around. Then you're actually looking immediately at your financial circumstance, and you're confronted with it again and again. Is this pleasant? No. But that's the point.

Stephanie Kelton: Thanks for listening to the Best New Ideas in Money. You can subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts. If you like what you heard, please leave us a rating or review. If you have ideas for future episodes, drop us a line at bestnewideasinmoney@MarketWatch.com. Thanks to Carleton English, Marshall Lux, Merle van den Akker, and Lauren Saunders. To learn more about buy now, pay later, head to MarketWatch.com. I'm Stephanie Kelton.

Charles Passy: And I'm Charles Passy. The Best New Ideas in Money is a podcast from MarketWatch. The producers are Michael McDowell, Matty Lukshoff, Katy Ferguson. This episode was mixed by Meghan Oftermat. Melissa Haggerty is the executive producer. Jeremy Banks is our news editor, and Mark Decanbury edited this episode. The Best New Ideas in Money theme was composed by Sam Retzer. Stephanie Kelton is an economist and a professor of economics and public policy at Stony Brook University, and not part of the MarketWatch newsroom. We'll be back next week with another new idea.

2022年10月25日火曜日

建部正義「MMT(現代貨幣理論)批判再説」(『商学論纂』第64巻第1・2号。2022年9月)

中央大学学術リポジトリ-トップページ
建部正義「MMT(現代貨幣理論)批判再説」(『商学論纂』第64巻第1・2号。2022年9月)
chuo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=reposi…
https://chuo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/index.php?action=repository_view_main_item_detail&item_id=16044&item_no=1&page_id=13&block_id=21

トップページ

全文検索

日本語

インデックス


Permalink

http://id.nii.ac.jp/1648/00016029/

本文を見る

タイトル(英)

Criticism on MMT

アイテムタイプ

紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper

言語

日本語

キーワード

貨幣供給の基本的メカニズム, 金融政策の効果波及経路, 中央銀行の本質, 国家貨幣制度, 「租税が貨幣を動かす」, 「政府による国債売却は金融政策の一部」, 財政的現象としてのインフレーション論

著者

建部 正義
タテベ マサヨシ

著者別名(英)

雑誌名

雑誌名 商学論纂
64
1-2
開始ページ 31
終了ページ 70
発行年 2022-09-01

出版者

中央大学商学研究会

ISSN

0286-7702

権利

この資料の著作権は、資料の著作者または学校法人中央大学に帰属します。著作権法が定める私的利用・引用を超える使用を希望される場合には、掲載誌発行部局へお問い合わせください。

フォーマット

application/pdf

著者版フラグ

publisher

公開状況

公開



iPhoneから送信

2022年10月23日日曜日

Pavlina R Tchernevaさんのツイート

Lael Brainard 2022/10/11 ケルトン



Lael Brainard 2022/10/11
https://love-and-theft-2014.blogspot.com/2022/10/lael-brainard-20221011.html @
https://www.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/2133355681582705445/4363789758014076440


https://t.co/FDapnIOYu7


https://twitter.com/slowslow2772/status/1584060335324921856?s=61&t=ZVOlEzCLcJgc3LmOuY2IEg 


9:14

"The return of retail margins to more normal levels could meaningfully help reduce inflationary pressures in some consumer goods,…" 

…insistent with two percent inflation wage growth nonetheless has been running well below current inflation strong wage growth along with high rental and housing costs mean that inflation from core Services is expected to ease only slowly from currently elevated levels in contrast core Goods have been expected to return to something closer to the pre-pandemic trend of modest disinflation as a result of demand rotating away from Goods coupled with the healing of Supply chains and declining or import prices of course that disinflation in core Goods would be very helpful in offsetting the inflationary pressures in services during the five years before The Crisis Core goods made a small negative contribution to inflation but that swung sharply into positive territory last year and had only started to step down somewhat in the middle of this year so I think the surprise in the August inflation data was the large contribution of core Goods inflation at a point in the post-pandemic recovery when many forecasts had anticipated this can this contribution would continue moderating since the pandemic significant supply and demand imbalances have coincided with large increases in retail trade margins in several good sectors in some sectors the increase in the retail trade margin exceeds the contemporaneous increase in wages paid to the workers uh in that sector although that's not true in food and apparel.

so the return of retail margins to more normal levels would meaningfully help reduce inflationary pressures in core Goods considering that gross retail margins are about 30 percent of total sales dollars overall so among general merchandise retailers for instance where the inventory to sales ratio is about 20 percent above pre-pandemic levels retail margins have increased about 20 percent since the onset of the pandemic that's more than twice the increase in average hourly earnings in contrast in the auto sector the the real inventory to sales ratio is still 20 below its pre-pandemic level and there we see the retail margin for Motor Vehicles sold at dealerships up by more than 180 percent since pre-pandemic and that's 10 times the level of the increase in wages within that sector so there is a lot of room for margin recompression to help reduce Goods inflation but that will depend on demand Cooling Supply constrain easing and inventories restocking despite the higher prices for a broad set of goods and services market and survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are within ranges consistent with expectations that inflation will return to two percent over the medium term in order to bring inflation down and to keep those expectations solidly anchored at two percent the Federal Reserve has increased the federal funds rate target range by 300 basis points in the past seven months and both market and policy surveys indicate additional increases through the end of this year and into the early part of next year in addition balance sheet shrinkage is now proceeding at its maximum rate reinforcing the move to a restrictive stance broader U.S financial conditions have tightened rapidly in response the two-year treasury yield has moved above four percent for the first time since 2007 and the 10-year yield is near its highest level in over a decade and we see similar kinds of moves and corporate bond yields mortgage rates and the dollar monetary policy tightening is also preceding rapidly overseas many central banks and large economies have raised rates by 125 basis points or more over the last six months and yields 

インフレ率2%にもかかわらず、賃金の伸びは現在のインフレ率を大きく下回っています。賃金の伸びが強いことに加え、賃貸料や住宅費の高騰もあり、コアサービスのインフレ率は現在の高い水準からゆっくりとしか緩和しないと予想されます。 パンデミック以前のトレンドに近い、緩やかなディスインフレに戻ると予想されています。これは、需要が商品から回転し、サプライチェーンが回復し、輸入価格が低下した結果です。もちろん、商品コアのディスインフレは、危機以前の5年間におけるサービスのインフレ圧力を相殺する上で非常に有効です。 パンデミック後の回復期において、多くの予測では、この寄与は緩やかに続くとされていました。パンデミック以降、需給の著しい不均衡は、いくつかの優良セクターにおける小売業の利幅の大幅な上昇と重なっています。

9:14

小売マージンがより正常な水準に戻れば、中核産業のインフレ圧力を大幅に軽減することができます。 一方、自動車産業では、実質的な在庫販売比率はパンデミック前の水準よりまだ20%低く、販売店で販売される自動車の小売マージンはパンデミック前より180%以上上昇しています。 このため、商品インフレを抑制するためにマージンを縮小する余地は大いにありますが、それは需要次第です。 広範な商品やサービスの価格が上昇しているにもかかわらず、供給制約が緩和され、在庫が補充されることで、市場や調査ベースの長期的なインフレ期待値は一貫した範囲内にあります。 連邦準備制度理事会(FRB)は過去7ヵ月間に連邦基金金利の目標レンジを300ベーシスポイント引き上げ、市場調査と政策調査の双方から、今年末から来年初めにかけてさらに引き上げを行うことが示唆されている。 年物国債利回りは2007年以来初めて4%を超え、10年物国債利回りは過去10年間で最高値に近い水準にある。



The price drops aren't materializing because current inflation largely isn't demandor labordriven as it often is during inflationary periods, said Claudia Sahm, a former Fed economist and founder of Sahm Consulting. "High inflation is not workers' fault, but the Fed is waging a war on US workers," Sahm said. 
Lael Brainard, Federal Reserve Board vice chair, even acknowledged the roles of pricing and supply chain disruptions during a speech this week before the National Association for Business Economics. Retail profit margins have increased 20% since the pandemic's onset, Brainard noted, roughly doubling the 9% increase in average hourly earnings by the sector's employees. In the auto sector, margins for vehicles sold at dealerships have increased by more than 180% since February 2020 about 10 times the rise in the sector's average hourly earnings, Brainard said.
 "The return of retail margins to more normal levels could meaningfully help reduce inflationary pressures in some consumer goods," she added.

元FRBエコノミストでSahm Consultingの創設者であるClaudia Sahm氏は、現在のインフレは、インフレ期によく見られるような需要や労働者主導型ではないため、物価下落は実現しないと述べている。「高インフレは労働者のせいではないが、FRBは米国の労働者に戦争を仕掛けている」とSahm氏は述べた。
連邦準備制度理事会の副議長であるLael Brainardは、今週行われた全米ビジネス経済学会での講演で、価格設定とサプライチェーンの混乱の役割を認めているほどだ。ブレイナード氏は、パンデミック発生以降、小売業の利益率は20%上昇し、この部門の従業員の平均時給の9%上昇のおよそ2倍になっていると指摘した。自動車部門では、ディーラーで販売される車のマージンが2020年2月以降180%以上増加し、同部門の平均時給の上昇率の約10倍に達したとBrainardは述べている。
「小売マージンがより正常な水準に戻ることは、一部の消費財におけるインフレ圧力を意味あるものにする可能性がある」と付け加えた。


Latest US inflation data raises questions about Fed's interest rate hikes | US economy | The Guardian
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/oct/16/us-inflation-federal-reserve-interest-rate-hikes


《"The return of retail margins to more normal levels could meaningfully help reduce inflationary pressures in some consumer goods," she added.》 


Keynote by Federal Reserve Board Vice Chair Lael Brainard (2022/10/11)

https://youtu.be/1ABMr0v1taY?t=9m14s

2022/10/15

9:14


 
 
slowslow2772
⁦‪@slowslow2772‬⁩
⁦‪@StephanieKelton‬⁩ ⁦‪@cascamike‬⁩twitter.com/slowslow2772/s…
 
2022/10/23 14:53
 
 

https://twitter.com/slowslow2772/status/1584060335324921856?s=61&t=ZVOlEzCLcJgc3LmOuY2IEg


Lael Brainard 2022/10/11

 
 
slowslow2772
⁦‪@slowslow2772‬⁩
twitter.com/stephaniekelto…
Latest US inflation data raises questions 
theguardian.com/business/2022/…
Lael Brainard
2022/10/11
"The return of retail margins to more normal levels could meaningfully help reduce inflationary pressures in some consumer goods…" 
youtu.be/1ABMr0v1taY?t=… pic.twitter.com/vH4Kvps3EB
 
2022/10/23 14:52
 
 

https://twitter.com/slowslow2772/status/1584060059201417220?s=61&t=ZVOlEzCLcJgc3LmOuY2IEg


Latest US inflation data raises questions about Fed's interest rate hikes | US economy | The Guardian

Latest US inflation data raises questions about Fed's interest rate hikes

Experts say raising rates 'isn't working' and that the real culprits are corporate pricing, energy costs and supply chain

The Fed has hiked rates five times in 2022 and indicated more increases are to come.
The Fed has hiked rates five times in 2022 and indicated more increases are to come. Photograph: Jim Watson/AFP/Getty Images

A fresh round of US inflation data released last week showed persistently high prices, raising more questions about whether the Federal Reserve's interest rate hikes are missing what many economists contend are the real inflationary culprits: corporate pricing, energy costs and supply chain disruptions.

The news is further stirring fears of unnecessary economic pain should the Fed push America into recession.

"Raising interest rates isn't working, and the Fed's overly aggressive actions are shoving our economy to the brink of a devastating recession," said Rakeen Mabud, chief economist at the progressive Groundwork Collaborative thinktank. "Supply chain bottlenecks, a volatile global energy market and rampant corporate profiteering can't be solved by additional rate hikes."

The Fed and some economists maintain that demand generated by a hot labor market and higher wages are driving inflation, and higher unemployment and interest rates are panaceas.

To that end, the Fed has hiked rates five times in 2022 and indicated more increases are to come, moves the Federal Reserve board chair, Jerome Powell, has acknowledged will "bring some pain" to households and businesses.

Data shows the Fed is making some progress in its aim: mortgage rates are soaring and home sales are plummeting. Meanwhile, the latest employment numbers show a sharp decline in job openings, as well as slowing job and wage growth.

But Thursday's Consumer Price Index numbers for September revealed the approach has yielded few gains on pricing. Inflation inched up to 8.2%, while month-to-month it climbed 0.1% in August and 0.4% in September.

The price drops aren't materializing because current inflation largely isn't demand- or labor-driven as it often is during inflationary periods, said Claudia Sahm, a former Fed economist and founder of Sahm Consulting.

"High inflation is not workers' fault, but the Fed is waging a war on US workers," Sahm said.

Lael Brainard, Federal Reserve Board vice chair, even acknowledged the roles of pricing and supply chain disruptions during a speech ★ this week before the National Association for Business Economics. Retail profit margins have increased 20% since the pandemic's onset, Brainard noted, roughly doubling the 9% increase in average hourly earnings by the sector's employees.

In the auto sector, margins for vehicles sold at dealerships have increased by more than 180% since February 2020 – about 10 times the rise in the sector's average hourly earnings, Brainard said.

"The return of retail margins to more normal levels could meaningfully help reduce inflationary pressures in some consumer goods," she added.

'Fatter margins'

An April analysis by the Economic Policy Institute, a progressive economic think tank, put numbers behind the theory that corporate pricing is an inflationary driver.

Prices have risen at an annualized rate of over 6% since 2020's second quarter compared with 1.8% during the pre-pandemic business cycle of 2007-2019. EPI broke prices in the non-financial corporate sector into three main components: labor costs, non-labor inputs and profit margins.

Over half of the Covid recovery era increase "can be attributed to fatter profit margins" while labor costs represented less than 8%, the report's author, Josh Bivens, wrote.

That's nearly an exact flip of what was seen in the decades leading up to Covid, the report found.

