イザベラ・ウェーバー Whither Inflation? - Round Table I 2022/12/07
https://love-and-theft-2014.blogspot.com/2022/12/whither-inflation-round-table-i20221207.html @
https://www.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/2133355681582705445/6608351367632860688
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https://twitter.com/stephaniekelton/status/1600635863330848770?s=61&t=8EnHYCUF4TKrMPNeU55frw
Stephanie Kelton @Stephanie Kelton-1/10/19
The entire point of MMT/Functional Finance is to balance the risks of
accelerating inflation against the benefits of full employment. It is about
analyzing resource constraints (ex ante) and *avoiding* stimulus beyond
those limits.
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t 150
Stephanie Kelton @Stephanie Kelton-1/10/19
The budgeting process itself must take into account capacity
constraints. If you're writing about MMT and complaining it will be hard
to raise taxes to fight *ex post* inflation, you're assuming into existence
a problem that MMT/Functional Finance explicitly combats *ex ante*.
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1 39
Stephanie Kelton
@Stephanie Kelton
351
12:12 PM 1/10/19 Twitter Web Client
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So imagine you had government agencies identifying new
projects/evaluating new spending programs (e.g. a National
Resources Planning Board or a National Investment
Authority or if CBO was doing input-output analysis and
scoring inflation risk).
私自身の思考におけるLeontiefの産業連関モデルの位置づけ。今、@IsabellaMWeberとその共著者たちの新しい研究によって、この方向に真の進歩が見られるかもしれませんね。
Stephanie Kelton @Stephanie Kelton-1／10／19 MMT／Functional Financeの要点は、インフレ加速のリスクと完全雇用のメリットのバランスをとることです。資源制約を分析し、その限界を超えた刺激を避けることである。18 t 150
Stephanie Kelton @Stephanie Kelton-1／10／19 予算編成のプロセス自体が、キャパシティーの制約を考慮しなければならない。もしあなたがMMTについて書いていて、*事後的*なインフレに対抗するために増税するのは難しいと文句を言うなら、MMT／機能的財政が*事前的*に明示的に対抗する問題を存在させていることになりますよ。97 1 39
Stephanie Kelton @Stephanie Kelton 351 12:12 PM 1／10／19 Twitter Web Client 112 では、新しいプロジェクトを特定し、新しい支出プログラムを評価する政府機関（例えば、国家資源計画委員会や国家投資庁、あるいはCBOが産業連関分析やインフレリスクのスコアリングを行っている場合）があるとします。
https://love-and-theft-2014.blogspot.com/2022/12/stephanie-keltonthe-place-of-leontiefs.html
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https://twitter.com/slowslow2772/status/1603211108155678721?s=61&t=8EnHYCUF4TKrMPNeU55frw
Whither Inflation? - Round Table I
2022/12/07
https://youtu.be/PV2LGCXGf74?t=40m18s
28:30 ~ 48:18
Inflation in Times of Overlapping Emergencies
Isabella M. Weber
Whither Inflation? - Round Table I
Recently, inflation, i.e., the change in prices for goods and services over time, has become one of the main concerns for the
global economy. In this round table the timely topic of inflation was explored in detail by a panel of global economists: Torsten
Bell of the Resolution Foundation; Yeva Nersisyan, Franklin and Marshall College; and Isabella Weber, University of
Massachusetts Amherst. Chaired and convened by IIPP Associate Professor in Economics, Dr Carolina Alves.
近年、インフレ、すなわち財やサービスの価格が時間とともに変化することが、世界経済における主要な懸念事項の一つとなっています。今回のラウンドテーブルでは、このタイムリーなトピックであるインフレについて、世界的なエコノミストのパネリストが詳細に検討しました。トーステン・ベル（レゾリューション財団）、イェバ・ネルシシャン（フランクリン＆マーシャル大学）、イザベラ・ウェーバー（マサチューセッツ大学アマースト校）の3氏です。司会進行は、IIPP経済学准教授のカロリナ・アルベス博士が務めました。
4:23~27:45
Soft Landing or Stagflation?
Monetary Policy in the Time of a Pandemic
Yeva Nersisyan
28:30 ~ 48:18
Inflation in Times of Overlapping Emergencies
Isabella M. Weber
48:55~1:12:22
Whither Inflation?
Torsten Bell
4:26~27:45
Soft Landing or Stagflation?
Monetary Policy in the Time of a Pandemic
Yeva Nersisyan
Associate Professor, Franklin and Marshall College
Research Scholar, Levy Economics Institute
ソフトランディングかスタグフレーションか？Yeva Nersisyan フランクリン・アンド・マーシャル大学准教授 Levy Economics Institute リサーチスカラー
28:30~48:18
Inflation in Times of Overlapping Emergencies
Systemically Significant Prices from an Input-output Perspective
Isabella M. Weber, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Jesús Lara Jauregui, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Lucas Teixeira, University of Campinas
Luiza Nassif, University of Sao Paulo
IIPP UCL, December 7, 2022
緊急事態が重なった時のインフレ率 産業連関の視点から見たシステム上重要な物価の変化
イザベラ・M・ウェーバー
マサチューセッツ大学
アマースト マサチューセッツ大学 Jesús Lara Jauregui ルーカス・テイシェイラ カンピーナス大学 Luiza Nassif サンパウロ大学 IIPP UCL、2022年12月7日開催
Conclusion
• If price shocks become systemic, it is not feasible to react with rate hikes
each time a shock hits a systemically significant sector.
Economic stabilization requires disaster preparedness to absorb shocks in
systemically significant sectors. This requires a change in mindset and
monitoring capacity as well as institutions and laws for emergency price
management which can involve buffer stocks, regulation of financial
speculation, prohibition of price gouging, anti trust measures, limits to price
hikes, investments and a standby authority for emergency price stabilization
in systemically significant sectors.
If systemically significant sectors are so important that they can unsettle the
whole economy, the public needs a say (central banks were once private).
Anti-Trust measures limits to price
hikes Investments to increase
結論
・価格ショックがシステミックになった場合、ショックがシステミックに重要なセクターを襲うたびに利上げで対応することは不可能である。
・経済の安定化には、システム上重要なセクターの衝撃を吸収するための災害対策が必要である。そのためには、緊急価格管理のための制度や法律だけでなく、考え方や監視能力の変革が必要であり、それにはバッファストック、金融投機の規制、価格操作の禁止、反信託措置、価格引き上げの制限、投資、システム上重要なセクターの緊急価格安定のための待機機関などが含まれる。
・システム上重要な部門が経済全体を不安定にするほど重要であれば、国民が発言する必要がある（中央銀行はかつて民間銀行だった）。独占禁止法 値上げの制限 投資の増加
Whither Inflation?
UCL IIPP Research Seminar
Torsten Bell, Chief Executive, Resolution Foundation
@resfoundation
インフレはどこへ行くのか？UCL IIPP Research Seminar トーステン・ベル、レゾリューション財団最高責任者 @resfoundation
so this is our last seminar of the term so we have a round table with three you know amazing presenters I'm gonna get
that soon so I just want you to say that the research seminar at IPP is happening every happening every other Wednesday
although next term it may be on Tuesdays but okay uh so we're trying to discuss
uh or trying to make that bridge between research and policy and we are
challenging or looking through the challenges we're facing right now from like green transition
climate change uh also the role of the stage obviously the issue of inflation
which has been a problem in the last should I say a year yeah I think so yeah and uh in in the
implications that that has uh for the entire Society including of course the poorest households which we're also
going to unpack that a little bit so yeah so thank you very much for coming so our first Speaker would be yeva
nurses nursian uh thank you very much for being here yeah his associate
professor of Economics at Franklin and Marshall College in a research scholar at the living economics Institute of
Bard College she has a PHD in economics and Mathematics from the University of
Missouri Kansas City city thank you so she is a macroeconomist working in
modern money Theory mmt plus Keynesian and institutionalist traditions her
research interests include um interests include Banking and Financial instability fiscal and
monetary Theory and policy and she has also published a number of papers on the
topics of Shadow banking fiscal policy government deficits and debt and the
green New Deal currently however is co-editing the Elgar companion of modern
Monet Theory with Rondo Ray so that's we're very looking forward to this um so
then we have Isabella Weber our next speaker who is a political Economist who work on China global trade in the
history of economic thought she's assistant professor of Economics at University of Massachusetts I hate the
word amarest and the research leader for China at political economy Research Institute Isabella holds a PhD in
economics from the new school and also from Cambridge and she was a visiting research at TC to single University
China I assume so her first book how China escaped shock therapy the market
reform debates the winner of the John Robinson price 2021 and also was awarded
the best book of many 2021 lists around the globe and I am more recently
Isabella has been involved with the public debate in inflation in advising the government the German government
regarding the gas price break which they're adopting recently and finally
we have here with us tours and Bell in person so he's the only one who is Rio today who is less exotic it's like yeah
that's exciting really and Torsten is a chief executive of the resolution
Foundation I think tank here in UK that combines analytical regrowth policy
prescription to improve the living standards of those in Britain on low to Middle incomes and it's a fantastic
foundation you should check it out everything they do he has a background in economics economic policy and his
research focuses on economic change inequality the labor market tax and
benefits and wealth prior to Leading the resolution for the foundation torson was the director of police for the labor
party I didn't know about that I've lost a lot of Elections anyone wants advice I've got it
he also worked for the treasury as a member of the currency of economic advisors doing the financial crisis in
as a civil servant fantastic your National bank's also done that Torsten is a trustee of the child
poverty Action Group in a fellow of the Academy of social sciences so I'm sorry for taking long to introduce them but I
think that I want to show how especially that evening is and how we have probably here the one of the best Scholars and
and intellectuals to talk about inflation today so yes if I'm passing
the floor to you thank you.
9+ アバターの画像
これが今学期最後のセミナーですので、3 人の素晴らしいプレゼンターとの円卓会議を開催します。すぐに発表するので、IPP での研究セミナーは毎回行われていることをお伝えしたいと思います隔週の水曜日ですが、次の学期は火曜日になるかもしれませんが、まあ、私たちは議論しようとしている、または研究と政策の間の橋渡しをしようとしています。気候変動の移行 ええと、ステージの役割も明らかに、過去に問題となったインフレの問題です。1年と言えばいいでしょうか。ええ、ええ、もちろん社会全体に影響を与えるという意味ではそう思います。私たちが最も貧しい世帯をまた、それを少し開梱するつもりです。そうそう、来てくれてありがとう。私たちの最初の講演者は看護師のイェヴァですバード カレッジの生活経済学研究所で、彼女はミズーリ大学カンザス シティ市で経済学と数学の博士号を取得しています。ありがとうございます。彼女はマクロ経済学者であり、現代の貨幣理論に加えて、ケインジアンと制度主義の伝統に取り組んでいます。また、彼女は、シャドーバンキングの財政政策、政府の赤字と債務、およびグリーンニューディールのトピックに関する多くの論文も発表していますが、現在、エルガーの仲間のロンド・レイによる現代のモネ理論なので、私たちはこれを非常に楽しみにしているので、経済思想の歴史の中で中国の世界貿易に取り組んでいる政治経済学者であるイザベラ・ウェーバーを次のスピーカーに迎えます。マサチューセッツ大学の経済学助教授 私はアマレストという言葉が嫌いで、政治経済研究所の中国の研究リーダー イザベラは新しい学校とケンブリッジで経済学の博士号を取得しており、彼女は TC で単一の大学への客員研究員でした中国私は、彼女の最初の本である中国がどのようにショック療法を免れたか、市場改革について議論し、2021 年のジョン・ロビンソン価格の勝者を議論し、世界中の多くの 2021 リストの中で最高の本を受賞したと思います。ドイツ政府が最近採用しているガス価格の引き下げについて政府に助言する際のインフレの議論、そして最終的に私たちはツアーとベルと一緒にここにいるので、今日のリオでエキゾチックではないのは彼だけです。 '本当にエキサイティングで、トルステンは解像度財団の最高経営責任者です。私はここ英国のタンクだと思います。分析的な再成長政策の処方箋を組み合わせて、英国の低所得者から中所得者の生活水準を改善しています。すべてをチェックする必要がある素晴らしい財団です。彼は経済学のバックグラウンドを持っています 経済政策と彼の研究は経済変化の不平等に焦点を当てています 労働市場税と利益と富 以前は財団の決議を主導していました トーソンは労働党の警察長官でした 私は知りませんでした私は多くの選挙で負けました誰もがアドバイスを求めています私はそれを知っています彼はまた財務省で金融危機を行っている経済顧問の通貨のメンバーとして働いていましたあなたの国立銀行を素晴らしい公務員として」また、トルステンが社会科学アカデミーのフェローである児童貧困行動グループの理事であることもわかっているので、彼らを紹介するのに時間がかかり申し訳ありませんが、特にその夜がどのようなもので、私たちがどのように過ごしているかを示したいと思います.おそらくここには、今日のインフレについて話す最高の学者や知識人がいるでしょう。
イェバ：
all right so um
I want to talk about the uh current inflation that we are facing today and
my focus is largely on the United States but I think what I say about the US applies uh to a lot of economists
especially developed economies including that of the UK um what I want to look at is whether the
current inflation we're seeing is a demand issue or Supply issue and ultimately what are the kinds of
solutions that we we should be reaching for uh and I'm going to go against the consensus the mainstream consensus and
say that monetary policy is really not the right tool so that's basically my
conclusion and I would say it's not just not the right tool for this current inflationary episode in general I'm
going to argue that monetary policy is not the right tool for inflation period
so um at least in the United States there has been a narrative that's been built
that the current inflation we're seeing is a problem of too much demand and where is this demand coming from it's
because the government added too much stimulus to the economy during covet we
gave stimulus checks to people that was way too much obviously all of the focus is on the stimulus checks that went to
households we don't hear a lot about all the money that went to businesses although a lot of the spending of the
government that went to businesses but that's been the narrative that is a problem of too much demand and we have
to rein in demand to solve our inflation problem um but even when you so when you look at
the uh economy I think a different picture emerges it's a picture of an economy where demand has recovered uh to
the pre-pandemic levels and it has recovered rather quickly compared to our previous situations but it's not a
situation of too much demand even by mainstream standards I would say
um because you know a mainstream Economist and a post case can look at the same economy and they can see different levels of slack right
um you know somebody like me who does mmt would look at the economy uh where
the unemployment rate is say 3.5 and I would say we can still push it even lower and not necessarily get inflation
pressures it's just about the kind of policy we do but even going by mainstream standards right uh is the
economy overheating and is that the reason why we have inflation uh so one way to look at this would be to look at
potential GDP versus actual GDP and this is all in nominal terms so um initially
when the pandemic started uh the Congressional budget office which comes up with this estimates of potential GDP
because that's what they are their estimates they're not observables uh and so they revise their estimates downward
because of the expectation that we were going to have this huge downturn and in downturns our Economist potential gets
eroded because we basically don't use the potential and so uh it gets eroded
that way but then they quickly revise them upward and they kept revising them upward right because of the kind of
recovery that we had which was Stronger which I would attribute to the strong fiscal policy response and so if you
look at these numbers only in the second quarter of 2022 is that is when our
actual GDP went about the potential GDP and that wasn't by by that much right
and obviously inflation had started way before that right so if the argument is that we've reached our Economist
potential right we are spending more then the economy can accommodate then you should have started seeing inflation
pressure starting in you know the middle of 2022 but obviously inflation started way before that and so even by this
measure we hadn't reached our Economist potential until sometime in 2022. now
just because we reached the economy's potential doesn't necessarily mean we have to see inflation and this graph
actually showcases that very well so I have the potential GDP which is the blue
line and then actual GDP which is the red line and on the right hand scale I'm measuring inflation in the inflation
rate which is the Consumer Price Index basically um the change in the Consumer Price
Index year over year and we can see that we had this long period right this was
leading up to the global financial crisis where we had our uh you know we
had reached our potential GDP and we were even over it to some extent for quite a while and our inflation was
hovering around three percent we weren't seeing this runaway you know seven eight nine percent inflation that we are
seeing today and it picked up here uh because we had the commodity speculation so basically when the housing market
crashed a lot of the money that was in the housing market moved to the commodity market and inflated the
Commodities Futures that's why we saw that spike in inflation and then there was the you know very quick downturn and
then inflation stayed very subdued in the aftermath of the global financial crisis so
um you know just because we are we are getting close to potential GDP doesn't mean we necessarily have to see price
pressures and and this is the story that we're getting from mainstream economists right people like Larry Summers Jason
Furman basically saying we stimulated the economy too much got to the potential level overheated and that's
why we're seeing inflation pressures even before kovid right we were very close to our potential we had gotten
there um and the result was not the runaway inflation that you know we we are we are
seeing today one other thing I would say here is that you can also see that this blue line right how its trend went you
know changed in a downward because we did not do appropriate and adequate
policy measures in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and during the Great Recession instead we engaged in
austerity here and obviously it was worse in the UK and you the Eurozone and
that has depressed our economy's potential so in a way the lesson that I'm seeing from these two recessions is
not that we um should not overdo fiscal policy because we're going to get inflation
it's more like if you don't do sufficient then you are lowering your economy's potential and setting it up
for inflationary pressures down the line and I'm happy to answer questions on this if I've when you know if I I'm
being too um you know technical here now the other story we're getting is that
the labor market is too tight right and that's evidenced by the low unemployment rate but of course the unemployment rate
is not the whole story what I have here is the labor force participation rate basically this tells us what percentage
of the population that's eligible to be in the labor force is either working or is unemployed and looking for a job
right so we look at the how much the population let's say 16 and over that's
not in prisons you know that's not institutions of any sort that is participating in the labor force and
what we've been seeing since the 1970s in the US is this gradual decline in labor force participation rate and
obviously this drop since the global financial crisis is quite significant and what we see is that we never
recovered right our economy never recovered back so the people who left the labor force they left it basically
for Good Very you know quite a lot of them stayed out and then we had this very big drop in the uh after month of
covet and we have recovered but we are not even at the pre-pandemic levels right so we haven't even gotten back to
those levels I'm not even talking about this pre-global financial crisis levels right so there is still more room uh to
coax more workers into the labor market right and and for that we need to make sure that the recovery continues that
labor market stays strong right um which is obviously not the policy uh
choice that we are uh taking that's not the policy or what we're taking right now
the other graph that I wanted to show you which kind of also tells the story that we are not having a problem of too
much demand is this graph from the Atlanta Federal Reserve business expectation survey so there instead of
surveying Wall Street people and economists to try to gauge what the inflation expectations are there
actually surveying non-financial businesses large and small and they're
asking them a bunch of questions like how do your sales compare to um to the
norm right and when you look at that you see that businesses are not reporting
sales that are above the norm right uh and then there you one of the questions
they're getting asked is what's going to be the influence of sales in the future
on prices and we can see that that hasn't been above the norm in the
aftermath of the pandemic and in fact that you know value is actually going down right now right so even if you
could make the case that we had a problem of too much demand earlier after
the pandemic that has all played out right so you can't say that we are continuing we are going to continue to
see too much demand to the extent that the fiscal stimulus was contributing to the demand that has all played out in
the United States at least all right now um what is driving the
current inflation um I think there are many factors that are contributing to it
um and I would say they're mostly on the supply side so this is the breakdown of
the CPI the Consumer Price Index by a major component and I think Isabella is going to talk about one of these
components in particular you don't have to be able to read the legend to tell me which one is the green bar right it's
obvious that it's Transportation it's obvious that a lot of it is oil um some of it is car prices which is
related to the shortage of semiconductors and so on so clearly this is a story of particular bottlenecks and
the other line that is the other bar that is quite noticeable is this yellow
one right here and that's rentals right but it's not actual rentals the actual
rentals are this green sorry gray bars that are you know still significant
somewhat but they're not as in important as the yellow ones and the yellow is what we call imputed rentals for housing
so the way so these are not actual prices these are imputed prices and
what's done is that um you know the question is if you're owning your own home like I do for
instance uh how much would I pay to rent the kind of house that I currently own
right so this is for owner occupied homes people who own their homes the question is if they were to rent that
kind of home how much would they pay for it right obviously this is not a good reflection of how much I'm actually
paying because my mortgage has been fixed ever since I got the house right say 10 years ago so this is not an
actual price that people are paying this is just the price that we would be paying if we were to rent homes of you
know the kinds of homes that we have bought and we live in so in some sense
you can see that this unobservable price is quite an important part of the price
index and it's been driving the current inflation the high rate readings of inflation as well
all right but I think to me the main story here is that this is a problem of
oil and if you look at the oil markets um is it a question of too much demand
is it a question of two too little Supply I think it's a little bit of both right so again to me it seems like the
demand has recovered and the supply has not been able to recover at least in the U.S right we are only now getting to the
pre-pandemic levels of oil supply and obviously we can see that OPEC is a big
part of this story right it was a big part of the story in the US in the 1970s when we had the inflationary episode and
it's still a big part of the story today so it you know we haven't taken we we
didn't do it right in the 1970s the policy of say transitioning away from
oil and it seems like where we have where we haven't learned those lessons that we're still not doing the right thing here all right so um the story to
me is a supply Side Story right it's a story of a pandemic that that started as a supply I say crisis morphed into
demand and we have the policy tools to affect demand and for as an mmt
economist I would say we we can Finance demand in unlimited amounts so money is
not a problem the problem is the real resources right so do we have enough real resources and that's where the
supply comes in so the first round of covet covet relief that we did in the US
the fiscal stimulus or Cisco relief I should say it wasn't really stimulus it helped people pay their bills pay up
paid their debts it also increased savings so in a way it was split in
three equal parts a third of it went to uh consumption a third one to saving and a third one to paying debts basically
um and then eventually the last round Resort spending to the pre-covet levels
but at the same time we've continued to see supply side pressures supply chain
issues that companies have been facing in that same survey that I talked about
the Atlanta fed survey when they when companies are asked about price you know supply side disruptions they like the
majority of them were reporting supply-side disruptions as as late as the middle of 2022 still and I think
those things are still continuing there's also the question of pricing right prices don't just happen they are
set by corporations and in the US corporations tell their shareholders
very clearly that they are using the cover of inflation to raise prices right they are actually saying that this is a
great time for our pricing decisions right we can basically take advantage of the situation because there is inflation
and nobody's like going to single us out as or look at this one company that's raising their prices right so they are
using this as an opportunity to raise their prices there's also the issue of of course War the war in Ukraine and and
the sanctions and so on and that's going to be a bigger part of the story in Europe I would say um and that's why I
think we're seeing a higher inflationary pressures in a place like Germany right uh compared even to the United States so
it's not a story of wages driving this right it's not a story of wage price spiral it's wages are just plain catch
up at this point and I so early on I basically were was of the opinion that
this inflationary episode was transitory and I'm still of that opinion that it's transitory even though I think it's
taking longer than I initially thought it was going to take and that's because in the US workers don't really have the
power to force uh firms to compensate them fully for the inflation uh that
they're facing in fact real wages have actually you know not been catching up right so they've decreased in the real
terms pay has all right so I'm going to speed up because I think I'm already at that 15 minute Mark so the question then
is what do we do about it right what can central banks do about this inflation or inflation in general in the US the FED
basic quickly held off for as long as they could but then they were under
strong pressure from economists in particular saying that the FED has to do something about it if it doesn't do it
the inflation cat is going to be out of the bag and there's no way we're going to put it back in you know um
the Fed was called too soft on inflation Larry Summers who was not a part of the
administration trying to sort of influence policy from outside urging the FED to keep raising raids or
great you know the argument was that it should have started earlier and it should have raised them faster stuff like that right
um and and the FED eventually sort of obliged and now they are on a path of interest rate increases right which I
think is not going to end very well the FED of course so economists are definitely to blame for this and I'll
get to that in just a moment again but the FED is also to blame because they have taken credit for the low inflation
in the U.S so they've been happy to take credit for it which I think has been unjustified to great extent
so uh suppo the story is that supposedly Paul volcker the chairman of the FED uh
broke the back of inflation in the 1980s the reality was that he raised interest
rates you know above 20 and caused the Deep recession and financial crisis not
just in the U.S but also abroad something that were again seeing uh happening right now or is potentially
going to happen um they also broke labor unions right that's what happened during Reagan they
broke labor unions they broke the air traffic controller strike and uh and something we're seeing right now in the
US player as well as the strike of railroad workers is being broken again um so the reality I think is that uh
first labor unions lost their power but and we also had this in a related issue was the globalized supply chains the
Outsourcing the cheap labor abroad um we also had this just in time
production largely driven by Wall Street where companies were trying to squeeze every last bit of profit by trying to
keep their costs slow labor costs and otherwise we've also had a fiscal policy
that's been too tight over the last few recoveries so we've had stagnating demand and austerity we had austerity in
the middle of a recession basically after the global financial crisis and so
we've had this jobless recoveries where wage wage pressures have not materialized right the labor market has
been too weak and so that's really what's kept prices low and If the Fed has had any role in all of this it's
been to preemptively raise interest rates to prevent tight labor markets and to prevent wage growth that's been the
role of the fed and they say it if you look at the FED minutes they basically say it that that's what they look at
they look at the labor market once it gets too tight they are going to jump in and start raising interest rates
um now as I said you know economists and economics has a role to play here
obviously and economics has been a terrible guide for monetary policy and for the fed the FED has abandoned the
quantity Theory the monetarist idea that we have to control money supply to fight inflation it's arguable to what extent
they really Embrace that idea some economic historians have argued that it was really
um sort of a cover for raising interest rates to 20 and saying well we're not doing that we're just controlling the
money supply and interest rates are where they are and the current approach is this approach of the new monetary consensus
that the expectations of inflation cause inflation not clear how and that policy
works by controlling expectations right that monetary policy this the you know
the our main approach for controlling inflation is about basically controlling
the expectations of inflation uh of the market and so fed Economist Jeremy Rudd
wrote this very good paper a few years ago where he basically said the FED has no working theory of inflation even fed
officials have basically said said that my cuatha Randall Ray and Dimitri Papa
dimitrio wrote a paper in 1994 saying the FED is Flying Blind and they
recently wrote an update of that saying that the FED is still flying by blind they have really no way of you know they
have no uh Theory adequate theory of inflation so this graph shows you the
inflation expectations long-term and short term and this is the actual inflation right so instead of
expectations driving inflation it's more like expectations eventually converge to
reality right inflate expectations of inflation change when the actual inflation rates change so uh this right
could not have caused that and that's basically the facts theory that the expectations of inflation cause
inflation and that's just uh not uh you know what we're seeing in reality
and this is the Fed actively trying to control inflation like raising rates and
that's the orange line here it's the federal funds rate or the overnight rate and this is actual inflation which you
know it's like active fed is fighting inflation what is it that they're fighting so I will conclude by saying
that the reality of using monetary policy to fight inflation is what mmt
economists have been saying for quite some time and post-kansas too obviously is that
um the FED is using unemployment as a tool to fight inflation and the only good thing to come out of this episode
is that they are actually openly admitting that right here is Jerome Powell saying that there will likely be
some softening of the labor market of labor market conditions but we will keep at it until we're confident the job is
done and it's interesting that he uses the word we will keep at it that's like the title of Paul volcker's book that
keeping at it something like that that he kept at it that despite all the pressure right from labor from from
other parts of the government and so on they kept at it and they got inflation under control uh you know again Powell
says the labor market is just very very very strong very strong right and I would argue that's not what we're seeing
in the data um and uh here is the uh chair sorry
oops chair of the Boston fed that says I do anticipate that accomplishing price
stability will require slower employment growth and a somewhat higher unemployment rate in fact the FED for
cast the unemployment rate to rise from 4.4 to 5 next year right so that's
what's the price that's the price to pay for getting inflation supposedly under control all right
um so I'll just jump to my conclusion in the interest of time I think it's time that we rethink inflation and we also
rethink how we fight it uh the current inflation is not really demand driven and to the extent that monetary policy
can do anything about inflation it's not about expectations it's really about just lowering aggregate demand right it
can solve our supply problems so the only thing it can do is to try to tighten demand and that's what we're
doing and all of this happens as fiscal tightening is happening right we have our president
um basically saying our deficit is going down that's a great thing but the deficit is going down it means physical
policy is getting tighter right so fiscal policy is getting Tighter and we're typing monetary policy and I think
that's a recipe for a recession um and so we have to rethink how we
fight inflation and we have to um uh you know give a bigger role to fiscal policy uh because fiscal policy
can actually address the bottlenecks it can address the issue of Housing and lack of housing it can issue the issue
of oil causing a bottleneck by say investing in alternative energies we can
try to help households who are struggling in the current inflationary environment again the FED cannot do it
it has to be done through fiscal policy and obviously fiscal policy is also done in a democratic manner which is not how
monetary policy is done okay I'll stop here and I'll have I'm happy to take questions at the end.
27:45
thank you very much yeah but that was fantastic
thank you that was great I really recommend you to check out ever's papers
on our website I think what's very interesting uh is not only uh you have
his purpose doesn't only show us how complex to understand the factors behind inflation is but also the painting on
your theoretical methodological starting point you go to different venues and you may miss this some of these factors
which is very important as well so please check out that paper so okay so uh Isabella you're next.
