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文字起こし 00:00 hello and welcome to new economic 00:01 thinking I'm here this afternoon with 00:03 Professor Marc love wah professor of 00:05 economics at the University of Ottawa 00:06 and a friend Marc it's good to see you 00:09 yes I've I wanted to have you on your 00:12 new economics textbook has come out the 00:15 post came post-keynesian economics new 00:17 foundations there have been a lot of 00:19 things that have been discredited in the 00:22 wake of the 2008 crisis including the 00:24 way we teach economics so this new book 00:27 is a welcome addition hopefully it will 00:29 change the way we think about economics 00:31 and the way we teach it what do you 00:33 think is the main difference between 00:35 your book and a shall we say a 00:37 mainstream economics textbook that we 00:40 might be seeing in most universities 00:41 those days well first it starts with 00:43 methodology in which you don't see too 00:46 often in the usual mainstream mainstream 00:50 books in a sense it tries to cover both 00:54 microeconomics and macroeconomics so 00:57 from that point of view it's not that 00:59 different but it deals with ideas that 01:03 are different for instance there's 01:06 there's a big discussion about what is 01:09 fundamental or radical uncertainty try 01:13 to explain the difference from risk 01:15 which can be can be measured with 01:18 probabilities then it has a different 01:21 picture of the firm and the firm is seen 01:25 as something that looks that is looking 01:29 more for growth rather than profits that 01:31 is looking more for power and growth is 01:34 the means to acquire that power so 01:37 there's a political economy dimension 01:39 which is actually neglected in economics 01:41 there's a notion that somehow you can 01:43 detach politics we make no ones which i 01:45 think is about as realistic as detaching 01:47 numbers from arithmetic it's a good way 01:49 to put it but I I wanted to get back to 01:53 these some of the ideas you've 01:54 introduced see the the radical 01:56 uncertainty notion because economics has 01:59 had a hard time dealing with that and in 02:01 many respects has made assumptions about 02:04 radical uncertainty which other 02:06 disciplines such as neuroscience and 02:09 psychology have disproved interestingly 02:11 enough the pre 02:13 Samuelsson economists notably Keynes I 02:15 think we're much more comfortable 02:17 dealing with the notion of radical 02:18 uncertainty and animal spirits for 02:20 example well yes and the standard 02:23 textbook assumes that people have 02:25 so-called rational expectations but I 02:28 would say the the worst in those books 02:30 is that not only do they assume that but 02:33 they assume that everybody knows exactly 02:35 how the economy functions and they 02:38 assume that everybody has the same 02:41 assumptions about how the economy 02:42 functions whereas in reality that's now 02:47 how people don't know exactly how the 02:49 economy functions you just look at what 02:52 happens to your neighbor or you are you 02:55 look at what happens to your sales and 02:57 adaptive expectations come into play 03:00 which was of course a key inside of 03:01 Minsky exactly and and then you you try 03:06 to you try to refer to your inventories 03:12 you you know so you look at your own 03:17 situation you don't assume that you know 03:20 exactly what's going on in the future 03:21 and what does that mean in terms of how 03:24 you teach economics if you given the 03:29 realities of radical uncertainty I mean 03:31 you always discussed it in the book so 03:33 well I would say that most people the 03:37 way I teach economics I'm not that quite 03:39 sure I teach economics I think in the 03:41 same way as others I'm using models I'm 03:43 using some equations it's just that the 03:47 assumptions will be different I dare say 03:51 that I hope that what I teach is more 03:54 realistic than what many of my 03:58 neoclassical colleagues would teach one 04:00 thing I've noticed and I've read a 04:02 number of your papers I learned a lot 04:05 from them in your particularly I've 04:08 found in your discussions of money and 04:10 banking you take a strongly 04:12 institutional approach by that I mean I 04:14 think you you look at reality you look 04:16 the way things are actually are grounded 04:18 and you construct models on them on the 04:20 basis of that when I was doing macro 04:23 economics 101 for example 04:25 you know we have the the idealized model 04:27 of the fractional reserve system and 04:30 loans can float out of that system and 04:33 then you have this little thing called 04:34 finance which was like a footnote well 04:37 nowadays of course about 75% of all 04:40 credit into mediations done through 04:42 financial as opposed to traditional 04:44 banking channels and I think the the 04:47 bank model that is described in the 04:49 economics textbook is inaccurate you 04:51 describe a model which i think is much 04:53 more accurately the so called overdraft 04:55 economy as opposed to the fractional 