"Companies are taking higher inputs, putting a bigger markup on them than they were previously, then passing that on to customers," Bivens said.

An April Guardian analysis of 100 top corporations SEC filings found 80 had increased net profits between 2019 and the corresponding quarter in 2021 or 2022, while inflation had eaten into most workers' wage gains.

Skyrocketing demand for durable goods coupled with supply chain problems has created "enormous pricing power" for companies that had stock on hand, Bivens said. Typically corporations attempt to widen margins by suppressing wages, but that changed during the Covid recovery, he added.

The situation is ever-evolving. Wages are falling, which should mean people are buying less and eroding corporations' pricing power, Bivens said, and some supply chain issues are resolving themselves – the cost of some shipping containers is down by 64% from the same week last year.

The producer price index, which tracks business inputs cost, showed deflation in July and August. It increased by 0.4% in September, but with food and energy excluded, it remained flat.

"That also supports the profiteering theory," said Lindsay Owens, Groundwork Collaborative's executive director. "We see input costs cooling more than consumer prices and companies aren't giving that pricing back to the consumer, or at least not yet."

Companies should "eventually" pass lower input costs on to consumers, Sahm said as marking down prices is "a really good way to draw in customers". Moreover, shareholders could ultimately be shooting themselves in the foot by relentlessly pressuring companies to increase prices, she added.

But in earnings calls, at least some executives have said they are not yet ready to lower prices, and told shareholders they plan to keep prices high as long as customers absorb them.

"You're not going to see a lot of companies chasing volume by discounting prices," a Colgate executive told shareholders in July while assuring them prices will remain high for now.

How to lower inflation

Observers say few politically palatable quick fixes exist, especially around curbing corporate pricing power.

Many supply chain issue resolutions are geopolitically difficult, Sahm said, like the US push for a cap on Russian oil prices. The US could also ban oil exports to bring down the cost of fuel here, she added, but doing so would devastate Europe.

"The most important things we are doing right now to fight inflation are these geopolitical decisions: how do we get Russia out of Ukraine? How do we get Europe through the winter?" Sahm said.

The Biden administration's most meaningful step to address soaring energy costs has been a new plan to wield the Strategic Petroleum Reserve – the nation's reserve of crude oil – as a price control tool by effectively setting a floor and ceiling on the price of oil.

Petroleum companies have said they are intentionally keeping production low and prices high because shareholders lost so much money in recent years in the oil market's boom-bust cycles. The Biden plan aims to bring stability to the market and incentivize production increases.

Meanwhile, the US Department of Justice has launched a price fixing investigation into the meat packing industry, and new US Department of Agriculture rules are designed to promote competition in it. The bipartisan Chips Act and Ocean Shipping Reform Act could help ease some supply chain issues, observers say.

But such measures are far short of those taken or seriously discussed in Europe, where the EU and UK have instituted windfall taxes on oil, gas and clean energy companies' profits. Meanwhile, hard price caps seem to be more palatable as the EU heads into winter facing a natural gas crisis. Such measures simply do not have enough political support in the US.

The Fed is restricted to monetary policy and can't directly do anything about corporate pricing or supply chains, though Powell "could be more vocal" in public about the need for a holistic approach, Owens said. If the US and other central banks go at it alone, then consequences will likely be dire and reach around the world, she added.

"This could result in global recession, sovereign debt defaults, bankruptcies, et cetera, and we are quite concerned because we really haven't seen this movie before so we don't know how it ends," Owens said.

This article was amended on 17 October 2022. An earlier version misnamed the Strategic Petroleum Reserve as the "Standard Petroleum Reserve".


米国の最新インフレデータ、FRBの利上げに疑問を投げかける|米国経済|The Guardian

https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/oct/16/us-inflation-federal-reserve-interest-rate-hikes


米国の最新インフレデータは、FRBの利上げに疑問を投げかける。

専門家は、利上げは「うまくいっていない」、真の原因は企業の価格設定、エネルギーコスト、サプライチェーンにあると指摘する。


トム・パーキンス

FRBは2022年に5回の利上げを行い、さらなる利上げの可能性を示唆した。

FRBは2022年に5回の利上げを行い、さらなる利上げが行われることを示唆した。写真を見る。ジム・ワトソン/AFP/Getty Images

先週発表された米国の新たなインフレデータは、物価の高止まりを示し、FRBの利上げは多くのエコノミストが主張するインフレの真犯人である企業価格、エネルギーコスト、サプライチェーンの混乱を見逃しているのではないかという疑問をさらに呼び起こすものであった。


このニュースは、FRBが米国を景気後退に追い込んだ場合、不必要な経済的苦痛を与えるのではないかという懸念をさらに掻き立てるものだ。


「金利を上げても効果はない。FRBのあまりに積極的な行動は、経済を壊滅的な不況の瀬戸際に追いやっている」と、進歩的なシンクタンク、グラウンドワーク共同体のチーフエコノミスト、ラキーン・マブド氏は述べている。「サプライチェーンのボトルネック、不安定な世界的エネルギー市場、横行する企業の利益誘導は、追加利上げで解決できるものではない。


FRBと一部のエコノミストは、熱い労働市場と賃金の上昇が生み出す需要がインフレを促進しており、失業率と金利の上昇は万能薬であると主張している。


そのため、FRBは2022年に5回の利上げを行い、さらなる利上げを示唆しているが、FRBのパウエル理事長は、家計や企業に「多少の痛みをもたらす」ことを認めている。


住宅ローン金利が高騰し、住宅販売が急減するなど、FRBの狙いがある程度進んでいることを示すデータもある。一方、最新の雇用統計では、求人数が激減し、雇用と賃金の伸びも鈍化している。


しかし、木曜日に発表された9月の消費者物価指数は、この政策が物価上昇にほとんど寄与していないことを明らかにした。インフレ率は8.2%に上昇し、前月比では8月に0.1%、9月に0.4%上昇した。


元FRBエコノミストでSahm Consultingの創設者であるClaudia Sahm氏は、現在のインフレは、インフレ期によく見られるような需要主導型でも労働者主導型でもないため、価格下落が実現しないのだと言う。


「高いインフレは労働者のせいではないが、FRBは米国の労働者に戦争を仕掛けている」とSahm氏は述べた。


連邦準備制度理事会副議長のLael Brainard氏は今週、全米ビジネス経済学会での講演で、価格設定とサプライチェーンの混乱の役割を認めたほどだ。ブレイナード氏は、パンデミック発生以来、小売業の利益率は20%上昇し、この部門の従業員の平均時給が9%上昇したのとほぼ同じであると指摘した。


自動車部門では、販売店で販売される自動車の利幅が2020年2月以降180%以上増加し、同部門の平均時給の上昇率の約10倍に達したとBrainard氏は指摘した。


「小売マージンがより正常な水準に戻ることは、一部の消費財におけるインフレ圧力を意味あるものにする可能性がある」と付け加えた。


より太い利幅



進歩的な経済シンクタンク、エコノミック・ポリシー・インスティテュートの4月の分析では、企業の価格設定がインフレの推進力になっているという説を数字で裏付けている。


2007年から2019年のパンデミック前の景気循環では1.8%だったのに対し、2020年の第2四半期以降、物価は年率6%超で上昇したのである。EPIは、非金融法人部門の物価を、人件費、非労働投入物、利益率の3つに分類した。


コビッド回復期の上昇分の半分以上は「利益率の肥大化に起因する」とし、人件費は8%未満を占めると、報告書の著者ジョシュ・ビベンズは記している。


これは、コヴィドに至るまでの数十年間に見られたものとほぼ同じであることが、報告書の中で明らかにされている。


「企業はより高いインプットを得て、以前より大きな値上げをし、それを顧客に転嫁している」とビベンズは述べている。


4月にガーディアンが100社のトップ企業のSEC提出書類を分析したところ、80社が2019年と2021年または2022年の対応する四半期の間に純利益を増やしていることがわかった。一方、インフレはほとんどの労働者の賃金上昇を食い止めた。


耐久消費財の需要急増とサプライチェーンの問題が相まって、手元に在庫を持つ企業には「巨大な価格決定力」が生まれたとビベンズは言う。通常、企業は賃金を抑制することで利幅を拡大しようとするが、コヴィッド社の回復期にはそれが変わった、と彼は付け加えた。


状況は刻々と変化している。また、サプライチェーンの問題も解決しつつあり、一部の輸送用コンテナのコストは前年同期比で64%低下している。


企業の投入コストを示す生産者物価指数(Producer Price Index)は、7月、8月とデフレを示しました。9月には0.4%上昇したが、食品とエネルギーを除くと横ばいであった。


グラウンドワーク・コラボのエグゼクティブ・ディレクター、リンゼイ・オーエンスは、「これは利益誘導説を裏付けるものでもある」と言う。"消費者価格よりも投入コストの方が冷え込んでいると見ており、企業はその価格設定を消費者に還元していない、少なくともまだ還元していない"。


価格の引き下げは「顧客を引きつける本当に良い方法」であるため、企業は「最終的には」投入コストの低下を消費者に還元すべきだとサーム氏は言う。さらに、株主が企業に値上げを執拗に迫ることは、結果的に自らの足を引っ張ることになりかねない、と彼女は付け加えた。


しかし、少なくとも一部の経営陣は、決算発表の場で、まだ値下げをする準備ができていないと述べ、顧客が吸収してくれる限り価格を高く維持するつもりであると株主に語っている。


コルゲート社のある幹部は7月、株主に対して「価格を引き下げて量を増やすような企業はあまりないだろう」と述べ、当面は価格を高く維持することを確約した。


インフレ率を下げるには


オブザーバーによると、特に企業の価格設定力を抑制することに関しては、政治的に受け入れやすい手っ取り早い解決策はほとんど存在しない。


Sahm氏は、サプライチェーンの問題の多くは地政学的に困難であると指摘する。例えば、米国はロシアの石油価格に上限を設けるよう要求している。米国が石油の輸出を禁止して燃料コストを下げることも可能だが、そうすれば欧州は壊滅的な打撃を受けるだろう、と彼女は付け加えた。


「インフレに対抗するために今最も重要なことは、地政学的な決断を下すことです。どうやってロシアをウクライナから追い出すか、どうやってヨーロッパに冬を越させるか。とSahmは言った。


バイデン政権がエネルギーコストの高騰に対処するための最も重要な措置は、戦略石油備蓄(国の原油備蓄)を、原油価格に事実上の下限と上限を設定することによって価格統制手段として行使するという新しい計画であった。


石油会社は、近年の石油市場の好不況のサイクルで株主が大きな損失を被ったため、意図的に生産を低く抑え、価格を高くしていると述べている。バイデン案は、市場に安定をもたらし、増産のインセンティブを与えることを目的としている。


一方、米国司法省は食肉加工業界に対する価格操作の調査を開始し、米国農務省の新しい規則は、この業界における競争を促進するためのものである。超党派のチップス法と海上輸送改革法は、サプライチェーンの問題をある程度緩和するのに役立つだろう、とオブザーバーは述べている。


しかし、こうした措置は、EUと英国が石油、ガス、クリーンエネルギー企業の利益に対して風穴をあける税制を導入しているヨーロッパで取られたり、真剣に議論されている措置にはほど遠いものである。一方、EUは天然ガス危機に直面して冬を迎えているため、ハードな価格規制の方が受け入れられやすいようだ。米国では、このような措置は政治的に十分な支持を得られないだけである。


FRBは金融政策に限定されており、企業の価格設定やサプライチェーンに対して直接何かをすることはできませんが、パウエルは公の場で全体的なアプローチの必要性について「もっと声を大にしてもいい」とオーウェンズは述べています。米国や他の中央銀行が単独でこの問題に取り組んだ場合、その結果は悲惨なものとなり、世界中に波及する可能性が高いと、オーエンズ氏は指摘します。


「世界的な景気後退、国債のデフォルト、破産などが起こる可能性がある。私たちは、この映画を見たことがないので、どのように終わるのかわからないため、かなり心配している」とオーエンズ氏は述べた。


この記事は2022年10月17日に修正されました。以前のバージョンでは、戦略石油備蓄を「標準石油備蓄」と誤って表記していました。


 
 
Gregory Daco
⁦‪@GregDaco‬⁩
#Fes Vice Chair Lael Brainard

Restoring Price Stability in an Uncertain Economic Environment at ⁦‪@business_econ‬⁩ #NABE2022 

federalreserve.gov/newsevents/spe…pic.twitter.com/R0QJ4mXUKt
 
2022/10/11 2:47
 
 

https://twitter.com/gregdaco/status/1579528991064887296?s=61&t=ZVOlEzCLcJgc3LmOuY2IEg




Speech by Vice Chair Brainard on restoring price stability in an uncertain economic environment - Federal Reserve Board
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20221010a.htm

Restoring Price Stability in an Uncertain Economic Environment

October 10, 2022

Vice Chair Lael Brainard

At "Shocks and Aftershocks: Finding Balance in an Unstable World" 64th National Association for Business Economics Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois

Watch Live

It is a pleasure to join this discussion today.1 Inflation is high in the United States and around the world reflecting the lingering imbalance between robust demand and constrained supply caused by the pandemic and Russia's war against Ukraine. Global supply chains have eased significantly, but by some measures they are still more constrained than at nearly any time since the late 1990s.2 High inflation places a burden on all Americans, but especially lower-income families, who spend three-fourths of their income on necessities—more than twice the share spent by higher-income families. The Federal Reserve has tightened policy strongly to bring inflation down, and U.S. tightening is being amplified by concurrent foreign tightening. We are starting to see the effects in some areas, but it will take some time for the cumulative tightening to transmit throughout the economy and to bring inflation down. Uncertainty remains high, and I am paying close attention to the evolution of the outlook as well as global risks.

Higher interest rates are working to temper demand and bring it into better alignment with supply, which is still constrained. Output has decelerated so far this year by more than anticipated, suggesting that policy tightening is having some effect. Real gross domestic product (GDP) declined at an annual rate of roughly 1 percent in the first half. Real private domestic final purchases stepped down from a 6.4 percent pace last year to an annual rate of only 1.3 percent during the first half of this year.