イヴ：
わかりました、ええと、私たちが今日直面している現在のインフレについて話したいと思います。私の焦点は主に米国ですが、米国について私が言うことは、多くのエコノミスト、特に先進国を含む多くの経済学者に当てはまると思います。英国 ええと、私が見たいのは、私たちが見ている現在のインフレが需要の問題なのか供給の問題なのか、そして最終的にはどのような種類の解決策に到達する必要があるのかということです。コンセンサスに反対します主流のコンセンサスに基づいており、金融政策は実際には適切なツールではないと言っているので、基本的にはこれが私の結論であり、一般的に現在のインフレ エピソードには適切なツールではないというだけではありません。」金融政策はインフレ期の適切なツールではないと主張するつもりなので、少なくとも米国では、現在のインフレは需要が多すぎるという問題であり、これはどこにあるのかという話が構築されています。政府が欲しがっている間に経済にあまりにも多くの刺激を加えたからです.私たちは人々に刺激小切手を与えました.それはあまりにも多すぎました.政府の支出の多くはビジネスに使われましたが、それはビジネスに使われたお金です。需要が多すぎる問題であり、インフレ問題を解決するために需要を抑制しなければならないという話がありましたが、そうであったとしても、ええと、経済を見ると、別の状況が現れると思います。それは経済の状況です。需要はパンデミック前のレベルまで回復しており、以前の状況に比べてかなり急速に回復していますが、主流の基準から見ても需要が多すぎる状況ではありません。同じ経済で、彼らはさまざまなレベルのたるみを見ることができます.ええと、私のようなMMTを行う人は、失業率が3.5である経済を見るでしょう.それでも私たちはそれをさらに下げることができ、必ずしもインフレ圧力これはまさに私たちが行っている種類の政策ですが、主流の基準で行っても、経済の過熱が原因であり、それがインフレの理由です。これを調べる1つの方法は、潜在GDPと実際のGDPを比較することです。すべて名目上のものですので、最初はパンデミックが始まったときに議会予算局が潜在的なGDPの見積もりを出しました。私たちはこの巨大な不況に見舞われ、不況時にはエコノミストとしての可能性が侵食されます。可能性を利用すると、そのように侵食されますが、その後、彼らはすぐに上方修正し、上方修正を続けました。これは、強力な財政政策への対応に起因するより強い回復であったためです。これらの数字を 2022 年の第 2 四半期にのみ見ると、実際の GDP が潜在 GDP に近づいたときであり、それはそれほど正しくなく、明らかにインフレがその前に始まっていたので、議論が私たちはエコノミストの潜在的な権利に達しました。私たちは経済が対応できる以上の支出を行っています。2022 年半ばにはインフレ圧力が始まり始めていたはずですが、明らかにインフレはそれよりも前に始まっていたので、この尺度でさえ、私たちはそうではありませんでした。 2022 年のいつかまで、エコノミストの可能性に達しました。現在、経済の潜在力に達したからといって、必ずしもインフレを確認する必要があるわけではありません。このグラフは実際にそれを非常によく示しています。青い線が潜在GDPで、赤い線が実際のGDPで、右側が右側にあります。ハンドスケール 私は消費者物価指数であるインフレ率でインフレを測定しています。これは基本的に、消費者物価指数の年々の変化です。この長い期間が正しかったことがわかります。これは世界的な金融危機につながりました。私たちは潜在GDPに到達し、かなり長い間それをある程度超えていたことを知っていました.インフレは3％前後で推移していました.この暴走を見ると、今日目にしている 789% のインフレ率がわかり、ここで上昇したのは、コモディティの投機があったためです。基本的に、住宅市場が暴落したとき、住宅市場にあった多くのお金がコモディティに移動しました。そのため、インフレの急上昇が見られました。その後、非常に急速な景気後退があり、世界金融危機の余波でインフレは非常に抑制されたままでした。潜在GDPへの影響は、必ずしも価格圧力に直面しなければならないという意味ではありません。ラリー・サマーズ・ジェイソン・ファーマンのような主流のエコノミストから得た正しい人々は、基本的に、経済を刺激しすぎて潜在的なレベルに達し、過熱したと言っています。ええと、結果は暴走したインフレではありませんでしたが、今日私たちが見ているもう1つのことは、この青い線がトレンドがどのように進んだかがわかるということです。世界的な金融危機の余波と大不況の間、適切かつ適切な政策措置を講じなかった代わりに、私たちはここで緊縮財政に取り組みました.英国とユーロ圏では明らかにそれが悪化し、それは私たちの経済の可能性を低下させました。私が受けた教訓これらの 2 つの不況からわかるのは、財政政策を過度に行うべきではないということではありません。なぜなら、インフレが起こるからです。十分に対策を講じないと、経済の潜在力が低下し、インフレ圧力が低下するように設定することになります。これについての質問にお答えさせていただきます。私がやりすぎているかどうかはわかりますが、ここで技術的なことはわかります。もう 1 つの話は、労働市場が逼迫しすぎているということです。もちろん、失業率がすべてではありません ここで私が持っているのは労働力率です 基本的にこれは、人口の何パーセントが労働力になる資格があるのは、働いているか、失業しており、適切な仕事を探しているかのどちらかです。つまり、16 歳以上の人口がどれだけいるかを調べます。これは、刑務所にいるわけではありません。参加しているあらゆる種類の機関ではありません。 1970 年代以降米国で見られたのは、労働力参加率の緩やかな低下であり、明らかに世界金融危機以降のこの低下は非常に顕著であり、私たちが見ているのは、私たちの経済がまったく回復しなかったということです。回復したので、労働力を去った人々は基本的に良いために去りました。非常に多くの人が外に出ていたことを知っています。パンデミック前のレベルで正しいので、私たちは持っていません」私はこの世界的な金融危機前のレベルについてさえ話していないので、より多くの労働者を労働市場に引き込む余地はまだあります。そのためには、回復を確実にする必要があります労働市場は引き続き堅調です.ええと,それは明らかに政策ではありません.ええと,私たちが取っている選択です.それは政策でもなく,私たちが現在取っているものでもありません.需要が多すぎるという問題はありません。このグラフはアトランタ連邦準備制度理事会のビジネス期待調査からのものです。ウォール街の人々やエコノミストを調査して、実際に大小の非金融ビジネスを調査して、インフレ期待がどのようなものかを測定しようとしています。そして彼らが'あなたの売上は標準と比べてどのようになっているのかなど、彼らにたくさんの質問をします.それを見ると、企業は標準を超える売上を報告していないことがわかります.そして、あなたは彼らの質問の1つです.再質問されているのは、将来の販売が価格に与える影響であり、パンデミックの余波でそれが標準を上回っていないことがわかります。実際、価値は現在実際に下がっています.ですから、パンデミックの直後に需要が多すぎるという問題があったと主張できたとしても、それはすべてうまくいったので、そうすることができます.私たちが継続していると言うことは、財政刺激策が需要に貢献している限り、過剰な需要が見られ続けるだろうということです.これには多くの要因が寄与していると思いますが、それらは主に供給側にあると思います。これは、消費者物価指数と消費者物価指数の主要な構成要素による内訳です。Isabella がその 1 つについて話すと思います。特にこれらのコンポーネントのうち、どれが緑色のバーであるかを伝えるために凡例を読むことができる必要はありません。それが交通機関であることは明らかです。その多くが石油であることは明らかで、その一部は自動車の価格であり、半導体の不足などに関連しているため、明らかにこれは特定のボトルネックの話であり、他のバーである他の線は非常に顕著です.この黄色のものがここにあり、それは賃貸料です。実際の賃貸料ではありません。実際の賃貸料は、この緑色の申し訳ありませんが灰色のバーです。これはまだある程度重要ですが、黄色のものほど重要ではありません。黄色は私たちが帰属と呼んでいるものですこれらは実際の価格ではありません これらは帰属価格であり、何が行われたかというと、質問はあなたがたとえば、私のように自分の家を所有しているとします。たとえば、私が現在所有しているような家を借りるのにいくら払うのでしょうか。これは所有者が住んでいる家の場合です。家を所有している人々の問題は、彼らがそのような家が正しいとしたら、彼らはいくら支払うでしょうか。明らかに、これは私が実際に支払っている金額をうまく反映していません。なぜなら、10 年前に家を正しく手に入れて以来、住宅ローンが固定されているためです。これは、私たちが家を借りる場合に支払うであろう価格にすぎません。私たちが購入して住んでいる家の種類を知っているので、ある意味では、この観察できない価格が非常に重要な部分であることがわかります。物価指数とそれ現在のインフレ率を押し上げており、インフレ率が高いことも問題ありませんが、ここでの主な話は、これは石油の問題であり、石油市場を見ると、需要が多すぎるということです。それは2つの供給が少なすぎるという問題ですか?それは両方とも少し正しいと思いますので、繰り返しになりますが、少なくとも米国では需要が回復し、供給は回復できていないようです。パンデミック前の石油供給レベルと明らかに、OPECがこの話の大部分を占めていることがわかります.1970年代にインフレエピソードがあったときの米国の話の大部分であり、それは今でも大部分を占めています.今日の話なので、私たちが取っていないことがわかります。1970年代には、石油からの移行という政策がありましたが、私たちがまだ正しいことをしていないという教訓を学んでいない場所があるようです。供給側の話です まさにそれは供給として始まったパンデミックの話です 危機が需要に変化したと私は言います 私たちは需要に影響を与える政策手段を持っています そしてMMTエコノミストとして 需要に無制限の資金を提供できると思いますお金は問題ではありません。問題は実際のリソースです。十分な実際のリソースがありますか。それが供給の出番です。米国で行った切望された切望された救済の最初のラウンドは、財政刺激策またはシスコの救済策であると言うべきです。だったそれは本当に刺激であり、人々が請求書を支払うのに役立ち、借金を返済し、貯蓄も増やしたので、ある意味で、3分の1が消費に、3分の1が貯蓄に、3分の1が借金の支払いに使われました。ええと、そして最終的には最後のラウンドのリゾート支出が切望される前のレベルに達しましたが、同時に、私がアトランタ連邦準備制度理事会の調査について話したのと同じ調査で企業が直面しているサプライサイドの圧力、サプライチェーンの問題が引き続き見られます。彼らは企業が価格について尋ねられたとき、あなたは供給側の混乱を知っています彼らは好きです彼らの大多数は2022年の半ばまで供給側の混乱を報告していました. 'たまたま企業によって設定されており、米国の企業は株主に対して、インフレのカバーを使用して価格を引き上げていることを非常に明確に伝えています。インフレがあり、誰も私たちを選び出そうとしたり、価格を正しく引き上げているこの1つの会社を見たりするつもりはないので、彼らはこれを価格を上げる機会として利用しているので、もちろん戦争の問題もあります。ウクライナや制裁などは、ヨーロッパの話の大きな部分を占めることになるでしょう。それが、ドイツのような場所では、米国よりも高いインフレ圧力が見られると思う理由です。そのように述べる」これは賃金がこれを正しく動かしているという話ではありません 賃金価格のスパイラルの話ではありません 賃金はこの時点で単純に追いついています.当初考えていたよりも時間がかかっていると思いますが、それは一時的なものであるというその意見の意見は、米国では労働者が企業にインフレを完全に補償するよう強制する力を実際には持っていないためです。 「実際に直面しているのは、実質賃金が追いついていないことです。実質賃金は減少しています。賃金は大丈夫です。スピードを上げていきます。mはすでにその15分のマークにあるので、問題は、中央銀行がこのインフレまたは米国の一般的なインフレに対して何ができるかということです。特にエコノミストからの強い圧力の下で、もしそれをしなければ、FED は何かをしなければならないと言っており、インフレの猫はバッグから出てくるだろうし、我々はどうしようもないだろう.それを元に戻すつもりです.ええと、FRBはインフレに甘すぎると呼ばれていました.ラリー・サマーズは政権の一員ではありませんでした.外部から政策に影響を与えようとしている.もっと早く始めるべきだったし、そのようなものをもっと早く調達すべきだったし、FEDは最終的に義務付けられており、今では金利上昇の道を歩んでいるし、FEDはうまく終わらないだろうと思うもちろん、エコノミストは間違いなくこれに責任があります。これについてはすぐにもう一度説明しますが、連邦準備制度理事会 (FED) にも責任があります。私はそれを喜んで信用してきましたが、それはかなり不当であると私は思います.だから話はおそらくポール・ボルカー連邦準備理事会の議長が1980年代にインフレの裏をかいたということです.現実は彼が金利を引き上げたことです. 20歳以上を知っていて、米国だけでなく海外でも深刻な不況と金融危機を引き起こしました.今起こっていること、または起こる可能性があることを再び見ていました.彼らは労働組合を壊しました.レーガン時代に起こったことです.彼らは労働組合を壊しました.彼らは航空管制官のストライキを破った現在、米国のプレーヤーと鉄道労働者のストライキが再び破られているのを見て、最初に労働組合が力を失ったのが現実だと思いますが、関連する問題として、グローバル化されたサプライチェーンもありました。安価な労働力を海外にアウトソーシングすることもありました。このジャスト イン タイムの生産は主にウォール街によって行われました。ウォール街では、企業はコストを人件費に合わせて維持しようとすることで最後の少しの利益を絞り出そうとしましたが、それ以外の場合は財政政策もありました。過去数回の景気回復期はタイトすぎたため、需要が停滞し、緊縮財政が発生しました。基本的には世界金融危機後の不況の最中に緊縮財政がありました。賃金圧力が現実のものとならず、労働市場があまりにも弱体化しており、それが実際に物価を低く抑えている理由であり、FRBがこれらすべてに何らかの役割を果たしてきたとすれば、引き締めを防ぐために先制的に金利を引き上げたことです。労働市場とFRBの役割である賃金の伸びを防ぐために、彼らはFED議事録を見ると、彼らは基本的にそれを言っていると言います.彼らが見ているのは、労働市場が逼迫しすぎると、飛び込んで金利を上げ始めるということです。ええと、私が言ったように、エコノミストと経済学がここで果たすべき役割を持っていることは明らかであり、経済学はひどいものでした金融政策とFRBの指針 FEDは数量理論を放棄した インフレと戦うためにマネーサプライをコントロールしなければならないというマネタリストの考え それは議論の余地がある その考えを受け入れる 一部の経済史家は、それは本当に金利を 20 に引き上げて、それを行っていないことをうまく伝えるための隠れ蓑マネーサプライを制御するだけで、金利は現在の位置にあり、現在のアプローチは、インフレの期待がインフレを引き起こすという新しい金融コンセンサスのアプローチであり、その政策は期待を正しく制御することによって機能します。インフレを制御するための私たちの主なアプローチは、基本的に市場のインフレ期待を制御することであり、連邦準備制度理事会のエコノミストであるジェレミー・ラッドは、数年前にこの非常に優れた論文を書きました。私のcuatha Randall RayとDimitri Papa dimitrioが1994年にFEDはフライング・ブラインドであるという論文を書き、最近彼らはFEDがまだブラインドで飛んでいると言って更新を書いたと言いました。いいえ ええと 理論 インフレの適切な理論なので、このグラフは長期と短期のインフレ期待を示しています。これは実際のインフレ率です。期待がインフレを促進するのではなく、期待が最終的に現実に収束するようなものです。実際のインフレ率は変化するので、この権利がそれを引き起こした可能性はありません。これは基本的に、インフレの期待がインフレを引き起こすという事実理論です。それは、私たちが実際に見ていることを知っているだけでなく、FRBが積極的に制御しようとしているのです。利上げのようなインフレ。これはオレンジ色の線です。フェデラル ファンド レートまたはオーバーナイト レートです。これは実際のインフレであり、アクティブな FRB がインフレと戦っているようなものです。
インフレと戦うために金融政策を使用することの現実は、MMTのエコノミストがかなり前から言ってきたことであり、ポストカンザス州も明らかに、FEDは失業をインフレと戦うためのツールとして使用していると言って締めくくります。このエピソードから得られる唯一の良いことは、ジェローム・パウエルが労働市場の状況の緩和が起こる可能性が高いと言っていることを彼らが実際に公然と認めていることですが、自信が持てるまでそれを続けます仕事は終わったし、ポール・ヴォルカーの肩書きのような言葉を彼が使っているのは興味深い」彼の本は、政府の他の部分からの労働者からのあらゆる圧力にもかかわらず、彼らはそれを続け、インフレを制御したとパウエルは言います。市場は非常に非常に強い 非常に強い権利であり、それはデータに見られるものではないと私は主張します.ええと、ええと、ボストン連銀の議長は申し訳ありません.雇用の伸びの鈍化と失業率のやや高い実際、FEDは失業率を来年4.4から5に上昇させるため、それがインフレを制御するために支払う代償です。時間の都合上、私の結論にジャンプします.インフレについて再考し、それと戦う方法も再考する時が来たと思います.現在のインフレは実際には需要主導型ではなく、金融政策がインフレに対して何かをすることができる限り、それはそうではありません.期待については、実際には総需要を引き下げるだけであり、供給の問題を解決できるので、できることは需要を引き締めることだけです。大統領が基本的に赤字が縮小していると言っているのは素晴らしいことですが、赤字が縮小しているということは、物理的な政策が引き締められていることを意味しているので、財政政策は引き締められており、金融政策を打ち込んでいると思います。景気後退のレシピなので、インフレと戦う方法を再考する必要があります。財政政策により大きな役割を与える必要があります。財政政策は実際にボトルネックに対処できるため、住宅や不足の問題に対処できます。代替エネルギーへの投資などによってボトルネックを引き起こしている石油の問題を解決することができます 現在のインフレ環境で苦労している家計を助けることができます FEDはそれを行うことができません 財政政策を通じて行われなければならず、明らかに財政政策はまた、民主的な方法で行われていますが、これは金融政策が行われる方法ではありません。ここでやめて、最後に喜んで質問させていただきます。
27:45
どうもありがとう ええ でもそれは素晴らしかったです ありがとう 素晴らしかったです 私たちのウェブサイトでこれまでの論文をチェックすることを本当にお勧めします 非常に興味深いのは、ええと、あなたには彼の目的があるということだけではありません 理解するのがいかに複雑かを示すだけではありませんインフレの背後にある要因は、あなたの理論的方法論の出発点に関する絵でもあります。さまざまな場所に行くと、これらの要因のいくつかを見逃す可能性があります。これも非常に重要です。その論文をチェックしてください。 .
イザベラ
great um thank
you so much for setting this up um I think that you have us paper and my paper actually speak to one another perfectly so I can just kind of pick up
um where she ended which is exciting so the title of my presentation is inflation in times of overlapping
emergencies systemically significant prices from an input output perspective
some of you might have seen that I got very heavily criticized when I suggest
that um pretty much exactly about a year ago that we might have to start thinking
about specific methods to tackle um the the price increases that are
happening in specific sectors and that this might involve us um to uh to to
have to go back to the tool of targeted price controls which we have been kind of abandoned to the Dustbin of history
for a while but that might become relevant again now um a year on
um because I want the same people who criticize me at the time have actually been recommending price controls in the
context of um war in Europe and I find myself I'm just being about to conclude
work on a German government commission where we have been designing gas price
caps and I can talk about the specificities of these policy of this policy because it's a very like kind of
complex kind of type of arrangement but um I think that the notion that we might
need to do something about specific prices is by now much more acceptable than it was a year ago and I think that
the reason for this is in parts that at least in the European context it's now
very clear that there is a very serious emergency there's war in Europe in a way in which it hasn't been in a long time
and this has huge economic implications in particular for energy markets in ways
that require new kinds of economic policy towards now what I'm arguing in
this paper is that yes the situation in Europe is very dramatic um the pandemic was very dramatic but
this idea that we are just about to return to some state of normal Tranquility seems very charming and
tempting and I hope it is the case that the war will be over soon that the pandemic will stop looming and will
actually be eventually that we will have a true victory that really is a global victory that we get climate change under
control that we do not have any more extreme weather events that we do not have any more shocks from climate change
and so on um my sense is that chances are there are more shocks in the pipeline because
we are living in a world of overlapping emergencies so that the kind of shocks to supply that we have been observing in
the last um two years or so um are likely to reoccur in some fashion
or another we don't really know how they're gonna happen we don't really know where they're gonna hit but it
seems likely enough that there might be more shocks to come which is the reason
why I'm arguing for for a form of economic disaster preparedness no one wants a disaster to happen but it's
better to be prepared than to have a disaster happen without being prepared so as I think Kim already it became
already very clear and yet give us a presentation we have been thinking of um
monetary policy a little bit like this coin-based um horse they're kind of
going back and forth in a very regular kind of fashion pretty one-dimensional
if you think
about it it's like basically one dimension that you care about there are different dimensions that different people emphasize some emphasize more the
quantity of money some emphasize more um the the the the the um the potential GDP in relation to the
actual GDP others might be stressing more the question of expectations but it's in general like kind of a
one-dimensional question where you have a one-dimensional tool which is Raising
interest rates which supposedly um is enough to get monetary stability
um uh for the economy as a whole with this mindset
um comes an understanding where changes in relative prices have nothing to do
with inflation Milton Friedman um as of course a figurehead of monetarism put this very explicit
explicitly in the context of the inflation of the 1970s when he said what
of oil and food to which every government officially has pointed in relationship to the inflation then are
they not the obvious immediate cause of the price explosion not at all it is essential to distinguish changes in
relative prices from changes in absolute prices the special conditions that drove
up the prices of oil and food required purchases to spend more on them leaving
less to spend on other items did that not force other prices to go down or to
rise less rapidly than otherwise why should the average level of oil prices
be affected significantly By changes in the prices of of some things relative to
others so here then these changes in relative prices have at the very best A transitory impact on the micro economy
and that tra that period of transition is so short that it really doesn't matter because people
um spend less on other items if they are spending more on some items which means that overall the price level will stay
constant now this is of course the exact opposite of the idea that specific price
shocks might matter for inflation I'm going to skip over this because you
have already covered this brilliantly um so what I'm arguing in this paper is
that because we are living in this world of overlapping emergencies where we have intense shocks two specific prices that
change relative prices and that because these shocks can be so intense that they can in fact unsettle the general price
level we have to think about price stabilization more like um the ways in which we think about writing and actual
Wars um which is we want to be prepared we want to understand what triggers our horse we want to be wearing a helmet we
want to be as safe as we can because we prepare for our ride
this the logic that we are using in this paper actually based on input output
analysis and input output analysis was first um formalized in the context of the second world war when one of the
pressing questions was how to pump the German economy in the most effective
kind of way and they wanted to understand what are the points in the economic system that if those points
collapse the whole economy stops working this was a question of strategic bombing
now what we are doing in this paper is kind of using the same type of method to see what are the points of the greatest
vulnerability today where if shocks hit these kind of sectors.
Inflation as monetary phenomenon - Monetants
"what of oil and food to which every government official has pointed? Are they not the
obvious immediate cause of the price explosion? Not at all. It is essential to distinguish
changes in relative prices from changes in absolute prices. The special conditions that
drove up the prices of oil and food required purchasers to spend more on them, leaving less
to spend on other items. Did that not force other prices to go down or to rise less rapidly
than otherwise? Why should the average level of all prices be affected significantly by
changes in the prices of some things relative to others?" (Friedman, 1974)
Large relative price changes transitory as such of no macroeconomic relevance
Relative prices only linked through the budget constraint of individuals
貨幣現象としてのインフレ Monetants 「すべての政府関係者が指摘している石油と食料はどうなのか？これらは価格爆発の明らかな直接の原因ではないのだろうか？全く違う。相対価格の変化と絶対価格の変化とを区別することが肝要である。石油と食糧の価格を高騰させた特別な条件は、購買者に石油と食糧により多くの支出を求め、他の品目への支出を少なくすることであった。そのため、他の物価は下がったり、上昇のスピードが落ちたりしなかったのでしょうか。なぜ、すべての物価の平均的な水準が、あるものの相対的な価格の変化によって大きな影響を受けなければならないのだろうか？(Friedman, 1974)
相対価格の大きな変動は一過性であり、マクロ経済とは無関係。
相対価格は個人の予算制約を通じてのみ連動する。
The economy as circular flow - Input-Output
"Input-output analysis is a method of systematically quantifying the mutual interrelationships
among the various sectors of a complex economic system." (Leontief, 1985)
"The effect of an event at any one point is transmitted to the rest of the economy step by
step via the chain of transactions that links the whole system together." (Leontief, 1951)
"Far from being independent of each other, the cost-price structures of all the separate
industries are nothing but links in a vast network which embraces the whole national
economy.
...overall dependence among wage rates, profits earned, and taxes paid per unit of output in
each of the many separate industries on the one hand and the prices of all different kinds of
goods and services sold by these industries on the other." (Leontief, 1947)
循環の流れとしての経済 産業連関分析 "産業連関分析は、複雑な経済システムの様々な部門間の相互関係を体系的に定量化する方法である"(Leontief, 1985)。(Leontief, 1985)
"ある一点での出来事の影響は、システム全体をつなぐ取引の連鎖を通じて、経済の他の部分に段階的に伝達される。" (Leontief, 1951)
"すべての個別産業のコスト・プライス構造は，互いに独立しているどころか，国民経済全体を包含する広大なネットワークのリンクに過ぎないのである。
...一方では，多くの個別産業における単位生産量当たりの賃金率，利潤，納税額，他方では，これらの産業が販売するあらゆる種類の商品とサービスの価格の間の全体的な依存関係"(Leontief, 1947) (レオンティーフ, 1947)
Inflation as a micro/sectoral phenomenom
"As a matter of fact, the problem of inflation cannot be dealt with in aggregative terms either. If you
had inflation in which all prices and incomes move in parallel, nobody would care. Actual inflation is a
change in relative prices, not just in the average price level.” (Leontief, 1974)
Change in relative prices of great relevance to macroeconomy because it has immediate
redistributive implications
• Downward stickiness of prices implies that increase in some prices is not compensated by
decrease in others but creates a cost-push pressure
●
Higher levels of inflation can follow from shocks to important sectors (e.g. through political events
like wars, climate disasters, speculative hikes, supply bottlenecks, large sector specific investment
programs)
ミクロ／セクターの現象としてのインフレ 「実のところ、インフレの問題は総体的な用語で扱うことはできないんだ。すべての物価と所得が平行して動くようなインフレなら、誰も気にしないでしょう。実際のインフレは、平均的な物価水準だけでなく、相対的な物価の変化である。"(Leontief, 1974) (価格の下方粘着性は、ある価格の上昇が他の価格の低下で補われず、コストプッシュ圧力を生み出すことを意味する ●重要なセクターへのショック（例えば、戦争などの政治的イベント、気候災害、投機的上昇、供給障害、大型セクター固有の投資計画など）を受けて、インフレ水準が上昇することがある。）
um this has the potential to unset the price price stability for the economy as
a whole this requires us to think of the economy as a circular circular circular flow as
Leon TF was arguing so in input output analysis we use a method of systemically
quantifying the mutual interrelationships among the various sectors of a complex economic system
which means that we can trace the effect of an event at any one point and the
ways in which it is transmitted to the rest of the economy step by step via the chain of transactions that links the
whole system together this also means that a sharp contrast to written
Friedman's notion far from being independent of each other the cost price structures of all the separate
Industries are nothing but links in a vast Network which Embraces the whole National economy this means that we are
taking the overall dependence among wage rates profits earned in taxes
um as the starting point for our analysis we're for someone's prices are
always someone else's costs which means that costs and prices across sectors are interrelated
in fact we can find a statement by leontier from the same year as the frequency and that claims the exact
opposite of what Friedman was saying as leonty have put it as a matter of fact the problem of inflation cannot be dealt
with in aggregative terms either if you had inflation in which all prices and incomes move in parallel nobody would
care actual inflation is a change in relative prices not just in the average
price level and as a matter of fact we can find similar statements also in Keynes
if we think of inflation as a matter of changes in relative prices this means
that this is important because it has immediate redistributive implications
this is based on the assumption that there's a downward stickiness of prices which means that if one price goes up it
does not mean that another price immediately goes up by the amount to keep the average constant
from this perspective then higher levels of inflation can follow from shocks to important sectors important sectors that
matter in the network of costs and prices and these shocks can be an expression of political events like Wars
climate disaster speculative hikes and so on.
Research question
If inflation is not always and everywhere a macroeconomic
phenomenon, but can be unleashed by microshocks on the supply
side, we need to identify which sectors present points of vulnerability
for monetary stability, or in other words, have the greatest potential to
become systemically significant for inflation.
Approach
1. Leontief Price Model
2. Simulate the inflation impact of a price shock to each sector
separately based on a) average price volatilities and b) the price
movements in the COVID pandemic assuming full pass-through
3. Rank sectors by their inflation impact to identify a) latent systemically
significant prices and b) realized systemically significant prices in the
COVID pandemic
研究課題
インフレが常にどこでもマクロ経済的な現象ではなく、供給サイドのミクロショックによって引き起こされるとすれば、どの部門が金融安定化にとって脆弱なポイント、言い換えれば、インフレにとってシステム的に重要な存在となる可能性が最も高いかを特定する必要がある。
アプローチ
1. Leontief Price Model
2. a) 平均的な価格変動率、b) 完全なパススルーを仮定したCOVIDパンデミックの価格変動率に基づいて、各セクターへの価格ショックのインフレインパクトを個別にシミュレートする
3. インフレインパクトによってセクターをランク付けし、a) 潜在的なシステム上重要な価格、b) COVIDパンデミックにおいて実現したシステム上重要な価格 を特定する。
the research question that we're addressing in this paper is if inflation is not always in everywhere a
macroeconomic phenomenon as the current mainstream would have it but can be Unleashed by micro shocks on the supply
side we need to identify which sectors present points of vulnerability for
monetary stability or in other words have the greatest potential to become
systemically significant for inflation so a bit like with the exercise in
strategic bombing you want to understand what are the points of the greatest vulnerability if those points are being
hit you want to understand how this percolates through the whole system
in our empirical analysis we first bid a leon TF price Model then we simulate the
inflation impact of a price shock to each of the 71 sectors in our input
output um economy one at a time this is to say we simulate what happens if there's a
shock to the first sector then we do the same for the second the third until we get to the 71st and in terms of the
magnitude of the shock we first used the average price volatilities as they were
observed before um the pandemic and then secondly we use
the actual price movements in the covid-19 pandemic breaking this up into what I'm calling the post shutdown
economy in 2021 and the economy during the Russian war on Ukraine
this then allows us to rank the sectors by the inflation impact and this is as
we argue is a way to identify through the first exercise using the volatilities which sectors are latently
systemically significant that is to say they have the potential to become the
sectors that unleash overall inflation or B those sectors that actually realize
systemically significance during the covid-19 inflation.