04:57 reserve model of economy so you want to 05:00 elaborate on that a little bit well I 05:05 think that perhaps the the part of the 05:07 book which is has the most institutional 05:10 content is the part that describes how 05:13 the central banks relate with the 05:15 government's and how the central banks 05:17 relate with the banking system I 05:20 wouldn't dare to say that I managed to 05:23 explain the so called shadow banking 05:25 system as well as someone like Aaron 05:28 Merlin for instance but you do talk 05:30 about for example the concept of 05:32 horizontal and vertical money which i 05:33 think is an important insight well 05:36 that's exactly I there's a bit of fair 05:40 discussion I think for the links between 05:43 the payment system declaring a 05:46 settlement system its links with the 05:48 central bank and its links with the 05:51 government and I think this is essential 05:53 in in the understanding how the central 05:56 bank manages to set rates of interest 06:00 and also on the other hand how banks or 06:03 the financial system at large is 06:05 relatively independent from the central 06:08 bank in deciding on the amount of 06:11 credits and money deposits that it will 06:14 create in the economy whereas the 06:16 standard story is that the central bank 06:19 somehow sets the level of reserves and 06:22 that this determines the amount of 06:24 monetary aggregates in the economy and 06:26 so remember you're doing a presentation 06:28 in Toronto a few years ago and you use 06:30 the example of the great financial 06:33 crisis of 2008 to precisely show but the 06:36 traditional models were 06:38 or incorrect because of course them the 06:40 banks weren't that central banks weren't 06:42 really setting a reserve rate in the way 06:44 that the textbook subscribe well yes the 06:47 the crisis gave rise to a lot of changes 06:50 in the standard thinking about how 06:55 monetary policy is being implemented and 06:57 how this deposit credit reserve nexus 07:02 works out but even us from the 07:04 post-keynesian point of view we had to 07:06 slightly modify our views for instance 07:09 we used to say that it's the amount of 07:12 credits that generates the exact amount 07:15 of reserves in the system so the 07:17 causality was going straightforwardly 07:20 from credits to deposits to central bank 07:23 reserves now with quantitative easing 07:28 and all that we discovered that well if 07:31 the central bank is giving itself a rate 07:35 of interest which is at the floor of its 07:38 corridor then the central bank is able 07:41 to set whatever amount of reserves in 07:44 the system that it wants and still be 07:46 able to control the rate of interest 07:48 right now maybe it's not so obvious 07:50 because as you know the federal funds 07:53 rate or the overnight rate in many 07:55 countries is next to zero but I'm sure 07:59 you know you know maybe in a couple of 08:01 years or in a few months 08:03 the Fed or whatever other central bank 08:06 will start raising the target rate of 08:09 interest and I believe in others in 08:12 central banks believe that they will be 08:15 able to do so despite keeping their very 08:19 large balance sheet yes and in fact them 08:23 there's a lot of people as you point out 08:25 very early on among some who say that 08:27 now that you've got this new 08:30 institutionalized structure recognized 08:33 you know the central bank as some dealer 08:35 or counterparties last resort that the 08:39 idea that were somehow going to shrink 08:41 the balance sheets and go back to the 08:42 way things were before is probably 08:44 unrealistic and I'm not even sure it's 08:46 desirable 08:47 well I don't even think that it's they 08:49 need to do it so there's nobody just 08:53 drink I don't think I don't think so 08:55 they don't need and on the other hand it 08:57 will also be helpful for the government 09:00 because all these bonds government bonds 09:03 or guarantee securities that the central 09:05 bank is holding well ditch this means 09:08 that it's less it's a smaller amount of 09:11 interest payments that the government 09:13 has to make to rent ears so this is 09:16 helping the government to have a smaller 09:20 deficit so the euthanasia of the rentier 09:24 might be a Keynesian prediction I want 09:28 to change topics just a little bit you 09:30 did some work with the late great wind 09:32 oddly on sectoral balances I've often 09:36 thought that if the Europeans in 09:39 particular or the the people help this 09:41 one of mana Michael maniacal focus on 09:43 fiscal austerity actually looked at the 09:47 world through this sectoral balances 09:49 frame where we might have a more 09:50 rational policymaking discussion why 09:54 don't you just briefly outline the 09:56 sectoral balanced approach that God that 09:59 because it's so crucial developing well 10:02 the sectoral balanced approach starts 10:05 from the national identities and we just 10:09 rearrange it in a way that well for 10:16 instance we we look at what is the 10:20 balance of the private sector what is 10:24 