Recent revisions to national income and product accounts data imply that the current stock of excess savings held by households is lower and has been drawn down more rapidly in recent quarters than had been previously estimated. Indeed, by Board staff estimates, the revisions imply that the stock of excess savings held by households is about 25 percent lower, which may imply a more subdued pace of consumer spending going forward than had been projected.

Market expectations for the level of the policy rate at the end of the year are now more than twice as high as they were just seven months ago. As a result of the significant increase in interest rates and associated tightening in broader financial conditions, I now expect that the second-half rebound will be limited, and that real GDP growth will be essentially flat this year.3

The moderation in demand due to monetary policy tightening is only partly realized so far. The transmission of tighter policy is most evident in highly interest-sensitive sectors like housing, where mortgage rates have more than doubled year to date and house price appreciation has fallen sharply over recent months and is on track to soon be flat. In other sectors, lags in transmission mean that policy actions to date will have their full effect on activity in coming quarters, and the effect on price setting may take longer. The moderation in demand should be reinforced by the concurrent rapid global tightening of monetary policy.

Against the backdrop of slower output growth, we are seeing some tentative signs of rebalancing in the labor market. Anecdotal reports suggest the availability and retention of workers are improving.4 For the second month in a row, growth in monthly payroll employment stepped down, slowing from 315,0000 in August to 263,000 in September. There was a sharp 1.1 million decline in job openings from July to August in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS). The ratio of job openings to job seekers declined to 1.7; for purposes of comparison, this ratio was 1.2 prior to the pandemic.5 The sharp fall in vacancies at a time when initial claims held steady at low levels provides support for the possibility that businesses that faced significant challenges finding and retaining qualified workers following the pandemic may be more inclined than in past cycles to retain rather than lay off their workers as demand weakens. In particular, there is still a sizable 1.2 million shortfall in employment levels relative to pre-pandemic levels in the in-person services sectors that accounted for the majority of September payroll gains, suggesting businesses in those sectors may still be trying to narrow that gap.6

That said, a variety of indicators suggest labor demand remains strong, while labor supply remains below pre-pandemic conditions. The unemployment rate is now at the very low level that prevailed pre-pandemic, and the volume of quits remains elevated.7 This supply–demand imbalance in the labor market is reflected in strong wage growth. The employment cost index increased by an annual rate of 6.3 percent over the second quarter—its highest level in decades. A more-timely data source, average hourly earnings, decelerated slightly to a 4.4 percent annual rate over the third quarter, down from 4.6 percent annual growth in the second quarter. Although it is well above levels consistent with 2 percent inflation, wage growth has been running below current inflation.

Strong wage growth along with high rental and housing costs mean that inflation from core services is expected to ease only slowly from currently elevated levels. In contrast, core goods have been expected to return to something closer to the pre-pandemic trend of modest disinflation as a result of demand rotation away from goods to services, coupled with the healing of supply chains and declining core import prices. Disinflation in core goods would help to offset the inflationary pressures in services. During the five years before the crisis, core goods made a small negative contribution to inflation. The contribution of core goods to inflation swung sharply into positive territory in 2021, and had started to step down somewhat in the middle part of 2022.8 So the surprise in the August inflation data was the large contribution of core goods inflation to overall inflation at a point in the post-pandemic recovery when many forecasts anticipated this contribution would continue moderating.

Since the pandemic, significant supply and demand imbalances have coincided with large increases in retail trade margins in several sectors. In some sectors, the increase in the retail trade margin exceeds the contemporaneous increase in wages paid to the workers engaged in retail trade, although this is not true in food and apparel. The return of retail margins to more normal levels could meaningfully help reduce inflationary pressures in some consumer goods, considering that gross retail margins are about 30 percent of total sales dollars overall.

For instance, among general merchandise retailers, where the real inventory-to-sales ratio is 20 percent above its pre-pandemic level, retail margins have increased 20 percent since the onset of the pandemic, roughly double the 9 percent increase in average hourly earnings by employees in that sector.9 In the auto sector, where the real inventory-to-sales ratio is 20 percent below its pre-pandemic level, the retail margin for motor vehicles sold at dealerships has increased by more than 180 percent since February 2020, 10 times the rise in average hourly earnings within that sector.10 So there is ample room for margin recompression to help reduce goods inflation as demand cools, supply constraints ease, and inventories increase.

Despite the higher prices for a broad set of goods and services, market- and survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are within ranges consistent with expectations that inflation will return to 2 percent over the medium term.11 Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities–based measures of five-year, five-year-forward breakeven inflation compensation are currently at 2.15 percent, roughly 10 basis points below their level at the start of the year. The median of inflation expectations over the next 5 to 10 years in the Michigan survey ticked down in September to 2.7 percent, below the 2.9 to 3.1 percent range in which it had been fluctuating since July 2021 and back within the range that was common before the 2015 decline in this metric.12 Currently, there is a greater dispersion than usual of views about future inflation in survey responses. Previously this reflected a rise in expectations for significantly above-target inflation, but now that dispersion also reflects expectations on the part of one quarter of respondents that prices are likely be the same or below their current level 5 to 10 years in the future.

In order to bring inflation down and to keep inflation expectations solidly anchored at 2 percent, the Federal Reserve has increased the federal funds rate target range by 300 basis points in the past seven months, and both market and policymaker surveys indicate additional increases through the end of this year and into next year. In addition, balance sheet shrinkage is now proceeding at its maximum rate, reinforcing the move to a restrictive stance. Broader U.S. financial conditions have tightened rapidly in response: The two-year Treasury yield has moved above 4 percent for the first time since 2007, and the 10-year yield is near its highest level in over a decade at 3.9 percent. Corporate bond yields have risen even more, as investment- and speculative-grade corporate bond spreads have increased about 80 basis points and 170 basis points, respectively, over the year. Mortgage rates have more than doubled since the beginning of the year. The Board's broad dollar index has appreciated 11 percent year to date.13

Monetary policy tightening is also proceeding rapidly abroad. Many central banks in large economies have raised rates by 125 basis points or more in the past six months, and yields on 10-year sovereign debt in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the largest euro area economies have seen increases on the order of 190 to 360 basis points this year.14

The combined effect of concurrent global tightening is larger than the sum of its parts. The Federal Reserve takes into account the spillovers of higher interest rates, a stronger dollar, and weaker demand from foreign economies into the United States, as well as in the reverse direction. We are attentive to the risk of further adverse shocks—for instance, from Russia's war against Ukraine, the pandemic, or China's zero-COVID policies. And we are also very aware that the cross-border effects of unexpected movements in interest rates and exchange rates, as well as worsening external imbalances, in some cases could interact with financial vulnerabilities. In this environment, a sharp decrease in risk sentiment or other risk event that may be difficult to anticipate could be amplified, especially given fragile liquidity in core financial markets. In some countries, the realization of these risks could pose challenging tradeoffs for policy.

That said, the real yield curve is now in solidly positive territory at all but the very shortest maturities, and the entire real curve will soon move into positive territory with the additional tightening and deceleration in inflation that are expected over coming quarters. Monetary policy will be restrictive for some time to ensure that inflation moves back to target over time. It will take time for the cumulative effect of tighter monetary policy to work through the economy broadly and to bring inflation down. In light of elevated global economic and financial uncertainty, moving forward deliberately and in a data-dependent manner will enable us to learn how economic activity, employment, and inflation are adjusting to cumulative tightening in order to inform our assessments of the path of the policy rate.


1. I want to thank Kurt Lewis and Daniel Villar of the Federal Reserve Board for their assistance on these remarks. These views are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee. Return to text

2. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Global Supply Chain Pressure Index,September 2022. Return to text

3. Both the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) and private forecasters showed expectations of above-trend 2022 growth early this year. The March SEP showed a median projection of 2.8 percent GDP growth in 2022 and a policy rate path that almost reached 2 percent by year-end. In the March 2022 Blue Chip Economic Indicators, the consensus projection for Q4/Q4 real GDP growth in 2022 was 2.6 percent, and policy expectations for year-end 2022 in the Blue Chip Financial Forecast for the same month were 1.3 percent. On a Q4-over-Q4 basis, the September Blue Chip consensus for 2022 real GDP growth was a decline of 0.1 percent. The median expectations for real GDP growth on a Q4-over-Q4 basis in the September SEP were 0.2 percent. Return to text

4. For example, the discussion in the September Beige Book notes that "overall labor market conditions remained tight, although nearly all Districts highlighted some improvement in labor availability, particularly among manufacturing, construction, and financial services contacts. Moreover, employers noted improved worker retention, on balance." See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2022), Beige Book(Washington: Board of Governors, September 7). Return to text

5. The current ratio is calculated as the number of job openings at the end of August in the most recent JOLTS release, divided by the number of unemployed persons reported in the September 2022 Current Population Survey. Return to text

6. The total shortfall in the level of employment in September 2022 relative to the level in February 2020 from the retail trade, educational services, local government education, health care and social assistance, and leisure and hospitality sectors was 1.16 million. Return to text

7. As shown by the data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's Wage Growth Tracker, through August the 12-month moving average of median wage growth among job switchers was nearly 2 percentage points higher than those who remained in their same role, with 6.9 percent growth for job switchers as opposed to 5.0 percent growth for those who remained in the same role. For more information, see https://www.atlantafed.org/chcs/wage-growth-trackerReturn to text

8. Expressed on an annualized basis, the average monthly contribution from core goods to total PCE inflation in 2021 would be 1.6 percent. For data going back to 1987, the contribution of core goods to total PCE inflation on a 12-month basis reached its peak in February 2022 at 1.8 percentage points and came in at 1.3 percentage points in August 2022. Return to text

9. See, for example, Josh Ulick and Suzanne Kapner (2022) "From Walmart to Gap, Which Retailers Have the Most Excess Inventory?" Wall Street Journal, June 9, https://www.wsj.com/articles/from-walmart-to-gap-which-retailers-have-the-most-excess-inventory-11654776000. Return to text

10. For additional information, see Alana Semuels (2022), "I Paid $3,000 Above Sticker Price for My New Car. You Probably Will Too," Time,September 29, https://time.com/6218046/new-car-prices-over-msrp. Return to text

11. Although the Survey of Professional Forecasters saw large increases in expected inflation for 2022 and 2023 between the first- and third-quarter surveys, reflecting the shocks to inflation between the periods in February and August when those surveys were conducted, the implied 5-to-10-year inflation expectation remained at 2 percent throughout the surveys conducted thus far in 2022. See https://www.philadelphiafed.org/surveys-and-data/real-time-data-research/survey-of-professional-forecastersReturn to text

12. For additional information, see https://data.sca.isr.umich.eduReturn to text

13. The Federal Reserve's broad trade-weighted dollar index is based on 26 currencies of major U.S. trading partners. It is published in Statistical Release H.10, "Foreign Exchange Rates," available on the Board's website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/current/default.htmReturn to text

14. The central banks of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the euro area, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland together account for 49 percent of nominal global GDP measured in dollars at market exchange rates. Each of these central banks has raised its policy rate by at least 125 basis points in the past six months. Return to text


不確実な経済環境における物価安定の回復に関するブレナード副議長のスピーチ - 連邦準備制度理事会
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20221010a.htm

不確実な経済環境における物価安定の回復

2022 年 10 月 10 日

副議長のラエル・ブレイナード

「Shocks and Aftershocks: Finding Balance in an Unstable World」第 64 回全米ビジネス経済学会年次総会、イリノイ州シカゴ

ライブを見る

本日、このディスカッションに参加できて光栄です。1 パンデミックとロシアの対ウクライナ戦争によって引き起こされた堅調な需要と抑制された供給との間の長引く不均衡を反映して、米国および世界中でインフレが高くなっています。世界のサプライ チェーンは大幅に緩和されましたが、いくつかの指標では、1990 年代後半以降のほぼどの時期よりも依然として制約されています。2 高インフレはすべてのアメリカ人に重荷を負わせますが、特に低所得世帯は、収入の 4 分の 3 を生活必需品に費やしています。これは、高所得世帯の 2 倍以上です。連邦準備制度理事会は、インフレを抑えるために政策を強力に引き締めており、米国の引き締めは、同時進行する外国の引き締めによって増幅されています。いくつかの分野で影響が見られ始めていますが、累積的な引き締めが経済全体に波及し、インフレ率が低下するまでにはしばらく時間がかかるでしょう。不確実性は依然として高く、私は見通しの変化と世界的なリスクに細心の注意を払っています。

金利の上昇は、需要を抑制し、依然として制約されている供給との整合性を高めるために働いています。今年の生産高はこれまでのところ予想以上に減速しており、政策の引き締めが何らかの影響を及ぼしていることを示唆しています。実質国内総生産 (GDP) は、上半期に年率約 1% で減少しました。実質個人の国内最終購入は、昨年の 6.4% ペースから、今年上半期の年率わずか 1.3% に低下しました。

国民所得と製品勘定データの最近の改訂は、家計が保有する超過貯蓄の現在のストックが以前の推定よりも低く、最近の四半期でより急速に引き出されたことを示唆しています。実際、理事会のスタッフの見積もりによると、この修正は、家計が保有する超過貯蓄のストックが約 25% 減少することを示唆しており、これは、今後の個人消費のペースが予測よりも抑制されることを意味する可能性があります。

年末の政策金利水準に対する市場の期待は、わずか 7 か月前の 2 倍以上になっています。金利の大幅な上昇とそれに伴う金融環境全体の逼迫の結果、下半期の回復は限定的になり、今年の実質 GDP 成長率は実質的に横ばいになると予想しています。3