40:00
um I have a chart here to explain what an input output table is in case that is not familiar to the audience I skip over
it in the interest of time for now.
what we do in this model is that we take
the value of the output of each industry which is composed of the value of domestic input so all the stuff that an
industry buys from other Industries value added which is profits wages and taxes and the Imports that an industry
buys from abroad that is imported inputs we then divide this value of the output
of an industry um by the the total output of this industry which it gives us the prices
per unit of output and this is important the price here then is composed of the
the the value of domestic inputs plus the value added plus the imported
um inputs which we can again solve for prices which then gives us an equation
where every price of every industry is interrelated to the prices of all other
Industries this allows us to um decompose the
shocks that we are simulating into direct inflation impacts where there's a change
um that a a specific price change um uh induces in the CPI in the consumer
baskets and the indirect inflation impact which comes through the impact of
that price change on all other Industries so if you take the example of oil um the price of fertilizers will change
if the price of fertilizers changes the price of wheat will change the price of wheat changes the price of bread will
change so at the end of the day you have a pretty big indirect impact of the change in the price of oil on overall
inflation and we combine this direct and the indirect inflation impact to come up
with a measure of total inflation impact and then we rank the sectors based on this total inflation impact which we use
to identify systemically significant prices.
this chart is um intentionally such that you cannot read it I just want you to look at the shape of these figures um these are the rankings that we get of the sectoral inflation total inflation impact and you can see that it's very unevenly distributed in other words um some sectors clearly matter much more than others so if we zoom into this and we look at the latent systemic significance which is composed of a direct effect in an indirect effect as I've just explained where these green points um indicate the magnitude of the price volatility from 2000 to 2019. we find that the most important sectors from the perspective of the pre-pandemic world are petroleum and core products oil and gas extraction Farms food and beverage into back tobacco products then the Federal Reserve Banks which is a weird industry and an input output setting which is why I'm I'm discarding it and I can explain in more detail why then we have chemical products housing utilities wholesale trade and other retail other retail is kind of a basket case so I'm also discarding this this leaves us with eight Industries which show up as systemically significant and all of these eight Industries um appear again on the top of the ranking when we use the actual price changes as they occurred in the post shutdown economy that is quarter for 2021 and when we use the price shocks as they occurred in the second quarter of 2022 so the time when the the war in Ukraine was already in for um in full swing that's not the right terminology to use here sorry but it was already happening um I think I'm kind of okay in the interest of time I'm also going to skip over this um and just point out that we basically have three groups of systemically significant sectors the first one is basic necessities that is housing food Farms utilities petroleum and gas products the second one is basic production inputs such as petroleum and gas products again oil and gas extraction and chemical products but also basics of circulation such as wholesale trade and truck transportation which is a sector that only shows up in the context of the covid-19 pandemic and I would argue it's a specific sector that had specific bottlenecks but that is related to oil and gas at the end of the day we also um do a similar kind of exercise where we do not assume as we did in the Baseline model I just showed you that profits and wages just stay what they were before the shock but that now um workers can actually regain their rear wage by increasing the nominal wage in a ways in ways to compensate for the price increases for the staff that they are buying or that businesses can increase their profits in a way that compensate for the decreased profit margins from increased costs this is what we call conflict inflation based on Raw funds um important work of the 1970s if we run these simulations we find that the ranking of systemically significant sectors stays pretty much um the same but we can also see that with basically the exception of oil and gas extraction in all cases um the this line is going up more between the second and the third model which is the the change from The Profit adjustment to the wage adjustment this means that we would need a larger page adjustment to compensate for the price increases then the magnitude of the profit adjustment that we would need to compensate for the price increases in other words this means that if there is no such weight adjustment real wages are hit harder than profit margins buy these shocks to systemically significant prices or in other words workers are carrying the brand of these shocks in conclusion then we can say that if price rocks become systemic because we are living in overlapping emergencies it is not feasible to react with rate hikes each time a stock a sector is hit by a shock because of the reasons that yeva has laid out for us economic stabilization then requires a form of disaster preparedness to absorb shocks and systemically significant significant sectors this requires a change in mindset and requires monitoring capacity for these systemically significant sectors as well as institutions and laws for emergency price management which can involve buffer stocks regulation of financial speculation which is important for the whole commodity sector prohibition of price gouging in times of emergencies Anti-Trust measures limits to price hikes Investments to increase the medium-term resilience and a standby Authority for emergency price stabilization and systemically significant sectors if systemically significant sectors are so important that they can unsettle the economy as a whole this also raises the question whether the public doesn't need more of a say in these sectors just as central banks were once private in history thank you very much.
Conclusion
• If price shocks become systemic, it is not feasible to react with rate hikes
each time a shock hits a systemically significant sector.
Economic stabilization requires disaster preparedness to absorb shocks in
systemically significant sectors. This requires a change in mindset and
monitoring capacity as well as institutions and laws for emergency price
management which can involve buffer stocks, regulation of financial
speculation, prohibition of price gouging, anti trust measures, limits to price
hikes, investments and a standby authority for emergency price stabilization
in systemically significant sectors.
If systemically significant sectors are so important that they can unsettle the
whole economy, the public needs a say (central banks were once private).
Anti-Trust measures limits to price
hikes Investments to increase
結論
・価格ショックがシステミックになった場合、ショックがシステミックに重要なセクターを襲うたびに利上げで対応することは不可能である。
・経済の安定化には、システム上重要なセクターの衝撃を吸収するための災害対策が必要である。そのためには、緊急価格管理のための制度や法律だけでなく、考え方や監視能力の変革が必要であり、それにはバッファストック、金融投機の規制、価格操作の禁止、反信託措置、価格引き上げの制限、投資、システム上重要なセクターの緊急価格安定のための待機機関などが含まれる。
・システム上重要な部門が経済全体を不安定にするほど重要であれば、国民が発言する必要がある（中央銀行はかつて民間銀行だった）。独占禁止法 値上げの制限 投資の増加
イザベラ
これを設定していただきありがとうございます。私はあなたが私たちの紙と私の紙が実際にお互いに完全に話し合っていると思います。それで、彼女が終わったところをちょっと拾うことができます。それはエキサイティングなので、私のプレゼンテーションのタイトルはインフレです緊急事態が重なる時期には、インプットアウトプットの観点から体系的に重要な価格です。ちょうど約 1 年前に、具体的な対処方法を考え始める必要があるかもしれないと私が提案したとき、私が非常に厳しく批判されたことに気付いた人もいるかもしれません。特定のセクターで起こっている価格上昇と、これにより、私たちがしばらくの間歴史のごみ箱に捨てられていたターゲットを絞った価格管理のツールに戻らなければならなくなる可能性がありますが、それは可能性があります。ええと、ええと、ええと、私が欲しいからです当時私を批判したのと同じ人々が、実際にはヨーロッパでの戦争の文脈で価格管理を推奨していました.私は、ガスの価格上限を設計してきたドイツ政府委員会での作業を終了しようとしているところです.このポリシーのこれらのポリシーの具体性について話すことができます。なぜなら、それは複雑な種類の取り決めに非常に似ているからですが、特定の価格について何かをする必要があるかもしれないという考えは、今では以前よりもはるかに受け入れられると思いますこの理由の一部は、少なくともヨーロッパの状況では、非常に深刻な緊急事態が発生していることが非常に明確になっているためだと思います.ヨーロッパでは戦争が起こっています.これは長い間続いており、これは特にエネルギー市場に大きな経済的影響を与えており、現在の経済政策に向けた新しい種類の経済政策を必要としています。この論文で主張しているのは、はい、ヨーロッパの状況は非常に劇的であり、パンデミックは非常に劇的でしたが、私たちが通常の平穏の状態に戻ろうとしているというこの考えは、非常に魅力的で魅力的であるように思われ、そうであることを願っています.戦争はすぐに終わり、パンデミックが迫り来るのを止め、実際に最終的には真の勝利が得られます。これは本当に世界的な勝利です。気候変動を制御下に置き、極端な気象現象がこれ以上発生しないようにします。気候変動などによるショックはこれ以上ないというのが私の感覚ですが、私たちは緊急事態が重なり合う世界に住んでいるため、パイプラインにさらに多くのショックが発生する可能性があると思います。過去 2 年かそこらで、何らかの形で再発する可能性があります。どのように起こるかはよくわかりません どこに影響が及ぶかはわかりません経済的災害への備え 誰も災害が起こることを望んでいませんが、準備をせずに災害が起こるよりは、準備をしておくほうがよいので、キムはすでに非常に明確になっていると思いますが、金融政策について考えているプレゼンテーションをしてくださいこのコインベースのうーん馬のように、非常に規則的な方法で行ったり来たりしています。かなり一次元的です。経済的災害への備えの形については、誰も災害が起こることを望んでいませんが、準備せずに災害が起こるよりも、準備をしておくほうがよいと主張しています。このコインベースの馬のように、金融政策を考えてきました。非常に規則的な方法で行ったり来たりしています。かなり一次元的です。経済的災害への備えの形については、誰も災害が起こることを望んでいませんが、準備せずに災害が起こるよりも、準備をしておくほうがよいと主張しています。このコインベースの馬のように、金融政策を考えてきました。非常に規則的な方法で行ったり来たりしています。かなり一次元的です。非常に規則的な種類のファッションで行ったり来たりするようなものです かなり一次元的です非常に規則的な種類のファッションで行ったり来たりするようなものです かなり一次元的です
考えてみれば、基本的にあなたが気にかけているのは 1 つの次元のようなものです さまざまな人々が強調するさまざまな次元があります お金の量をもっと強調する人もいます 実際の GDP に対する潜在的な GDP をもっと強調する人もいます期待の問題をより強調していますが、それは'一般的には、一次元のツールを持っている一次元の質問のようなものです.おそらく金利を上げることは、経済全体にとって金融の安定を得るのに十分である.この考え方では、どこが変化するかを理解する.相対価格ではインフレとは何の関係もありません ミルトン・フリードマン もちろん、マネタリズムの代表者は、1970年代のインフレの文脈でこれを非常に明確に述べました。インフレに比べて、それらは価格爆発の明白な直接の原因ではないか 相対価格の変化と絶対価格の変化を区別することは不可欠である 石油と食料の価格を押し上げた特別な状況彼ら他の項目への支出を減らしたからといって、他の価格が下落したり、他の価格よりも緩やかに上昇したりすることはありませんでした.他のものと比較したいくつかの物の価格の変化によって、なぜ石油価格の平均レベルが大きく影響を受けるのでしょうか.相対価格の変化は、最高の状態でミクロ経済に一時的な影響を及ぼし、その移行期間は非常に短いため、実際には問題にはなりません。これはもちろん、特定の価格ショックがインフレに影響を与える可能性があるという考えとは正反対です.この論文で重要なことは、私たちは緊急事態が重なるこの世界に住んでいるため、強いショックが発生し、相対価格を変化させる2つの特定の価格であり、これらのショックが非常に激しく、実際に私たちが持っている一般的な価格水準を不安定にする可能性があるためです。価格の安定化について考えるには、執筆と実際の戦争について考える方法と同じように、準備したいものです。何が馬を引き金にするのかを理解したいです。ヘルメットをかぶりたいです。この論文で使用しているロジックは、実際には入出力分析に基づいており、入出力分析は、第二次世界大戦の文脈で最初に形式化されました。最も効果的な方法でのドイツ経済、そして彼らが望んでいた経済システムのどのような点が崩壊すると経済全体が機能しなくなるかを理解することは、これは戦略爆撃の問題でした。ショックがこれらの種類のセクターを襲った場合、今日の最大の脆弱性。
金融現象としてのインフレ - モネタンツ
「すべての政府関係者が指し示している油と食物はどうですか？
価格爆発の明らかな直接の原因は? 全くない。区別することが不可欠です
絶対価格の変化からの相対価格の変化。その特別な条件は
石油と食料の価格が上昇したため、購入者はより多くの出費を余儀なくされ、残りは少なくなりました
他のアイテムに費やす。それによって、他の価格が下落したり、上昇速度が遅くなったりすることはありませんでしたか?
それ以外より？なぜすべての価格の平均レベルは、
あるものの価格が他のものと比べて変化することは?」 (Friedman, 1974)
相対価格の大幅な変動は一時的であり、マクロ経済との関連性はありません
個人の予算制約によってのみリンクされる相対価格
貨幣現象としてのインフレ Monetants 「すべての政府関係者が指摘している石油と食料はどうなのか？これらは価格爆発の明らかな直接の原因ではないのだろうか？全く違う。相対価格の変化と絶対価格の変化とを区別することが肝要である。石油と食糧の価格を高騰させた特別な条件は、購買者に石油と食糧により多くの支出を求め、他の品目への支出を少なくすることであった。そのため、他の物価は下がったり、上昇のスピードが落ちたりしなかったのでしょうか。なぜ、すべての物価の平均的な水準が、あるものの相対的な価格の変化によって大きな影響を受けなければならないのだろうか？(Friedman, 1974)
相対価格の大きな変動は一過性であり、マクロ経済とは無関係。
相対価格は個人の予算制約を通じてのみ連動する。
循環の流れとしての経済 - インプット - アウトプット
「産業連関分析は、相互の相互関係を体系的に定量化する方法です。
複雑な経済システムのさまざまな部門の中で」(Leontief, 1985)
「ある時点での出来事の影響は、経済の残りの部分に段階的に伝達されます。
システム全体を結び付けるトランザクションのチェーンを介してステップを踏む." (Leontief, 1951)
「互いに独立しているどころか、すべての個別のコスト-価格構造は、
産業は、国全体を包含する広大なネットワークのリンクにすぎません。
経済。
...賃金率、得られる利益、および生産単位あたりに支払われる税金の間の全体的な依存関係
一方では多くの別々の産業のそれぞれと、すべての異なる種類の価格
これらの産業が他方で販売する商品やサービス」（レオンチェフ、1947年）
循環の流れとしての経済 産業連関分析 "産業連関分析は、複雑な経済システムの様々な部門間の相互関係を体系的に定量化する方法である"(Leontief, 1985)。(Leontief, 1985)
"ある一点での出来事の影響は、システム全体をつなぐ取引の連鎖を通じて、経済の他の部分に段階的に伝達される。" (Leontief, 1951)
"すべての個別産業のコスト・プライス構造は，互いに独立しているどころか，国民経済全体を包含する広大なネットワークのリンクに過ぎないのである。
...一方では，多くの個別産業における単位生産量当たりの賃金率，利潤，納税額，他方では，これらの産業が販売するあらゆる種類の商品とサービスの価格の間の全体的な依存関係"(Leontief, 1947) (レオンティーフ, 1947)
ミクロ/部門別現象としてのインフレ
「実際のところ、インフレの問題も総体的に扱うことはできません。もしあなたが
すべての物価と収入が並行して動くインフレがあったとしても、誰も気にしないでしょう。実際のインフレは
平均価格水準だけでなく、相対価格の変化です。」(レオンチェフ、1974)
即時性があるため、マクロ経済に大きく関連する相対価格の変化
再分配の意味
• 価格の下方粘着性は、一部の価格の上昇が補償されないことを意味します。
他の人は減少しますが、コストプッシュ圧力を生み出します
●
高水準のインフレは、ショックから重要なセクターへと続く可能性があります (例えば、政治イベントを通じて)
戦争、気候災害、投機的なハイキング、供給のボトルネック、大規模なセクター固有の投資など
プログラム）
ミクロ／セクターの現象としてのインフレ 「実のところ、インフレの問題は総体的な用語で扱うことはできないんだ。すべての物価と所得が平行して動くようなインフレなら、誰も気にしないでしょう。実際のインフレは、平均的な物価水準だけでなく、相対的な物価の変化である。"(Leontief, 1974) (価格の下方粘着性は、ある価格の上昇が他の価格の低下で補われず、コストプッシュ圧力を生み出すことを意味する ●重要なセクターへのショック（例えば、戦争などの政治的イベント、気候災害、投機的上昇、供給障害、大型セクター固有の投資計画など）を受けて、インフレ水準が上昇することがある。）
ええと、これは経済全体の物価の安定性を乱す可能性があります。これは、レオン TF が主張していたように、経済を循環的な循環の流れと考える必要があります。複雑な経済システムのさまざまなセクター間の相互関係。これは、ある時点でのイベントの影響と、それが経済の残りの部分に伝達される方法を、一連のトランザクションを介して段階的に追跡できることを意味します。システム全体を合わせることは、書かれたフリードマンとは対照的であることも意味します。私たちの概念は、互いに独立しているわけではありません.すべての個別の産業の原価構造は、国民経済全体を包含する広大なネットワーク内のリンクにすぎません.私たちの分析の出発点は、誰かの価格は常に他の誰かです。s のコストは、セクター全体のコストと価格が相互に関連していることを意味します。インフレの問題は、すべての物価と所得が平行して動くインフレがあった場合も、総計で扱うことはできません 実際のインフレは、平均価格水準だけでなく相対価格の変化であり、実際問題として、私たちはそれを行うことができますケインズにも同様の記述があります.インフレを相対価格の変化の問題と考える場合,これは重要であることを意味します.つまり、ある価格が上昇しても、この観点から平均を一定に保つために別の価格がすぐに上昇するわけではなく、重要なセクターへの衝撃からより高いレベルのインフレが続く可能性があることを意味します。コストと価格のネットワークの中で、これらのショックは、戦争、気候災害、投機的なハイキングなどの政治的出来事の表現である可能性があります.
研究課題
インフレがいつでもどこでもマクロ経済的であるとは限らない場合
現象ですが、電源のマイクロショックによって解き放たれる可能性があります
一方で、どのセクターが脆弱な点を示しているかを特定する必要があります
通貨の安定のために、言い換えれば、最大の可能性を秘めている
インフレにとってシステム的に重要になる。
アプローチ
1. レオンティブ価格モデル
2. 価格ショックが各セクターに及ぼすインフレの影響をシミュレートする
a) 平均価格ボラティリティと b) 価格に別々に基づく
完全なパススルーを想定した COVID パンデミックの動き
3. セクターをインフレの影響によってランク付けし、a) システム的に潜在的な潜在性を特定します。
b) システム上重要な価格の実現
COVID パンデミック
研究課題
インフレが常にどこでもマクロ経済的な現象ではなく、供給サイドのミクロショックによって引き起こされるとすれば、どの部門が金融安定化にとって脆弱なポイント、言い換えれば、インフレにとってシステム的に重要な存在となる可能性が最も高いかを特定する必要がある。
アプローチ
1. レオンティブ価格モデル
2. a) 平均的な価格変動率、b) 完全なパススルーを仮定したCOVIDパンデミックの価格変動率に基づいて、各セクターへの価格ショックのインフレインパクトを個別にシミュレートする
3. インフレインパクトによってセクターをランク付けし、a) 潜在的なシステム上重要な価格、b) COVIDパンデミックにおいて実現したシステム上重要な価格 を特定する。
私たちの研究課題この論文で再び取り上げるのは、現在のメインストリームのようにインフレが常にどこでもマクロ経済現象であるとは限らないが、供給側のマイクロショックによって解き放たれる可能性がある場合である。どのセクターが通貨の安定やその他の面で脆弱な点を示しているかを特定する必要がある単語はインフレにとってシステム的に重要になる可能性が最も高いため、戦略爆撃の演習と少し似ています。これらのポイントが攻撃された場合、最大の脆弱性のポイントは何かを理解したいと考えています。これがシステム全体にどのように浸透するかを理解したいと考えています。私たちの経験的分析では、最初にレオン TF 価格モデルを入札し、次に、投入産出と経済の 71 セクターのそれぞれに対する価格ショックのインフレの影響を一度に 1 つずつシミュレートします。最初のセクターへのショックから、2 番目、3 番目のセクターについても同じことを行い、71 番目のセクターに到達します。ショックの大きさに関しては、最初にパンデミック前に観測された平均価格ボラティリティを使用し、次に 2 番目にcovid-19パンデミックでの実際の価格変動を使用して、これを2021年のシャットダウン後の経済と、ウクライナに対するロシア戦争中の経済と呼んでいるものに分割します。これにより、インフレの影響でセクターをランク付けできます。これは私たちが主張するように、ボラティリティを使用した最初の演習を通じて、どのセクターが潜在的にシステム的に重要であるか、つまり、全体的なインフレを解き放つセクターになる可能性があるか、またはcovidの間に実際にシステム的に重要なセクターになる可能性があるかを特定する方法です。 19 インフレ。
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ええと、聴衆になじみのない場合に備えて、ここに入出力テーブルが何であるかを説明するためのチャートがあります.
時間の都合でスキップします.このモデルで行うことは、出力の値を取得することです.各産業は国内投入の価値で構成されているため、産業が他の産業から購入するすべてのものは付加価値であり、利益、賃金、税金、および産業が外国から購入する輸入投入物である輸入品です。産業の産出 um この産業の総産出量によって、産出の単位あたりの価格が得られます。これは重要です。ここでの価格は、国内投入の価値と付加価値と輸入された投入量で構成されます。これを再び価格について解くと、次の方程式が得られます。業界は他のすべての業界の価格と相互に関連しています。これにより、シミュレートしているショックを直接的なインフレの影響に分解することができます。特定の価格変動が消費者バスケットの CPI にもたらす変化と、その価格変動が他のすべての産業に与える影響による間接的なインフレの影響です。石油を例にとると、肥料の価格は次のようになります。肥料の価格が変われば変わる 小麦の価格が変わる 小麦の価格が変わる パンの価格が変わる したがって、結局のところ、石油価格の変化が全体的なインフレにかなり大きな間接的な影響を与え、この直接的および間接的なインフレの影響を組み合わせて、総インフレの影響を測定し、この総インフレの影響に基づいてセクターをランク付けします。これを使用して、システム上重要な価格を特定します。このチャートは、意図的に読めないようにしています。
形だけ見てほしいこれらの数値は、セクター別のインフレ総インフレ率のランキングです。非常に不均一に分布していることがわかります。言い換えれば、一部のセクターは明らかに他のセクターよりもはるかに重要です。先ほど説明したように、これらの緑色の点が 2000 年から 2019 年までの価格変動の大きさを示しています。パンデミックの世界は、石油と中核製品 石油とガスの抽出 農業 食品と飲料をたばこ製品に戻し、連邦準備銀行は奇妙な産業であり、インプットアウトプットの設定であり、それが私が私である理由です.私はそれを破棄し、なぜ化学製品が公益事業の卸売業やその他の小売業を収容しているのかをより詳細に説明することができます.他の小売りは一種のバスケットケースなので、これも破棄します.そして、2021 年の四半期であるシャットダウン後の経済で発生した実際の価格変動を使用し、2021 年の第 2 四半期に発生した価格ショックを使用すると、これら 8 つの産業のすべてが再びランキングのトップに表示されます。 2022 年ということは、ウクライナでの戦争がすでに本格化していた時期でした。ここで使用する適切な用語ではありません。申し訳ありませんが、それはすでに起こっていました。m また、この um は飛ばして、基本的にシステム上重要なセクターの 3 つのグループがあることを指摘します。最初のグループは、住宅の基本的な必需品です。農場、ユーティリティ、石油およびガス製品、2 番目のグループは、石油やガスなどの基本的な生産投入物です。製品は再び石油とガスの抽出と化学製品だけでなく、covid-19パンデミックのコンテキストでのみ現れるセクターである卸売業やトラック輸送などの流通の基本でもあり、私はそれを主張します.特定のボトルネックを抱えていたが、最終的には石油とガスに関連している特定のセクターでは、ベースラインモデルで行ったように想定していない同様の種類の演習も行っています。利益と賃金が示されました。ショック前の状態を維持するだけですが、今では労働者は、購入しているスタッフの価格上昇を相殺する方法で名目賃金を引き上げることによって、または企業が利益を増やすことができる方法で、実際に後部賃金を取り戻すことができます。コストの増加による利益率の低下を補う方法 これは、1970年代のローファンドと重要な仕事に基づく紛争インフレと呼ばれるものです これらのシミュレーションを実行すると、システム上重要なセクターのランキングはほとんど変わらないことがわかりますが、また、基本的に例外を除いてそれを見ることができますすべてのケースで石油とガスの抽出 ええと、この線は 2 番目と 3 番目のモデルの間でさらに上昇しています。これは、利益調整から賃金調整への変更です。これは、価格を補うために、より大きなページ調整が必要であることを意味します。つまり、そのような重量調整がなければ、実質賃金は利益率よりも大きな打撃を受けることを意味し、システム的に重要な価格へのこれらのショックを購入する、または言い換えると、結論として、労働者はこれらのショックのブランドを背負っています。もし私たちが重複する緊急事態の中で生活しているために価格変動が体系的になった場合、セクターがショックに見舞われるたびに利上げに対応することは現実的ではないと言えます。 yeva が提示した理由私たちにとって、経済の安定化には、ショックとシステム上重要なセクターを吸収するための災害への備えが必要です。これには、考え方の変化が必要であり、これらのシステム上重要なセクターの監視能力と、緩衝在庫規制を含む可能性のある緊急価格管理のための制度と法律が必要です。コモディティセクター全体にとって重要な金融投機の防止 緊急時の値上げの禁止 反トラスト措置による価格上昇の制限 中期的な回復力を高めるための投資と待機 緊急の価格安定とシステム上重要なセクター（システム上重要な場合）のための権限セクターは非常に重要であるため、経済全体を混乱させる可能性があるため、一般の人々がそうでないかどうかという疑問も生じます。歴史上中央銀行がかつて非公開だったように、これらのセクターでこれ以上発言する必要はありません。
Three groups of systemically significant sectors
1. Basic necessities
Housing, Food, Farms, Utilities, Petroleum and gas products
2. Basic production inputs
Petroleum and gas products, Oil and gas extraction, Chemical products
3. Basic circulation
Wholesale trade, (truck transportation)
Conflict inflation
The model outlined above assumes that nominal wages and profits remain constant through
price adjustments in response to an increase in input costs due to a sector-specific price shock.
We can extend the model to incorporate a conflict inflation scenario in which firms and
workers respond to the price shock and subsequent price adjustments by trying to regain their
initial position. We develop three models:
(i) No profit or wage adjustment (this is the model outlined before)
(ii) Industries adjust their prices to keep the profit share of the value of their output constant
(iii) Wages adjust to keep real wages constant
システム上重要なセクターの3つのグループ
1. 基本的生活必需品 住宅、食料、農業、公益事業、石油・ガス製品
2. 基本的生産投入物 石油・ガス製品、石油・ガス採掘、化学製品
3. 基本循環 卸売業、（トラック輸送）
コンフリクトインフレ
上記のモデルは、部門別の物価ショックによる投入コスト上昇に対して価格調整を行い、名目賃金と利潤を一定に保つことを想定している。このモデルを拡張して、企業や労働者が価格ショックとその後の価格調整に対して、元のポジションを取り戻そうとするコンフリクトインフレを取り入れることができる。
(i)利潤調整も賃金調整もしない（これは前に概説したモデル）
(ii)産業は生産額に対する利潤シェアを一定に保つように価格を調整する
(iii)賃金は実質賃金を一定に保つように調整する、の三つのモデルを開発する。
結論
・価格ショックがシステミックになった場合、ショックがシステミックに重要なセクターを襲うたびに利上げで対応することは不可能である。
・経済の安定化には、システム上重要なセクターの衝撃を吸収するための災害対策が必要である。そのためには、緊急価格管理のための制度や法律だけでなく、考え方や監視能力の変革が必要であり、それにはバッファストック、金融投機の規制、価格操作の禁止、反信託措置、価格引き上げの制限、投資、システム上重要なセクターの緊急価格安定のための待機機関などが含まれる。
・システム上重要な部門が経済全体を不安定にするほど重要であれば、国民が発言する必要がある（中央銀行はかつて民間銀行だった）。独占禁止法 値上げの制限 投資の増加
48:18
thank you
thank you very much Isabella so needle is to say that's another paper another word you should take it out you may
think that all this indirect impact of prices is like straightforward or the connection between among sectors but
most of the analysis don't really get into debt uh uh yeah level it's not even
a level for detail right don't get into that approach that don't develop the
analysis from from that perspective okay so we have our final speaker Torsten in
person.