the financial balance of the government 10:26 sector which is then the government 10:29 surplus or government deficit and what 10:31 is the external balance so that's a good 10:34 radio equipment once we put into the 10:36 current account balance and we know that 10:38 the sum of those three things has to be 10:40 equal to zero but at any given time any 10:44 one of those sectors can run a deficit 10:46 or a surplus product a--they another 10:48 sector is prepared to accommodate it 10:50 exactly so if you make some predictions 10:53 regarding the about the financial 10:56 balance of the private sector 10:58 and you already know what's the 11:00 situation of the order likely situation 11:04 of the external sector then you have a 11:06 good idea of what's going to be the 11:08 deficit or the surplus of the government 11:12 and then if your if your predictions 11:18 about these various things don't add up 11:20 then it means one of your assumptions is 11:23 wrong and I think it's a if we had 11:25 looked at national economies more on 11:29 that sort of a framework before 2008 we 11:31 might have had been able to get to grips 11:33 with the the problems that we 11:36 subsequently experienced for for example 11:39 countries like Spain and Ireland for 11:42 example had very good good is probably 11:46 problem were to use but they think they 11:47 their public sector balance were roughly 11:50 he's doing with their public levels of 11:53 debt were small and so everyone who 11:54 thought would have thought on the 11:55 conventional notion that public property 11:57 is bad that these are great countries 12:00 their models before but there was little 12:03 sensitivity to the huge buildup in 12:05 private sector debt which would have 12:07 been picked up had there been more 12:08 focused on this sectoral balanced 12:10 approach well yes you you know I had 12:13 many discussions about this with wind 12:15 Godley so he was more optimistic than I 12:18 was I must say on the usefulness of 12:22 these balances I mean it's highly useful 12:24 as I said to identify whether or not 12:26 you're making a very bad forecast with 12:28 respect to one of the balances or one of 12:31 the assumptions about economic growth 12:33 and so on his forecasting record would 12:35 suppose remarkably could compared to 12:36 most UK colobus maybe that was a cause 12:40 for his optimism yes people use my 12:43 methodology you know well and it has 12:46 been used by companies like Goldman 12:48 Sachs and it is now generalized I mean 12:52 it's not something that when God Lee 12:53 himself invented because it's a national 12:57 account identity but he's certainly the 13:01 the person who emphasized it most and 13:03 who induced other people to discover it 13:07 and to use it and as I said now in many 13:10 financial offices 13:12 they are using this to better understand 13:15 what's going on let me go back to the 13:18 the textbook and generally the the 13:20 teaching of economics if there is one or 13:24 two things that you felt needed to be 13:26 changed in terms of the way that 13:28 economic students is taught anywhere 13:30 what would they be liking the easy 13:33 questions no not an easy question I well 13:39 I I think that if we're talking about 13:42 macroeconomics I think the the crucial 13:45 issue is whether or not you believe in 13:48 the natural rate of unemployment and 13:50 this is tied in with the belief in the 13:53 existence of a natural rate of interest 13:57 so I I think this is the the crucial 14:00 issue because if you think that there is 14:03 a natural rate of unemployment out there 14:06 that if you ever get away from it if 14:09 your rate of unemployment is too low 14:11 that this will drive up inflation and 14:14 therefore induce the central bank to 14:16 pursue restrictive restrictive economic 14:19 policies then there is nothing to do you 14:23 know if you think that whenever you know 14:28 you will consider that all you want is 14:31 price stability and this is what 14:33 happened during the Great Moderation the 14:36 obsession was with this and this of 14:38 course this is partly the so-called 14:41 nayru area it's very much part of that 14:45 and it's linked with all the rest which 14:47 is that if the rate of unemployment is 14:50 too high it is because workers are 14:55 shirking or don't want to work enough or 14:57 because the tax tax rates are too high 15:00 and in fact we are here in the OECD 15:03 building and this is what the OECD keeps 15:08 telling the the countries for instance 15:11 France right now they say well you need 15:14 to have a more flexible labor market and 15:16 this will help you reduce the rate of 15:19 employment of unemployment but from I 15:22 think you may be inadvertently correct 15:24 first time because in fact usually in 15:26 the absence of any aggregate demand 15:28 improvement see me all these supply-side 15:29 befores will do is effectively create 15:31 more unemployment because you're going 15:33 to be firing workers or making it easier 15:34 to fire work and this is what in the 15:36 book