金融政策の引き締めによる需要の緩和は、これまでのところ部分的にしか実現されていません。引き締め政策の波及効果は、住宅ローン金利が年初来で 2 倍以上に上昇し、住宅価格の上昇がここ数か月で急激に低下し、間もなく横ばいになる軌道に乗っている、住宅などの非常に金利に敏感なセクターで最も顕著です。他のセクターでは、伝播の遅れは、これまでの政策措置が今後数四半期の活動に完全に影響を及ぼし、価格設定への影響がより長くかかる可能性があることを意味します. 需要の緩和は、同時進行する世界的な金融政策の急速な引き締めによって強化されるはずです。

生産量の伸びが鈍化していることを背景に、労働市場にリバランスの一時的な兆候が見られます。事例報告は、労働者の可用性と定着率が向上していることを示唆しています。4 2 か月連続で月間雇用者数の伸びは鈍化し、8 月の 315,000 人から 9 月の 263,000 人に減速しました。求人・離職率調査(JOLTS)では、7月から8月にかけて110万人の求人が激減した。求人倍率は1.7倍に低下。比較のために、この比率はパンデミック前は 1.2 でした。5 当初の請求額が低水準で安定していた時期に欠員が急激に減少したことは、パンデミック後に有能な労働者を見つけて維持するという重大な課題に直面した企業が、過去のサイクルよりも解雇するよりも維持する傾向にある可能性を裏付けています。需要が弱まるにつれ、労働者は減少します。特に、9月の給与増加の大部分を占める対面サービス部門の雇用レベルは、パンデミック前のレベルと比較して120万人相当の不足があり、これらの部門の企業は依然としてそのギャップを縮めようとしている可能性があることを示唆しています。 . 6

とはいえ、さまざまな指標が示すように、労働需要は依然として旺盛で、労働供給はパンデミック前の水準を下回っています。失業率は現在、パンデミック前の非常に低い水準にあり、禁煙者の数は依然として高いままです。7 この労働市場における需要と供給の不均衡は、力強い賃金の伸びに反映されています。人件費指数は、第 2 四半期で年率 6.3% 上昇し、過去数十年で最高水準に達しました。よりタイムリーなデータ ソースである平均時給は、第 2 四半期の年間成長率 4.6% から第 3 四半期にかけてわずかに減速し、年率 4.4% になりました。2% のインフレと一致するレベルをはるかに上回っていますが、賃金の伸びは現在のインフレ率を下回っています。

高い賃料と住宅費に加えて賃金が大幅に伸びていることは、中核サービスのインフレが現在の上昇水準からゆっくりとしか緩和しないと予想されることを意味します。対照的に、コア商品は、サプライチェーンの回復とコア輸入価格の低下と相まって、商品からサービスへの需要の回転の結果として、パンデミック前のトレンドである緩やかなディスインフレに近い状態に戻ると予想されています。コア商品のディスインフレは、サービスのインフレ圧力を相殺するのに役立ちます。危機前の 5 年間、中核財はインフレにわずかにマイナスの影響を及ぼしました。コア財のインフレへの寄与は、2021 年に急激にプラスに転じ、2022 年半ばにはやや低下し始めた8 。 したがって、8 月のインフレ データの驚きは、多くの予測がこの寄与が引き続き緩和すると予想していたときに、パンデミック後の回復の時点で、コア商品のインフレが全体的なインフレに大きく貢献したことでした。

パンデミック以降、需要と供給の大幅な不均衡が、いくつかのセクターで小売業のマージンの大幅な増加と一致しています。一部のセクターでは、小売業マージンの増加が、小売業に従事する労働者に支払われる賃金の同時増加を上回っていますが、これは食品やアパレルには当てはまりません。総小売利益率が総売上高の約 30% であることを考えると、小売利益率がより正常なレベルに戻ることは、一部の消費財のインフレ圧力を大幅に軽減するのに役立つ可能性があります。

たとえば、実際の在庫と販売の比率がパンデミック前のレベルを 20% 上回っている総合小売業者の間では、小売マージンはパンデミックの発生以来 20% 増加しており、平均時給の 9% の増加の約 2 倍です。その部門の従業員によって。9 実質在庫対販売比率がパンデミック前のレベルを 20% 下回る自動車部門では、ディーラーで販売された自動車の小売マージンは 2020 年 2 月以降、平均の 10 倍の 180% 以上増加しました。そのセクター内の時給。10 したがって、需要が冷え込み、供給の制約が緩和され、在庫が増加するにつれて、商品のインフレを抑えるのに役立つマージンの再圧縮の余地は十分にあります。

幅広い商品やサービスの価格が上昇しているにもかかわらず、市場および調査に基づく長期的なインフレ予想の測定値は、インフレが中期的に 2% に戻るという予想と一致する範囲内にあります。11 インフレ連動国債に基づく 5 年間、5 年間先送りのブレークイーブン インフレ補償は現在 2.15% で、年初の水準を約 10 ベーシス ポイント下回っています。ミシガン州の調査によると、今後 5 年から 10 年間のインフレ期待の中央値は 9 月に 2.7% に低下し、2021 年 7 月以降変動していた 2.9% から 3.1% の範囲を下回り、2021 年 7 月以前に一般的だった範囲内に戻った。 2015 年のこの指標の低下。12 現在、調査の回答における将来のインフレに関する見解は、通常よりも大きなばらつきがあります。以前は、これはインフレ率が目標を大幅に上回るという予想の高まりを反映していましたが、現在の分散は、回答者の 4 分の 1 が、5 年から 10 年先の価格は現在の水準と同じかそれ以下になる可能性が高いという予想も反映しています。

インフレ率を低下させ、インフレ期待を 2% にしっかり固定するために、連邦準備制度理事会は過去 7 か月間にフェデラル ファンド レートの目標範囲を 300 ベーシス ポイント引き上げました。今年から来年にかけて。さらに、バランスシートの縮小は現在最大の速度で進行しており、制限的なスタンスへの動きが強まっています。これに対応して、米国の金融環境全体が急速に引き締まりました。2 年物国債利回りは 2007 年以来初めて 4% を超え、10 年物利回りは 3.9% で 10 年以上にわたって最高水準に近づいています。社債の利回りはさらに上昇しており、投資適格および投機的適格の社債スプレッドは約 80 ベーシス ポイントと 170 ベーシス ポイント上昇しています。それぞれ、年間で。住宅ローンの金利は、年初から 2 倍以上に上昇しています。理事会の広範なドル指数は、年初来で 11% 上昇しています。13

海外でも金融引き締めが急速に進んでいる。大国の多くの中央銀行は過去 6 か月間に 125 ベーシス ポイント以上の利上げを行っており、カナダ、英国、および最大のユーロ圏経済における 10 年物国債の利回りは 190 のオーダーで上昇しています。今年は360ベーシスポイントに。14

同時に行われる全体的な引き締めの複合効果は、その部分の合計よりも大きくなります。連邦準備制度理事会は、金利の上昇、ドル高、外国経済から米国への需要の減少、およびその逆の波及効果を考慮に入れています。私たちは、ロシアの対ウクライナ戦争、パンデミック、中国のゼロ COVID 政策など、さらなる悪影響のリスクに注意を払っています。また、金利や為替レートの予想外の動きや対外不均衡の悪化による国境を越えた影響が、場合によっては金融の脆弱性と相互作用する可能性があることも十分に認識しています。この環境では、リスクセンチメントの急激な低下や、予測が困難なその他のリスクイベントが増幅される可能性があります。特に、コア金融市場の脆弱な流動性を考えると。一部の国では、これらのリスクの実現は、政策にとって困難なトレードオフをもたらす可能性があります。

とはいえ、実質利回り曲線は現在、非常に短い満期を除いて、堅調なプラスの領域にあり、今後数四半期にわたって予想されるインフレのさらなる引き締めと減速により、実質利回り曲線全体がすぐにプラスの領域に移行するでしょう。金融政策は、インフレが時間の経過とともに目標に戻ることを確実にするために、しばらくの間制限的になります。金融引き締めの累積的な効果が経済全体に作用し、インフレ率が低下するには時間がかかるでしょう。世界的な経済と金融の不確実性の高まりに照らして、意図的にデータに依存した方法で前進することで、経済活動、雇用、インフレが累積的な引き締めにどのように適応しているかを知ることができ、政策の進路についての評価を知ることができます。レート。


1. 連邦準備制度理事会のカート・ルイスとダニエル・ヴィラーのこれらの発言に対する支援に感謝したい。これらの見解は私自身のものであり、連邦準備制度理事会や連邦公開市場委員会の見解を必ずしも反映するものではありません。 本文に戻る

2. ニューヨーク連邦準備銀行のグローバル サプライ チェーン圧力指数、 2022 年 9 月 。本文に戻る

3. 経済予測の概要 (SEP) と民間の予測者の両方が、今年初めに 2022 年の成長がトレンドを上回るとの予想を示しました。3 月の SEP は、2022 年の GDP 成長率の中央値予測を 2.8% と示し、政策金利の経路は年末までにほぼ 2% に達しました。2022 年 3 月の Blue Chip Economic Indicators では、2022 年の第 4 四半期 / 第 4 四半期の実質 GDP 成長率のコンセンサス予測は 2.6% であり、同月の Blue Chip Financial Forecast における 2022 年末の政策予測は 1.3% でした。第 4 四半期ベースで、2022 年の実質 GDP 成長率に関する 9 月の優良企業のコンセンサスは 0.1% の減少でした。9 月の SEP における第 4 四半期対第 4 四半期ベースの実質 GDP 成長率の中央値予想は 0.2% でした。 本文に戻る

4. たとえば、9 月のベージュ ブックの議論では、「労働市場の状況は全体的にタイトなままでしたが、ほぼすべての地区で、特に製造、建設、金融サービスとの接触において、労働力の利用可能性がいくらか改善したことが強調されました。さらに、雇用主は労働者の改善に注目しました。保持、バランス。」連邦準備制度理事会 (2022 年)、 ベージュ ブック(ワシントン: 理事会、9 月 7 日) を参照してください。 本文に戻る

5. 流動比率は、最新の JOLTS リリースにおける 8 月末時点の求人数を、2022 年 9 月の現行人口調査で報告された失業者数で除して計算されます。 本文に戻る

6. 2020 年 2 月の水準と比較した 2022 年 9 月の雇用水準の、小売業、教育サービス、地方自治体の教育、医療と社会扶助、およびレジャーとホスピタリティ部門の合計不足は 116 万人でした。 本文に戻る

7. アトランタ連邦準備銀行の Wage Growth Tracker のデータが示すように、8 月までの転職者の賃金上昇の中央値の 12 か月移動平均は、同じ役割にとどまっている人よりも 2 パーセント近く高く、6.9 でした。同じ役割にとどまっている人の5.0%の成長とは対照的に、転職者の%の成長。詳細については、  https://www.atlantafed.org/chcs/wage-growth-trackerを参照してください。 本文に戻る

8. 年換算ベースで表すと、2021 年の総 PCE インフレ率に対する中核財の月平均寄与は 1.6% になります。1987 年にさかのぼるデータについては、12 か月ベースでの総 PCE インフレ率に対する中核財の寄与は、2022 年 2 月に 1.8 パーセント ポイントでピークに達し、2022 年 8 月には 1.3 パーセント ポイントに達しまし た。本文に戻る

9. たとえば、Josh Ulick と Suzanne Kapner (2022) の「ウォルマートからギャップまで、どの小売業者が最も過剰な在庫を持っているか?」を参照してください。 ウォール ストリート ジャーナル、  6 月 9 日、https://www.wsj.com/articles/from-walmart-to-gap-which-retailers-have-the-most-excess-inventory-11654776000。 本文に戻る

10. 詳細については、Alana Semuels (2022)、「新車のステッカー価格よりも 3,000 ドル高い金額を支払いました。あなたもそうするでしょう」、  Time、 9 月 29 日、https: //time.com/6218046/new-car- を参照してください。 msrp に対する価格。 本文に戻る

11. プロの予測者の調査では、第 1 四半期と第 3 四半期の調査の間に 2022 年と 2023 年の予想インフレ率が大幅に上昇したことがわかりましたが、これらの調査が実施された 2 月と 8 月の期間の間のインフレへのショックを反映しています。 2022 年にこれまでに実施された調査を通じて、10 年までのインフレ予想は 2% のままでした 。 - 予報士。 本文に戻る

12. 追加情報については、  https://data.sca.isr.umich.eduを参照してください。 本文に戻る

13. 連邦準備制度理事会の広範な貿易加重ドル指数は、米国の主要貿易相手国の 26 の通貨に基づいています。これは、理事会のウェブサイトhttps://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/current/default.htmで入手できる統計リリース H.10「Foreign Exchange Rates」に掲載されてい ます。 本文に戻る

14. 米国、英国、カナダ、ユーロ圏、オーストラリア、ニュージーランド、ノルウェー、スウェーデン、スイスの中央銀行は合わせて、市場為替レートでドルで測定した世界の名目 GDP の 49% を占めています。これらの中央銀行はいずれも、過去 6 か月間に政策金利を少なくとも 125 ベーシス ポイント引き上げました。 本文に戻る



関連


https://www.forexfactory.com/search?searchid=39934905


Evans Remarks at the 64th National Association for Business Economics (NABE) | Forex Factory


https://www.forexfactory.com/news/1183588-evans-remarks-at-the-64th-national-association-for


ーーー


Keynote by Federal Reserve Board Vice Chair Lael Brainard (2022 NABE Ann...