トンプソン
um so I'm slightly nervous because I'm not qualified obviously to talk about this
because I've never ridden a horse there I'm also slightly shell-shocked by the reminder that Americans had their
mortgages fixed for the life fixed for the lifetime of their uh mortgages whichever in the US in the UK who does
not have that pleasure is about to be as I'll come on to later snacks around the head uh for the next few years by Rising
mortgage uh bills anyway um so I thought I would cope with all that trauma by
um uh I'd want to repeat a lot of the discussion on the macroeconomics of the current crisis so I'll touch on that a
bit at the end um but I said I thought I'd do something much simpler which is what is the impact what's going on in the UK which isn't
the same as going on in the US um what is the impact on people and different kinds of people of that
um shock and what might we think comes next broadly as three things to cover so I'll try and do that and I'll try and do
that reasonably quickly maybe not covering all this right we've actually got some slides that are working right okay so this tells you the obvious you
all know this we've seen the highest inflation rate in 40 years we've also seen the highest and so the fastest
increase in the inflation rate in 40 years so it's not just that this is turned up it's turned up as a complete
surprise if I'd shown you four car this is the Bank of England the obr's latest forecast from last month but if I'd
shown you all the forecasts that started from this time last year going backwards they all basically look like two percent
stretching into the Horizon with a nice straight line so it's always nice to be surprised
um in life the same thing would be true if I showed you fed forecasts for the United States too so that's the big
thing you all know the um
this is then covering some of the similar ground to charts you've seen so again I'm not going to dwell on it other than to say for the UK I think again
this is one reason why the UK and most European countries are obviously very different to the us not to you consider
the Eurozone which is we're talking here about pretty small but very open economies right one two the gas price
issue is a much bigger deal in Europe much much bigger than in Europe than it is in the States because we don't
produce it obviously the um thirdly for consumers it's a bigger deal in the UK because not only do we use gas fading
our homes we use gas for generating electricity to a much greater extent than most European countries and these
things really matter when you come to as you say how do how do individual prices feed through to wider inflation metrics
so this is telling you broadly what you probably already know um so you've got two broad things going on the international side of things here
we've got basically energy related costs at the bottom pushing up we've then got other goods and I'm putting that there
because all most of those are internationally traded to some degree or other some of the services are in the
green basket too and a lot of that is relating to as I'm going to come back to some of the questions about what U.S
demand has been versus what other countries demand has been during this phase but broadly what I'm saying to you
is in terms of the inflation rate we're seeing today in the UK stay away from the macro rare about whether you need to raise rates but in terms of what we're
seeing today it's definitely driven by International goods and in particular obviously energy costs right then just a footnote on the
macro debate before we move on which is just to say all of the economics debate is dominated by the United States that's
because all of all economics debates are dominated by the United States if you haven't got used to that yet and you've chosen a query in economics you've
chosen the wrong career it's not going to go away anytime soon the um but this is just showing you that the big phenomenon that's sitting behind the
rail that um the other two speakers have excellently covered in the United States on the causes of inflation which is
broadly is it being driven because people had too much money and they have spent it basically on buying loads of
goods and in particular durable goods we mean here cars and Ledger Goods right they bought every ukulele you can find
in the US every bit of sports kit has I don't know I don't know how where people are doing so much sport but anyway they
bought a lot of sports kit okay and they've kept doing it slightly Against All my expectations
um whereas Services spending is down below its longer term Trend so they've switched from Services spending into
large amounts of durable and to good spending then that's the route whether that is a demand problem people had too
much money or that is a supply problem they couldn't get the stuff they wanted to buy is obviously a large part of
what's going on all I'm really saying to you here is whenever your view is on that debate that is not what's going on
in the UK because everything's a turkey okay so like everyone's spending is down significantly from its pre-pandemic path
you can see a switch from services like blue into Goods green during the
pandemic because any of you that who was in the UK during the pandemic you'll notice you couldn't buy any go out to the you can go out and have a nice time
right so you all bought rubbish for your home in the UK it was like DIY kit because they're so upset about what was going to happen to her you might as well
have a nice house if you're going to pay your mortgage right so they all went and bought DIY stuff in the UK um but again
the overall level of spending is significantly low below what you would have been expecting if I could show you the same chart with income levels it
would show you a similar pattern right okay so it's not the same thing most European countries version of this chart
looks more like the UK than it looks like the US so the US is a really special case to some degree and is
totally dominating this inflation debate so stop it it's basically this is my polite way of saying that okay right the
um right then moving on to what does this all mean for actual people because that's what we in the end should be focused on the first thing is it's
really really bad in terms of what is happening to household incomes this is showing you income growth uh on this is
national accounts measures of income growth if they don't want to talk about different measures you get slightly different results but broadly this is showing you income growth for households
over the annual annualized and basically it's telling you over the two years so the Year we're just about to end the
next year we're seeing about a seven percent fall in household incomes that is something like 1 700 pounds per
household um that is as you can see not normal even in very deep recessions 1980s
financial crisis you don't see income Falls that big okay now if I do that
shows you the same chart of GDP what you would see obviously is really big Falls of GDP in the pandemic like really big
obviously we shut down half the economy so we weren't producing anything the um but but income didn't fall because
government support basically stepped in you couldn't get income from GDP so you've got income from the state right the um in lots of cases furlough big
increase in benefits happening at the same time what's now happened is that we're now projecting a shallow ish recession
yeah but very deep Falls in household incomes I think that's what's really important to understand about what's
going on and the reason that's going on is because the country's got poorer so that's because the for the UK we don't produce any hardly any hydrocarbons
there's a reason why the climate change transition is harder in the US than the UK we haven't got anyone to put out of work and we haven't got to shut down any
gas Fields really the um uh but in the US they do they um and so the result
though for us is we just get a lot poorer when you get an energy price shock and so we're importing that until basically one way of thinking about all
the political economy of the current phase of British politics is we're just deciding how we get poorer and who and
when right that's what the strike is that's what a strike is that's what raising taxes or cutting spending is and
all of that is about power politics and it decides who pays and when they pay so this is so it's a big deal that's what
I'm saying this is a very this is the equivalent of a very deep recession uh happening and it's happening this year and next the um right
um it's not the same for everybody now I'm sure everyone in the room knows this but just to briefly cap this is showing you poorest households on the left
riches households on the right what is air inflation rate given what we know is the differences in consumption baskets
for different kinds of households and then apply exactly the same CPI methodology but to those different consumption baskets and it's basically
telling you what you should know which is poorer households obviously consumer energy is a much bigger part of their consumption basket than it is for
middle-income households and richer households and so is food and food and energy are doing a lot of the work in
this round of inflation which is giving us this basically record gap between the
inflation paid by the richest households some bits of what's going on right now are really bad for richer household so richer households drive a lot more so
petrol prices are actually pretty top heavy but petrol prices have come down a bit in a way that gas prices and
therefore household Energy prices haven't okay the um uh so first also
poor households much harder hit the balance between energy and food is quite unusual so if you look back at the
previous rounds usually despite what people say inflation rates are quite similar for different income groups over
long periods of time generally in the UK okay the exceptions in the recent past
for you to have in your head are before the financial crisis when we're busy buying Banks um uh I can remember a
phase of like six months where rice prices I don't even remember this there was a rise price disaster going on for
the basic food price problem but it was more rice based and less wheat based which is what we've got going on now this may sound someone's looking like
why is he talking about rice and wheat at the back uh anyway it's a reasonable question but I'm going to finish the point now uh um it was a big problem on
that and that did have that does have big distribution effects so different countries consume different things I haven't got a chart here on pasta prices
I promise but different countries consume different kinds of food and different groups and that was a consumed
different kinds of food and that was a big problem in that phase you saw a big diff stretching of what poor and richer households and then we saw the same
thing in 2012 2013 which was the last NG price shock yeah that was very small compared to this one but that's the last
time so those are the times when we see poorer households being harder hit when those are the things driving and you'll notice those are all imported
for the UK or is it all imported prices right I'll just briefly say that older
households are also facing a higher inflation rate this is our own uh work using the same methodologies I've just
shown you uh showing you 80 older households that's because old households don't spend very much apart from eating
okay now you might not feel that sorry for them because they've got like five bedrooms per person okay and all the
rest so they can but but that is part of what is going on older households in the UK have not only do they have much bigger houses they have much leakier
houses and they don't spend any other money right so they have high so the older households in general are being
harder hit by what is going on um uh right now so
um Isabella touched on this but policy is like despite everyone saying that the FED is doing all the work the FED is
obviously doing the work in so far as being and the bank of England and dealing with inflation in the like longer term perspective but in almost
all countries but definitely in all big European countries fiscal policy is doing shed loads of work right and so is
regulatory policy and this is just a touch on some of the elements that this chart is showing you again poor
households on the left richer households on the right the the levels and the distribution of fiscal support to
households this year 2223 in blue and next year 23 24 in red okay because
we now know what the government support package is notionally going to be for next year in fingers crossed unless Energy prices don't come down and what
it's telling you is two things in 22 23 everybody got quite a lot of support so
this is like energy price guarantee capping all energy bills at 2 500 pounds checks for the poorer households and
Universal payments that get delivered through the energy bill system so you get for those of you not paying your
energy bill you get 400 pounds off your energy bill per household if you're doing everyone does whatever their income so you've got a pretty
Universalist system and you've got it and it's pretty big it's been done really messily obviously it's not a good way to do it but forget all the micro
stuff it's big this is a large amount of cash per household then you've got what's happening next year where we've
got a more Progressive significantly more Progressive uh system but it's much less generous so now next year about
two-thirds will go to the bottom half whereas broadly the bottom half only got about half
um this year this is mainly made up of 900 pound payments going to each household on means tested benefits or
for some older households and then it's the energy price guarantee capping prices at 3 000 pounds the equivalent of three thousand pounds for a typical
energy user from April up from the current 2500 okay the um now and
obviously the energy prices end up being higher than this red bar would go up because we'd be capping up the cost of
that cap would rise okay the um now what I would take away from this is that energy price cap obviously is affecting
what the actual measured CPI is right but it's not going to affect it's not going to affect what the actual
inflationary pressure is we're just deciding whether the state's bearing it or the individual is bearing it that's what I'm saying to we're deciding who's
getting poor how we're getting poorer the um uh the other thing is I haven't got it in slide here but is the system
we're using for capping wholesale whole energy so Retail Energy prices via the energy price cap which other countries
are doing other versions of so the French went in very heavy early on we're going to cap these price Rises is in
Brackets we won't talk about it very much but we're going to suck up the cost of that with Insider nationalized energy sector until we don't want to suck it up
anymore and then we'll start letting it happen but you had you can use you can use regulatory policies the cap Energy prices stop stop
wholesale prices flowing through or you can let the wholesale prices flow through and then you can use
straightforward fiscal policy to let them to help people deal with those prices right and that is in the end
that's why it's really important to form a households perspective this isn't just about interest rates these policies make a huge huge difference and if wholesale
prices stay where they are next year is a disaster for this reason right even if they just stay exactly where they are
now you've got to find an extra Grand right and anyone that's met low income Britain knows they haven't got a
thousand pounds just sitting around to pay for a higher energy bill uh right make the it work right then
given though that there's lots of support why does this all feel difficult for us to cope with I just want to give
you a reflection on um why in Britain in particular we are not in a good position to deal with this
crisis and saying behind this is a view which is Britain as a country with high inequality since the 1980s not high not
high not increasing recently but High uh highest large highest inequality in a large European
economy plus a slow growing economy okay for at least for the last 15 years growing slower than our comparator
economies one of the effects of that by far the it not the only one is that the amount of our spending as households
that goes on Essentials has risen over time and that's what this chart's showing you so poorest households at the top richest households at the bottom in
blue we're showing the position in 2006 how much what percentage of people's budgets did they spend on Essentials and
then we're showing you what it's changed to today so the green is the more recent data okay and we're saying just focus for example on the top right we're
saying in 2006 under 52 percent of the budgets of the poorest households went on Essentials housing energy transport
things you can't really stop spending on to go through your life food uh and in 2019 it's over 58 okay now the reason
this matters when an energy price shock hits is because that's another increase in a cost of essential but the way you
cope with energy product when a central price Rises is you cut back on non-essential spending but poorer
households haven't got as much of that okay remember in the pandemic why did Rich household save loads of money because they couldn't go on Posh
holidays anymore right to a staggering extent whenever I look at data at what rich people spend on holidays it's a lot
of money people like it's more than you can possibly imagine even like every time I discuss it with anyone I'm like I mean I'm very tight but they spend a lot
of money that's why they saved so much so these households way of dealing with energy price shock is that they'll go on
a slightly less Posh holiday next summer okay these households are not going to be doing that okay because they don't
have the margin adjustment the same think it would be if I showed you exactly the same chart with savings these people have savings they can draw
down on a temporary price shock these people do not um here's another way of thinking about
this which is from survey a survey that the ons is now running almost weekly I'm not sure why they're running it weekly but they are they're at it showing you
how people are responding to this energy pressure again poorest ourselves on the left richest households on the right this one is actually done by the
deprivation of the area because they don't have full income data but I think the pattern is broadly fair to compare
so for poorer households 58 are already cutting back on foods and other Essentials because as I've just shown
you on the other chart that's what they've got to cut back on the everybody's having a tough time so even a third of the top are coming back on
some of those so even Rich households are not having the energy on heating on as much as they normally would but 58 at
the bottom if you look at them who is investing in energy improvements for their home who's doing it richer households 35 are doing it versus only
24 of households on the poor income so the way that this shock translates into how people are able to cope is very
different the coping strategies that exist are different you might be less worried about younger people because a lot of them have just moved back in with
their parents to cope with the shock you might be more right about them because they've been back in with their parents and that is not what anyone should do
now the um yes they're Italian the
can we just right let's just briefly then go on to the Future so I'm going to start with the optimism
which is all else equal there's a lot of as Bella was telling us just now shocks will turn up right but
all else equal lots of the things that economists particularly policy orientated economists have been worrying
about for the last year look like they're easing okay so lots of the things driving particularly these the
like International imported part of the the shock that's going on the data is coming in a bit better than we might
have expected so we're not going to go through all of them we've got a paper coming out of this in the next weeks but this is showing you producer prices so
like input or output prices for what firms are actually doing where you can see we're already past the the peak of
inflation hopefully that's good news for everybody the um uh come on there we go
right secondly as as we were discussing earlier inflation expectations are a large part of the anxiety so why is
Central Bank saying we've got to go really hard because they're saying look if inflation expectations get out of
whack then getting them back again will require really high unemployment words if we can keep the expectations down we
won't need to get unemployment as high without having a big discussion that's what they're saying whether you agree them or not that's what they are doing
then this is just showing you the inflation expectations this is two different measures here you've got him
the blue line is showing you firms reported inflation expectations what do they expect to happen a year ahead
starting to fall the um I mean in general by the way all inflation expectation measures just track actual
inflation generally so don't get over excited but the point is they're not shooting up to 10 okay and this is in
red is showing you the household measure of inflation expectations again looks like it may well have um peaked I.E the bank of England on
that front may feel like they should be relaxing um a bit more now the I think the danger
is um that we could easily spend I think there's a serious danger that we spend the beginning of 2023 with everyone in
Economic Policy World saying oh well things are actually getting a bit better like I'll give you another example like the public finances for the UK will
probably improve because interest rates were being charged in our debt probably won't be quite as high as they were priced in in this recent Autumn
statement probably save us quite a significant amount of money for so I think there's lots of areas of people being like Oh it's not quite as bad as
we thought it turns out German industry can cope with less gas than we thought it could hopefully
um uh I think the danger of that is that for households that is not what's going to happen because the fact that things
might be slightly less than you thought they were going to be it doesn't help the fact that they're getting and that's what's going to be
happening to households so this is going to be three ways of thinking about that the first is showing you for unemployment this is showing you the
bank of England in in uh whatever that is light purple and the office of budget responsibility which for those of you
not for the UK is our fiscal Council the kind of independent forecast that does the government's forecast to underpin
our fiscal arithmetic showing their expectations of quite big increases in unemployment next year or over the next
18 months really now the obr is like we're talking here about it looks small in comparison but we're talking 500 000
people okay the bank of England's number is a million people the um now again in
U.S terms you can divide that you can times that by five to get to the like rough impact we're talking about in
terms of so there's a lot of as a lot of people that's a very concentrated effect most people won't lose their jobs but
for those that do that was a they have a very large effect I remember the UK welfare state doesn't protect their
incomes if that happens to them unless they're very low earning in the first place but then we've got what we I was
starting with earlier on what's Happening to people's mortgages where in the UK as I said remember nobody has
well almost nobody has a fixed mortgage for the length of their term let's not go into the reasons why what instead
happens is that we have some people on variable mortgages they're the red green blue bars okay who already starting to
see their mortgages rise with bank base rate and then with the bigger population who have fixed term mortgages but on
very different terms sometimes two years three years five years some lucky people on ten years they are over the course of
the next five or six years going to be flowing over time as their current deal ends onto New Deals and those deals are
going to have much higher interest rates much higher and as they do to give you a
sense so the next election in the UK is the end of 2024 five million people households I should say will have seen
there no interest interest bills go up we're not talking about like a bit they'll be
going up by like four or five thousand pounds on average it's a lot of money okay now these are middle income
households in general obviously they're younger they're going to be younger there's going to be better off bits of younger cohorts that are going to get absolutely
hammered does anyone buy a house in the last year here because you shouldn't have done that uh
the um anyway I'm afraid the um because those unlucky people are going to get the higher interest bills but not get the lower house prices which you can see
in the day their data out this morning showing you pretty big house price Falls already getting started like there is no way we can sustain current house prices
with three four percent interest rates so like if you're gonna buy just wait a little bit everyone yeah I mean you
probably can't get a mortgage anyway now but then right then last reason this is just showing you the office of budget
responsibilities income forecast so the same measure I started with right and showing you what does this mean I just
want to just spell out how bad what is going on is so the um since the financial crisis we didn't get a lot of income growth here we did have a good
phase there was a good phase around 2015 which was falling gas prices plus fast rising employment and when wages did get
going a bit then then this brexit thing happened do you remember the um and so broadly you haven't had much income
growth since as I say not big falls in the pandemic really because policy made a big difference but huge Falls that's
the seven percent fall I was telling you about the beginning we don't get back to the where you were in the pandemic in
the until the second half of this decade yeah so anyone in the economics land saying oh things aren't too bad next
year which I promise you I think that's the most we're going to be in that world possibly by like March and used to look
at these kind of charts and be like that's what matters not what like the fact that it's a bit less difficult for you and your rate interest rate setting
is not the exam question here the exam question is what is happening to people trying to deal with high food costs
higher remember for people is the price level that matters right inflation does matter in terms of the macroeconomy they should clearly
care about it but it's the price level so the fact that oil stock and gas stops going up is less material than it's much
higher than I'm used to remember we're used to average energy price has been basically around 1 100 pounds per
household for like the last 15 years small fluctuations over time but basically and we're now talking three
thousand so the fact that inflation doesn't get any worse and go above 3000 isn't much better for you because you still can't afford your even camping
holiday because it's two and a half times what you're used to uh I won't go through this because I've
said all that that's what I concluded but you already heard that and we already have time so the end .
1:12:22
thank you very much Justin so if I hadn't convinced you to check the resolution foundation's work I hope now
you're convinced um so you know I hope like me you feel that it was a great panel
of different approaches but also making us very aware of the problem we're gonna face I feel that uh yeah was in Isabella
gave us some optimistic Vibe and then tourist and just yeah
gloomy and I and sorry I should have said that Martin couldn't join us we had a confusion regarding the time and he's
in Australia and he decided to sleep instead of join us so you know that doesn't make any sense but I have a
feeling that Martin would kind of join tourist in uh gloomy approach in the
sense that discussing how inflation now liberal area era sorry has moved from
price to assets inflation and so on which had would have been a great discussion so yeah I mean if all of you
agree that you can stay a little bit longer do the the technical issues so we have probably 10 to 15 minutes
discussion so I'm not gonna say anything because I can see it's the amazing audience I have about the IPP students
here I want to hear them as questionable so I see two members of the positive money Think Tank which is another thing
think you should check their work out so yeah please just ask away
who would like to be first everybody shy here we go let's go
can you hear me
okay go ahead all right thank you very much for the presentation but they cannot hear me and I have a question for
you in particular it's a question it's a question for you if you ever
um so um I um 100 accept this framework by which there are microeconomic
determinants of inflation he likes all your work [Laughter]
however I wanted to ask whether there is a role and what is the role of traditional expansion or monetary policy
in the inflation that we're seeing because of course there are Supply bottlenecks etc etc but also when
you look at the amount of money in circulation there is a huge increase that did that play a role or
um so uh are you letting off oh I got it
yeah I wasn't trying to be optimistic by the way if that's okay
yeah I was I you know my uh prediction has been that we're not gonna see that
soft landing and um I think that that some people are hoping for but um so the
quantity of money in the economy is not a very important variable and I'm a very
sort of Keynesian on this issue right so it's not the amount of money that matters it's the amount of spending and
when monetary policy if it has any impact on the economy it's not uh in terms of the quantity money or changing
the quantity of money it's really a changing interest rates which that has the majority of its impact through asset
prices right so central banks can't do very much when it comes to prices of output labor but they can be very
effective in terms of asset prices whether blowing in a bubble or the you
know disinflating a bubble I mean you just have to look at the crypto market and see what's going on there right A
lot of it is getting wiped out because the FED raised the interest rate so in that sense it's been very effective there so to the extent that there is any
room for monetary policy I very much with Keynes on this one that we have to keep interest rates low and just keep
them there basically forever not use them as a tool where we raise it we
lower it raise it and lower it because it has Financial instability repercussion so a very sort of Minsky
and um in that sense right so I would say keep interest rates low to the extent
that we're trying to address certain bottlenecks then low interest rates help um to um you know they're not going to
encourage more investment in certain areas but at least they're not going to be prohibitive in that sense so they you
know allowing for low interest rates and then trying to invest in certain areas
like housing in case of the US renew local energy and things like that the
areas that are that are the bottlenecks that's I think how monetary policy can help
thanks thank you next question
um okay this this sounds very much like um
you know even the the image of the war destroyed um
are you actually because there was this moment when Saudi Arabia and China and you know there was this there are these
moments where you realize the the policy of the military policy of the Russia is
actually you know we're only seeing one-fifth of the war making in in Ukraine the rest of it is happening via
these kind of pressure points from you know and is that um is that purposefully
in your mind that this is uh that this is also not just sensitive you know to
manipulation in other ways but that it's actually a war zone these are War making zones that you're
trying to map their fragilities and and the second question is just what you
said what was raised now is how how will you surmount if there is some price control or is that if there is some
other methodology how will you not um inspire people to stop investing in
that and this whole conundrum of the oil and trying to disinvest and stop when in
fact we need that oil to burn to make solar panels it's more a question like you said who how who gets poorer it's
really how do we make the things we need to make um rather than how do we stop using this
so this whole sorry War and the future how how is it
happening amazing I think it's small questions yeah I think that actually go across the
panel yeah I heard it was meant for Isabella because of the War uh yeah so if you
want to take that yeah yeah um I mean let me also start by saying that I'm not optimistic I mean I'm
calling for economic policy disaster preparedness um because I basically think we need
something like a fire department for economic policy because more shocks are going to hit and as yeba has Illustrated
the institutions that we have are not prepared to fight these fires so these fires are in the pipeline I mean we're
hoping they're not gonna break out we are hoping it will all be fine and I mean maybe that's gonna be the word
we're living in I mean everybody should be hoping and working towards that but chances are that more shocks are hitting
so we should better get prepared I mean things like the Mississippi River being dried up in green no longer being able
to be shipped across the U.S it's going to create another crisis in the grain market so I mean the shocks are already
coming right whether it be of the same magnitude probably Maybe not immediately
in 2023 Maybe again in 2024 I don't know but it seems likely that more more is to
come um that kind of connects to the question of the geopolitic that I mentioned here
um so I happen to be of the opinion that in particular in relationship to China I think we only have a chance as Humanity
really to manage the crisis that we are facing um if we somehow manage to create a new
framework for a stable Global Order because I think if we are at war between the most important
powers in the world and we are trying to fight climate change we're pretty doomed
so that just like as as a precursor um but that being said I was quite
struck watching what happened in Europe how clearly the European countries were
engaged in a form of economic Warfare with the sanctioned regimes but did not prepare their own economies for the
extremely predictable repercussions of this economic Warfare that they were
engaged in which was really shocking and puzzling to me to be honest and I think
that this has a lot to do with the economic mindset that people have where there seems to be an idea that you can
deal with a war economy type of situation buy free market economic policies and
this to me is just a total illusion I think that history proves this wrong I think also that we see that whenever
major Awards happen that there is this phase when everybody thinks that they can deal with these shocks and business
as usual terms and then they find out it's not working and then eventually they start scrambling together new kinds
of measures like the measures that person has been talking about in terms of fiscal responses and so on now to the
question of um price controls and the energy sector
um two points the first one is um I agree and disagree with the person that
first I agree that we have to distinguish between
um price controls that are basically price caps that function through fiscal subsidies and price caps that are
actually regulatory price caps that say you may not charge a price that is higher than x this latter kind of price
control in my mind can work if it is being imposed relatively close to the
source of a good so that could work on the European level it cannot work on the
national level which is why to have a sustainable price civilization response
to the candid opinion crisis we would need some form of European level price stabilization that could involve a total