this is what I try to emphasize I 15:38 exercise all these Demian aspects that 15:42 the economy is essentially demand led 15:46 both in the short run which is something 15:49 that most of our New King James 15:51 colleagues or Marxist colleagues would 15:54 agree with like Paul Krugman and so on 15:56 but post-keynesian also believe in argue 16:00 and there's a lot of evidence about this 16:02 now following the crisis that aggregate 16:05 demand also drives the economy in the 16:07 long run for instance it is being 16:11 realized now that potential output is 16:14 much lower you know six years after the 16:17 financial crisis then it was supposed to 16:20 be measured in 2008 and this is because 16:25 aggregate demand has suddenly fallen and 16:29 and and this induces our fall in the 16:32 aggregate supply which is being 16:34 generated so the way to pick it pick it 16:38 back up is to have expansionary policies 16:41 to increase aggregate demand so you 16:45 don't bind the the secular stagnation 16:48 doctrine which has become increasingly 16:50 popular you wouldn't you would argue 16:52 that it it's a it's a function of the 16:54 deficient aggregate demand to a large 16:56 extent well there's a bit of truth in it 16:59 I mean the argument of Summers is that 17:02 there's been a slowdown in population so 17:05 yes you know I would buy that look at 17:09 what happens in Japan there's very 17:12 little growth but on the other hand 17:13 their output per capita has been growing 17:17 so to some extent the low growth in 17:20 Japan is also due to the fact that 17:21 there's no growth in population so you 17:25 know it's it's just that all I'm saying 17:27 is that yeah supply-side factors do have 17:30 an impact like the rate of growth of 17:32 population but aggregate demand 17:35 is a key component of what happens to 17:38 the economy and and this is true also in 17:42 the long run let me ask you what other 17:45 metric we often we use the metric of 17:49 growth in GDP it's been in quite a 17:51 popular metric since the Second World 17:53 War I guess we wanted to measure how 17:54 well how much output we were producing 17:56 to win a war but it wasn't to use very 17:59 commonly in fact I don't think it was 18:01 used at all before that period and I'm 18:05 wondering if that kind of a metric best 18:08 captures what we should be looking at I 18:13 mean there are people like Joe Stiglitz 18:14 for example we're talking about really 18:15 using different kinds of metrics to 18:16 measure overall national prosperity with 18:19 them what are your thoughts I don't have 18:21 much of an opinion on this frankly you 18:26 know no it's not discussed in the book 18:28 and it's a tough 18:31 I mean GDP is you know it's about the 18:34 best as we can is it's an indicator of 18:37 what's going on but yeah for sure it's 18:41 not the optimal indicator that that one 18:45 would wish for but I'm not I'm not so 18:48 sure that we can do much better and and 18:51 and do you think we should be teaching 18:54 economics in a way that helps to embrace 18:56 other for other social sciences for 18:58 example of it given that we have these 19:00 these we gain these move new insights 19:02 but uncertainty for example from 19:05 neurosciences in psychology is one 19:07 example oh well yeah I mean we can 19:11 always benefit a bit from the other 19:13 sciences but I must admit that in the 19:16 book there's not that I mean the purpose 19:18 of the book was to give to you know 19:23 students PhD students or fourth-year 19:26 students give them an idea of what this 19:29 alternative called post-keynesian 19:30 economics look like because you know 19:33 today people look search on on the web 19:37 they get some indications they hear 19:39 about it in particular through modern 19:41 monetary theory but they they don't you 19:45 know they need something 19:46 who puts it all together and that was 19:49 the purpose of the book the purpose of 19:51 the book was to to give a survey of what 19:54 is post-keynesian economics today 19:57 because I had done it 20 years earlier 19:59 but of course a lot has changed over the 20:02 last 20 years and has the book gained 20:05 reasonably good acceptance in academic 20:08 circles it's likely to be reflected in 20:11 the curriculum of many well in the 20:16 curricula of departments that have some 20:19 heterodox courses I with the University 20:22 of Ottawa or others but yeah the book I 20:28 think it is successful because it's 20:30 already in a paperback version which is 20:34 a good sign it means that it is selling 20:36 well enough no I don't think so it's 20:43 well look III have i have read parts of 20:47 the book and i've also benefitted from 20:49 your teaching for many many years 20:52 Thank You Marshall I just want to thank 20:55 you for coming to be with us today and I 20:58 do hope that more people do embrace this 21:00 type of teaching in because I think it's 21:01 in table 2 new economic thinking 21:03 self-love well thanks very much for 21:04 being with me today Thank You Marshall 21:06 hurricane 英語 (自動生成)