https://youtu.be/1ABMr0v1taY

2022/10/15





um but now for the main event um it's my distinct honor to welcome Vice chair lail Brainerd to the 64th nabe annual meeting the conference is titled shocks and aftershocks finding balance in an unstable world Dr Brainerd is undoubtedly and uniquely positioned to give perspective on this topic the many many luminous events in Dr brainerd's career are many and too many to list today but I thought I would just give you a a little smattering of some of those experiences a diplomat's daughter she spent a childhood in West Germany and Poland an undergraduate at Wesleyan University a PhD at Harvard and a professor at MIT an advisor to Bill Clinton including stewarding his policy and interactions with APEC NAFTA WTO and the G7 deputy director at the National Economic Council under Secretary of the Treasury for international Affairs during the Obama Administration and she joined the Federal Reserve Board in 2014 and this fine year she became vice chair please join me in welcoming Dr lail Brainerd foreign for the kind invitation and Lisa amspo Mattingly for the very kind introduction also just want to um as always give a nod to lavon's amazing work over the years and a shout out to the nape Scholars the Next Generation uh so nice that you can be here today and of course it's uh it's a great day to celebrate uh the Nobel prizes uh including uh for uh Ben Bernanke who um I think in the world of both research and practice put his work to uh to good use um it's it's um it's an interesting time inflation of course is high in the United States and around the world we've seen Global Supply chains easing considerably but there's still more constrained at nearly any time uh since the late 1990s at the Federal Reserve we have tightened policies strongly to bring inflation down and that tightening in the U.S is being Amplified by concurrent foreign tightening and we're starting to see the effect on some sectors but it's going to take some time for that cumulative tightening to transmit throughout the economy and for inflation to come down and of course uncertainty is high so I'm paying close attention to Global risk so let me take you through each of those in turn so higher interest rates are working to temper demand and bring it into better alignment with Supply which is still constrained output has decelerated this year by more than many had anticipated suggesting that policy tightening is having an effect real GDP declined at an annual pace of roughly one percent in the first half and over that same time period uh real pdfp private domestic final purchases stepped down from a 6.4 percent Pace uh in 2021 to an annual rate of only 1.3 percent during the first the first half recent revisions to the Nipa data imply that the current stock of excess savings held by households is lower and has been drawn down faster in recent quarters than had been estimated previously indeed by some board staff estimates the revisions imply that the stock of excess savings by households is about a quarter lower which may imply a more subdued pace of consumer spending going forward and of course Market expectations for the level of the policy rate at the end of the year are more than twice as high currently as they were just six months ago and as a result I expect the second half rebound will be limited and that real GDP growth will be essentially flat this year the moderation and demand due to monetary policy tightening is only partly realized so far the transmission of tighter policy is already quite evident and highly interest sensitive sectors like housing where mortgage rates have more than doubled year to date and housing price growth has fallen sharply as and is on track to be flat soon in other sectors lags and transmission mean that policy actions to date will have their full effect on activity in coming quarters and the effect on price setting may take longer the moderation and demand should be reinforced by the concurrent global tightening of monetary policy in the labor market we're seeing some tentative signs of rebalancing for the second month in a row growth in monthly payroll employment step down slowing by about 50 000 to 263 000 in September and in the jolts there was a sharp over 1 million decline in job openings from July to August the ratio of job openings to job Seekers has declined to 1.7 by comparison that ratio was about 1.2 prior to the pandemic the sharp fall in vacancies at a time when initial claims held steady at low levels provide some support for the possibility the businesses that face significant challenges finding and retaining qualified workers following the pandemic may be more inclined than in past Cycles to retain rather than layoff workers as demand softens in particular there's still a sizable 1.2 million shortfall in employment levels relative to pre-pandemic in the in-person services sectors and those are the sectors that accounted for the majority of September payroll gains suggesting businesses in those sectors may still be trying to catch up a variety of indicators suggest labor demand is still strong overall relative to labor Supply which in turn remains below pre-pandemic conditions the unemployment rate is is now the same very low level that prevailed prior to the pandemic and the volume of quits is elevated the supply demand imbalance in the labor market is reflected in strong wage growth so if you look at the ECI it increased by an annual rate of 6.3 percent over the second quarter its highest level in decades and of course we'll have a read on the third quarter soon a more timely data source the average hourly earnings decelerated slightly to 2 to 4.4 percent annual rate over the third quarter compared with 4.6 in the second quarter while well above levels consistent with two percent inflation wage growth nonetheless has been running well below current inflation strong wage growth along with high rental and housing costs mean that inflation from core Services is expected to ease only slowly from currently elevated levels in contrast core Goods have been expected to return to something closer to the pre-pandemic trend of modest disinflation as a result of demand rotating away from Goods coupled with the healing of Supply chains and declining or import prices of course that disinflation in core Goods would be very helpful in offsetting the inflationary pressures in services during the five years before The Crisis Core goods made a small negative contribution to inflation but that swung sharply into positive territory last year and had only started to step down somewhat in the middle of this year so I think the surprise in the August inflation data was the large contribution of core Goods inflation at a point in the post-pandemic recovery when many forecasts had anticipated this can this contribution would continue moderating since the pandemic significant supply and demand imbalances have coincided with large increases in retail trade margins in several good sectors in some sectors the increase in the retail trade margin exceeds the contemporaneous increase in wages paid to the workers uh in that sector although that's not true in food.
 and apparel.