wholesale cap as some have been arguing I personally think it would be good to have some price flexibility in the LNG
part but I mean whatever the design of that would be um we would need something at the EU
level now if we do fiscally Finance price gaps as the UK has been doing and
as Germany has been doing which I have been working on it depends on the policy design but if you if you design it in a
way that it ends up being measured in your CPI it says that the CPI goes down
then yes the first place is a statistical effect but given that we are living in a word of central banks that
tailor their response to inflation based on measured CPI and based on expected in
inflation then kind of because of the ways in which we have designed our Economic Policy institutions this does
have a real effect because it takes some pressure off the ECB in that case which I think is important in terms of
possibly having some arguments against hawkish interest rate policies but more
importantly if you design these fiscally Finance
price gaps in a way where you combine them with a win for profit tax which is
designed to make sure that the decreased cost thanks to a fiscally financed price
Gap is actually handed down along the value Chain by businesses then you can
have an instrument that does lower inflation also substantially not just as
a statistical effect but actually across the value chain in a substantive measure now if we were to do actual price
controls not fiscally financing subsidies that sustain price gaps but price controls that dictate prices to
companies which I think would be a possibility in oil and gas in the U.S one has to talk about the level and so
on but I think in theory it could be a possibility what would this do to investment in output this was the question that I'm
getting at now um I think that counter to your initial intuition they
think okay if the price is being capped this means that output may go down this
is actually not what is going to happen because if you go through the earnings cards of fossil fuel companies and you
look at what they're doing right now then they are talking about having the best of times and we actually have a
forthcoming paper where we are tracing oil um and and gas profits globally they are
having the best of times producing less at spectacularly high prices with lower
costs why is that so because during the pandemic they took a lot of their assets Off the Grid so they stopped producing
with the high cost assets and instead use the low cost assets to produce now
the the costs went down their prices went up their profits went through the
roof they have zero incentive to increase production if you were to say your price is now going to be kept at X
which means that you can only increase your profits by producing more then they
would actually have more of an incentive to produce more I'm not saying that we necessarily want more fossil fuel
production I'm just saying in terms of the ways in which the price cap operates it can even be a situation in these
extreme scenarios that we are talking about in times of emergencies where price cap can encourage more production
and this is something that we have also seen historically in the context of wars
thank you so yeah okay so I have Simon in any anyone else so I can get two okay
oh yeah okay see you oh okay so go Simon yeah so I agree
it's not about the quantity money but actually demand and spending
um but is there not you know an argument there what monetary policy can do is encourage people to spend less right by
Saving and delaying their consumption so it's not the argument and I guess related to that well you know I agree
with pains and obviously you know saving investment grade savings and things like that when people talk about increasing
all of this investment in order to deal with these supply chain issues you know
as lots of countries which have found out when they've done industrialization drives like in the Soviet Union Japan
China and others they it becomes inflationary and they have to kind of
encourage saving in other sectors of the economy so therefore as well as this
investment in the things we need do we also need to be restricting investment in other sectors which are less
necessary and do we also need to be encouraging savings great uh
can you see him here I can't see yeah okay yeah just more um obviously we're talking about 1970 stagflation supply
side shops the lack of optimism probably with the globalization China and climate
change saying things aren't maybe necessarily better down the line and that shift in thinking from keynesianism
to laissez faire or the rise of monetarism in terms of the long-term macro and policy Outlook what are the
solutions do we think like the green New Deal or Marshall Plan for developing countries that can actually solve these
problems in the long term and make a slightly more optimistic towards them thank you I'm going to get a third one
then we can just do all together yeah that's one question for everyone can
everybody here yeah [Music]
okay I get your argument that inflation at the moment is Supply driven uh do you
consider that it's always the case or do you acknowledge that inflation can be demon driven at least in certain sectors
such as housing or commodity Market at times uh Isabella
in your paper you mentioned ubiquity and volatility as um two drivers of uh as
you say systemic significance of sectoral prices so my question is if we change the tools
that we use to fight inflation and adopted tools along the lines that you put forward and this had an influence
some volatility for instance would that alter the results of your input output regression
and uh top 10 yeah how do you get a shallow recession
with a deep income form I've had them can that even last you know for probably
increase and yeah sorry but just about the you got inflation expectation like the five
to ten year range I used to forecast inflation I mean you never do that
forever great so have lots going on uh should we
started um um okay well there's lots there so I'm conscious with it so when I pick up on
um uh two of them so the investment the investment question I think is leaving aside the like specifics of
um uh Soviet era industrialization but there is a general thing which is in the UK party debate in particular but
actually you see versions of this in the US there's obviously and particularly you see this on the I think you see it
on across the political Spectrum but it's probably slightly more prevalent on the left there's a recognition we need a
higher investment Future Okay whether that's from public investment whether it's through um because of the Net Zero transition or
whether it's because we'd like our companies to actually grow at some point because we haven't had a wage rise for 15 years so what there is almost no
discussion of is what the implications of that where the funds for that investment would come from the um and
the trade-offs that includes which are like at the most basic level obviously your broad choices would you like to
have would you like to have lower consumption for quite a considerable period of time for households uh or
would you like to borrow from abroad for the to fund the investment and you'll notice that the UK already does quite a lot of that not least because of energy
prices right now yeah so there is basically zero discussion of that at all who's and the reason that's a problem is
because if you are in favor of that high investment I am then you should really care about whose consumption Falls and
how and that will then have effects on the wider shape of your economy right because the cons consumption Falls for
some people means other people's jobs right it's the same thing when everyone says to me it's really important we get
on with retrofitting load of homes and it's going to create loads of jobs so you know that that's true at like the
micro level at the macro level it's not going to create loads of jobs it's going to move a load of activity from this part of the economy to this part of the
economy it's going to do it by reducing depending on how you pay for it by reducing some consumption other things so households are paying for it
themselves they'll go out to eat less right I mean it's what will also Save the Planet so we should do it okay but
the general thought which is we always tell ourselves investment pays off quickly enough that there's no consumption form is basically broadly
nonsense um and you do need to think through that kind of thing if you're interested in a
natural economic project as opposed to kind of just saying some things there so that's a good thing on
um how do you get a shallow how can you get a shallow recession and a big foreign income the answer is because the country is getting poorer and you're not
it's not that we're producing less it's that we can buy fewer Goods we're an open economy so we can buy fewer Goods
around the world for what we produce in pounds right I.E Energy prices have gone
up we consume a lot of those and they're almost all imported and so we get poorer as households even though our actual
production level I mean it's a separate thing you still get some production Falls obviously um because it's more expensive to
produce some things which have those as inputs and households are responding but broadly you can when the terms of trade
shock is driving a lot of what's going on for households it doesn't have to feed through into production huge
production Force domestically great thank you you have us
I think there is room for a savings policy um if you are at a situation like full
employment so for example Keynes talks about that in how to pay for the war I've used that same kind of uh
approach and papers on the green New Deal which is another thing that came up I think in general we have to think of
spending as a use of resources and then uh you know if there is too much spending then we're using too much
resources right and it can be public spending and private spending as well so the question for me is not how do we
limit the spending so that sometimes that's necessary but right now I think that's not really our problem right if
we get to two truthful employment then obviously yes how do we limit spending so that we can avoid inflation because
inflation can be demand driven as well I just don't think that the current inflation in particular is German driven
so I would distinguish between true inflation which is what we start to see when we get to Full Employment and
that's basically keynes's definition of true inflation right and so um I think
we can rethink How We Do fiscal policy so this kind of indiscriminate fiscal policy I would I call it the free market
approach to fiscal policy where we just give people money and let them just spend away right I think that's the
wrong way to do it so modern money Theory economists have been advocating for targeted fiscal policy in the form
of guaranteed jobs for example um the green new deal obviously can be very important I think over the long
term something like the green New Deal is this inflationary investment demands resources in the time when you are doing
that investment project but over the long term it pays for itself in the in the sense that it creates more capacity
so if we invest in Renewables today yes we need more workers to say build solar panels right but over the long run we
have that capacity now that we can tap into in terms of energy so it can lower energy costs over the long term so the
you know public investment in general in particular areas whether it's housing whether it's energy I think energy
especially because it also helps us tackle climate change right we tackle climate change we also you know create
jobs and hopefully good jobs and and you know expand our economy's capacity if we
have to do something like that and if we're reaching truly reaching our economy's capacity then we can think of
some ways to facilitate things like Saving right but I don't think that this
indiscriminate increase in interest rates is the right way to do it we can try to think of other policies where we
can encourage people to say in general I'm again with Keynes that saving is this two-part decision first you decide
how much you save and that depends on your income so if you don't even can't meet your Necessities obviously you're
not going to save regardless of interest rates right like those low-income households that Thorson was talking
about they're not going to be doing this saving regardless of the higher interest rates right the higher interest rates
are going to be going to the asset holders which happen to be the wealthier households in a sense when interest
rates change it's just a shuffling of assets from one asset class to another right it's that second step of the
saving decision how do you distribute the saving between different asset classes that's where the interest rates
come into the picture so I think I've addressed all of the questions to some extent and at this point I actually have
to run because I have a class to teach so I'm just gonna say thank you for
having me thank you very much thank you [Applause]
later thank you bye bye Isabella please
um so I'm not sure if I heard the question correctly but I gather it was like about the dimensions that feed into
systemic significance in our model that all right
it was it was it was how would the how would your budget model show any different results if your policy regime
was adopted I.E would those with different areas become significant yeah
um yes it would show different results because I mean let's say you had a
buffers I mean let's say you didn't have only the Strategic petroleum reserves in the way in which they are operating
right now but let's say they were um backed up by the FED doing open
market operations for oil and what actually stabilize price spikes and oil
which is something that people like salamarova for example have been suggesting and the fat is pretty good at
like buying when no one else is buying and selling and no one else wants to sell so that's kind of the business that
they have been doing for many decades let's say you had that kind of policy and you didn't have the extreme
volatility in oil and gas prices anymore then clearly in our model that sector
would decrease um in its systemic significance for inflation right all that we're looking
here is um inflation as as the relevant variable if for housing you had like a big public
investment push into housing let's say or you had um preferential interest rates um for
first-time buyers which brings down the cost of buying houses it might kind of bring down that that measured cost of
housing then yes that would affect the ways in which this enters into the CPI
um inter so the weight of these expansions would go down in the CPI which would mean that in our model the
the importance would go down maybe one after thought on this whole question of investment
um not saying that this is necessarily going to happen but I think there's a serious question of
whether if these supply chain shocks are indeed going to turn out to be more
intense and if we see a further unraveling of Global Supply chains um in
the context of enormous geopolitical tensions whether then we might not be
hitting um physical real limits to investment in
ways in which we haven't seen them in a pretty long time which means that if you want to do large-scale investments in
green stuff let's say you might be in a situation where certain critical components that you
need for that are not readily available in a sufficient quantity which raises a
whole new question of industrial policy where it's not just about like kind of putting the money where it needs to be
setting the right priorities with fiscal spending but I'm raises a whole new question of State capacity too like in
the work that I've been doing on the government commission I mean one of the big questions that was kind of looming in the background was it should we be
making sure that systemically significant activities have enough and
sufficiently cheap gas available if the gas crisis is going to become more severe the answer is that currently
states are not prepared to even understand what are the systemically significant parts of your economy and do
not even have the capacity to understand how at the end of the day a form of physical rationing could work now I'm
not advocating rationally that's not the idea here but the idea is that it's
perceivable that depending on how this world energy crisis plays out and if we
are serious about trying to do a transition to a green economy in a fast
enough way to seriously do something about climate change that we might be hitting some physical limits which then
raises the question of physical allocation in in new kinds of ways
thank you isabellas okay so if you want to carry on this conversation just join
us upstairs for drinks uh obviously Isabella can't join us but after your first drink you can you can write down a
question and you can say to her uh but yeah please join me to thank you Isabella and Ever from like join us for
across Atlantic
it's interesting for being here in person but also the three of you for been doing this work on such a important
matter for all of us yeah thank you very much [Applause]
48:18
ありがとう、どうもありがとう イザベラ だから、針はそれが別の論文だと言うことです 別の言葉 あなたはそれを取り除くべきです 価格のこの間接的な影響はすべて、直接的またはセクター間のつながりのように思えるかもしれませんが、ほとんどの分析は実際にはそうではありません借金を
トンプソン
私は緊張してます
私はそこで馬に乗ったことがないので、明らかにこれについて話す資格がないからです.私はまた、アメリカ人が住宅ローンを生涯にわたって固定していたことを思い出して少しショックを受けました.その後、今後数年間、頭の周りの軽食をとり、住宅ローンの上昇により、とにかく、ええと、そのトラウマすべてに対処できると思いました。ええと、現在の危機のマクロ経済学に関する多くの議論を繰り返したいと思いますそれについては最後に少し触れますが、私はもっと簡単なことをするつもりだと言いました。これは、英国で起こっている影響であり、米国で起こっていることと同じではありません。そのショックが人々やさまざまな種類の人々に与える影響は次のとおりです試してみます、そして私はそれを合理的に迅速に試みますおそらくすべてを適切にカバーしていない可能性があります実際にはいくつかのスライドがあり、問題なく機能しているため、これはあなたが知っていることを示しています最高のインフレが見られました40年間でインフレ率も最高で、40年間で最も急速に上昇したため、これが上昇しただけでなく、4台の車を見せた場合、これは完全な驚きです。先月のイングランド銀行の最新の予測ですが、昨年のこの時期から始まったすべての予測を逆に見てみると、基本的にすべて、水平線に向かって 2% 伸びているように見えます。人生で驚かされるのはいつでもうれしいことです.もし私があなたに米国の供給された予測を見せたとしても同じことが真実です.繰り返しになりますが、英国について言う以外に、これについて詳しく説明するつもりはありません.かなり小さいが非常に開かれた経済についてここで話している右 1 2 ガソリン価格の問題は、米国よりもヨーロッパではるかに大きな取引です。 '英国ではより大きな取引です。なぜなら、私たちは家庭でガスをフェージングするだけでなく、ほとんどのヨーロッパ諸国よりもはるかに多くの量の発電にガスを使用しているためです。より広いインフレ指標に至るまで、これはおそらくあなたがすでに知っていることを大まかに伝えているので、国際的な側面で2つの大きなことが起こっていますここでは基本的にエネルギー関連のコストが一番下にあります他の商品を手に入れましたが、それらのほとんどすべてがある程度国際的に取引されているか、その他のサービスの一部も緑色のバスケットに含まれているため、そこに置いています。 U.S の需要は、この段階での他の国の需要に対するものでしたが、大まかに言えば、今日英国で見られるインフレ率に関しては、調達する必要があるかどうかについて、マクロレアから離れてください。しかし、今日私たちが見ているものに関しては、それは間違いなく国際商品、特に明らかにエネルギーコストによって動かされており、先に進む前のマクロ論争の脚注に過ぎません。それは、すべての経済学の議論のすべてが米国によって支配されているためです。まだそれに慣れていない場合、経済学のクエリを選択した場合、間違ったキャリアを選択した場合、すぐに消えることはありません。うーん、でもこれは、その大きな現象を示しているだけです。レールの後ろに座っているのは、ええと、他の2人の講演者が米国でインフレの原因について見事にカバーしていることです.耐久財 ここでは車と元帳グッズを意味します 彼らはアメリカで見つけることができるすべてのウクレレを購入しました スポーツキットのすべてのビットはありません 私は知りません どこで人々がそんなに多くのスポーツをしているのかわかりませんが、とにかく彼らはたくさん買いましたスポーツキットの数は大丈夫で、彼らはそれを少し続けていますが、私の期待に反して、サービス支出は長期的なトレンドを下回っているため、サービス支出から大量の耐久財と良い支出に切り替えました.それが人々がお金を持ちすぎた需要の問題なのか、それとも購入したいものを手に入れることができなかった供給の問題なのかというルートは、明らかに何が起こっているかの大部分です。あなたの意見が英国で起こっていることではないその議論についていつでも、すべてが七面鳥であるため、誰もが支出がパンデミック前の経路から大幅に減少しているように、パンデミック中に青のようなサービスから商品の緑への切り替えを見ることができます.パンデミックの最中に英国にいた人は、外出先で買い物をすることができなかったことに気付くでしょう。外出して楽しい時間を過ごすことができるので、英国の家のためにゴミを購入しました。 DIY キット彼女に何が起こるかについてとても動揺しています。住宅ローンを正しく支払うつもりなら、素敵な家を持った方がいいので、彼らは皆、英国で DIY 用品を買いに行きましたが、全体的な支出レベルはかなり高いです。同じグラフを収入レベルで表示できれば、あなたが期待していたよりも低いです。同様のパターンを示しているので、同じではありません。ほとんどのヨーロッパ諸国のバージョンのこのグラフは、見た目よりも英国に似ています。米国はある程度特別なケースであり、このインフレの議論を完全に支配しているのでやめてください。基本的にこれは私の丁寧な言い方です。それが最終的に私たちが最初に集中すべきことだからです。家計所得に何が起こっているかという点では本当に悪いです これは所得の伸びを示しています これは国民経済計算の所得の伸びの指標です 異なる指標について話したくなければ、わずかに異なる結果が得られますが、大まかに言えばこれは示しています年間年率での世帯の収入の伸びであり、基本的には 2 年間にわたることを示しているため、来年の終わりに近づいている年では、世帯収入が約 7% 減少し、1 700 ポンドのようになります1980 年代の金融危機でさえ、非常に深刻な不況の中でさえ、通常とは異なることがわかります。所得が大幅に落ち込んでいますが、GDP の同じグラフが表示されます。明らかに、非常に大きなパンデミックでの GDP の落ち込みです。明らかに、経済の半分が停止したため、何も生産していませんでした。ええと、しかし、政府の支援が基本的に介入したため、収入は減少しませんでした.GDPから収入を得ることができなかったので、州から収入を得ています。現在起こっていることは、浅い景気後退を予測していることです ええ、しかし非常に深い 家計収入の落ち込みです 何が起こっているのかを理解することが本当に重要であり、その理由は国が貧しくなったためです。私たちがいない英国炭化水素はほとんど生産されていない 気候変動への移行が英国よりも米国の方が難しいのには理由がある米国では彼らはそうしていますが、その結果、私たちにとっては、エネルギー価格のショックを受けると非常に貧しくなります.英国の政治では、どのように貧しくなるか、誰がいつ適切かを決定しているだけです。それがストライキとは何か、ストライキとは何か、増税または歳出削減とは何か、そしてすべては権力政治に関するものであり、誰が支払いを行い、誰が支払うかを決定します。彼らが支払うとき、これは大したことです。それが私です」私は、これは非常に深刻な景気後退に相当すると言っています。そして、それは今年と来年に起こります。ええと、ええと、今は誰にとっても同じではありません。部屋にいる全員がこれを知っていると確信していますが、簡単に説明しますこれは、左側が最も貧しい世帯、右側が裕福な世帯を示しています。私たちが知っていることは、さまざまな種類の世帯の消費バスケットの違いであり、まったく同じ CPI 方法論をそれらの異なる消費バスケットに適用すると、空気インフレ率はいくらになるかを示しています。 'これは基本的に、どちらがより貧しい世帯であるかを知っておくべきことを示しています。明らかに、消費者エネルギーは、中所得世帯や裕福な世帯よりも消費バスケットのはるかに大きな部分を占めており、食料と食料とエネルギーが多くの仕事をしています。今回のインフレは、最も裕福な世帯が支払うインフレとの間に基本的に記録的なギャップをもたらしています。現在起こっていることのいくつかは、より裕福な世帯にとって本当に悪いことであり、より裕福な世帯はより多くの車を運転するため、ガソリン価格は実際にはかなり高くなっています。しかし、ガソリンの価格は、ガソリンの価格、ひいては家庭のエネルギー価格が低下したのと同じように、少し下がっています。ええと、まず、貧しい世帯がエネルギーと食料のバランスに大きな打撃を与えることは非常に珍しいことです。そのため、以前のラウンドを振り返ると、インフレ率は、長期間にわたってさまざまな所得層で非常に似ていると人々が言うにもかかわらず、通常はそうです。一般的に英国ではオーケーです。頭の中にある最近の例外は、金融危機の前で、銀行の購入で忙しかったときです。うーん、ええと、米価が覚えていない 6 か月ほどの段階を思い出すことができます。これは、基本的な食料価格の問題で物価上昇の災害が起こっていましたが、それはより多くの米に基づいており、小麦に基づいていませんでした。これが現在起こっていることです.ええと、とにかくそれは合理的な質問ですが、私は'ええと、それは大きな問題でした。それは大きな流通効果を持っていたので、国が異なれば消費するものも異なります。パスタの価格に関するチャートはここにはありませんが、約束しますが、国によって消費されるものは異なります食物の種類と異なるグループ、そしてそれは異なる種類の食物の消費であり、それはその段階で大きな問題でした。あなたは貧しい家庭と裕福な家庭の大きな違いを見ました.2012年に同じことが見られました.2013年が最後でした. NG価格ショックはこれに比べて非常に小さいものでしたが、これが最後なので、これらが原動力となっているときに貧しい世帯がより大きな打撃を受けているのを見るときです。それらはすべて英国向けに輸入されているか、それはすべて輸入価格ですよね簡単に言うと、古い世帯もより高いインフレ率に直面しています.これは私たち自身の作業であり、同じ方法論を使用しています.80の古い世帯を示しています.古い世帯は大丈夫です.今では、1人あたり5つの寝室があり、残りはすべて大丈夫なので、彼らを気の毒に思わないかもしれませんが、それは英国の古い世帯で起こっていることの一部です。家にはもっと漏れやすい家がありますが、そうではありません。t他のお金を正しく使うので、彼らは高いので、一般的に高齢世帯は何が起こっているかによってより大きな打撃を受けています。ええと、ええと、イザベラはこれに触れましたが、FEDがすべての仕事をしていると誰もが言っているにもかかわらず、政策は似ていますFEDは明らかにイングランド銀行と同じように長期的な視点でインフレに対処していますが、ほとんどすべての国で、しかし間違いなくすべての主要なヨーロッパ諸国では、財政政策は適切に多くの作業を行っています。は規制政策であり、これはこのグラフが示している要素の一部に触れているに過ぎません。左は貧しい世帯、右は裕福な世帯、財政支援のレベルと分布、今年は青、来年は 2223 です。 23 24 赤で表示パッケージは、エネルギー価格が下がらない限り、概念的には来年の指を交差させる予定であり、それがあなたに言っていることは、22 23で2つのことです。誰もがかなり多くの支持を得たので、これはすべてのエネルギー料金を2 500 ポンドの小切手は、より貧しい世帯と、エネルギー請求システムを通じて提供されるユニバーサル ペイメントです。これにより、エネルギー請求書を支払っていない人には、1 世帯あたりのエネルギー請求額が 400 ポンド割引になります。かなりの普遍主義システムを手に入れて、それを手に入れました。それはかなり大規模です。本当に乱雑に行われました。明らかに、それを行うのは良い方法ではありませんが、細かいことはすべて忘れてください。それは大きいです。世帯、それからあなたは何を持っています'来年は、よりプログレッシブになり、大幅にプログレッシブなシステムになりますが、それほど寛大ではないため、来年は約3分の2が下半分に行きますが、今年は下半分が約半分しか得られません。主に、手段がテストされた給付または一部の高齢世帯向けに各世帯に送られる 900 ポンドの支払いで構成されており、4 月から現在の2500 ええと、ええと、明らかにエネルギー価格は、この赤いバーが上がるよりも高くなります。上限のコストを上限にすると、その上限のコストは上昇します。ええと、これから私が取り上げることは、エネルギー価格の上限は明らかに実際に測定されたCPIが正しいことに影響を与えているということですが、それは何にも影響を与えません。実際のインフレ圧力は、国が負担しているのか、それとも個人が負担しているのかを判断しているだけです。それが私が言っていることです。誰が貧しくなっているのかを判断しています。ここのスライドでわかりましたが、私たちが卸売全体のエネルギーを制限するために使用しているシステムです.他の国が他のバージョンを行っているエネルギー価格の上限を介した小売エネルギー価格.これらの価格の上限を設定しますそのコストをインサイダーの国有化されたエネルギー部門で吸い上げるつもりです.卸売価格の流れを止めるか、卸売価格の流れに任せて、単純な財政政策を使用して、人々がそれらの価格を正しく処理できるようにすることができます。最終的には、家計の視点を形成することが本当に重要です金利だけではありません。これらの政策は非常に大きな違いをもたらします。卸売価格が来年の水準にとどまると、この理由で惨事になります。たとえ現在の水準に正確に留まるとしても、追加のグランドを見つける必要があります。正しく、誰でも」英国は低所得者に会った 英国は、より高いエネルギー料金を支払うためにただ座っているだけで1000ポンドを持っていないことを知っています。たくさんの支持があるのに、なぜ私たちが対処するのが難しいと感じるのですか?特に英国では、この危機に対処するのに適した立場にない理由について考えてみたいと思います。英国は 1980 年代以来、不平等の大きい国である 高くはない 高くはない 最近は増加していないが、高い えー、最高 大 最高 大規模なヨーロッパ経済と低成長経済における不平等 少なくとも過去 15 年間は、比較対象の経済よりもゆっくりと成長しているその影響の 1 つは、これだけではありませんが、Essentials に費やされる世帯としての支出額が時間の経過とともに増加したことです。ブルー・ウィーズ2006 年にエッセンシャルに費やされた予算の割合を示しています。次に、今日の変化を示しています。緑が最近のデータです。たとえば、右上 2006 年には、最も貧しい世帯の予算の 52% 未満が、エッセンシャルズ 住宅のエネルギー輸送物に費やされました。生活を営むために支出を止めることはできません。ええと、2019 年には 58% 以上です。これは、エネルギー価格のショックが発生したときに重要になりますが、それは必須のコストの別の増加であるためですが、中央価格が上昇したときにエネルギー製品に対処する方法は、非必須の支出を削減することですが、貧しい世帯はそうしていません.パンデミックで、金持ちが休日に費やす金額のデータを見ると、富裕層の世帯がもう豪華な休日に行けなくなったために、驚くほど多くのお金を節約した理由を思い出してください。人々は想像以上にお金が好きです 誰かと話し合うたびに、私はとてもきついですが、彼らはたくさんのお金を使うので、彼らはたくさん貯めたので、これらの世帯の扱い方エネルギー価格のショックは、彼らが来年の夏に少し豪華な休日に行くことです。これらの世帯はそうしないので大丈夫です。証拠金調整が同じである まったく同じチャートを貯蓄で示した場合と同じように考えます これらの人々は貯蓄を持っています 彼らは一時的な価格ショックで引き出すことができます これらの人々はそうではありません ええと、これについての別の考え方は、調査から得られたものですオンスが現在ほぼ毎週実行している調査 なぜ彼らが毎週実行しているのかはわかりませんが、彼らは人々がこのエネルギー圧力にどのように反応しているかを示しています 左の最も裕福な世帯で最も貧しい完全な収入データがないため、これは実際には地域の剥奪によって行われますが、パターンは大まかに比較すると公平であると思います。したがって、貧しい世帯の場合、58 はすでに食品やその他の必需品を削減しています。他のチャートであなたを示したところです。誰もが苦労していることを削減しなければならないので、トップの3分の1でさえそれらのいくつかに戻ってきているので、金持ちの世帯でさえ通常ほど暖房にエネルギーを持っていませんが、下の58家庭のエネルギー改善に投資している人々を見てみると、裕福な世帯の 35 世帯がそうしているのに対し、収入の低い世帯はわずか 24 世帯なので、このショックが人々の対処方法に変換される方法は、対処方法が大きく異なります。若い人たちの多くはショックに対処するために両親と一緒に戻ってきたばかりなので、若い人たちについてはあまり心配していないかもしれません。誰もが今やるべきことではありませんええと、彼らは'イタリア語について では、簡単に説明しましょう。それから未来に進みましょう。楽観主義から始めましょう。他はすべて同じです。ベラが言っていたように、多くのことがあり、ショックは正しく発生しますが、それ以外はすべて同じです。エコノミスト、特に政策志向のエコノミストが昨年懸念していたのと同じくらい多くのことが緩和されているように見えるので、多くのことが特にこれらのようなものを推進していますデータに起こっているショックの一部を国際的に輸入しました私たちが予想していたよりも少し良いので、すべてを検討するつもりはありません。今後数週間のうちに論文を発表しますが、これは生産者の価格を示しています。企業は実際に私たちの目に見えるところでやっています」すでにインフレのピークを過ぎています。これは皆さんにとって良いニュースであることを願っています。ええと、そこに来ました。先ほど議論したように、インフレ期待が不安の大部分を占めているので、中央銀行はなぜそうしなければならないと言っているのでしょうか。彼らは、インフレ期待が暴落した場合、再び元に戻すには非常に高い失業率の言葉が必要になると言っているので、非常に懸命に努力してください。彼らが言っていることは、あなたが同意するかどうかに関係なく、彼らがしていることです。これはインフレ期待を示しているだけです。これは2つの異なる尺度です。青い線は、企業がインフレ期待を報告したことを示しています。企業は、1 年先に何が起こると予想しているかを示しています。つまり、一般に、すべてのインフレ期待指標は実際のインフレを追跡するだけなので、興奮しないでください。しかし重要なのは、彼らが10まで上昇していないということです。これは赤字で示されています。これは、家計のインフレ期待の測定値が再びピークに達した可能性があることを示しています。つまり、その面でイングランド銀行はそうあるべきだと感じているかもしれません。もう少しリラックスしてください.危険なのは、私たちが簡単に過ごすことができることだと思います.2023年の初めに、経済政策の世界の誰もが「まあ、実際には私のように少し良くなっている」と言って過ごすことは深刻な危険があると思います.別の例を挙げると、英国の財政はおそらく改善するでしょう。なぜなら、私たちの債務に課せられた金利は、この最近の秋の声明で織り込まれたほど高くはないでしょう。お金のための多くの分野があると思います ああ、思ったほど悪くはありません ドイツの産業は、思ったよりも少ないガスに対処できます うまくいけば、ええと、それの危険性は家庭のためだと思います物事があなたが思っていたよりもわずかに少ないかもしれないという事実は、彼らが得ているという事実を助けないので、それは起こることではありません.これは家計に起こっているので、これは3つの考え方になるでしょう.最初は失業についてあなたに示すことです.これはイングランド銀行をあなたに示すことです.英国以外の皆さんは、私たちの財政評議会です。これは、来年または今後 18 か月にわたって失業率が大幅に増加するという彼らの期待を示す、政府の予測を裏付ける一種の独立した予測です。 「ここで話していることは、比較すると小さく見えますが、50 万人について話しているのです。イングランド銀行の数は 100 万人です。これも米国で言えば、それを 5 倍して割ることができます。ラフインパクトつまり、非常に多くの人々が非常に集中した効果を持っているということです。ほとんどの人は仕事を失うことはありませんが、そうする人にとっては非常に大きな効果があります。英国の福祉国家はそうではありません。それが彼らに起こった場合、そもそも彼らが非常に低収入でない限り、彼らの収入を保護しないでください.まあ、ほとんどの人が任期中固定住宅ローンを持っているわけではありませんが、変動住宅ローンを利用している人々が何人かいるという理由には立ち入りません。赤、緑、青のバーについては大丈夫です。住宅ローンが銀行の基準金利で上昇し始めており、その後、定期住宅ローンを持っている人口が増えていますが、条件は大きく異なりますが、2 年 3 年 5 年 10 年で幸運な人もいます。次の 5 年か 6 年の間に、彼らの現在の取引が終了し、新しい取引が行われ、それらの取引の金利がはるかに高くなり、次の選挙で感覚が得られるようになります。英国では 2024 年末に 500 万人の世帯が金利の上昇を目にしたことがないと言うべきです。 'たくさんのお金 大丈夫です これらは一般的に中所得世帯です 明らかに彼らは若いです 彼らはもっと若くなるでしょう 絶対に打たれる若いコホートの一部の方が良いでしょう 最後に家を買う人はいますか1年ここにいるのは、あなたがそれをするべきではなかったからですとにかく、残念ながら、それらの不運な人々はより高い利子を得ることができますが、より低い住宅価格を得ることができないからです。朝はかなり大きな住宅価格を示しています.3 4% の金利で現在の住宅価格を維持する方法はないように、すでに下落が始まっています。たとえば、購入する場合は、少し待ってください。とにかく今は住宅ローンを取得しますが、最後の理由は、予算責任局の収入予測を示しているだけなので、私が始めたのと同じ尺度であり、これが何を意味するのかを示しています。金融危機以来、私たちはここで多くの収入を得ることができませんでしたが、良い段階がありました.2015年頃にはガス価格が下落し、雇用が急速に増加し、賃金が上昇したときに良い段階がありました.ちょっとそれで、このブレグジットのことが起こったのを覚えていますか、そして、私が言っているように、政策が大きな違いをもたらしたので、パンデミックで大きな落ち込みはありませんでしたが、7％の落ち込みである巨大な落ち込みでした。私たちがしていない始まりについてあなたに話します'この 10 年の後半までパンデミックに陥っていた場所に戻りましょう。ええ、そうです、経済界の誰もが、来年はそれほど悪くないと言っています。それは約束します。おそらく3月までにその世界にいて、この種のチャートを見て、それは問題ではなく、あなたにとって少し難しくなく、金利の設定はここの試験問題ではありません.試験の質問は、高い食料費に対処しようとしている人々に何が起こっているのかということです.株価とガスの上昇は、私よりもはるかに高いよりも少ない材料です。エネルギー価格の平均は、過去 15 年間、基本的には 1 世帯あたり約 100 ポンドでした。時間の経過とともに小さな変動がありましたが、基本的に、現在は 3,000 ポンドであり、インフレが起きていないという事実を覚えています。さらに悪いことに 3000 を超えることは、あなたにとってあまり良いことではありません。なぜなら、あなたはまだキャンプ休暇を過ごす余裕がないからです。なぜなら、それはあなたが慣れ親しんでいるものの 2.5 倍だからです。それがすべて私が結論付けたことですが、あなたはすでにそれを聞いていて、私たちはすでに時間がありますので、最後に
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ジャスティンに感謝します。私と同じように、さまざまなアプローチの素晴らしいパネルであると感じていただければ幸いですが、私たちが直面する問題についても私たちに非常に認識させてくれます。ええと、イザベラは私たちに楽観的な雰囲気を与えてくれました。観光客で、うんうんと憂鬱で、申し訳ありませんが、マーティンは私たちに参加できなかったと言うべきでした。時間について混乱があり、彼はオーストラリアにいて、私たちに参加する代わりに寝ることにしました。意味はわかりませんが、マーティンは、残念ながらリベラル時代のインフレが価格から資産のインフレにどのように移行したかについて議論するという意味で、暗いアプローチで観光客に参加するような気がします。そうですね、技術的な問題を解決するためにもう少し長く滞在できることに皆さんが同意する場合は、おそらく 10 ～ 15 分間のディスカッションがありますので、何も言いません。ここにいる IPP の学生は疑わしいと聞きたいので、ポジティブ マネー シンクタンクのメンバーが 2 人いますが、これは別のことですが、彼らの仕事をチェックする必要があると思います。させて'聞こえますか オーケー オーケー オーケー プレゼンテーションをありがとうございましたが、彼らは私の声を聞くことができませんでした。特にあなたに質問があります。インフレのミクロ経済的決定要因が存在するこの枠組み.供給のボトルネックなどがありますが、流通している金額を見ると、それが役割を果たした巨大な増加があります.ところで、それでよろしければ、私は私でした。私の予測では、私たちはソフトランディングは見られないだろうし、それを望んでいる人もいると思うが、経済におけるお金の量はそれほど重要な変数ではなく、私はこの問題に関して非常にケインジアンなので、そうではない重要なのは支出額であり、金融政策が経済に影響を与える場合、それはお金の量やお金の量の変更という点ではなく、実際には金利の変化であり、それが大部分を占めています資産価格への影響は正しいので、生産労働の価格に関しては中央銀行はあまりできませんが、バブルを吹き飛ばすか、バブルを崩壊させるかを知っているかどうかにかかわらず、資産価格の観点からは非常に効果的です。暗号市場を見て、何を見る必要があります」FEDが金利を引き上げたため、その多くは一掃されつつあります。その意味では、金融政策の余地がある限り、非常に効果的です.私はこれについてケインズと非常に一致しています.金利を低く維持し、基本的に永遠に金利を維持する必要があります。金利を引き上げるツールとして使用しないでください。金利を下げます。金利を上げたり下げたりします。金融の不安定性の影響があるためです。その意味では、非常に一種のミンスキーとええとしたがって、特定のボトルネックに対処しようとしている範囲で金利を低く維持することをお勧めします。低金利は、特定の分野への投資を促進するものではないことを知っていますが、少なくとも.その意味で法外になることはないので、低金利を許容し、米国が地元のエネルギーを更新する場合に備えて住宅などの特定の分野に投資しようとすることを知っています。金融政策がどのように役立つか考えてみてください。次の質問に感謝します。ええと、これは非常によく似ています。戦争のイメージでさえ破壊されたことを知っています。ええと、サウジアラビアと中国のこの瞬間があり、これがあったことを知っているからです。ロシアの軍事政策が実際に私たちが知っていることであることに気付く瞬間があります。ウクライナで行われている戦争の 5 分の 1 しか見ていません。残りの部分は、この種のプレッシャー ポイントを介して起こっています。他の方法で操作することを知っていますが、実際には戦争地帯であることを知っています.いくつかの価格管理、または他の方法論がある場合、実際にソーラーパネルを作るためにその石油を燃やす必要があるときに、それとこの石油の難問全体への投資を止め、投資をやめて止めようとするのを人々にやめさせるにはどうすればよいでしょうか。それはあなたが言ったように、誰がどのように誰がより貧しくなるかという問題です.どうやってこれを使うのをやめるのではなく、本当に必要なものをどうやって作るのですか 戦争と未来はどのように起こっているのですか？戦争のためにイザベラのためのものだと聞いたので、それを聞きたいのなら、ええええええと、私は楽観的ではないということから始めさせてください。つまり、私は経済政策の災害対策を求めているということです基本的に、経済政策には消防署のようなものが必要だと思います。なぜなら、より多くのショックが襲うからです。イェバが示したように、私たちが持っている機関はこれらの火事と戦う準備ができていないため、これらの火事はパイプラインにあります。彼らは勃発するつもりはありません。すべてがうまくいくことを願っています。それは私たちが生きている言葉になるだろう誰もがそれを望み、それに向けて努力するべきだということですが、より多くのショックが襲う可能性があるので、準備をしておく必要があります。米国を横断して出荷されると、穀物市場に新たな危機が生じることになるため、同じ規模であるかどうかにかかわらず、ショックはすでに適切に発生しているということです おそらく 2023 年にはすぐにではないかもしれません 2024 年にはまた起こるかもしれませんわかりませんが、もっと多くのことが来る可能性が高いようです。そのようなものは、私がここで言及した地政学の問題に関連しているので、特に中国との関係では、チャンスしかないと思います。私たちが世界で最も重要な大国の間で戦争をしており、気候変動と戦おうとしているのであれば、安定した世界秩序のための新しい枠組みをなんとかして作成することができれば、私たちが直面している危機を人類として本当に管理することができます。私たち'かなり運命づけられているので、前兆と同じように、ええと、そうは言っても、ヨーロッパで起こったことを見て、ヨーロッパ諸国が制裁対象の政権と経済戦争の形で関与しているのに、自国の経済を準備していなかったことが明らかであることに非常に感銘を受けました。彼らが関与したこの経済戦争の非常に予測可能な影響は、正直に言うと本当に衝撃的で不可解でした。これは、人々が持っている経済的考え方と大きく関係していると思います戦争経済のような状況に対処できる 自由市場の経済政策を買える 私にとってこれは完全な幻想に過ぎない 歴史がこれが間違っていることを証明していると思う また、主要な賞が行われるときはいつでも、誰もが考えるこの段階があることを私たちは知っていると思います彼らはこれらの衝撃に対処することができ、通常の条件でビジネスを行い、その後、彼らはそれを見つけます」それは機能せず、最終的には、その人が財政対応の観点から話していた措置などの新しい種類の措置を取り合い始め、今では価格管理とエネルギー部門の問題に取り組んでいます。最初の 2 点はええと、私は最初に、財政補助金を通じて機能する基本的に価格上限である価格管理と、実際には規制上の価格上限である価格上限である価格管理を区別する必要があることに同意するという人に同意します。 x よりも高い この後者の種類の価格管理は、商品の供給源に比較的近い場所で課せられている場合に機能する可能性があるため、ヨーロッパ レベルでは機能する可能性がありますが、国内レベルでは機能しません。そのため、持続可能な価格を設定する必要があります。率直な意見の危機に対する文明の対応個人的には、LNG 部分にある程度の価格の柔軟性を持たせることは良いことだと考えていますが、その設計が何であれ、ええと、私たちはそうするでしょう。私たちが財政的に行う場合、今EUレベルで何かが必要です 英国が行ってきたように、そしてドイツが行ってきたように、私が取り組んできたように、価格ギャップに資金を提供します。あなたのCPIで測定されることになるそれはCPIが下がると言います、そしてそうです最初の場所は統計的効果ですが、測定されたCPIに基づいてインフレへの対応を調整する中央銀行の言葉に住んでいることを考えるとインフレは、私たちが経済政策を設計した方法によるものですこれは、タカ派の金利政策に反対する可能性があるという点で重要だと思いますが、これらの財政金融価格ギャップをそれらを、財政的に資金調達された価格ギャップのおかげで減少したコストが実際に企業によってバリューチェーンに沿って伝えられるように設計された利益税の勝利と組み合わせると、インフレを大幅に下げるだけでなく、インフレを下げる手段を持つことができます。統計的効果としてではなく、実際にはバリューチェーン全体で実質的な尺度として、実際の価格管理を行うとしたら、財政的に価格ギャップを維持するための補助金に資金を提供するのではなく、企業に価格を指示する価格管理を行う場合、石油と石油で可能性があると思います.米国のガスのレベルなどについて話さなければなりませんが、理論的には、これが産出への投資にどのような影響を与えるかは可能性があると思います。これは私が今得ている質問でした。最初の直感では、彼らは、価格が制限されている場合、これは生産量が低下する可能性があることを意味すると考えていますが、これは実際に起こることではありません。現在、彼らは最高の時間を過ごすことについて話している.実際に、私たちは石油とガスの利益を世界的に追跡している論文を発表している.彼らは最高の時間を過ごしている.つまり、パンデミックの間、彼らは多くの資産をオフザグリッドにしたため、高コストの資産での生産をやめ、代わりに低コストの資産を使用して生産したため、コストが下がり、価格が上昇し、利益が屋根を通り抜けました。あなたの価格がXに維持されると言うなら、彼らは生産を増やすインセンティブを持っていません.私たちは必然的に化石燃料の生産量を増やしたいと言っています。プライス キャップの運用方法に関して言えば、プライス キャップがより多くの生産を促進できる緊急時に話しているこれらの極端なシナリオの状況でさえある可能性があり、これは歴史的にも見られたものです。戦争の文脈で ありがとう ええ ええ じゃあ私はサイモンを他の誰かに持っているので 2 つ手に入れることができます ええええええええええしかし、金融政策ができることは、貯蓄をして消費を遅らせることで、人々の適切な支出を減らすことができるという議論があることをご存知でしょうか?それは議論ではなく、それに関連していると思います。あなたが知っているサプライチェーンの問題に対処するために、このすべての投資を増やすことについて人々が話すとき、投資適格の貯蓄などを節約することは明らかです。多くの国は、工業化を行ったときに、ソビエト連邦、日本、中国などのように推進していることに気づき、インフレになり、経済の他の部門での貯蓄を奨励する必要があるため、この投資だけでなく、私たちがしなければならないことは、必要性の低い他のセクターへの投資を制限する必要もあり、貯蓄を奨励する必要もありますか？1970 年のスタグフレーションについて話していると、サプライ サイドで楽観主義が欠如している可能性があります。おそらくグローバリゼーションに伴う中国と気候変動です。物事は将来的に必ずしも良くなるとは限らず、ケインジアン主義から自由放任主義への考え方の変化、またはマネタリズムの台頭によるものです。長期的なマクロと政策の見通し グリーンニューディールや開発途上国向けのマーシャルプランのように、これらの問題を実際に長期的に解決し、それらに対してもう少し楽観的にすることができる解決策は何だと思いますか。 3 番目のものを手に入れたら、みんなで一緒にやります はい、それは全員に 1 つの質問です ここにいる全員に質問します [音楽] わかりました 現時点でのインフレは供給主導であるというあなたの主張は理解できます。常にそうであるか、またはインフレが少なくとも住宅や商品市場などの特定のセクターで悪魔によって引き起こされる可能性があることを認めますか.イザベラはあなたの論文でユビキタスとボラティリティを2つのドライバーとして言及しました.価格なので、私の質問は、私たちがインフレと戦うために使用するツールを変更し、あなたが提案した方針に沿ってツールを採用した場合、これが例えばいくつかのボラティリティに影響を与えた場合、それはあなたの入出力回帰の結果を変更し、トップ 10 ええどうすれば深い収入形態で浅い景気後退を迎えることができますか?最後に、おそらく増加する可能性がありますが、申し訳ありませんが、私がインフレを予測するために使用した5年から10年の範囲のようなインフレ期待が得られました。私たちは始めましたええと、まあ、そこにはたくさんあるので、私はそれを意識しているので、ええと、それらのうちの2つを取り上げると、投資は、投資の問題は、ええと、ソビエト時代の工業化のような詳細を脇に置いていると思いますが、そこにはあります特に英国の政党の議論にある一般的なことですが、実際にはこれのバージョンが米国で見られます。明らかに、特にこれは政治的スペクトル全体で見られると思いますが、おそらく左側でわずかに普及しています。そこの'より高い投資が必要であることを認識 将来 それが公共投資によるものなのか ネットゼロへの移行によるものなのか 賃金が上がっていないのである時点で会社を実際に成長させたいからなのか15年なので、ほとんど議論されていないのは、その投資の資金がumから来るということの意味と、最も基本的なレベルでのようなものを含むトレードオフであることは明らかです。かなりの期間、家計の消費を抑えたいと思いますか?それとも、投資資金を調達するために海外から借り入れたいと思いますか?英国はすでにエネルギー価格のせいですでにかなり多くのことを行っていることに気付くでしょう。ええ、基本的に誰が誰であるかについての議論はまったくありません。それが問題である理由は、あなたがその高い投資に賛成しているなら、では、誰の消費量が減少するか、どのように経済の全体像に影響を与えるかを本当に気にする必要があります。なぜなら、一部の人々にとって消費量の減少は、他の人々の仕事を意味するからです。重要なことは、住宅の改修を進め、それによって多くの雇用が創出されることです。つまり、ミクロ レベルでもマクロ レベルでも、多くの雇用が創出されるわけではありません。経済のこの部分から経済のこの部分に活動の負荷を移動させようとしている 消費を減らすことで支払い方法に応じて削減することでそれを行うので、世帯はそれを自分で支払うようになります外食は減る権利があるということは、地球を救うことにもなるので、大丈夫ですが、投資はすぐに報われ、消費形態がないという一般的な考えは、基本的にナンセンスであり、あなたが必要とするものです自然な経済プロジェクトに興味がある場合は、そこに何かを言うのではなく、そのようなことを考えてみてください。それは良いことです。外貨収入の答えは、国が貧しくなっているからです。生産量が減っているわけではありません 購入できる商品が少ないということです 私たちは開かれた経済であるため、ポンド単位で生産したものに対して世界中で購入できる商品が少なくなります IE エネルギー価格が上昇し、それらはほとんどすべて輸入されているため、実際の生産レベルであっても、世帯としては貧しくなります。つまり、まだ一部の生産が得られるのは別のことです。それらを投入物と世帯として持つものを生産する方が費用がかかるため、明らかに落ちます。は対応していますが、交易条件のショックが家計に多くのことを引き起こしている場合は、広く対応できます。生産にフィードスルーする必要があります 巨大な生産力 国内で素晴らしい ありがとうございます ありがとうございます 完全雇用のような状況にあるなら 貯蓄政策の余地があると思います 例えば ケインズは戦争の支払い方法でそれについて語っています私は同じ種類のアプローチとグリーンニューディールに関する論文を使用しましたが、これは別のことです。一般的に、支出はリソースの使用と考える必要があると思います。それから私たちはあまりにも多くのリソースを適切に使用しており、それは公的支出と民間支出の両方である可能性があるため、私にとっての問題は、支出をどのように制限するかではなく、時にはそれが必要になることもありますが、今はそう思います.それは本当に私たちの問題ではありません.2つの真実の雇用に到達した場合、明らかにそうです.インフレを回避できるように支出を制限するにはどうすればよいですか.インフレは需要によっても左右される可能性があるため.真のインフレとは、完全雇用に到達したときに見られるものであり、それは基本的にケインズの真のインフレ適正の定義です。つまり、財政政策のやり方を再考できると思います。つまり、この種の無差別な財政政策私はそれを財政政策への自由市場アプローチと呼んでいいでしょうか？それは間違ったやり方です 現代のマネー理論のエコノミストは 保証された雇用の形で的を絞った財政政策を提唱してきました たとえばグリーンニューディールは 明らかに非常に重要になり得る 長期的にはグリーンニューディールのようなものがあると思いますこのインフレ投資は、その投資プロジェクトを行っている間にリソースを必要としますが、長期的には、より多くの容量を生み出すという意味で元が取れます。したがって、今日再生可能エネルギーに投資する場合、太陽光発電を建設するためにはより多くの労働者が必要です。パネルは正しいですが、長期的には、エネルギーに関して利用できるようになったため、長期的にエネルギーコストを削減できるため、住宅であるかどうかにかかわらず、特定の分野での一般的な公共投資がわかります。エネルギー エネルギーは特に、気候変動への取り組みにも役立つからだと思います。私たちは気候変動に正しく取り組みます。また、雇用を創出し、できれば良い仕事を生み出します。また、そのようなことをしなければならない場合、経済の能力を拡大することも知っています。私たちの経済のキャパシティに真に到達することで、私たちは貯蓄のようなことを促進するいくつかの方法を考えることができますが、私はこの無差別な金利の上昇が正しい方法だとは思いません。私はケインズと同じで、貯蓄とはこの 2 つの部分からなる決定であると、一般的に言うよう人々に勧めてください。まず、貯蓄額を決定します。トールソンが話していた低所得世帯のように、金利に関係なく貯蓄するつもりはありません.金利が変化したとき、たまたま裕福な世帯である保有者 ある資産クラスから別の権利への資産の入れ替えにすぎない 貯蓄決定の第 2 段階 異なる資産クラス間で貯蓄をどのように分配するか料金が問題になるので、すべての質問にある程度対処したと思います。この時点で、教えるクラスがあるため、実際に走らなければなりません。私を迎えてくれてありがとう、どうもありがとう、ありがとう [拍手] 後で、ありがとう、バイバイ私たちのモデルにおける体系的な重要性 大丈夫でした 政策体制が採用された場合、予算モデルはどのように異なる結果を示すでしょうか IE 異なる領域を持つものは重要になるでしょうか ええええと、それは異なる結果を示すでしょうつまり、バッファがあったとしましょう。つまり、現在の運用方法で戦略的石油備蓄だけを持っていなかったとしましょう。彼らは、FEDが石油の公開市場操作を行っており、実際に価格の急上昇と石油を安定させていることにバックアップされていると言っています。売買であり、誰も売りたがらないので、彼らが何十年にもわたって行ってきたビジネスのようなものです。あなたがその種の政策を持っていて、石油とガスの価格に極端なボラティリティがなくなったとしましょう。私たちのモデルでは、セクターがインフレに対する体系的な重要性を低下させるというのは正しいです。私たちがここで見ているのは、住宅に関して大きな公共投資が住宅に押し寄せた場合の関連変数としてのインフレです。ええと、初回購入者向けの優遇金利があったとしましょう。これにより、住宅の購入コストが低下します。住宅の測定コストが低下する可能性があります。そうであれば、これが CPI に入り込む方法に影響を与える可能性があります。つまり、私たちのモデルでは、この投資の問題全体を考えた後、重要性が低下することを意味します。ええと、これが必ずしも起こるとは言っていませんが、これらのサプライ チェーンのショックが実際にさらに激しくなるかどうか、そして巨大な地政学的緊張の文脈でグローバル サプライ チェーンのさらなる崩壊が見られるかどうかという深刻な問題は、物理的な現実の限界に達していない可能性があるかどうかです。これまでにない方法で投資する」つまり、環境に優しいものに大規模な投資をしたい場合、そのために必要な特定の重要なコンポーネントが十分な量ですぐに入手できない状況にあるとしましょう。財政支出で正しい優先順位を設定する必要がある場所にお金を投入するだけでなく、私が取り組んでいる仕事のように、国家の能力についてもまったく新しい問題を提起している産業政策のまったく新しい問題私は政府の委員会で行ってきました.背景に迫っていた大きな問題の1つは、ガス危機がより深刻になる場合、システム的に重要な活動が十分かつ十分に安価なガスを利用できるようにするべきかということでした.答えは、現在の州は、経済のシステム上重要な部分が何であるかを理解する準備さえできておらず、結局のところ物理的な配給がどのように機能するかを理解する能力さえ持っていないということです.私は主張していません.合理的には、それはここでのアイデアではありませんが、アイデアはそれです」この世界のエネルギー危機がどのように展開するかによって、また、気候変動について真剣に何かをするのに十分な速さでグリーン経済への移行を真剣に試みている場合、物理的な限界に達し、それが物理的な限界に達している可能性があることは認識できます。新しい方法での物理的な割り当ての問題です イザベラさん ありがとう質問して、彼女に言ってもいいけど、はい、イザベラに感謝するために私に参加してください、大西洋を越えて私たちに参加してください.私たち全員、本当にありがとうございました [拍手] 52:45 / 1:40:48 Whither Inflation? -