so the return of retail margins to more normal levels would meaningfully help reduce inflationary pressures in core Goods considering that gross retail margins are about 30 percent of total sales dollars overall so among general merchandise retailers for instance where the inventory to sales ratio is about 20 percent above pre-pandemic levels retail margins have increased about 20 percent since the onset of the pandemic that's more than twice the increase in average hourly earnings in contrast in the auto sector the the real inventory to sales ratio is still 20 below its pre-pandemic level and there we see the retail margin for Motor Vehicles sold at dealerships up by more than 180 percent since pre-pandemic and that's 10 times the level of the increase in wages within that sector so there is a lot of room for margin recompression to help reduce Goods inflation but that will depend on demand Cooling Supply constrain easing and inventories restocking despite the higher prices for a broad set of goods and services market and survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are within ranges consistent with expectations that inflation will return to two percent over the medium term in order to bring inflation down and to keep those expectations solidly anchored at two percent the Federal Reserve has increased the federal funds rate target range by 300 basis points in the past seven months and both market and policy surveys indicate additional increases through the end of this year and into the early part of next year in addition balance sheet shrinkage is now proceeding at its maximum rate reinforcing the move to a restrictive stance broader U.S financial conditions have tightened rapidly in response the two-year treasury yield has moved above four percent for the first time since 2007 and the 10-year yield is near its highest level in over a decade and we see similar kinds of moves and corporate bond yields mortgage rates and the dollar monetary policy tightening is also preceding rapidly overseas many central banks and large economies have raised rates by 125 basis points or more over the last six months and yields on 10-year sovereign debt in a number of foreign large advanced economies saw increases on the order of 190 to 360 basis points this year the combined effect of concurrent Global tightening is larger than the sum of its parts we take into account the spillovers of higher interest rates a stronger dollar and weaker demand from foreign economies into the United States as well as in the reverse Direction I'm also very attentive to the risk of further adverse shocks for instance from Russia's war against Ukraine or China's zero covet policies or the pandemic and we're also very aware that the cross-border effect of unexpected movements in interest rates and exchange rates as well as worsening external imbalances in some cases could interact with financial vulnerabilities in this kind of environment a sharp decrease in Risk sentiment or other risk event that may be difficult to anticipate could be Amplified especially given fragile liquidity in core financial markets in some countries the realization of these risks could pose challenging trade-offs for policy that said the real yield curve is now in solidly positive territory at all but the very shortest maturities and the entire real yield Curve will soon move into positive territory with the additional tightening and deceleration and inflation that are broadly expected monetary policy will be restrictive for some time to ensure that inflation moves back to Target over time it will take time for the cumulative effect of tighter monetary policy to work through the economy broadly and to bring inflation down in light of elevated global economic and financial uncertainty moving forward deliberately and in a data dependent manner will enable us to learn how economic activity employment and inflation are adjusting to the cumulative tightening in order to inform our assessment of the path of the policy rate so let me wrap up there and we can turn to our discussion thank you foreign thank you um and I I do have this wonderful little app that we can use to send questions if you go into the name connect connect app you can send uh questions our way um and I think I will start it out with um a fascinating um panel that Elaine uh buffburg who's at GM hosted and I said it was she had actually curated it just for herself because it was about supply chain disruptions energy semiconductors and labor um and she said no it was uh Chad moutre who's uh the chief Economist for the National Association for manufacturers who had helped put the panel together but the my takeaway from that panel was wow Supply chains are disruptions are not probably going to go away the tight labor market is not going to go away anytime soon and and certainly monetary policy is a blunt instrument but um what do you hope to see on the supply chain front that will give you confidence that it's starting to work so it is a um a really unusual uh environment with constraints um on labor on Commodities on key intermediates such as semiconductors um all uh interacting uh in a sort of Perfect Storm um and so we're seeing we have seen just a less elastic Supply response than I think we had all become accustomed to over over several decades actually if you look at certain indicators things have gotten a great deal better shipping times have gotten a great deal better for instance but if you look at some metrics like the Federal Reserve Bank of New York index what you'll see there is a massive Spike and a massive easing to this point but the point where we are currently is still above just about every year with a three-month exception since the 9 1990 so it just gives a sense of how constrained things are of course in the labor market we are watching you know very um carefully uh in in terms of prime age workers we have seen you know month to month there's volatility but we have seen a big Improvement in labor force participation over the course of this year we're within um you know about 30 basis points about 0.3 percentage Point um of where we were pre-pandemic but if you look at labor force participation more generally we do have um a large number of early excess retirements retirements that were not earlier projected in the um uh in the pre-pandemic trend um and it's hard to see um we just don't know how many of those people there's a very substantial number above 2 million how many of those are likely to return um to the labor force of course there were also pandemic related restrictions associated with immigration so you also have a very large number of people that might have been anticipated um as uh immigration flows um had they been at normal levels so probably we'll continue to see um labor Supply um we're sort of below a pre-pandemic for some time and what do we look at um of course if you look across inflation core peace or headline PC inflation you know about a third of that um sorry the the overall um you know what is it like six uh six six and a quarter um the most recent monthly about a third of that is food and energy that is almost entirely associated with Russia's war against Ukraine so further shocks quite possible there um then we see um you know an another large amount that's in-person services so that's about a third there I think the labor Supply question that I was talking about earlier how many people come back into those sectors and how much wages um continue to uh grow there um and then the remaining third you might divide between housing which is a little sticky and there too you know you had a big demand shock with work from home so uh there too we had a big Distortion um and so mortgage rates should help to cool demand there and the remaining uh about a little more than a sixth is for goods and and we were talking about that earlier where we still have Supply constraints interacting with low inventories the sales ratio and and high margins right um so throughout our careers we've heard had a lot of handbringing over what has been called the Dual the the Dual deficits uh here in the U.S the current account and the fiscal deficit um if anything we're seeing a strong dollar Dynamic that doesn't seem to be an issue however should we watch with caution the experiences the UK has been experiencing and are there any takeaways for us coming out of the UK well I'd certainly say the Dual deficit story has now been um uh you know a good story for this cycle um the first we did see um a very strong fiscal support during the pandemic um but actually we saw some of that saved um so we didn't see that in a corresponding uh big increase in the current account deficit and likewise we've seen um as some of that's gotten spent out we've actually seen an increase in government savings so it's just worked um quite differently I think than we've seen previously um and and the current account has not been moving in the same direction um that said of course um there are really important just basic principles that we probably think would be wise to follow and you know one is um right now um inflation is a very significant um challenge for all Americans particularly low-income Americans who spend three quarters of their incomes just on on Necessities um and so we should have a you know very strong consistent uh set of policies that are focused on that you know we know what we need to do at the Federal Reserve and the more you have policy consistency policies working in the same direction you know the more um I think you'll see that process working um so on the other side of that strong U.S dollar our trade Partners Japan the UK China the Eurozone um and we have seen central banks start to intervene um in their markets um to offset that rapid rise in the dollar how is the Fed communicating and monitoring the impact of our monetary policy to our trade partners so we are very aware that we operate in a global economy in a Global Financial system we recognize uh you know very uh very uh much that um Financial conditions in the U.S transmit uh abroad um and uh that uh currency appreciation um where well it may be um disinflationary for the dollar to be stronger the the other side of that picture um is that some economies who may also be uh working to contain inflation may be getting some inflationary pressures we um stay in very close contact UM with uh certainly with uh central banks around the world um and I think generally uh we all you know with a few a notable exceptions most central banks are united in uh the fight against High inflation and so most important there is just being transparent um predictable about what policies we're going to undertake to combat inflation and I think that's generally appreciated we also um have regular interactions with financial stability authorities around the world where we try to think about what those amplification channels cross-border in particular might be um and we also have fora in which monetary policy and fiscal policy officials talk and so you know we are very aware of and also um you know sort of I we a lot of communicate uh U.S policies and potential Transmissions um so now I'm going to start asking questions from the audience that have been upvoted so you if you want to get angry at at me don't get angry at me um uh so uh uh given long and variable policy lags how do you calibrate the risks of the FED over tightening we are very cognizant um of you know uh past history um and you know we're aware um that there are different kinds of risks in a tightening cycle and the kinds of environment that we see currently especially where Supply Supply disruptions have been prominent um there's a really important risk that inflation expectation um could start to flip and that would make the task of bringing inflation down much harder so we've been very focused on making sure inflation expectations remain anchored and it's clear that our policies are going to bring inflation down and it's uh clear that monetary policy will be restrictive for some time there is a risk as we saw in the 1970s of uh easing prematurely and so that's why it's it's very important for us to be cognizant of that but at some point risks could become more two-sided um and there too you know we have to be cognizant of those risks and so there I would say um that by moving in um a data um uh informed uh data dependent uh and deliberate way it allows us to learn about how the tightening that we're seeing here abroad and in financial markets is affecting inflation employment and activity more generally and to take into account Global risks in order to calibrate the path of policy you brought up a very interesting point which is um the the scenario from the 1970s which was easing too early um and so it loud and clear data dependent um what are some of the Sentinel data points that you're going to be looking for to tell you that you have gotten inflation under control yeah so in an environment like this where you know you have um a more complicated supply side of the economy with all the constraints that we talked about earlier Commodities um labor Goods we just need to be cognizant of a much broader set of a bigger dashboard of data if you will so of course I'm looking at the most interest sensitive sectors uh the you know to see those early signs and as I said earlier you can really see the effect of higher mortgage rates on the housing market it's moving very rapidly but of course we're also looking across less interest rate um uh sensitive sectors like core Services um and uh sort of looking very much to see what kinds of demand Dynamics we might see there as well as wage setting Dynamics so we're really looking across the full gamut I'm looking very much at inflation expectations I think you know we had seen some deterioration there those now look really firmly anchored back in ranges that were characteristic of pre-pandemic and of course financial markets to make sure that Financial conditions are consistent with what we think the likely uh path of policy is right um so there's there's a question which is sort of like you get to to pick your your favorite cause of uh the global inflation that we're seeing is it is it the covet shocks is it the supply chain is it um uh you you mentioned actually excess savings um uh is it the labor market what what is the core driver of the inflation that we're seeing yeah so I don't think this is a simple uh inflationary Dynamic um what we saw was a sequence of very severe Supply shocks um uh stemming initially from the pandemic um and then greatly compounded by the war um that Russia um has uh has pursued against uh Ukraine and the difficulty in that kind of environment where you see um a lengthy sequence of Supply shocks is that consumers and businesses might get accustomed to seeing higher inflation might start to change their price setting Behavior their wage setting Behavior so I think I wouldn't actually say there's a single uh cause here it was a combination of high demand along with a very protracted series of in some cases unrelated Supply shocks that brought us to the very complicated place that we are at today and I'd also say that you know if you look across most of the foreign large foreign economies inflation is high throughout even though the mix in each of those economies might be slightly different and the introduction of QE following the global financial crisis helped stabilize the fixed income markets and the disabled financial sector QE was again re-initiated in response to the dramatic dislocations we experienced during the covet shock lockdowns um today the pace of QT has begun to accelerate what are you watching watching what are you monitoring to see if QT is progressing if it's doing what you wanted to do and if there are any concerns on the QT front yeah so I think um as we shrink the balance sheet um you know we have uh agreed a plan that will allow treasury Securities to roll off at about twice the pace of the previous episode of quantitative tightening um and MBS a little bit a little bit less than than twice and we expect that balance sheet shrinkage to reinforce um the tightening cycle um and uh the effect of the increase in the policy rate but of course um we also recognize that liquidity is um a little fragile in core markets and so we're carefully monitoring liquidity conditions in those markets um you know we have now um One path uh full cycle to look back on which of course we didn't when we initiated QT the last time so that's very helpful and so I think we're better equipped with the particular market indicators that might have given us some signal last time around as we get a little bit closer to you know that ample reserves regime kind of um uh sort of stabilizing point but that's that's some distance in the future but we are working very we are watching very carefully as we go all right um so I'm going to ask a question that came from the audience and got upvoted and I'm going to add a little bit of a an addition to it the sep suggests that the fomc participants are comfortable with the terminal rate and the four and a half percent range what developments in financial conditions specifically would lead you to believe four and a half might be too high but too too high or too low um uh and actually I'll let you if you don't want to answer it that's fine but so um you know I think um that uh the summary of economic projections um represents um you know all the members of the committee's best effort to write down um a forecast um that's consistent with their projected policy path at any point in time and then of course you know what you look at is the median of that um and most of the people in this room also write down forecasts um so you know that those are you know very well informed by all the data to date as well as historical relationships um but things can change um and so uh while you know there's um Clarity that monetary policy um will be restrictive for some time until there's confidence about inflation coming down um and the committee has has taken um quite a quite strong action um and the Committees uh said that the policy rate will increase race further we also will be learning as we go and that assessment will reflect incoming data and you know the sort of balance of risks uh domestically and globally so I think it's a it's very uh helpful at a point in time to get a sense of you know where members kind of project the policy path to be going but it's also helpful to remember that the actual policy path will be data dependent so president Evans gave us a little bit of his view on this question um but as we went to the zero bound we introduced forward guidance to sort of create a more stimulative monetary policy despite hitting that zero bound now we're clearly off that zero bound um is the set something we should continue to do is it is it doing what you wanted to do um I won't tell you what president Evans said foreign you know I think it is important to distinguish between um the SCP um which is again uh individual members forecast um and um and forward guidance um again you know we are um we're moving um in a deliberate way and in a data dependent way and so you know we we are going to continue taking into account um how the economy is evolving um what's happening with inflation what's happening with the labor market as we go um so in that sense um you know I think uh there's been clarity about what our goals are um and our resolve and we've taken really strong action and shown that resolve inflation uh is going to come back to two percent we're going to take necessary actions um to get it there um but in terms of exactly what the path of policy is that's something that in my mind will benefit um from the incoming data as well as you know a sense of uh ongoing evolution of risks in an environment where I think uncertainty is clearly very high absolutely um we've been through quite a bit over the last dozen years we've had we've had covid we've had a repo event we've had lots and lots of shocks to the system how do you think the reforms that were implemented following the GFC are doing well um so critically important I think that um the resilience in the banking sector was greatly improved following um the great financial crisis um and you've seen the benefit of that as we've been able to um stress test Banks throughout pandemic and now of course um uh coming into a more period and that has I think both helped with Market transparency but also just the resilience of liquidity and capital at the core financial institutions the banks now we have seen um more um Financial amplification outside of the core banking system so you know the nbfi sector was a huge source of amplification both in the GFC and in the pandemic stress period And so reforms there I think are ongoing but certainly the visibility had improved somewhat um and the cooperation among authorities across borders and in the U.S across multiple Regulators had improved a lot so you know I think what it suggested was we had made some really important progress particularly on resilience in the banking system but we still have work to do and particularly outside of the mbfi sector and including the most opaque parts of that sector right um so sticky inflation um one of them one of the biggest stickiest parts of inflation is rent um and we are starting to see some significant slowdowns in the housing market house prices um maybe even some inflection points on um on on high frequency rent indicators what are your thoughts on um that part of inflation um coupled with maybe some of the challenges that might rise as we start to see some difficulties in the housing market yeah so um that um uh that the housing part of core Services I generally anticipate will be sticky and in general um just based on past patterns um expect for services to be a sort of bigger contributor to inflation um you know in this in this period and so that's why the focus on poor Goods would be so great uh to see core Goods um playing more disinflationary role um you know which which it could well do given um that core import prices um will help out put a bit there um and inventories are starting to get better but um but within housing I think the Dynamics that you just talked about are exactly right so mortgage rates have gone up a lot and house prices um are you know growing more slowly and will soon are likely on aggregate to to be flat um and in those parts of the country you saw the biggest um house uh house price appreciation we've actually seen some declines what that means for rents though is a little bit complicated because some people who you know might be first-time homebuyers with these mortgage rates are you know not perhaps going to be renting longer um so you might see some additional demand there um and uh as you said while high frequency indicators of of rent um you know may be starting to see a bit of a Slowdown which will be really important um average rents take longer because those uh those rents are only renegotiated slowly so it's we assume there's going to be some stickiness um in that Housing Services portion obviously not as big for pce as for CPI but that's why it's important to see some um you know some less pressure elsewhere so just following on on the housing market and and actually this is the commercial MBS Market um there's a question does stress in the commercial MBS Market due to higher rates cause concern for proceeding with balance sheet reduction yeah so I think um um feel pretty good then has um gotten off the ground so far um and of course we're monitoring those markets um very closely as I mentioned earlier we have a dashboard of indicators that we thought um you know were particularly with the benefit of hindsight valuable in the first episode of QT so we're monitoring that dashboard really quickly um really closely so my sense is you know so far um we're seeing uh the kind of absorption that you would wish to see but we are aware um that you know this is a moment where liquidity is somewhat strange and so we're we're going to remain alert to that possibility foreign the fed's regulatory stress testing scenarios do not feature stagflationary scenarios what do we know about our financial systems resilience to such outcomes yeah so I would say that first of all we have done a whole variety of different um scenarios over the years and we did have a bit of that flavor in the 2018 stress test we learned a lot from those stress tests in 2018. um the other thing is that you know we have the ability to do kind of top-down exercises that are more just to inform ourselves what environments might be more difficult for banking system resilience than others and so we're able to look at a variety of different kinds of environments in in that and we do um and you know I think that is uh the kind of an environment where you see um you know interest rates going up by a lot more than expected and Rising credit losses is a complicated environment with some offsetting effects depending on the business model of the bank but we certainly um you know we certainly want to be aware of how that would play out and so we do a bunch of internal analysis to just make sure we're we understand how different environments could affect different kinds of institutions so fair or not some people have been dusting off their analysis of the 1970s to try to get a sense of what can the Central Bank do Etc and certainly there's a lot of uh talking about uh Paul volcker and what Paul volcker did a question I would have is given the debt levels today in the U.S economy can we do can we have another Volker fed with the debt dynamics that we have today yeah so I think when we think about um the 1970s um and then the 1980s importantly I think there are a variety of um important um differences and lessons um and and I'll get to the debt point in a second but you know what's different now well first of all I think there's a general um understanding uh that monetary policy has both the capacity and the responsibility to get inflation down that wasn't clear when uh the inflationary shocks happened in the 1970s it's a very widely accepted tenant and we certainly um you know we we take it very very seriously that we have the resolves at the resolve and the tools another huge difference um is uh that um inflation expectations were unanchored in the 1970s and so you saw some really um some really uh toxic um uh dynamics of high inflation becoming entrenched and leading to higher of inflation again we carefully carefully monitor a whole variety of measures of inflation expectations you know and we have seen those moving to ranges that were um you know prevalent prior to the pandemic which suggests that you know there is an understanding out there that inflation is going to come back down um so those are those are enormous uh advantages that I think uh will help with the fight against inflation today in terms of debt levels I mean one of the interesting things uh that's different about this stress period the pandemic then perhaps past Cycles is that a lot of the fiscal support was actually used in ways that improved both business balance sheets and household balance sheets so coming into this tightening period you actually have healthier household balance sheets and businesses that have better debt servicing on average and so that gives us a bit of a better starting point than you might have seen otherwise because obviously those credit Aggregates are very important for thinking about potential Financial stability complications so if we think about the U.S corporate sector today they are pretty close to Peak profitability as a share of of U.S GDP and income and the capex levels that we've seen out of the corporate sector is actually pretty pretty close to you know all-time lows um do you think that the corporate sector is going to be investing reinvesting to address some of the shortages some of the labor market tightness Etc going forward well so there I think um obviously in a rising interest rate environment there's um it makes it more difficult for some of those Capital plans to be execute on so we recognize there's that macro effect but when we talk to businesses in different sectors at kind of the micro level there's a lot of really interesting investment that is going on some of it uh supported um for instance you know the semiconductor area and the energy transition area both you know supported by recent changes um in in law so you know my sense is there are areas where there's tremendous uh interest and over a longer period of time you know you'll see quite quite fundamental and important Investments that will go to some of the challenges that the nation clearly faced during this last period both on the energy front on the climate front and on key intermediate inputs to end this discussion thinking about total Factor productivity and how wonderful it is for the U.S economy and the wonderful role that the central bank bank plays in making sure that we stay on that path so thank you very much for taking some time with us thank you. 