52:45 / 1:40:48
Whither Inflation? - Round Table I
UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose
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Recently, inflation, i.e., the change in prices for goods and services over time, has become one of the main concerns for the global economy. In this round table the timely topic of inflation was explored in detail by a panel of global economists: Torsten Bell of the Resolution Found …
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0:06
so this is our last seminar of the term so we have a round table with three you know amazing presenters I'm gonna get
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that soon so I just want you to say that the research seminar at IPP is happening every happening every other Wednesday
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although next term it may be on Tuesdays but okay uh so we're trying to discuss
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uh or trying to make that bridge between research and policy and we are
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challenging or looking through the challenges we're facing right now from like green transition
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climate change uh also the role of the stage obviously the issue of inflation
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which has been a problem in the last should I say a year yeah I think so yeah and uh in in the
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implications that that has uh for the entire Society including of course the poorest households which we're also
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going to unpack that a little bit so yeah so thank you very much for coming so our first Speaker would be yeva
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nurses nursian uh thank you very much for being here yeah his associate
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professor of Economics at Franklin and Marshall College in a research scholar at the living economics Institute of
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Bard College she has a PHD in economics and Mathematics from the University of
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Missouri Kansas City city thank you so she is a macroeconomist working in
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modern money Theory mmt plus Keynesian and institutionalist traditions her
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research interests include um interests include Banking and Financial instability fiscal and
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monetary Theory and policy and she has also published a number of papers on the
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topics of Shadow banking fiscal policy government deficits and debt and the
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green New Deal currently however is co-editing the Elgar companion of modern
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Monet Theory with Rondo Ray so that's we're very looking forward to this um so
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then we have Isabella Weber our next speaker who is a political Economist who work on China global trade in the
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history of economic thought she's assistant professor of Economics at University of Massachusetts I hate the
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word amarest and the research leader for China at political economy Research Institute Isabella holds a PhD in
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economics from the new school and also from Cambridge and she was a visiting research at TC to single University
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China I assume so her first book how China escaped shock therapy the market
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reform debates the winner of the John Robinson price 2021 and also was awarded
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the best book of many 2021 lists around the globe and I am more recently
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Isabella has been involved with the public debate in inflation in advising the government the German government
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regarding the gas price break which they're adopting recently and finally
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we have here with us tours and Bell in person so he's the only one who is Rio today who is less exotic it's like yeah
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that's exciting really and Torsten is a chief executive of the resolution
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Foundation I think tank here in UK that combines analytical regrowth policy
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prescription to improve the living standards of those in Britain on low to Middle incomes and it's a fantastic
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foundation you should check it out everything they do he has a background in economics economic policy and his
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research focuses on economic change inequality the labor market tax and
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benefits and wealth prior to Leading the resolution for the foundation torson was the director of police for the labor
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party I didn't know about that I've lost a lot of Elections anyone wants advice I've got it
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he also worked for the treasury as a member of the currency of economic advisors doing the financial crisis in
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as a civil servant fantastic your National bank's also done that Torsten is a trustee of the child
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poverty Action Group in a fellow of the Academy of social sciences so I'm sorry for taking long to introduce them but I
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think that I want to show how especially that evening is and how we have probably here the one of the best Scholars and
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and intellectuals to talk about inflation today so yes if I'm passing
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the floor to you thank you
イヴ
all right so um
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I want to talk about the uh current inflation that we are facing today and
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my focus is largely on the United States but I think what I say about the US applies uh to a lot of economists
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especially developed economies including that of the UK um what I want to look at is whether the
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current inflation we're seeing is a demand issue or Supply issue and ultimately what are the kinds of
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solutions that we we should be reaching for uh and I'm going to go against the consensus the mainstream consensus and
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say that monetary policy is really not the right tool so that's basically my
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conclusion and I would say it's not just not the right tool for this current inflationary episode in general I'm
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going to argue that monetary policy is not the right tool for inflation period
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so um at least in the United States there has been a narrative that's been built
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that the current inflation we're seeing is a problem of too much demand and where is this demand coming from it's
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because the government added too much stimulus to the economy during covet we
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gave stimulus checks to people that was way too much obviously all of the focus is on the stimulus checks that went to
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households we don't hear a lot about all the money that went to businesses although a lot of the spending of the
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government that went to businesses but that's been the narrative that is a problem of too much demand and we have
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to rein in demand to solve our inflation problem um but even when you so when you look at
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the uh economy I think a different picture emerges it's a picture of an economy where demand has recovered uh to
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the pre-pandemic levels and it has recovered rather quickly compared to our previous situations but it's not a
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situation of too much demand even by mainstream standards I would say
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um because you know a mainstream Economist and a post case can look at the same economy and they can see different levels of slack right
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um you know somebody like me who does mmt would look at the economy uh where
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the unemployment rate is say 3.5 and I would say we can still push it even lower and not necessarily get inflation
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pressures it's just about the kind of policy we do but even going by mainstream standards right uh is the
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economy overheating and is that the reason why we have inflation uh so one way to look at this would be to look at
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potential GDP versus actual GDP and this is all in nominal terms so um initially
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when the pandemic started uh the Congressional budget office which comes up with this estimates of potential GDP
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because that's what they are their estimates they're not observables uh and so they revise their estimates downward
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because of the expectation that we were going to have this huge downturn and in downturns our Economist potential gets
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eroded because we basically don't use the potential and so uh it gets eroded
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that way but then they quickly revise them upward and they kept revising them upward right because of the kind of
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recovery that we had which was Stronger which I would attribute to the strong fiscal policy response and so if you
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look at these numbers only in the second quarter of 2022 is that is when our
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actual GDP went about the potential GDP and that wasn't by by that much right
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and obviously inflation had started way before that right so if the argument is that we've reached our Economist
7:54
potential right we are spending more then the economy can accommodate then you should have started seeing inflation
8:00
pressure starting in you know the middle of 2022 but obviously inflation started way before that and so even by this
8:08
measure we hadn't reached our Economist potential until sometime in 2022. now
8:15
just because we reached the economy's potential doesn't necessarily mean we have to see inflation and this graph
8:22
actually showcases that very well so I have the potential GDP which is the blue
8:28
line and then actual GDP which is the red line and on the right hand scale I'm measuring inflation in the inflation
8:34
rate which is the Consumer Price Index basically um the change in the Consumer Price
8:40
Index year over year and we can see that we had this long period right this was
8:45
leading up to the global financial crisis where we had our uh you know we
8:51
had reached our potential GDP and we were even over it to some extent for quite a while and our inflation was
8:57
hovering around three percent we weren't seeing this runaway you know seven eight nine percent inflation that we are
9:03
seeing today and it picked up here uh because we had the commodity speculation so basically when the housing market
9:10
crashed a lot of the money that was in the housing market moved to the commodity market and inflated the
9:15
Commodities Futures that's why we saw that spike in inflation and then there was the you know very quick downturn and
9:21
then inflation stayed very subdued in the aftermath of the global financial crisis so
9:27
um you know just because we are we are getting close to potential GDP doesn't mean we necessarily have to see price
9:33
pressures and and this is the story that we're getting from mainstream economists right people like Larry Summers Jason
9:38
Furman basically saying we stimulated the economy too much got to the potential level overheated and that's
9:45
why we're seeing inflation pressures even before kovid right we were very close to our potential we had gotten
9:51
there um and the result was not the runaway inflation that you know we we are we are
9:57
seeing today one other thing I would say here is that you can also see that this blue line right how its trend went you
10:06
know changed in a downward because we did not do appropriate and adequate
10:12
policy measures in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and during the Great Recession instead we engaged in
10:18
austerity here and obviously it was worse in the UK and you the Eurozone and
10:24
that has depressed our economy's potential so in a way the lesson that I'm seeing from these two recessions is
10:30
not that we um should not overdo fiscal policy because we're going to get inflation
10:36
it's more like if you don't do sufficient then you are lowering your economy's potential and setting it up
10:41
for inflationary pressures down the line and I'm happy to answer questions on this if I've when you know if I I'm
10:48
being too um you know technical here now the other story we're getting is that
10:53
the labor market is too tight right and that's evidenced by the low unemployment rate but of course the unemployment rate
11:00
is not the whole story what I have here is the labor force participation rate basically this tells us what percentage
11:07
of the population that's eligible to be in the labor force is either working or is unemployed and looking for a job
11:14
right so we look at the how much the population let's say 16 and over that's
11:20
not in prisons you know that's not institutions of any sort that is participating in the labor force and
11:26
what we've been seeing since the 1970s in the US is this gradual decline in labor force participation rate and
11:33
obviously this drop since the global financial crisis is quite significant and what we see is that we never
11:39
recovered right our economy never recovered back so the people who left the labor force they left it basically
11:46
for Good Very you know quite a lot of them stayed out and then we had this very big drop in the uh after month of
11:54
covet and we have recovered but we are not even at the pre-pandemic levels right so we haven't even gotten back to
12:00
those levels I'm not even talking about this pre-global financial crisis levels right so there is still more room uh to
12:07
coax more workers into the labor market right and and for that we need to make sure that the recovery continues that
12:14
labor market stays strong right um which is obviously not the policy uh
12:19
choice that we are uh taking that's not the policy or what we're taking right now
12:24
the other graph that I wanted to show you which kind of also tells the story that we are not having a problem of too
12:31
much demand is this graph from the Atlanta Federal Reserve business expectation survey so there instead of
12:37
surveying Wall Street people and economists to try to gauge what the inflation expectations are there
12:43
actually surveying non-financial businesses large and small and they're
12:49
asking them a bunch of questions like how do your sales compare to um to the
12:54
norm right and when you look at that you see that businesses are not reporting
12:59
sales that are above the norm right uh and then there you one of the questions
13:05
they're getting asked is what's going to be the influence of sales in the future
13:10
on prices and we can see that that hasn't been above the norm in the
13:15
aftermath of the pandemic and in fact that you know value is actually going down right now right so even if you
13:23
could make the case that we had a problem of too much demand earlier after
13:29
the pandemic that has all played out right so you can't say that we are continuing we are going to continue to
13:35
see too much demand to the extent that the fiscal stimulus was contributing to the demand that has all played out in
13:42
the United States at least all right now um what is driving the
13:47
current inflation um I think there are many factors that are contributing to it
13:52
um and I would say they're mostly on the supply side so this is the breakdown of
13:58
the CPI the Consumer Price Index by a major component and I think Isabella is going to talk about one of these
14:04
components in particular you don't have to be able to read the legend to tell me which one is the green bar right it's
14:11
obvious that it's Transportation it's obvious that a lot of it is oil um some of it is car prices which is
14:18
related to the shortage of semiconductors and so on so clearly this is a story of particular bottlenecks and
14:26
the other line that is the other bar that is quite noticeable is this yellow
14:32
one right here and that's rentals right but it's not actual rentals the actual
14:37
rentals are this green sorry gray bars that are you know still significant
14:42
somewhat but they're not as in important as the yellow ones and the yellow is what we call imputed rentals for housing
14:48
so the way so these are not actual prices these are imputed prices and
14:53
what's done is that um you know the question is if you're owning your own home like I do for
15:00
instance uh how much would I pay to rent the kind of house that I currently own
15:06
right so this is for owner occupied homes people who own their homes the question is if they were to rent that
15:12
kind of home how much would they pay for it right obviously this is not a good reflection of how much I'm actually
15:18
paying because my mortgage has been fixed ever since I got the house right say 10 years ago so this is not an
15:24
actual price that people are paying this is just the price that we would be paying if we were to rent homes of you
15:30
know the kinds of homes that we have bought and we live in so in some sense
15:35
you can see that this unobservable price is quite an important part of the price
15:41
index and it's been driving the current inflation the high rate readings of inflation as well
15:47
all right but I think to me the main story here is that this is a problem of
15:52
oil and if you look at the oil markets um is it a question of too much demand
15:58
is it a question of two too little Supply I think it's a little bit of both right so again to me it seems like the
16:05
demand has recovered and the supply has not been able to recover at least in the U.S right we are only now getting to the
16:12
pre-pandemic levels of oil supply and obviously we can see that OPEC is a big
16:17
part of this story right it was a big part of the story in the US in the 1970s when we had the inflationary episode and
16:23
it's still a big part of the story today so it you know we haven't taken we we
16:28
didn't do it right in the 1970s the policy of say transitioning away from
16:33
oil and it seems like where we have where we haven't learned those lessons that we're still not doing the right thing here all right so um the story to
16:42
me is a supply Side Story right it's a story of a pandemic that that started as a supply I say crisis morphed into
16:48
demand and we have the policy tools to affect demand and for as an mmt
16:56
economist I would say we we can Finance demand in unlimited amounts so money is
17:02
not a problem the problem is the real resources right so do we have enough real resources and that's where the
17:08
supply comes in so the first round of covet covet relief that we did in the US
17:14
the fiscal stimulus or Cisco relief I should say it wasn't really stimulus it helped people pay their bills pay up
17:20
paid their debts it also increased savings so in a way it was split in
17:26
three equal parts a third of it went to uh consumption a third one to saving and a third one to paying debts basically
17:34
um and then eventually the last round Resort spending to the pre-covet levels
17:40
but at the same time we've continued to see supply side pressures supply chain
17:45
issues that companies have been facing in that same survey that I talked about
17:50
the Atlanta fed survey when they when companies are asked about price you know supply side disruptions they like the
17:57
majority of them were reporting supply-side disruptions as as late as the middle of 2022 still and I think
18:04
those things are still continuing there's also the question of pricing right prices don't just happen they are
18:09
set by corporations and in the US corporations tell their shareholders
18:15
very clearly that they are using the cover of inflation to raise prices right they are actually saying that this is a
18:21
great time for our pricing decisions right we can basically take advantage of the situation because there is inflation
18:28
and nobody's like going to single us out as or look at this one company that's raising their prices right so they are
18:34
using this as an opportunity to raise their prices there's also the issue of of course War the war in Ukraine and and
18:41
the sanctions and so on and that's going to be a bigger part of the story in Europe I would say um and that's why I
18:48
think we're seeing a higher inflationary pressures in a place like Germany right uh compared even to the United States so
18:55
it's not a story of wages driving this right it's not a story of wage price spiral it's wages are just plain catch
19:03
up at this point and I so early on I basically were was of the opinion that
19:09
this inflationary episode was transitory and I'm still of that opinion that it's transitory even though I think it's
19:15
taking longer than I initially thought it was going to take and that's because in the US workers don't really have the
19:20
power to force uh firms to compensate them fully for the inflation uh that
19:28
they're facing in fact real wages have actually you know not been catching up right so they've decreased in the real
19:34
terms pay has all right so I'm going to speed up because I think I'm already at that 15 minute Mark so the question then
19:40
is what do we do about it right what can central banks do about this inflation or inflation in general in the US the FED
19:47
basic quickly held off for as long as they could but then they were under
19:52
strong pressure from economists in particular saying that the FED has to do something about it if it doesn't do it
19:59
the inflation cat is going to be out of the bag and there's no way we're going to put it back in you know um
20:05
the Fed was called too soft on inflation Larry Summers who was not a part of the
20:11
administration trying to sort of influence policy from outside urging the FED to keep raising raids or
20:17
great you know the argument was that it should have started earlier and it should have raised them faster stuff like that right
20:23
um and and the FED eventually sort of obliged and now they are on a path of interest rate increases right which I
20:30
think is not going to end very well the FED of course so economists are definitely to blame for this and I'll
20:36
get to that in just a moment again but the FED is also to blame because they have taken credit for the low inflation
20:42
in the U.S so they've been happy to take credit for it which I think has been unjustified to great extent
20:48
so uh suppo the story is that supposedly Paul volcker the chairman of the FED uh
20:55
broke the back of inflation in the 1980s the reality was that he raised interest
21:00
rates you know above 20 and caused the Deep recession and financial crisis not
21:06
just in the U.S but also abroad something that were again seeing uh happening right now or is potentially
21:12
going to happen um they also broke labor unions right that's what happened during Reagan they
21:19
broke labor unions they broke the air traffic controller strike and uh and something we're seeing right now in the
21:25
US player as well as the strike of railroad workers is being broken again um so the reality I think is that uh
21:32
first labor unions lost their power but and we also had this in a related issue was the globalized supply chains the
21:38
Outsourcing the cheap labor abroad um we also had this just in time
21:44
production largely driven by Wall Street where companies were trying to squeeze every last bit of profit by trying to
21:50
keep their costs slow labor costs and otherwise we've also had a fiscal policy
21:56
that's been too tight over the last few recoveries so we've had stagnating demand and austerity we had austerity in
22:03
the middle of a recession basically after the global financial crisis and so
22:08
we've had this jobless recoveries where wage wage pressures have not materialized right the labor market has
22:14
been too weak and so that's really what's kept prices low and If the Fed has had any role in all of this it's
22:20
been to preemptively raise interest rates to prevent tight labor markets and to prevent wage growth that's been the
22:26
role of the fed and they say it if you look at the FED minutes they basically say it that that's what they look at
22:32
they look at the labor market once it gets too tight they are going to jump in and start raising interest rates
22:39
um now as I said you know economists and economics has a role to play here
22:44
obviously and economics has been a terrible guide for monetary policy and for the fed the FED has abandoned the
22:52
quantity Theory the monetarist idea that we have to control money supply to fight inflation it's arguable to what extent
22:59
they really Embrace that idea some economic historians have argued that it was really
23:05
um sort of a cover for raising interest rates to 20 and saying well we're not doing that we're just controlling the
23:11
money supply and interest rates are where they are and the current approach is this approach of the new monetary consensus
23:18
that the expectations of inflation cause inflation not clear how and that policy
23:23
works by controlling expectations right that monetary policy this the you know
23:29
the our main approach for controlling inflation is about basically controlling
23:34
the expectations of inflation uh of the market and so fed Economist Jeremy Rudd
23:40
wrote this very good paper a few years ago where he basically said the FED has no working theory of inflation even fed
23:47
officials have basically said said that my cuatha Randall Ray and Dimitri Papa
23:52
dimitrio wrote a paper in 1994 saying the FED is Flying Blind and they
23:57
recently wrote an update of that saying that the FED is still flying by blind they have really no way of you know they
24:03
have no uh Theory adequate theory of inflation so this graph shows you the
24:09
inflation expectations long-term and short term and this is the actual inflation right so instead of
24:15
expectations driving inflation it's more like expectations eventually converge to
24:21
reality right inflate expectations of inflation change when the actual inflation rates change so uh this right
24:28
could not have caused that and that's basically the facts theory that the expectations of inflation cause
24:33
inflation and that's just uh not uh you know what we're seeing in reality
24:39
and this is the Fed actively trying to control inflation like raising rates and
24:45
that's the orange line here it's the federal funds rate or the overnight rate and this is actual inflation which you
24:51
know it's like active fed is fighting inflation what is it that they're fighting so I will conclude by saying
24:57
that the reality of using monetary policy to fight inflation is what mmt
25:02
economists have been saying for quite some time and post-kansas too obviously is that
25:09
um the FED is using unemployment as a tool to fight inflation and the only good thing to come out of this episode
25:15
is that they are actually openly admitting that right here is Jerome Powell saying that there will likely be
25:22
some softening of the labor market of labor market conditions but we will keep at it until we're confident the job is
25:28
done and it's interesting that he uses the word we will keep at it that's like the title of Paul volcker's book that
25:35
keeping at it something like that that he kept at it that despite all the pressure right from labor from from
25:41
other parts of the government and so on they kept at it and they got inflation under control uh you know again Powell
25:47
says the labor market is just very very very strong very strong right and I would argue that's not what we're seeing
25:53
in the data um and uh here is the uh chair sorry
25:58
oops chair of the Boston fed that says I do anticipate that accomplishing price
26:04
stability will require slower employment growth and a somewhat higher unemployment rate in fact the FED for
26:09
cast the unemployment rate to rise from 4.4 to 5 next year right so that's
26:15
what's the price that's the price to pay for getting inflation supposedly under control all right
26:22
um so I'll just jump to my conclusion in the interest of time I think it's time that we rethink inflation and we also
26:28
rethink how we fight it uh the current inflation is not really demand driven and to the extent that monetary policy
26:35
can do anything about inflation it's not about expectations it's really about just lowering aggregate demand right it
26:41
can solve our supply problems so the only thing it can do is to try to tighten demand and that's what we're
26:48
doing and all of this happens as fiscal tightening is happening right we have our president
26:53
um basically saying our deficit is going down that's a great thing but the deficit is going down it means physical
27:00
policy is getting tighter right so fiscal policy is getting Tighter and we're typing monetary policy and I think
27:05
that's a recipe for a recession um and so we have to rethink how we
27:11
fight inflation and we have to um uh you know give a bigger role to fiscal policy uh because fiscal policy
27:18
can actually address the bottlenecks it can address the issue of Housing and lack of housing it can issue the issue
27:25
of oil causing a bottleneck by say investing in alternative energies we can
27:32
try to help households who are struggling in the current inflationary environment again the FED cannot do it
27:39
it has to be done through fiscal policy and obviously fiscal policy is also done in a democratic manner which is not how
27:46
monetary policy is done okay I'll stop here and I'll have I'm happy to take questions at the end
27:53
thank you very much yeah but that was fantastic
28:00
thank you that was great I really recommend you to check out ever's papers
28:06
on our website I think what's very interesting uh is not only uh you have
28:12
his purpose doesn't only show us how complex to understand the factors behind inflation is but also the painting on
28:18
your theoretical methodological starting point you go to different venues and you may miss this some of these factors
28:25
which is very important as well so please check out that paper so okay so uh Isabella you're next great um thank
28:34
you so much for setting this up um I think that you have us paper and my paper actually speak to one another perfectly so I can just kind of pick up
28:42
um where she ended which is exciting so the title of my presentation is inflation in times of overlapping
28:49
emergencies systemically significant prices from an input output perspective
28:54
some of you might have seen that I got very heavily criticized when I suggest
28:59
that um pretty much exactly about a year ago that we might have to start thinking
29:06
about specific methods to tackle um the the price increases that are
29:12
happening in specific sectors and that this might involve us um to uh to to
29:18
have to go back to the tool of targeted price controls which we have been kind of abandoned to the Dustbin of history
29:24
for a while but that might become relevant again now um a year on
29:30
um because I want the same people who criticize me at the time have actually been recommending price controls in the
29:35
context of um war in Europe and I find myself I'm just being about to conclude
29:41
work on a German government commission where we have been designing gas price
29:47
caps and I can talk about the specificities of these policy of this policy because it's a very like kind of
29:52
complex kind of type of arrangement but um I think that the notion that we might
29:58
need to do something about specific prices is by now much more acceptable than it was a year ago and I think that
30:05
the reason for this is in parts that at least in the European context it's now
30:10
very clear that there is a very serious emergency there's war in Europe in a way in which it hasn't been in a long time
30:17
and this has huge economic implications in particular for energy markets in ways
30:24
that require new kinds of economic policy towards now what I'm arguing in
30:30
this paper is that yes the situation in Europe is very dramatic um the pandemic was very dramatic but
30:38
this idea that we are just about to return to some state of normal Tranquility seems very charming and
30:46
tempting and I hope it is the case that the war will be over soon that the pandemic will stop looming and will
30:53
actually be eventually that we will have a true victory that really is a global victory that we get climate change under
31:00
control that we do not have any more extreme weather events that we do not have any more shocks from climate change
31:05
and so on um my sense is that chances are there are more shocks in the pipeline because
31:11
we are living in a world of overlapping emergencies so that the kind of shocks to supply that we have been observing in
31:20
the last um two years or so um are likely to reoccur in some fashion
31:25
or another we don't really know how they're gonna happen we don't really know where they're gonna hit but it
31:32
seems likely enough that there might be more shocks to come which is the reason
31:37
why I'm arguing for for a form of economic disaster preparedness no one wants a disaster to happen but it's
31:44
better to be prepared than to have a disaster happen without being prepared so as I think Kim already it became
31:52
already very clear and yet give us a presentation we have been thinking of um
31:58
monetary policy a little bit like this coin-based um horse they're kind of
32:03
going back and forth in a very regular kind of fashion pretty one-dimensional if you think
32:09
about it it's like basically one dimension that you care about there are different dimensions that different people emphasize some emphasize more the
32:16
quantity of money some emphasize more um the the the the the um the potential GDP in relation to the
32:24
actual GDP others might be stressing more the question of expectations but it's in general like kind of a
32:30
one-dimensional question where you have a one-dimensional tool which is Raising
32:35
interest rates which supposedly um is enough to get monetary stability
32:41
um uh for the economy as a whole with this mindset
32:47
um comes an understanding where changes in relative prices have nothing to do
32:52
with inflation Milton Friedman um as of course a figurehead of monetarism put this very explicit
32:59
explicitly in the context of the inflation of the 1970s when he said what
33:05
of oil and food to which every government officially has pointed in relationship to the inflation then are
33:11
they not the obvious immediate cause of the price explosion not at all it is essential to distinguish changes in
33:17
relative prices from changes in absolute prices the special conditions that drove
33:23
up the prices of oil and food required purchases to spend more on them leaving
33:29
less to spend on other items did that not force other prices to go down or to
33:35
rise less rapidly than otherwise why should the average level of oil prices
33:40
be affected significantly By changes in the prices of of some things relative to
33:47
others so here then these changes in relative prices have at the very best A transitory impact on the micro economy
33:54
and that tra that period of transition is so short that it really doesn't matter because people
34:00
um spend less on other items if they are spending more on some items which means that overall the price level will stay
34:07
constant now this is of course the exact opposite of the idea that specific price
34:12
shocks might matter for inflation I'm going to skip over this because you
34:18
have already covered this brilliantly um so what I'm arguing in this paper is
34:24
that because we are living in this world of overlapping emergencies where we have intense shocks two specific prices that
34:31
change relative prices and that because these shocks can be so intense that they can in fact unsettle the general price
34:38
level we have to think about price stabilization more like um the ways in which we think about writing and actual
34:44
Wars um which is we want to be prepared we want to understand what triggers our horse we want to be wearing a helmet we
34:51
want to be as safe as we can because we prepare for our ride
34:56
this the logic that we are using in this paper actually based on input output
35:02
analysis and input output analysis was first um formalized in the context of the second world war when one of the
35:09
pressing questions was how to pump the German economy in the most effective
35:15
kind of way and they wanted to understand what are the points in the economic system that if those points
35:22
collapse the whole economy stops working this was a question of strategic bombing
35:27
now what we are doing in this paper is kind of using the same type of method to see what are the points of the greatest
35:34
vulnerability today where if shocks hit these kind of sectors
35:40
um this has the potential to unset the price price stability for the economy as
35:46
a whole this requires us to think of the economy as a circular circular circular flow as
35:54
Leon TF was arguing so in input output analysis we use a method of systemically
36:00
quantifying the mutual interrelationships among the various sectors of a complex economic system
36:05
which means that we can trace the effect of an event at any one point and the
36:11
ways in which it is transmitted to the rest of the economy step by step via the chain of transactions that links the
36:18
whole system together this also means that a sharp contrast to written
36:23
Friedman's notion far from being independent of each other the cost price structures of all the separate
36:30
Industries are nothing but links in a vast Network which Embraces the whole National economy this means that we are
36:37
taking the overall dependence among wage rates profits earned in taxes
36:44
um as the starting point for our analysis we're for someone's prices are
36:50
always someone else's costs which means that costs and prices across sectors are interrelated
36:58
in fact we can find a statement by leontier from the same year as the frequency and that claims the exact
37:05
opposite of what Friedman was saying as leonty have put it as a matter of fact the problem of inflation cannot be dealt
37:12
with in aggregative terms either if you had inflation in which all prices and incomes move in parallel nobody would
37:20
care actual inflation is a change in relative prices not just in the average
37:25
price level and as a matter of fact we can find similar statements also in Keynes
37:31
if we think of inflation as a matter of changes in relative prices this means
37:37
that this is important because it has immediate redistributive implications
37:43
this is based on the assumption that there's a downward stickiness of prices which means that if one price goes up it
37:50
does not mean that another price immediately goes up by the amount to keep the average constant
37:56
from this perspective then higher levels of inflation can follow from shocks to important sectors important sectors that
38:03
matter in the network of costs and prices and these shocks can be an expression of political events like Wars
38:10
climate disaster speculative hikes and so on
38:16
the research question that we're addressing in this paper is if inflation is not always in everywhere a
38:22
macroeconomic phenomenon as the current mainstream would have it but can be Unleashed by micro shocks on the supply
38:29
side we need to identify which sectors present points of vulnerability for
38:34
monetary stability or in other words have the greatest potential to become
38:39
systemically significant for inflation so a bit like with the exercise in
38:45
strategic bombing you want to understand what are the points of the greatest vulnerability if those points are being
38:52
hit you want to understand how this percolates through the whole system
38:58
in our empirical analysis we first bid a leon TF price Model then we simulate the
39:04
inflation impact of a price shock to each of the 71 sectors in our input
39:10
output um economy one at a time this is to say we simulate what happens if there's a
39:16
shock to the first sector then we do the same for the second the third until we get to the 71st and in terms of the
39:23
magnitude of the shock we first used the average price volatilities as they were
39:28
observed before um the pandemic and then secondly we use
39:33
the actual price movements in the covid-19 pandemic breaking this up into what I'm calling the post shutdown
39:40
economy in 2021 and the economy during the Russian war on Ukraine
39:47
this then allows us to rank the sectors by the inflation impact and this is as
39:54
we argue is a way to identify through the first exercise using the volatilities which sectors are latently
40:02
systemically significant that is to say they have the potential to become the
40:07
sectors that unleash overall inflation or B those sectors that actually realize
40:13
systemically significance during the covid-19 inflation.
40:19
um I have a chart here to explain what an input output table is in case that is not familiar to the audience I skip over
40:25
it in the interest of time for now what we do in this model is that we take
40:33
the value of the output of each industry which is composed of the value of domestic input so all the stuff that an
40:39
industry buys from other Industries value added which is profits wages and taxes and the Imports that an industry
40:46
buys from abroad that is imported inputs we then divide this value of the output
40:55
of an industry um by the the total output of this industry which it gives us the prices
41:02
per unit of output and this is important the price here then is composed of the
41:07
the the value of domestic inputs plus the value added plus the imported
41:14
um inputs which we can again solve for prices which then gives us an equation
41:20
where every price of every industry is interrelated to the prices of all other
41:27
Industries this allows us to um decompose the
41:35
shocks that we are simulating into direct inflation impacts where there's a change
41:41
um that a a specific price change um uh induces in the CPI in the consumer
41:48
baskets and the indirect inflation impact which comes through the impact of
41:53
that price change on all other Industries so if you take the example of oil um the price of fertilizers will change
42:00
if the price of fertilizers changes the price of wheat will change the price of wheat changes the price of bread will
42:05
change so at the end of the day you have a pretty big indirect impact of the change in the price of oil on overall
42:12
inflation and we combine this direct and the indirect inflation impact to come up
42:18
with a measure of total inflation impact and then we rank the sectors based on this total inflation impact which we use
42:25
to identify systemically significant prices this chart is um intentionally such that
42:32
you cannot read it I just want you to look at the shape of these figures um these are the rankings that we get of
42:39
the sectoral inflation total inflation impact and you can see that it's very unevenly distributed in other words
42:47
um some sectors clearly matter much more than others so if we zoom into this and
42:53
we look at the latent systemic significance which is composed of a direct effect in an indirect effect as
42:59
I've just explained where these green points um indicate the magnitude of the
43:04
price volatility from 2000 to 2019. we find that the most important sectors
43:10
from the perspective of the pre-pandemic world are petroleum and core products
43:15
oil and gas extraction Farms food and beverage into back tobacco products then
43:22
the Federal Reserve Banks which is a weird industry and an input output setting which is why I'm I'm discarding
43:28
it and I can explain in more detail why then we have chemical products housing
43:34
utilities wholesale trade and other retail other retail is kind of a basket
43:39
case so I'm also discarding this this leaves us with eight Industries which
43:45
show up as systemically significant and all of these eight Industries um appear again on the top of the
43:52
ranking when we use the actual price changes as they occurred in the post
43:57
shutdown economy that is quarter for 2021 and when we use the price shocks as
44:04
they occurred in the second quarter of 2022 so the time when the the war in
44:09
Ukraine was already in for um in full swing that's not the right terminology to use here sorry but it was
44:16
already happening um I think I'm kind of okay in the interest
44:24
of time I'm also going to skip over this um and just point out that we basically have three groups of systemically
44:30
significant sectors the first one is basic necessities that is housing food Farms utilities petroleum and gas
44:37
products the second one is basic production inputs such as petroleum and gas products again oil and gas
44:44
extraction and chemical products but also basics of circulation such as
44:49
wholesale trade and truck transportation which is a sector that only shows up in
44:54
the context of the covid-19 pandemic and I would argue it's a specific sector that had specific bottlenecks but that
45:01
is related to oil and gas at the end of the day we also um do a similar kind of exercise
45:10
where we do not assume as we did in the Baseline model I just showed you that profits and wages just stay what they
45:17
were before the shock but that now um workers can actually regain their
45:23
rear wage by increasing the nominal wage in a ways in ways to compensate for the
45:30
price increases for the staff that they are buying or that businesses can increase their profits in a way that
45:36
compensate for the decreased profit margins from increased costs this is
45:42
what we call conflict inflation based on Raw funds um important work of the 1970s
45:49
if we run these simulations we find that the ranking of systemically significant
45:55
sectors stays pretty much um the same
46:00
but we can also see that with basically the exception of oil and gas extraction
46:06
in all cases um the this line is going up more
46:12
between the second and the third model which is the the change from The Profit
46:19
adjustment to the wage adjustment this means that we would need a larger page adjustment to compensate for the price
46:26
increases then the magnitude of the profit adjustment that we would need to
46:31
compensate for the price increases in other words this means that if there is
46:36
no such weight adjustment real wages are hit harder than profit margins buy these
46:44
shocks to systemically significant prices or in other words workers are
46:50
carrying the brand of these shocks in conclusion then we can say that if
46:57
price rocks become systemic because we are living in overlapping emergencies it
47:02
is not feasible to react with rate hikes each time a stock a sector is hit by a
47:08
shock because of the reasons that yeva has laid out for us
47:14
economic stabilization then requires a form of disaster preparedness to absorb
47:20
shocks and systemically significant significant sectors this requires a change in mindset and requires
47:27
monitoring capacity for these systemically significant sectors as well as institutions and laws for emergency
47:33
price management which can involve buffer stocks regulation of financial speculation which is important for the
47:40
whole commodity sector prohibition of price gouging in times of emergencies Anti-Trust measures limits to price
47:48
hikes Investments to increase the medium-term resilience and a standby
47:53
Authority for emergency price stabilization and systemically significant sectors
47:59
if systemically significant sectors are so important that they can unsettle the
48:04
economy as a whole this also raises the question whether the public doesn't need more of a say in these sectors just as
48:11
central banks were once private in history thank you very much thank you
48:24
thank you very much Isabella so needle is to say that's another paper another word you should take it out you may
48:30
think that all this indirect impact of prices is like straightforward or the connection between among sectors but
48:36
most of the analysis don't really get into debt uh uh yeah level it's not even
48:43
a level for detail right don't get into that approach that don't develop the
48:48
analysis from from that perspective okay so we have our final speaker Torsten in
48:54
person um so I'm slightly nervous because I'm not qualified obviously to talk about this
49:00
because I've never ridden a horse there I'm also slightly shell-shocked by the reminder that Americans had their
49:06
mortgages fixed for the life fixed for the lifetime of their uh mortgages whichever in the US in the UK who does
49:11
not have that pleasure is about to be as I'll come on to later snacks around the head uh for the next few years by Rising
49:17
mortgage uh bills anyway um so I thought I would cope with all that trauma by
49:22
um uh I'd want to repeat a lot of the discussion on the macroeconomics of the current crisis so I'll touch on that a
49:28
bit at the end um but I said I thought I'd do something much simpler which is what is the impact what's going on in the UK which isn't
49:36
the same as going on in the US um what is the impact on people and different kinds of people of that
49:43
um shock and what might we think comes next broadly as three things to cover so I'll try and do that and I'll try and do
49:49
that reasonably quickly maybe not covering all this right we've actually got some slides that are working right okay so this tells you the obvious you
49:55
all know this we've seen the highest inflation rate in 40 years we've also seen the highest and so the fastest
50:01
increase in the inflation rate in 40 years so it's not just that this is turned up it's turned up as a complete
50:06
surprise if I'd shown you four car this is the Bank of England the obr's latest forecast from last month but if I'd
50:11
shown you all the forecasts that started from this time last year going backwards they all basically look like two percent
50:17
stretching into the Horizon with a nice straight line so it's always nice to be surprised
50:22
um in life the same thing would be true if I showed you fed forecasts for the United States too so that's the big
50:28
thing you all know the um
50:35
this is then covering some of the similar ground to charts you've seen so again I'm not going to dwell on it other than to say for the UK I think again
50:42
this is one reason why the UK and most European countries are obviously very different to the us not to you consider
50:47
the Eurozone which is we're talking here about pretty small but very open economies right one two the gas price
50:55
issue is a much bigger deal in Europe much much bigger than in Europe than it is in the States because we don't
51:00
produce it obviously the um thirdly for consumers it's a bigger deal in the UK because not only do we use gas fading
51:06
our homes we use gas for generating electricity to a much greater extent than most European countries and these
51:12
things really matter when you come to as you say how do how do individual prices feed through to wider inflation metrics
51:18
so this is telling you broadly what you probably already know um so you've got two broad things going on the international side of things here
51:24
we've got basically energy related costs at the bottom pushing up we've then got other goods and I'm putting that there
51:30
because all most of those are internationally traded to some degree or other some of the services are in the
51:35
green basket too and a lot of that is relating to as I'm going to come back to some of the questions about what U.S
51:42
demand has been versus what other countries demand has been during this phase but broadly what I'm saying to you
51:47
is in terms of the inflation rate we're seeing today in the UK stay away from the macro rare about whether you need to raise rates but in terms of what we're
51:53
seeing today it's definitely driven by International goods and in particular obviously energy costs right then just a footnote on the
52:01
macro debate before we move on which is just to say all of the economics debate is dominated by the United States that's
52:06
because all of all economics debates are dominated by the United States if you haven't got used to that yet and you've chosen a query in economics you've
52:12
chosen the wrong career it's not going to go away anytime soon the um but this is just showing you that the big phenomenon that's sitting behind the
52:18
rail that um the other two speakers have excellently covered in the United States on the causes of inflation which is
52:24
broadly is it being driven because people had too much money and they have spent it basically on buying loads of
52:30
goods and in particular durable goods we mean here cars and Ledger Goods right they bought every ukulele you can find
52:36
in the US every bit of sports kit has I don't know I don't know how where people are doing so much sport but anyway they
52:41
bought a lot of sports kit okay and they've kept doing it slightly Against All my expectations
52:46
um whereas Services spending is down below its longer term Trend so they've switched from Services spending into
52:51
large amounts of durable and to good spending then that's the route whether that is a demand problem people had too
52:59
much money or that is a supply problem they couldn't get the stuff they wanted to buy is obviously a large part of
53:04
what's going on all I'm really saying to you here is whenever your view is on that debate that is not what's going on
53:10
in the UK because everything's a turkey okay so like everyone's spending is down significantly from its pre-pandemic path
53:16
you can see a switch from services like blue into Goods green during the
53:21
pandemic because any of you that who was in the UK during the pandemic you'll notice you couldn't buy any go out to the you can go out and have a nice time
53:28
right so you all bought rubbish for your home in the UK it was like DIY kit because they're so upset about what was going to happen to her you might as well
53:34
have a nice house if you're going to pay your mortgage right so they all went and bought DIY stuff in the UK um but again
53:40
the overall level of spending is significantly low below what you would have been expecting if I could show you the same chart with income levels it
53:46
would show you a similar pattern right okay so it's not the same thing most European countries version of this chart
53:52
looks more like the UK than it looks like the US so the US is a really special case to some degree and is
53:58
totally dominating this inflation debate so stop it it's basically this is my polite way of saying that okay right the
54:04
um right then moving on to what does this all mean for actual people because that's what we in the end should be focused on the first thing is it's
54:11
really really bad in terms of what is happening to household incomes this is showing you income growth uh on this is
54:18
national accounts measures of income growth if they don't want to talk about different measures you get slightly different results but broadly this is showing you income growth for households
54:25
over the annual annualized and basically it's telling you over the two years so the Year we're just about to end the
54:31
next year we're seeing about a seven percent fall in household incomes that is something like 1 700 pounds per
54:39
household um that is as you can see not normal even in very deep recessions 1980s
54:47
financial crisis you don't see income Falls that big okay now if I do that
54:52
shows you the same chart of GDP what you would see obviously is really big Falls of GDP in the pandemic like really big
54:58
obviously we shut down half the economy so we weren't producing anything the um but but income didn't fall because
55:04
government support basically stepped in you couldn't get income from GDP so you've got income from the state right the um in lots of cases furlough big
55:11
increase in benefits happening at the same time what's now happened is that we're now projecting a shallow ish recession
55:17
yeah but very deep Falls in household incomes I think that's what's really important to understand about what's
55:23
going on and the reason that's going on is because the country's got poorer so that's because the for the UK we don't produce any hardly any hydrocarbons
55:29
there's a reason why the climate change transition is harder in the US than the UK we haven't got anyone to put out of work and we haven't got to shut down any
55:35
gas Fields really the um uh but in the US they do they um and so the result
55:40
though for us is we just get a lot poorer when you get an energy price shock and so we're importing that until basically one way of thinking about all
55:47
the political economy of the current phase of British politics is we're just deciding how we get poorer and who and
55:53
when right that's what the strike is that's what a strike is that's what raising taxes or cutting spending is and
55:59
all of that is about power politics and it decides who pays and when they pay so this is so it's a big deal that's what
56:04
I'm saying this is a very this is the equivalent of a very deep recession uh happening and it's happening this year and next the um right
56:12
um it's not the same for everybody now I'm sure everyone in the room knows this but just to briefly cap this is showing you poorest households on the left
56:18
riches households on the right what is air inflation rate given what we know is the differences in consumption baskets
56:24
for different kinds of households and then apply exactly the same CPI methodology but to those different consumption baskets and it's basically
56:31
telling you what you should know which is poorer households obviously consumer energy is a much bigger part of their consumption basket than it is for
56:37
middle-income households and richer households and so is food and food and energy are doing a lot of the work in
56:44
this round of inflation which is giving us this basically record gap between the
56:49
inflation paid by the richest households some bits of what's going on right now are really bad for richer household so richer households drive a lot more so
56:56
petrol prices are actually pretty top heavy but petrol prices have come down a bit in a way that gas prices and
57:01
therefore household Energy prices haven't okay the um uh so first also
57:07
poor households much harder hit the balance between energy and food is quite unusual so if you look back at the
57:12
previous rounds usually despite what people say inflation rates are quite similar for different income groups over
57:18
long periods of time generally in the UK okay the exceptions in the recent past
57:23
for you to have in your head are before the financial crisis when we're busy buying Banks um uh I can remember a
57:30
phase of like six months where rice prices I don't even remember this there was a rise price disaster going on for
57:37
the basic food price problem but it was more rice based and less wheat based which is what we've got going on now this may sound someone's looking like
57:42
why is he talking about rice and wheat at the back uh anyway it's a reasonable question but I'm going to finish the point now uh um it was a big problem on
57:49
that and that did have that does have big distribution effects so different countries consume different things I haven't got a chart here on pasta prices
57:55
I promise but different countries consume different kinds of food and different groups and that was a consumed
58:01
different kinds of food and that was a big problem in that phase you saw a big diff stretching of what poor and richer households and then we saw the same
58:06
thing in 2012 2013 which was the last NG price shock yeah that was very small compared to this one but that's the last
58:13
time so those are the times when we see poorer households being harder hit when those are the things driving and you'll notice those are all imported
58:19
for the UK or is it all imported prices right I'll just briefly say that older
58:25
households are also facing a higher inflation rate this is our own uh work using the same methodologies I've just
58:30
shown you uh showing you 80 older households that's because old households don't spend very much apart from eating
58:36
okay now you might not feel that sorry for them because they've got like five bedrooms per person okay and all the
58:41
rest so they can but but that is part of what is going on older households in the UK have not only do they have much bigger houses they have much leakier
58:47
houses and they don't spend any other money right so they have high so the older households in general are being
58:52
harder hit by what is going on um uh right now so
58:59
um Isabella touched on this but policy is like despite everyone saying that the FED is doing all the work the FED is
59:06
obviously doing the work in so far as being and the bank of England and dealing with inflation in the like longer term perspective but in almost
59:13
all countries but definitely in all big European countries fiscal policy is doing shed loads of work right and so is
59:20
regulatory policy and this is just a touch on some of the elements that this chart is showing you again poor
59:25
households on the left richer households on the right the the levels and the distribution of fiscal support to
59:32
households this year 2223 in blue and next year 23 24 in red okay because
59:40
we now know what the government support package is notionally going to be for next year in fingers crossed unless Energy prices don't come down and what
59:46
it's telling you is two things in 22 23 everybody got quite a lot of support so
59:51
this is like energy price guarantee capping all energy bills at 2 500 pounds checks for the poorer households and
59:57
Universal payments that get delivered through the energy bill system so you get for those of you not paying your
1:00:03
energy bill you get 400 pounds off your energy bill per household if you're doing everyone does whatever their income so you've got a pretty
1:00:08
Universalist system and you've got it and it's pretty big it's been done really messily obviously it's not a good way to do it but forget all the micro
1:00:14
stuff it's big this is a large amount of cash per household then you've got what's happening next year where we've
1:00:20
got a more Progressive significantly more Progressive uh system but it's much less generous so now next year about
1:00:27
two-thirds will go to the bottom half whereas broadly the bottom half only got about half
1:00:33
um this year this is mainly made up of 900 pound payments going to each household on means tested benefits or
1:00:39
for some older households and then it's the energy price guarantee capping prices at 3 000 pounds the equivalent of three thousand pounds for a typical
1:00:45
energy user from April up from the current 2500 okay the um now and
1:00:51
obviously the energy prices end up being higher than this red bar would go up because we'd be capping up the cost of
1:00:56
that cap would rise okay the um now what I would take away from this is that energy price cap obviously is affecting
1:01:03
what the actual measured CPI is right but it's not going to affect it's not going to affect what the actual
1:01:09
inflationary pressure is we're just deciding whether the state's bearing it or the individual is bearing it that's what I'm saying to we're deciding who's
1:01:15
getting poor how we're getting poorer the um uh the other thing is I haven't got it in slide here but is the system
1:01:21
we're using for capping wholesale whole energy so Retail Energy prices via the energy price cap which other countries
1:01:27
are doing other versions of so the French went in very heavy early on we're going to cap these price Rises is in
1:01:33
Brackets we won't talk about it very much but we're going to suck up the cost of that with Insider nationalized energy sector until we don't want to suck it up
1:01:39
anymore and then we'll start letting it happen but you had you can use you can use regulatory policies the cap Energy prices stop stop
1:01:46
wholesale prices flowing through or you can let the wholesale prices flow through and then you can use
1:01:52
straightforward fiscal policy to let them to help people deal with those prices right and that is in the end
1:01:59
that's why it's really important to form a households perspective this isn't just about interest rates these policies make a huge huge difference and if wholesale
1:02:07
prices stay where they are next year is a disaster for this reason right even if they just stay exactly where they are
1:02:12
now you've got to find an extra Grand right and anyone that's met low income Britain knows they haven't got a
1:02:18
thousand pounds just sitting around to pay for a higher energy bill uh right make the it work right then
1:02:26
given though that there's lots of support why does this all feel difficult for us to cope with I just want to give
1:02:31
you a reflection on um why in Britain in particular we are not in a good position to deal with this
1:02:38
crisis and saying behind this is a view which is Britain as a country with high inequality since the 1980s not high not
1:02:45
high not increasing recently but High uh highest large highest inequality in a large European
1:02:52
economy plus a slow growing economy okay for at least for the last 15 years growing slower than our comparator
1:02:59
economies one of the effects of that by far the it not the only one is that the amount of our spending as households
1:03:05
that goes on Essentials has risen over time and that's what this chart's showing you so poorest households at the top richest households at the bottom in
1:03:12
blue we're showing the position in 2006 how much what percentage of people's budgets did they spend on Essentials and
1:03:18
then we're showing you what it's changed to today so the green is the more recent data okay and we're saying just focus for example on the top right we're
1:03:25
saying in 2006 under 52 percent of the budgets of the poorest households went on Essentials housing energy transport
1:03:32
things you can't really stop spending on to go through your life food uh and in 2019 it's over 58 okay now the reason
1:03:40
this matters when an energy price shock hits is because that's another increase in a cost of essential but the way you
1:03:46
cope with energy product when a central price Rises is you cut back on non-essential spending but poorer
1:03:52
households haven't got as much of that okay remember in the pandemic why did Rich household save loads of money because they couldn't go on Posh
1:03:57
holidays anymore right to a staggering extent whenever I look at data at what rich people spend on holidays it's a lot
1:04:03
of money people like it's more than you can possibly imagine even like every time I discuss it with anyone I'm like I mean I'm very tight but they spend a lot
1:04:10
of money that's why they saved so much so these households way of dealing with energy price shock is that they'll go on
1:04:15
a slightly less Posh holiday next summer okay these households are not going to be doing that okay because they don't
1:04:20
have the margin adjustment the same think it would be if I showed you exactly the same chart with savings these people have savings they can draw
1:04:26
down on a temporary price shock these people do not um here's another way of thinking about
1:04:31
this which is from survey a survey that the ons is now running almost weekly I'm not sure why they're running it weekly but they are they're at it showing you
1:04:38
how people are responding to this energy pressure again poorest ourselves on the left richest households on the right this one is actually done by the
1:04:44
deprivation of the area because they don't have full income data but I think the pattern is broadly fair to compare
1:04:50
so for poorer households 58 are already cutting back on foods and other Essentials because as I've just shown
1:04:56
you on the other chart that's what they've got to cut back on the everybody's having a tough time so even a third of the top are coming back on
1:05:02
some of those so even Rich households are not having the energy on heating on as much as they normally would but 58 at
1:05:08
the bottom if you look at them who is investing in energy improvements for their home who's doing it richer households 35 are doing it versus only
1:05:16
24 of households on the poor income so the way that this shock translates into how people are able to cope is very
1:05:23
different the coping strategies that exist are different you might be less worried about younger people because a lot of them have just moved back in with
1:05:29
their parents to cope with the shock you might be more right about them because they've been back in with their parents and that is not what anyone should do
1:05:35
now the um yes they're Italian the
1:05:40
can we just right let's just briefly then go on to the Future so I'm going to start with the optimism
1:05:47
which is all else equal there's a lot of as Bella was telling us just now shocks will turn up right but
1:05:53
all else equal lots of the things that economists particularly policy orientated economists have been worrying
1:05:58