um but now for the main event um it's my distinct honor to welcome Vice chair lail Brainerd to the 64th 0:08 nabe annual meeting the conference is titled shocks and aftershocks finding balance in an 0:15 unstable world Dr Brainerd is undoubtedly and uniquely 0:22 positioned to give perspective on this topic the many many luminous events in Dr 0:28 brainerd's career are many and too many to list today but I thought I would just 0:34 give you a a little smattering of some of those experiences 0:40 a diplomat's daughter she spent a childhood in West Germany and Poland an 0:47 undergraduate at Wesleyan University a PhD at Harvard and a professor at MIT 0:55 an advisor to Bill Clinton including stewarding his policy and interactions 1:00 with APEC NAFTA WTO and the G7 1:05 deputy director at the National Economic Council under Secretary of the Treasury 1:11 for international Affairs during the Obama Administration and she joined the Federal Reserve Board in 2014 and this 1:19 fine year she became vice chair please join me in welcoming Dr lail Brainerd 1:39 foreign 1:51 for the kind invitation and Lisa amspo Mattingly for the very kind introduction 1:57 also just want to um as always give a nod to lavon's amazing work over the 2:03 years and a shout out to the nape Scholars the Next Generation uh so nice 2:09 that you can be here today and of course it's uh it's a great day to celebrate uh 2:15 the Nobel prizes uh including uh for uh Ben Bernanke who 2:21 um I think in the world of both research and practice put his work to uh to good 2:27 use um it's it's um it's an interesting time inflation of 2:33 course is high in the United States and around the world we've seen Global 2:38 Supply chains easing considerably but there's still more constrained at nearly 2:44 any time uh since the late 1990s at the Federal Reserve we have tightened 2:50 policies strongly to bring inflation down and that tightening in the U.S is being Amplified by concurrent foreign 2:57 tightening and we're starting to see the effect on some sectors but it's going to take some time for that cumulative 3:03 tightening to transmit throughout the economy and for inflation to come down and of course uncertainty is high so I'm 3:10 paying close attention to Global risk so let me take you through each of those in turn 3:15 so higher interest rates are working to temper demand and bring it into better alignment with Supply which is still 3:23 constrained output has decelerated this year by more than many had anticipated 3:28 suggesting that policy tightening is having an effect real GDP declined at an annual pace of 3:36 roughly one percent in the first half and over that same time period uh real 3:41 pdfp private domestic final purchases stepped down from a 6.4 percent Pace uh 3:49 in 2021 to an annual rate of only 1.3 percent during the first the first half 3:55 recent revisions to the Nipa data imply that the current stock of excess savings 4:01 held by households is lower and has been drawn down faster in recent quarters 4:06 than had been estimated previously indeed by some board staff estimates the 4:12 revisions imply that the stock of excess savings by households is about a quarter lower which may imply a more subdued 4:20 pace of consumer spending going forward and of course Market expectations for 4:25 the level of the policy rate at the end of the year are more than twice as high currently as they were just six months 4:31 ago and as a result I expect the second half rebound will be limited and that real 4:37 GDP growth will be essentially flat this year the moderation and demand due to 4:43 monetary policy tightening is only partly realized so far the transmission of tighter policy is already quite 4:51 evident and highly interest sensitive sectors like housing where mortgage 4:56 rates have more than doubled year to date and housing price growth has fallen 5:02 sharply as and is on track to be flat soon in other sectors lags and 5:08 transmission mean that policy actions to date will have their full effect on activity in coming quarters and the 5:14 effect on price setting may take longer the moderation and demand should be reinforced by the concurrent global 5:22 tightening of monetary policy in the labor market we're seeing some 5:27 tentative signs of rebalancing for the second month in a row growth in monthly payroll employment step down 5:35 slowing by about 50 000 to 263 000 in September and in the jolts there was a 5:42 sharp over 1 million decline in job openings from July to August the ratio 5:48 of job openings to job Seekers has declined to 1.7 by comparison that ratio 5:55 was about 1.2 prior to the pandemic the sharp fall in vacancies at a time 6:00 when initial claims held steady at low levels provide some support for the 6:06 possibility the businesses that face significant challenges finding and retaining 6:13 qualified workers following the pandemic may be more inclined than in past Cycles to retain rather than layoff workers as 6:22 demand softens in particular there's still a sizable 1.2 million shortfall in employment 6:30 levels relative to pre-pandemic in the in-person services sectors and those are 6:35 the sectors that accounted for the majority of September payroll gains suggesting businesses in those sectors 6:40 may still be trying to catch up a variety of indicators suggest labor 6:47 demand is still strong overall relative to labor Supply which in turn remains 6:52 below pre-pandemic conditions the unemployment rate is is now the same 6:58 very low level that prevailed prior to the pandemic and the volume of quits is 7:03 elevated the supply demand imbalance in the labor market is reflected in strong wage 7:09 growth so if you look at the ECI it increased by an annual rate of 6.3 7:14 percent over the second quarter its highest level in decades and of course we'll have a read on the third quarter 7:20 soon a more timely data source the average hourly earnings decelerated 7:27 slightly to 2 to 4.4 percent annual rate over the third quarter compared with 4.6 7:33 in the second quarter while well above levels consistent with 7:38 two percent inflation wage growth nonetheless has been running well below 7:44 current inflation strong wage growth along with high rental and housing costs mean that 7:51 inflation from core Services is expected to ease only slowly from currently elevated levels 7:57 in contrast core Goods have been expected to return to something closer 8:02 to the pre-pandemic trend of modest disinflation as a result of demand 8:07 rotating away from Goods coupled with the healing of Supply chains and declining or import prices 8:14 of course that disinflation in core Goods would be very helpful in offsetting the inflationary pressures in 8:21 services during the five years before The Crisis Core goods made a small negative 8:26 contribution to inflation but that swung sharply into positive territory last 8:33 year and had only started to step down somewhat in the middle of this year so I think the surprise in the August 8:40 inflation data was the large contribution of core Goods inflation at a point in the post-pandemic recovery 8:46 when many forecasts had anticipated this can this contribution would continue moderating 8:53 since the pandemic significant supply and demand imbalances have coincided 8:58 with large increases in retail trade margins in several good sectors in some 9:03 sectors the increase in the retail trade margin exceeds the contemporaneous increase in wages paid to the workers uh 