about for the last year look like they're easing okay so lots of the things driving particularly these the
1:06:04
like International imported part of the the shock that's going on the data is coming in a bit better than we might
1:06:10
have expected so we're not going to go through all of them we've got a paper coming out of this in the next weeks but this is showing you producer prices so
1:06:17
like input or output prices for what firms are actually doing where you can see we're already past the the peak of
1:06:24
inflation hopefully that's good news for everybody the um uh come on there we go
1:06:29
right secondly as as we were discussing earlier inflation expectations are a large part of the anxiety so why is
1:06:35
Central Bank saying we've got to go really hard because they're saying look if inflation expectations get out of
1:06:40
whack then getting them back again will require really high unemployment words if we can keep the expectations down we
1:06:47
won't need to get unemployment as high without having a big discussion that's what they're saying whether you agree them or not that's what they are doing
1:06:52
then this is just showing you the inflation expectations this is two different measures here you've got him
1:06:57
the blue line is showing you firms reported inflation expectations what do they expect to happen a year ahead
1:07:03
starting to fall the um I mean in general by the way all inflation expectation measures just track actual
1:07:09
inflation generally so don't get over excited but the point is they're not shooting up to 10 okay and this is in
1:07:14
red is showing you the household measure of inflation expectations again looks like it may well have um peaked I.E the bank of England on
1:07:21
that front may feel like they should be relaxing um a bit more now the I think the danger
1:07:27
is um that we could easily spend I think there's a serious danger that we spend the beginning of 2023 with everyone in
1:07:32
Economic Policy World saying oh well things are actually getting a bit better like I'll give you another example like the public finances for the UK will
1:07:39
probably improve because interest rates were being charged in our debt probably won't be quite as high as they were priced in in this recent Autumn
1:07:45
statement probably save us quite a significant amount of money for so I think there's lots of areas of people being like Oh it's not quite as bad as
1:07:50
we thought it turns out German industry can cope with less gas than we thought it could hopefully
1:07:57
um uh I think the danger of that is that for households that is not what's going to happen because the fact that things
1:08:02
might be slightly less than you thought they were going to be it doesn't help the fact that they're getting and that's what's going to be
1:08:08
happening to households so this is going to be three ways of thinking about that the first is showing you for unemployment this is showing you the
1:08:14
bank of England in in uh whatever that is light purple and the office of budget responsibility which for those of you
1:08:20
not for the UK is our fiscal Council the kind of independent forecast that does the government's forecast to underpin
1:08:25
our fiscal arithmetic showing their expectations of quite big increases in unemployment next year or over the next
1:08:31
18 months really now the obr is like we're talking here about it looks small in comparison but we're talking 500 000
1:08:38
people okay the bank of England's number is a million people the um now again in
1:08:43
U.S terms you can divide that you can times that by five to get to the like rough impact we're talking about in
1:08:48
terms of so there's a lot of as a lot of people that's a very concentrated effect most people won't lose their jobs but
1:08:54
for those that do that was a they have a very large effect I remember the UK welfare state doesn't protect their
1:08:59
incomes if that happens to them unless they're very low earning in the first place but then we've got what we I was
1:09:06
starting with earlier on what's Happening to people's mortgages where in the UK as I said remember nobody has
1:09:12
well almost nobody has a fixed mortgage for the length of their term let's not go into the reasons why what instead
1:09:17
happens is that we have some people on variable mortgages they're the red green blue bars okay who already starting to
1:09:24
see their mortgages rise with bank base rate and then with the bigger population who have fixed term mortgages but on
1:09:30
very different terms sometimes two years three years five years some lucky people on ten years they are over the course of
1:09:36
the next five or six years going to be flowing over time as their current deal ends onto New Deals and those deals are
1:09:42
going to have much higher interest rates much higher and as they do to give you a
1:09:48
sense so the next election in the UK is the end of 2024 five million people households I should say will have seen
1:09:54
there no interest interest bills go up we're not talking about like a bit they'll be
1:09:59
going up by like four or five thousand pounds on average it's a lot of money okay now these are middle income
1:10:05
households in general obviously they're younger they're going to be younger there's going to be better off bits of younger cohorts that are going to get absolutely
1:10:11
hammered does anyone buy a house in the last year here because you shouldn't have done that uh
1:10:16
the um anyway I'm afraid the um because those unlucky people are going to get the higher interest bills but not get the lower house prices which you can see
1:10:23
in the day their data out this morning showing you pretty big house price Falls already getting started like there is no way we can sustain current house prices
1:10:30
with three four percent interest rates so like if you're gonna buy just wait a little bit everyone yeah I mean you
1:10:35
probably can't get a mortgage anyway now but then right then last reason this is just showing you the office of budget
1:10:40
responsibilities income forecast so the same measure I started with right and showing you what does this mean I just
1:10:45
want to just spell out how bad what is going on is so the um since the financial crisis we didn't get a lot of income growth here we did have a good
1:10:52
phase there was a good phase around 2015 which was falling gas prices plus fast rising employment and when wages did get
1:10:59
going a bit then then this brexit thing happened do you remember the um and so broadly you haven't had much income
1:11:05
growth since as I say not big falls in the pandemic really because policy made a big difference but huge Falls that's
1:11:12
the seven percent fall I was telling you about the beginning we don't get back to the where you were in the pandemic in
1:11:17
the until the second half of this decade yeah so anyone in the economics land saying oh things aren't too bad next
1:11:24
year which I promise you I think that's the most we're going to be in that world possibly by like March and used to look
1:11:29
at these kind of charts and be like that's what matters not what like the fact that it's a bit less difficult for you and your rate interest rate setting
1:11:36
is not the exam question here the exam question is what is happening to people trying to deal with high food costs
1:11:41
higher remember for people is the price level that matters right inflation does matter in terms of the macroeconomy they should clearly
1:11:47
care about it but it's the price level so the fact that oil stock and gas stops going up is less material than it's much
1:11:53
higher than I'm used to remember we're used to average energy price has been basically around 1 100 pounds per
1:11:58
household for like the last 15 years small fluctuations over time but basically and we're now talking three
1:12:04
thousand so the fact that inflation doesn't get any worse and go above 3000 isn't much better for you because you still can't afford your even camping
1:12:10
holiday because it's two and a half times what you're used to uh I won't go through this because I've
1:12:15
said all that that's what I concluded but you already heard that and we already have time so the end
1:12:27
thank you very much Justin so if I hadn't convinced you to check the resolution foundation's work I hope now
1:12:33
you're convinced um so you know I hope like me you feel that it was a great panel
1:12:39
of different approaches but also making us very aware of the problem we're gonna face I feel that uh yeah was in Isabella
1:12:48
gave us some optimistic Vibe and then tourist and just yeah
1:12:53
gloomy and I and sorry I should have said that Martin couldn't join us we had a confusion regarding the time and he's
1:13:01
in Australia and he decided to sleep instead of join us so you know that doesn't make any sense but I have a
1:13:07
feeling that Martin would kind of join tourist in uh gloomy approach in the
1:13:13
sense that discussing how inflation now liberal area era sorry has moved from
1:13:19
price to assets inflation and so on which had would have been a great discussion so yeah I mean if all of you
1:13:28
agree that you can stay a little bit longer do the the technical issues so we have probably 10 to 15 minutes
1:13:34
discussion so I'm not gonna say anything because I can see it's the amazing audience I have about the IPP students
1:13:41
here I want to hear them as questionable so I see two members of the positive money Think Tank which is another thing
1:13:47
think you should check their work out so yeah please just ask away
1:13:53
who would like to be first everybody shy here we go let's go
1:13:59
can you hear me
1:14:05
okay go ahead all right thank you very much for the presentation but they cannot hear me and I have a question for
1:14:12
you in particular it's a question it's a question for you if you ever
1:14:18
um so um I um 100 accept this framework by which there are microeconomic
1:14:25
determinants of inflation he likes all your work [Laughter]
1:14:30
however I wanted to ask whether there is a role and what is the role of traditional expansion or monetary policy
1:14:37
in the inflation that we're seeing because of course there are Supply bottlenecks etc etc but also when
1:14:44
you look at the amount of money in circulation there is a huge increase that did that play a role or
1:14:52
um so uh are you letting off oh I got it
1:14:58
yeah I wasn't trying to be optimistic by the way if that's okay
1:15:03
yeah I was I you know my uh prediction has been that we're not gonna see that
1:15:09
soft landing and um I think that that some people are hoping for but um so the
1:15:15
quantity of money in the economy is not a very important variable and I'm a very
1:15:21
sort of Keynesian on this issue right so it's not the amount of money that matters it's the amount of spending and
1:15:27
when monetary policy if it has any impact on the economy it's not uh in terms of the quantity money or changing
1:15:34
the quantity of money it's really a changing interest rates which that has the majority of its impact through asset
1:15:40
prices right so central banks can't do very much when it comes to prices of output labor but they can be very
1:15:48
effective in terms of asset prices whether blowing in a bubble or the you
1:15:54
know disinflating a bubble I mean you just have to look at the crypto market and see what's going on there right A
1:15:59
lot of it is getting wiped out because the FED raised the interest rate so in that sense it's been very effective there so to the extent that there is any
1:16:06
room for monetary policy I very much with Keynes on this one that we have to keep interest rates low and just keep
1:16:13
them there basically forever not use them as a tool where we raise it we
1:16:18
lower it raise it and lower it because it has Financial instability repercussion so a very sort of Minsky
1:16:24
and um in that sense right so I would say keep interest rates low to the extent
1:16:29
that we're trying to address certain bottlenecks then low interest rates help um to um you know they're not going to
1:16:38
encourage more investment in certain areas but at least they're not going to be prohibitive in that sense so they you
1:16:44
know allowing for low interest rates and then trying to invest in certain areas
1:16:49
like housing in case of the US renew local energy and things like that the
1:16:54
areas that are that are the bottlenecks that's I think how monetary policy can help
1:17:00
thanks thank you next question
1:17:05
um okay this this sounds very much like um
1:17:11
you know even the the image of the war destroyed um
1:17:16
are you actually because there was this moment when Saudi Arabia and China and you know there was this there are these
1:17:23
moments where you realize the the policy of the military policy of the Russia is
1:17:28
actually you know we're only seeing one-fifth of the war making in in Ukraine the rest of it is happening via
1:17:35
these kind of pressure points from you know and is that um is that purposefully
1:17:41
in your mind that this is uh that this is also not just sensitive you know to
1:17:48
manipulation in other ways but that it's actually a war zone these are War making zones that you're
1:17:54
trying to map their fragilities and and the second question is just what you
1:18:00
said what was raised now is how how will you surmount if there is some price control or is that if there is some
1:18:07
other methodology how will you not um inspire people to stop investing in
1:18:14
that and this whole conundrum of the oil and trying to disinvest and stop when in
1:18:20
fact we need that oil to burn to make solar panels it's more a question like you said who how who gets poorer it's
1:18:27
really how do we make the things we need to make um rather than how do we stop using this
1:18:33
so this whole sorry War and the future how how is it
1:18:39
happening amazing I think it's small questions yeah I think that actually go across the
1:18:45
panel yeah I heard it was meant for Isabella because of the War uh yeah so if you
1:18:52
want to take that yeah yeah um I mean let me also start by saying that I'm not optimistic I mean I'm
1:18:59
calling for economic policy disaster preparedness um because I basically think we need
1:19:05
something like a fire department for economic policy because more shocks are going to hit and as yeba has Illustrated
1:19:11
the institutions that we have are not prepared to fight these fires so these fires are in the pipeline I mean we're
1:19:17
hoping they're not gonna break out we are hoping it will all be fine and I mean maybe that's gonna be the word
1:19:23
we're living in I mean everybody should be hoping and working towards that but chances are that more shocks are hitting
1:19:29
so we should better get prepared I mean things like the Mississippi River being dried up in green no longer being able
1:19:35
to be shipped across the U.S it's going to create another crisis in the grain market so I mean the shocks are already
1:19:40
coming right whether it be of the same magnitude probably Maybe not immediately
1:19:46
in 2023 Maybe again in 2024 I don't know but it seems likely that more more is to
1:19:52
come um that kind of connects to the question of the geopolitic that I mentioned here
1:19:58
um so I happen to be of the opinion that in particular in relationship to China I think we only have a chance as Humanity
1:20:06
really to manage the crisis that we are facing um if we somehow manage to create a new
1:20:12
framework for a stable Global Order because I think if we are at war between the most important
1:20:19
powers in the world and we are trying to fight climate change we're pretty doomed
1:20:24
so that just like as as a precursor um but that being said I was quite
1:20:29
struck watching what happened in Europe how clearly the European countries were
1:20:35
engaged in a form of economic Warfare with the sanctioned regimes but did not prepare their own economies for the
1:20:42
extremely predictable repercussions of this economic Warfare that they were
1:20:48
engaged in which was really shocking and puzzling to me to be honest and I think
1:20:53
that this has a lot to do with the economic mindset that people have where there seems to be an idea that you can
1:20:59
deal with a war economy type of situation buy free market economic policies and
1:21:08
this to me is just a total illusion I think that history proves this wrong I think also that we see that whenever
1:21:14
major Awards happen that there is this phase when everybody thinks that they can deal with these shocks and business
1:21:20
as usual terms and then they find out it's not working and then eventually they start scrambling together new kinds
1:21:26
of measures like the measures that person has been talking about in terms of fiscal responses and so on now to the
1:21:32
question of um price controls and the energy sector
1:21:37
um two points the first one is um I agree and disagree with the person that
1:21:43
first I agree that we have to distinguish between
1:21:48
um price controls that are basically price caps that function through fiscal subsidies and price caps that are
1:21:55
actually regulatory price caps that say you may not charge a price that is higher than x this latter kind of price
1:22:02
control in my mind can work if it is being imposed relatively close to the
1:22:09
source of a good so that could work on the European level it cannot work on the
1:22:14
national level which is why to have a sustainable price civilization response
1:22:19
to the candid opinion crisis we would need some form of European level price stabilization that could involve a total
1:22:26
wholesale cap as some have been arguing I personally think it would be good to have some price flexibility in the LNG
1:22:33
part but I mean whatever the design of that would be um we would need something at the EU
1:22:39
level now if we do fiscally Finance price gaps as the UK has been doing and
1:22:44
as Germany has been doing which I have been working on it depends on the policy design but if you if you design it in a
1:22:52
way that it ends up being measured in your CPI it says that the CPI goes down
1:22:58
then yes the first place is a statistical effect but given that we are living in a word of central banks that
1:23:05
tailor their response to inflation based on measured CPI and based on expected in
1:23:12
inflation then kind of because of the ways in which we have designed our Economic Policy institutions this does
1:23:19
have a real effect because it takes some pressure off the ECB in that case which I think is important in terms of
1:23:25
possibly having some arguments against hawkish interest rate policies but more
1:23:33
importantly if you design these fiscally Finance
1:23:38
price gaps in a way where you combine them with a win for profit tax which is
1:23:45
designed to make sure that the decreased cost thanks to a fiscally financed price
1:23:52
Gap is actually handed down along the value Chain by businesses then you can
1:23:59
have an instrument that does lower inflation also substantially not just as
1:24:04
a statistical effect but actually across the value chain in a substantive measure now if we were to do actual price
1:24:12
controls not fiscally financing subsidies that sustain price gaps but price controls that dictate prices to
1:24:20
companies which I think would be a possibility in oil and gas in the U.S one has to talk about the level and so
1:24:27
on but I think in theory it could be a possibility what would this do to investment in output this was the question that I'm
1:24:33
getting at now um I think that counter to your initial intuition they
1:24:40
think okay if the price is being capped this means that output may go down this
1:24:46
is actually not what is going to happen because if you go through the earnings cards of fossil fuel companies and you
1:24:52
look at what they're doing right now then they are talking about having the best of times and we actually have a
1:24:57
forthcoming paper where we are tracing oil um and and gas profits globally they are
1:25:03
having the best of times producing less at spectacularly high prices with lower
1:25:09
costs why is that so because during the pandemic they took a lot of their assets Off the Grid so they stopped producing
1:25:17
with the high cost assets and instead use the low cost assets to produce now
1:25:22
the the costs went down their prices went up their profits went through the
1:25:27
roof they have zero incentive to increase production if you were to say your price is now going to be kept at X
1:25:35
which means that you can only increase your profits by producing more then they
1:25:40
would actually have more of an incentive to produce more I'm not saying that we necessarily want more fossil fuel
1:25:45
production I'm just saying in terms of the ways in which the price cap operates it can even be a situation in these
1:25:53
extreme scenarios that we are talking about in times of emergencies where price cap can encourage more production
1:25:59
and this is something that we have also seen historically in the context of wars
1:26:05
thank you so yeah okay so I have Simon in any anyone else so I can get two okay
1:26:11
oh yeah okay see you oh okay so go Simon yeah so I agree
1:26:18
it's not about the quantity money but actually demand and spending
1:26:24
um but is there not you know an argument there what monetary policy can do is encourage people to spend less right by
1:26:32
Saving and delaying their consumption so it's not the argument and I guess related to that well you know I agree
1:26:39
with pains and obviously you know saving investment grade savings and things like that when people talk about increasing
1:26:45
all of this investment in order to deal with these supply chain issues you know
1:26:50
as lots of countries which have found out when they've done industrialization drives like in the Soviet Union Japan
1:26:56
China and others they it becomes inflationary and they have to kind of
1:27:02
encourage saving in other sectors of the economy so therefore as well as this
1:27:07
investment in the things we need do we also need to be restricting investment in other sectors which are less
1:27:14
necessary and do we also need to be encouraging savings great uh
1:27:21
can you see him here I can't see yeah okay yeah just more um obviously we're talking about 1970 stagflation supply
1:27:29
side shops the lack of optimism probably with the globalization China and climate
1:27:35
change saying things aren't maybe necessarily better down the line and that shift in thinking from keynesianism
1:27:41
to laissez faire or the rise of monetarism in terms of the long-term macro and policy Outlook what are the
1:27:49
solutions do we think like the green New Deal or Marshall Plan for developing countries that can actually solve these
1:27:55
problems in the long term and make a slightly more optimistic towards them thank you I'm going to get a third one
1:28:02
then we can just do all together yeah that's one question for everyone can
1:28:08
everybody here yeah [Music]
1:28:15
okay I get your argument that inflation at the moment is Supply driven uh do you
1:28:22
consider that it's always the case or do you acknowledge that inflation can be demon driven at least in certain sectors
1:28:28
such as housing or commodity Market at times uh Isabella
1:28:34
in your paper you mentioned ubiquity and volatility as um two drivers of uh as
1:28:41
you say systemic significance of sectoral prices so my question is if we change the tools
1:28:49
that we use to fight inflation and adopted tools along the lines that you put forward and this had an influence
1:28:55
some volatility for instance would that alter the results of your input output regression
1:29:01
and uh top 10 yeah how do you get a shallow recession
1:29:07
with a deep income form I've had them can that even last you know for probably
1:29:12
increase and yeah sorry but just about the you got inflation expectation like the five
1:29:19
to ten year range I used to forecast inflation I mean you never do that
1:29:24
forever great so have lots going on uh should we
1:29:30
started um um okay well there's lots there so I'm conscious with it so when I pick up on
1:29:35
um uh two of them so the investment the investment question I think is leaving aside the like specifics of
1:29:43
um uh Soviet era industrialization but there is a general thing which is in the UK party debate in particular but
1:29:49
actually you see versions of this in the US there's obviously and particularly you see this on the I think you see it
1:29:55
on across the political Spectrum but it's probably slightly more prevalent on the left there's a recognition we need a
1:30:00
higher investment Future Okay whether that's from public investment whether it's through um because of the Net Zero transition or
1:30:07
whether it's because we'd like our companies to actually grow at some point because we haven't had a wage rise for 15 years so what there is almost no
1:30:13
discussion of is what the implications of that where the funds for that investment would come from the um and
1:30:18
the trade-offs that includes which are like at the most basic level obviously your broad choices would you like to
1:30:24
have would you like to have lower consumption for quite a considerable period of time for households uh or
1:30:30
would you like to borrow from abroad for the to fund the investment and you'll notice that the UK already does quite a lot of that not least because of energy
1:30:37
prices right now yeah so there is basically zero discussion of that at all who's and the reason that's a problem is
1:30:43
because if you are in favor of that high investment I am then you should really care about whose consumption Falls and
1:30:50
how and that will then have effects on the wider shape of your economy right because the cons consumption Falls for
1:30:56
some people means other people's jobs right it's the same thing when everyone says to me it's really important we get
1:31:02
on with retrofitting load of homes and it's going to create loads of jobs so you know that that's true at like the
1:31:09
micro level at the macro level it's not going to create loads of jobs it's going to move a load of activity from this part of the economy to this part of the
1:31:15
economy it's going to do it by reducing depending on how you pay for it by reducing some consumption other things so households are paying for it
1:31:22
themselves they'll go out to eat less right I mean it's what will also Save the Planet so we should do it okay but
1:31:28
the general thought which is we always tell ourselves investment pays off quickly enough that there's no consumption form is basically broadly
1:31:35
nonsense um and you do need to think through that kind of thing if you're interested in a
1:31:40
natural economic project as opposed to kind of just saying some things there so that's a good thing on
1:31:46
um how do you get a shallow how can you get a shallow recession and a big foreign income the answer is because the country is getting poorer and you're not
1:31:52
it's not that we're producing less it's that we can buy fewer Goods we're an open economy so we can buy fewer Goods
1:31:58
around the world for what we produce in pounds right I.E Energy prices have gone
1:32:03
up we consume a lot of those and they're almost all imported and so we get poorer as households even though our actual
1:32:09
production level I mean it's a separate thing you still get some production Falls obviously um because it's more expensive to
1:32:15
produce some things which have those as inputs and households are responding but broadly you can when the terms of trade
1:32:21
shock is driving a lot of what's going on for households it doesn't have to feed through into production huge
1:32:26
production Force domestically great thank you you have us
1:32:31
I think there is room for a savings policy um if you are at a situation like full
1:32:36
employment so for example Keynes talks about that in how to pay for the war I've used that same kind of uh
1:32:43
approach and papers on the green New Deal which is another thing that came up I think in general we have to think of
1:32:50
spending as a use of resources and then uh you know if there is too much spending then we're using too much
1:32:56
resources right and it can be public spending and private spending as well so the question for me is not how do we
1:33:03
limit the spending so that sometimes that's necessary but right now I think that's not really our problem right if
1:33:10
we get to two truthful employment then obviously yes how do we limit spending so that we can avoid inflation because
1:33:17
inflation can be demand driven as well I just don't think that the current inflation in particular is German driven
1:33:23
so I would distinguish between true inflation which is what we start to see when we get to Full Employment and
1:33:28
that's basically keynes's definition of true inflation right and so um I think
1:33:33
we can rethink How We Do fiscal policy so this kind of indiscriminate fiscal policy I would I call it the free market
1:33:40
approach to fiscal policy where we just give people money and let them just spend away right I think that's the
1:33:45
wrong way to do it so modern money Theory economists have been advocating for targeted fiscal policy in the form
1:33:53
of guaranteed jobs for example um the green new deal obviously can be very important I think over the long
1:33:59
term something like the green New Deal is this inflationary investment demands resources in the time when you are doing
1:34:06
that investment project but over the long term it pays for itself in the in the sense that it creates more capacity
1:34:12
so if we invest in Renewables today yes we need more workers to say build solar panels right but over the long run we
1:34:19
have that capacity now that we can tap into in terms of energy so it can lower energy costs over the long term so the
1:34:26
you know public investment in general in particular areas whether it's housing whether it's energy I think energy
1:34:32
especially because it also helps us tackle climate change right we tackle climate change we also you know create
1:34:40
jobs and hopefully good jobs and and you know expand our economy's capacity if we
1:34:46
have to do something like that and if we're reaching truly reaching our economy's capacity then we can think of
1:34:52
some ways to facilitate things like Saving right but I don't think that this
1:34:58
indiscriminate increase in interest rates is the right way to do it we can try to think of other policies where we
1:35:03
can encourage people to say in general I'm again with Keynes that saving is this two-part decision first you decide
1:35:09
how much you save and that depends on your income so if you don't even can't meet your Necessities obviously you're
1:35:14
not going to save regardless of interest rates right like those low-income households that Thorson was talking
1:35:20
about they're not going to be doing this saving regardless of the higher interest rates right the higher interest rates
1:35:25
are going to be going to the asset holders which happen to be the wealthier households in a sense when interest
1:35:31
rates change it's just a shuffling of assets from one asset class to another right it's that second step of the
1:35:36
saving decision how do you distribute the saving between different asset classes that's where the interest rates
1:35:42
come into the picture so I think I've addressed all of the questions to some extent and at this point I actually have
1:35:48
to run because I have a class to teach so I'm just gonna say thank you for
1:35:54
having me thank you very much thank you [Applause]
1:36:00
later thank you bye bye Isabella please
1:36:08
um so I'm not sure if I heard the question correctly but I gather it was like about the dimensions that feed into
1:36:14
systemic significance in our model that all right
1:36:20
it was it was it was how would the how would your budget model show any different results if your policy regime
1:36:26
was adopted I.E would those with different areas become significant yeah
1:36:32
um yes it would show different results because I mean let's say you had a
1:36:38
buffers I mean let's say you didn't have only the Strategic petroleum reserves in the way in which they are operating
1:36:43
right now but let's say they were um backed up by the FED doing open
1:36:48
market operations for oil and what actually stabilize price spikes and oil
1:36:53
which is something that people like salamarova for example have been suggesting and the fat is pretty good at
1:36:59
like buying when no one else is buying and selling and no one else wants to sell so that's kind of the business that
1:37:06
they have been doing for many decades let's say you had that kind of policy and you didn't have the extreme
1:37:11
volatility in oil and gas prices anymore then clearly in our model that sector
1:37:16
would decrease um in its systemic significance for inflation right all that we're looking
1:37:23
here is um inflation as as the relevant variable if for housing you had like a big public
1:37:31
investment push into housing let's say or you had um preferential interest rates um for
1:37:37
first-time buyers which brings down the cost of buying houses it might kind of bring down that that measured cost of
1:37:44
housing then yes that would affect the ways in which this enters into the CPI
1:37:49
um inter so the weight of these expansions would go down in the CPI which would mean that in our model the
1:37:56
the importance would go down maybe one after thought on this whole question of investment
1:38:02
um not saying that this is necessarily going to happen but I think there's a serious question of
1:38:07
whether if these supply chain shocks are indeed going to turn out to be more
1:38:14
intense and if we see a further unraveling of Global Supply chains um in
1:38:19
the context of enormous geopolitical tensions whether then we might not be
1:38:25
hitting um physical real limits to investment in
1:38:30
ways in which we haven't seen them in a pretty long time which means that if you want to do large-scale investments in
1:38:36
green stuff let's say you might be in a situation where certain critical components that you
1:38:43
need for that are not readily available in a sufficient quantity which raises a
1:38:48
whole new question of industrial policy where it's not just about like kind of putting the money where it needs to be
1:38:54
setting the right priorities with fiscal spending but I'm raises a whole new question of State capacity too like in
1:39:01
the work that I've been doing on the government commission I mean one of the big questions that was kind of looming in the background was it should we be
1:39:09
making sure that systemically significant activities have enough and
1:39:14
sufficiently cheap gas available if the gas crisis is going to become more severe the answer is that currently
1:39:22
states are not prepared to even understand what are the systemically significant parts of your economy and do
1:39:29
not even have the capacity to understand how at the end of the day a form of physical rationing could work now I'm
1:39:36
not advocating rationally that's not the idea here but the idea is that it's
1:39:42
perceivable that depending on how this world energy crisis plays out and if we
1:39:47
are serious about trying to do a transition to a green economy in a fast
1:39:53
enough way to seriously do something about climate change that we might be hitting some physical limits which then
1:40:01
raises the question of physical allocation in in new kinds of ways
1:40:07
thank you isabellas okay so if you want to carry on this conversation just join
1:40:12
us upstairs for drinks uh obviously Isabella can't join us but after your first drink you can you can write down a
1:40:19
question and you can say to her uh but yeah please join me to thank you Isabella and Ever from like join us for
1:40:25
across Atlantic
1:40:32
it's interesting for being here in person but also the three of you for been doing this work on such a important
1:40:39
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