9:11 in that sector although that's not true in food and apparel so the return of retail margins to more 9:17 normal levels would meaningfully help reduce inflationary pressures in core Goods considering that gross retail 9:24 margins are about 30 percent of total sales dollars overall so among general 9:30 merchandise retailers for instance where the inventory to sales ratio is about 20 percent above pre-pandemic levels retail 9:37 margins have increased about 20 percent since the onset of the pandemic that's more than twice the increase in average 9:44 hourly earnings in contrast in the auto sector the the real inventory to sales 9:50 ratio is still 20 below its pre-pandemic level and there we see the retail margin 9:56 for Motor Vehicles sold at dealerships up by more than 180 percent since 10:01 pre-pandemic and that's 10 times the level of the increase in wages within that sector so there is a lot of room 10:07 for margin recompression to help reduce Goods inflation but that will depend on 10:13 demand Cooling Supply constrain easing and inventories restocking 10:18 despite the higher prices for a broad set of goods and services market and 10:24 survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are within ranges consistent with expectations that 10:30 inflation will return to two percent over the medium term in order to bring inflation down and to 10:38 keep those expectations solidly anchored at two percent the Federal Reserve has 10:43 increased the federal funds rate target range by 300 basis points in the past seven months and both market and policy 10:51 surveys indicate additional increases through the end of this year and into the early part of next year in addition 10:58 balance sheet shrinkage is now proceeding at its maximum rate reinforcing the move to a restrictive 11:03 stance broader U.S financial conditions have tightened rapidly in response the 11:08 two-year treasury yield has moved above four percent for the first time since 2007 and the 10-year yield is near its 11:15 highest level in over a decade and we see similar kinds of moves and corporate 11:21 bond yields mortgage rates and the dollar monetary policy tightening is also 11:26 preceding rapidly overseas many central banks and large economies have raised 11:32 rates by 125 basis points or more over the last six months and yields on 10-year sovereign debt in a number of 11:38 foreign large advanced economies saw increases on the order of 190 to 360 11:43 basis points this year the combined effect of concurrent Global 11:49 tightening is larger than the sum of its parts we take into account the spillovers of 11:54 higher interest rates a stronger dollar and weaker demand from foreign economies into the United States as well as in the 12:02 reverse Direction I'm also very attentive to the risk of 12:07 further adverse shocks for instance from Russia's war against Ukraine or China's 12:13 zero covet policies or the pandemic and we're also very aware that the cross-border effect of unexpected 12:20 movements in interest rates and exchange rates as well as worsening external imbalances in some cases could interact 12:27 with financial vulnerabilities in this kind of environment a sharp decrease in 12:32 Risk sentiment or other risk event that may be difficult to anticipate could be Amplified especially given fragile 12:39 liquidity in core financial markets in some countries the realization of these 12:45 risks could pose challenging trade-offs for policy that said the real yield curve is now in 12:51 solidly positive territory at all but the very shortest maturities and the entire real yield Curve will soon move 12:58 into positive territory with the additional tightening and deceleration and inflation that are broadly expected 13:03 monetary policy will be restrictive for some time to ensure that inflation moves 13:08 back to Target over time it will take time for the cumulative effect of tighter monetary policy to 13:15 work through the economy broadly and to bring inflation down in light of elevated global economic and 13:21 financial uncertainty moving forward deliberately and in a data dependent manner will enable us to learn how 13:28 economic activity employment and inflation are adjusting to the cumulative tightening in order to inform 13:34 our assessment of the path of the policy rate so let me wrap up there and we can turn to our discussion thank you 13:42 foreign 13:52 thank you um and I I do have this wonderful little app that we can use to send questions if 13:59 you go into the name connect connect app you can send uh questions our way 14:06 um and I think I will start it out with um a fascinating 14:11 um panel that Elaine uh buffburg who's at GM hosted and I said it was she had 14:18 actually curated it just for herself because it was about supply chain disruptions energy 14:25 semiconductors and labor um and she said no it was uh Chad moutre 14:31 who's uh the chief Economist for the National Association for manufacturers who had helped put the panel together 14:37 but the my takeaway from that panel was wow Supply chains are disruptions are 14:44 not probably going to go away the tight labor market is not going to go away anytime soon 14:51 and and certainly monetary policy is a blunt instrument but 14:57 um what do you hope to see on the supply chain front that will give you 15:02 confidence that it's starting to work so it is a um a really unusual uh 15:09 environment with constraints um on labor on Commodities on key 15:15 intermediates such as semiconductors um all uh interacting uh in a sort of 15:22 Perfect Storm um and so we're seeing we have seen just a less elastic Supply response than I 15:29 think we had all become accustomed to over over several decades actually if you look at certain indicators things 15:36 have gotten a great deal better shipping times have gotten a great deal better for instance but if you look at some 15:43 metrics like the Federal Reserve Bank of New York index what you'll see there is 15:49 a massive Spike and a massive easing to 15:55 this point but the point where we are currently is still above just about every year with a three-month exception 16:04 since the 9 1990 so it just gives a sense of how constrained things are of 16:10 course in the labor market we are watching you know very um carefully uh in in terms of prime age 16:18 workers we have seen you know month to month there's volatility but we have seen a big Improvement in labor force 16:24 participation over the course of this year we're within um you know about 30 basis points about 16:30 0.3 percentage Point um of where we were pre-pandemic but if you look at labor force participation 16:36 more generally we do have um a large number of early excess 16:44 retirements retirements that were not earlier projected in the um uh in the 16:50 pre-pandemic trend um and it's hard to see um we just don't know how many of those 16:57 people there's a very substantial number above 2 million how many of those are likely to return 17:02 um to the labor force of course there were also pandemic related restrictions associated with immigration so you also 17:09 have a very large number of people that might have been anticipated 17:14 um as uh immigration flows um had they been at normal levels so 17:20 probably we'll continue to see um labor Supply um we're sort of below a pre-pandemic 17:28 for some time and what do we look at um of course if you look across 17:34 inflation core peace or headline PC inflation you know about a third of that 17:41 um sorry the the overall um you know what is it like six uh six 17:46 six and a quarter um the most recent monthly about a third 17:51 of that is food and energy that is almost entirely associated with Russia's 17:58 war against Ukraine so further shocks quite possible there um then we see 18:04 um you know an another large amount that's in-person services so that's 18:10 about a third there I think the labor Supply question that I was talking about earlier how many people come back into 18:16 those sectors and how much wages um continue to uh grow there 18:23 um and then the remaining third you might divide between housing which is a little sticky and there too you know you 18:29 had a big demand shock with work from home so uh there too we had a big 18:34 Distortion um and so mortgage rates should help to cool demand there 18:40 and the remaining uh about a little more than a sixth is for goods and and we 18:46 were talking about that earlier where we still have Supply constraints interacting with low inventories the 18:52 sales ratio and and high margins right 18:57 um so throughout our careers we've heard had a lot of handbringing over what has 19:03 been called the Dual the the Dual deficits uh here in the U.S the current account and the fiscal deficit 19:10 um if anything we're seeing a strong dollar Dynamic that doesn't seem to be an issue however should we 19:18 watch with caution the experiences the UK has been experiencing and are there 19:23 any takeaways for us coming out of the UK well I'd certainly say the Dual deficit 19:29 story has now been um uh you know a good story for this 19:35 cycle um the first we did see um a very strong fiscal support during 19:40 the pandemic um but actually we saw some of that saved um so we didn't see that in a 19:45 corresponding uh big increase in the current account deficit and likewise 19:51 we've seen um as some of that's gotten spent out we've actually seen an increase in 19:56 government savings so it's just worked um quite differently I think than we've seen previously 20:03 um and and the current account has not been moving in the same direction 20:08 um that said of course um there are really important just basic 20:13 principles that we probably think would be wise to follow and you know one is 20:20 um right now um inflation is a very significant 20:25 um challenge for all Americans particularly low-income Americans who spend 20:30 three quarters of their incomes just on on Necessities um and so we should have a you know very 20:37 strong consistent uh set of policies that are focused on that you know we 20:42 know what we need to do at the Federal Reserve and the more you have policy consistency policies working in the same 20:48 direction you know the more um I think you'll see that process working 20:55 um so on the other side of that strong U.S dollar our trade Partners Japan the 21:01 UK China the Eurozone um and we have seen central banks start to intervene um in their markets um to 21:08 offset that rapid rise in the dollar how is the Fed communicating and monitoring 21:13 the impact of our monetary policy to our trade partners so we are 21:20 very aware that we operate in a global 21:25 economy in a Global Financial system we recognize uh you know very uh very uh 21:34 much that um Financial conditions in the U.S transmit uh abroad 21:41 um and uh that uh currency appreciation 21:47 um where well it may be um disinflationary for the dollar to be 21:52 stronger the the other side of that picture um is that some economies who may also 21:58 be uh working to contain inflation may be getting some inflationary pressures we 22:05 um stay in very close contact UM with uh certainly with uh central banks around the world 22:11 um and I think generally uh we all you know with a few a notable exceptions 22:17 most central banks are united in uh the fight against High inflation and so most 22:24 important there is just being transparent um predictable about what policies we're 22:29 going to undertake to combat inflation and I think that's generally appreciated we also 22:36 um have regular interactions with financial stability authorities around the world where we try to think about 22:41 what those amplification channels cross-border in particular might be um and we also have fora in which 22:48 monetary policy and fiscal policy officials talk and so you know we are 22:54 very aware of and also um you know sort of I we a lot of 23:00 communicate uh U.S policies and potential Transmissions 23:07 um so now I'm going to start asking questions from the audience that have been upvoted so you if you want to get 23:12 angry at at me don't get angry at me um uh 23:18 so uh uh given long and variable policy lags how do you calibrate the risks of 23:25 the FED over tightening we are very cognizant 23:31 um of you know uh past history um and you know we're aware 23:38 um that there are different kinds of risks in a tightening cycle and the kinds of environment that we see 23:43 currently especially where Supply Supply disruptions have been prominent 23:49 um there's a really important risk that inflation expectation 23:55 um could start to flip and that would make the task of bringing inflation down 24:01 much harder so we've been very focused on making sure inflation expectations 24:07 remain anchored and it's clear that our policies are going to bring inflation 24:12 down and it's uh clear that monetary policy will be restrictive for some time 24:20 there is a risk as we saw in the 1970s of uh easing prematurely and so that's 24:29 why it's it's very important for us to be cognizant of that but at some point 24:34 risks could become more two-sided um and there too you know we have to be 24:40 cognizant of those risks and so there I would say um that by moving in 24:47 um a data um uh informed uh data dependent uh and 24:55 deliberate way it allows us to learn about how the tightening that we're 25:02 seeing here abroad and in financial markets is affecting inflation 25:07 employment and activity more generally and to take into account Global risks in 25:13 order to calibrate the path of policy you brought up a very interesting point 25:19 which is um the the scenario from the 1970s which was easing too early 25:26 um and so it loud and clear data dependent 25:31 um what are some of the Sentinel data points that you're going to be looking for to tell you that you have gotten 25:38 inflation under control yeah so in an environment like this where you know you 25:43 have um a more complicated supply side of the economy with all the constraints that we 25:49 talked about earlier Commodities um labor Goods we just need to be 25:56 cognizant of a much broader set of a bigger dashboard of data if you will so 26:02 of course I'm looking at the most interest sensitive sectors uh the you 26:07 know to see those early signs and as I said earlier you can really see the effect of higher mortgage rates on the 26:14 housing market it's moving very rapidly but of course we're also looking across less interest rate 26:20 um uh sensitive sectors like core Services um and uh sort of looking very much to 26:28 see what kinds of demand Dynamics we might see there as well as wage setting 26:34 Dynamics so we're really looking across the full gamut I'm looking very much at 26:40 inflation expectations I think you know we had seen some deterioration there those now look really firmly anchored 26:48 back in ranges that were characteristic of pre-pandemic and of course financial 26:54 markets to make sure that Financial conditions are consistent with what we think the likely uh path of policy is 27:03 right um so there's there's a question which is sort of like you get to to pick your 27:10 your favorite cause of uh the global inflation that we're seeing is it is it 27:15 the covet shocks is it the supply chain is it um uh you you mentioned actually excess 27:22 savings um uh is it the labor market what what is the core driver of the inflation that 27:29 we're seeing yeah so I don't think this is a simple uh inflationary Dynamic 27:35 um what we saw was a sequence of very 27:40 severe Supply shocks um uh stemming initially from the pandemic 27:46 um and then greatly compounded by the war um that Russia um has uh has pursued 27:53 against uh Ukraine and the difficulty in that kind of environment where you see 27:58 um a lengthy sequence of Supply shocks is that consumers and businesses might 28:06 get accustomed to seeing higher inflation might start to change their price setting Behavior their wage 28:13 setting Behavior so I think I wouldn't actually say there's a single uh cause here it was a combination of high demand 28:21 along with a very protracted series of in some cases unrelated Supply shocks 28:26 that brought us to the very complicated place that we are at today and I'd also 28:31 say that you know if you look across most of the foreign large foreign 28:37 economies inflation is high throughout even though the mix in each of those 28:42 economies might be slightly different and the introduction of QE following the 28:49 global financial crisis helped stabilize the fixed income markets and the disabled financial sector QE was again 28:57 re-initiated in response to the dramatic dislocations we experienced during the covet shock lockdowns 29:04 um today the pace of QT has begun to accelerate what are you watching watching what are you monitoring to see 29:12 if QT is progressing if it's doing what you wanted to do and if there are any 29:18 concerns on the QT front yeah so I think um as we shrink the balance sheet 29:26 um you know we have uh agreed a plan that will allow treasury Securities to 29:33 roll off at about twice the pace of the previous episode of quantitative 29:38 tightening um and MBS a little bit a little bit less than than twice and we expect that 29:48 balance sheet shrinkage to reinforce um the tightening cycle 29:53 um and uh the effect of the increase in the policy rate but of course 30:00 um we also recognize that liquidity is um a little fragile in core markets and 30:06 so we're carefully monitoring liquidity conditions in those markets 30:11 um you know we have now um One path uh full cycle to look back 30:17 on which of course we didn't when we initiated QT the last time so that's very helpful and so I think we're better 30:25 equipped with the particular market indicators 30:30 that might have given us some signal last time around as we get a little bit 30:36 closer to you know that ample reserves regime kind of 30:41 um uh sort of stabilizing point but that's that's some distance in the future but we are working very we are 30:48 watching very carefully as we go all right um so I'm going to ask a question that 30:54 came from the audience and got upvoted and I'm going to add a little bit of a an addition to it the sep suggests that 31:01 the fomc participants are comfortable with the terminal rate and the four and a half percent range what developments 31:07 in financial conditions specifically would lead you to believe four and a half might be too high but too too high 31:13 or too low um uh and actually I'll let you if you 31:20 don't want to answer it that's fine but so um you know I think 31:26 um that uh the summary of economic projections um represents 31:32 um you know all the members of the committee's best effort to write down um a forecast 31:38 um that's consistent with their projected policy path at any point in time and then of course you know what 31:44 you look at is the median of that um and most of the people in this room also write down forecasts um so you know 31:51 that those are you know very well informed by all the data to date as well 31:56 as historical relationships um but things can change um and so uh while you know there's 32:04 um Clarity that monetary policy um will be restrictive for some time 32:09 until there's confidence about inflation coming down um and the committee has has taken 32:16 um quite a quite strong action um and the Committees uh said that the 32:22 policy rate will increase race further we also will be learning as we go and 32:30 that assessment will reflect incoming data and you know the sort of balance of 32:38 risks uh domestically and globally so I think it's a it's very uh helpful at a 32:45 point in time to get a sense of you know where members kind of project 32:51 the policy path to be going but it's also helpful to remember that the actual 32:56 policy path will be data dependent so president Evans gave us a little bit 33:02 of his view on this question um but as we went to the zero bound we 33:08 introduced forward guidance to sort of create a more stimulative monetary 33:14 policy despite hitting that zero bound now we're clearly off that zero bound 33:20 um is the set something we should continue to do is it is it doing what you wanted to do 33:26 um I won't tell you what president Evans said foreign 33:33 you know I think it is important to distinguish between um the SCP 33:40 um which is again uh individual members forecast um and um and forward guidance 33:47 um again you know we are um we're moving um in a deliberate way 33:53 and in a data dependent way and so you know we we are going to continue taking 33:58 into account um how the economy is evolving um what's happening with inflation 34:03 what's happening with the labor market as we go um so in that sense um you know I think uh there's been 34:10 clarity about what our goals are um and our resolve and we've taken really strong action and shown that 34:16 resolve inflation uh is going to come back to two percent we're going to take 34:22 necessary actions um to get it there um but in terms of exactly what the path 34:27 of policy is that's something that in my mind will benefit um from the incoming data as well as you 34:36 know a sense of uh ongoing evolution of risks in an environment where I think 34:42 uncertainty is clearly very high absolutely um 34:48 we've been through quite a bit over the last dozen years we've had 34:54 we've had covid we've had a repo event we've had lots and lots of shocks to the 35:01 system how do you think the reforms that were implemented following the GFC are 35:08 doing well um so critically important I think 35:14 that um the resilience in the banking sector was greatly improved following 35:20 um the great financial crisis um and you've seen the benefit of that 35:26 as we've been able to um stress test Banks throughout pandemic 35:31 and now of course um uh coming into a more period and that 35:39 has I think both helped with Market transparency but also just the 35:45 resilience of liquidity and capital at the core financial institutions the 35:52 banks now we have seen um more um Financial amplification outside of 35:59 the core banking system so you know the nbfi sector was a huge source of 36:06 amplification both in the GFC and in the 36:12 pandemic stress period And so reforms there I think are ongoing but certainly 36:17 the visibility had improved somewhat um and the cooperation among authorities 36:23 across borders and in the U.S across multiple Regulators had improved a lot so you know I think what it suggested 36:30 was we had made some really important progress particularly on resilience in 36:35 the banking system but we still have work to do and particularly outside of 36:40 the mbfi sector and including the most opaque parts of that sector 36:46 right um so sticky inflation 36:52 um one of them one of the biggest stickiest parts of inflation is rent 36:57 um and we are starting to see some significant slowdowns in the housing 37:02 market house prices um maybe even some inflection points on 37:08 um on on high frequency rent indicators what are your thoughts on 37:14 um that part of inflation um coupled with maybe some of the 37:19 challenges that might rise as we start to see some difficulties in the housing 37:25 market yeah so um that um uh that the 37:31 housing part of core Services I generally 37:36 anticipate will be sticky and in general um just based on past patterns 37:44 um expect for services to be a sort of bigger contributor to inflation 37:50 um you know in this in this period and so that's why the focus on poor Goods 37:55 would be so great uh to see core Goods um playing more disinflationary role um you know which which it could well do 38:03 given um that core import prices um will help out put a bit there 38:08 um and inventories are starting to get better but um but within housing I think the Dynamics 38:15 that you just talked about are exactly right so mortgage rates have gone up a lot and house prices 38:21 um are you know growing more slowly and will soon are likely on aggregate to to 38:26 be flat um and in those parts of the country you saw the biggest um house uh house price appreciation 38:33 we've actually seen some declines what that means for rents though is a little bit complicated because some people who 38:39 you know might be first-time homebuyers with these mortgage rates are you know not perhaps going to be renting longer 38:47 um so you might see some additional demand there um and uh as you said while high 38:52 frequency indicators of of rent um you know may be starting to see a bit 38:57 of a Slowdown which will be really important um average rents take longer because 39:03 those uh those rents are only renegotiated slowly so it's we assume there's going to be some stickiness 39:09 um in that Housing Services portion obviously not as big for pce as for CPI 39:17 but that's why it's important to see some um you know some less pressure elsewhere 39:24 so just following on on the housing market and and actually this is the commercial MBS Market 39:31 um there's a question does stress in the commercial MBS Market due to higher rates cause concern for proceeding with 39:38 balance sheet reduction yeah so I think um um feel pretty good 39:46 then has um gotten off the ground so far um and of course we're monitoring those 39:53 markets um very closely as I mentioned earlier we have a dashboard of indicators that we thought 39:58 um you know were particularly with the benefit of hindsight valuable in the first episode of QT so we're monitoring 40:05 that dashboard really quickly um really closely so my sense is you 40:11 know so far um we're seeing uh the kind of absorption that you would wish to see 40:18 but we are aware um that you know this is a moment where 40:24 liquidity is somewhat strange and so we're we're going to remain alert to that possibility 40:29 foreign the fed's regulatory stress testing 40:34 scenarios do not feature stagflationary scenarios what do we know about our 40:40 financial systems resilience to such outcomes yeah so I would say that first 40:46 of all we have done a whole variety of different um scenarios over the years and we did 40:52 have a bit of that flavor in the 2018 stress test we learned a lot from those stress tests in 2018. 40:59 um the other thing is that you know we have the ability to do kind of top-down exercises that are more just to inform 41:06 ourselves what environments might be more difficult for banking system 41:12 resilience than others and so we're able to look at a variety of different kinds of environments in in that and we do 41:20 um and you know I think that is uh the kind of an environment where you see 41:25 um you know interest rates going up by a lot more than expected and Rising credit 41:31 losses is a complicated environment with some offsetting effects depending on the business model of the bank but we 41:37 certainly um you know we certainly want to be aware of how that would play out and so 41:43 we do a bunch of internal analysis to just make sure we're we understand how 41:49 different environments could affect different kinds of institutions so fair or not some people have been 41:55 dusting off their analysis of the 1970s to try to get a sense of what can the 42:01 Central Bank do Etc and certainly there's a lot of uh talking about uh 42:06 Paul volcker and what Paul volcker did a question I would have is given the debt 42:12 levels today in the U.S economy can we do can we have another Volker fed with 42:19 the debt dynamics that we have today yeah so I think when we think about 42:24 um the 1970s um and then the 1980s importantly I think there are a variety of um 42:31 important um differences and lessons um and and I'll get to the debt point in 42:37 a second but you know what's different now well first of all I think there's a general 42:43 um understanding uh that monetary policy has both the capacity and the 42:49 responsibility to get inflation down that wasn't clear when uh the inflationary shocks happened in the 42:55 1970s it's a very widely accepted tenant and we certainly 43:01 um you know we we take it very very seriously that we have the resolves at the resolve and the tools another huge 43:08 difference um is uh that um inflation expectations were 43:14 unanchored in the 1970s and so you saw some really 43:19 um some really uh toxic um uh dynamics of high inflation 43:25 becoming entrenched and leading to higher of inflation again we carefully 43:33 carefully monitor a whole variety of measures of inflation expectations you 43:38 know and we have seen those moving to ranges that were um you know prevalent prior to the 43:45 pandemic which suggests that you know there is an understanding out there that inflation is going to come back down 43:52 um so those are those are enormous uh advantages that I think uh will help 43:58 with the fight against inflation today in terms of debt levels I mean one of 44:04 the interesting things uh that's different about this stress period the pandemic then perhaps past Cycles is 44:13 that a lot of the fiscal support was actually used in ways that improved both 44:18 business balance sheets and household balance sheets so coming into this tightening period you actually have 44:26 healthier household balance sheets and businesses that have better debt 44:32 servicing on average and so that gives us a bit of a better starting point than 44:39 you might have seen otherwise because obviously those credit Aggregates are very important for thinking about 44:45 potential Financial stability complications so if we think about the U.S corporate 44:53 sector today they are pretty close to Peak profitability as a share of of U.S GDP 45:01 and income and the capex levels that we've seen out of the corporate sector is actually 45:07 pretty pretty close to you know all-time lows um 45:12 do you think that the corporate sector is going to be investing reinvesting to 45:18 address some of the shortages some of the labor market tightness Etc going 45:23 forward well so there I think um obviously in a rising interest rate 45:29 environment there's um it makes it more difficult for some of those Capital plans to be execute on so we recognize 45:35 there's that macro effect but when we talk to businesses in different sectors at kind of the micro level there's a lot 45:43 of really interesting investment that is going on some of it uh supported 45:49 um for instance you know the semiconductor area and the energy transition area both you 45:55 know supported by recent changes um in in law so you know my sense is 46:02 there are areas where there's tremendous uh interest and over a longer period of 46:08 time you know you'll see quite quite fundamental and important Investments that will go to some of the challenges 46:16 that the nation clearly faced during this last period both on the energy 46:22 front on the climate front and on key intermediate inputs 46:29 to end this discussion thinking about total Factor productivity and how wonderful it is for the U.S economy and 46:36 the wonderful role that the central bank bank plays in making sure that we stay on that path so thank you very much for 46:43 taking some time with us thank you.