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	Albena Azmanova ⁦‪@AAzmanova‬⁩ "Will austerity and precarity finish off the human species?", asks James Galbraith in a new episode of our online symposium Post-Neoliberalism: postneoliberalism.org/articles/will-…   2023/11/30 18:30

https://x.com/aazmanova/status/1730157379394650494?s=61

https://www.postneoliberalism.org/articles/will-austerity-and-precarity-finish-off-the-human-species/

Post-Neoliberalism | Will Austerity and Precarity Finish Off the Human Species?

Portrait of Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) engraved by Fournier for the 'Dictionary of Political Economics', 1853

At the outset of the Covid-19 pandemic, many with an otherwise minor interest in mathematics familiarized themselves with a concept known as "R" – the R-value or reproduction rate of coronavirus infections. R is a multiplicative factor, applied to the number of cases at a given moment "t" to yield the number that will prevail at a later moment, "t+1". If R exceeds 1, the epidemic will grow; otherwise it will decline and, eventually, it will be extinguished (Delamater et al., 2019).

The logic is identical for many processes including the fission reaction at the heart of an atomic bomb. In that example, each neutron crashing into the nucleus of an atom of uranium-235 or plutonium-239 will cause two neutrons to eject, moving along to other nuclei. Thus R=2 and after 80 generations in a tiny fraction of a second, the energy released is sufficient to blow the mass apart, with force adequate to destroy a city. Conversely, if the reaction is damped, so that R<1, it will fizzle; neutron-absorbing rods reduce the R-value and assure the shutdown of a nuclear reactor.

The concept of R originated, long ago, in demography (Adam, 2020). For human populations, what is most interesting, over a much longer timeframe, is the case where R, applied to the reproduction of the population itself, which is to say to the successful raising of children to reproductive age, is less than the critical value of 1. In that case, the total population will decline, while the average age rises. In the end, the consequences may be far more destructive than the explosion of a few bombs.

Human populations can decline for many reasons. From the time of the Bible to the days of Thomas Robert Malthus (1798) and beyond, attention focused on the Horsemen of the Apocalypse: War, Famine, Pestilence and Death. These, Malthus foresaw, would keep human populations in ultimate check, neutralizing (from time to time) the otherwise explosive tendency of humans, like any hot-blooded species, to copulate and procreate.

In Malthus's world people were young. They were, by and large, fertile at an early age. Contraception was almost unknown, abstinence was rare, and while pregnancy was dangerous many if not most women experienced it many times, typically delivering many babies of whom only a few would make it past early childhood. Yet even so R exceeded 1, and Malthus was not wrong in his view of the ultimate checks to population. From the Black Death to the Irish famine, proofs of his proposition would appear and reappear. The Irish case was especially dramatic, as the advent of the potato had multiplied the Irish at least three-fold before the combination of crop failure and British imperial doctrines of laissez-faire reimposed the Malthusian constraints.

But then things changed. In the second half of the 19th century grain and meat from the Americas erased the scourge of famine in Europe, bringing a population boom. Similarly in the Russian empire, whose population grew from 100 to 150 million by 1914 (Keynes, 1919). These numbers were not materially diminished even by the carnage of the Great War. There followed, in the 20th century, miracles of public sanitation, personal hygiene, mosquito control, antibiotics and cheap, abundant energy, all of which lessened the wear-and-tear on the human body. In the wealthy countries Social Security and similar pension schemes, as well as health insurance, assured basic incomes and income security to the elderly. Partly in response to this most basic supply-side incentive – monthly monetary incentives to keep on living – life expectancy at birth nearly doubled. Population boomed even more. More people were born, more survived to become adults, and they lived longer and healthier and more productive lives than ever before. This was the basic background for the development of post-war economic thought.

In the years following World War II, the economics profession reacted to population growth by modeling the consequences for economic growth (Solow, 1956). The basic principle held population growth to be an "exogenous" factor – not determined within the economy – that provided a critical input to economic activity. Thus the growth of labor and the growth of capital, alongside technical change and productivity, were the central concepts underpinning the theory of economic growth.

In the late 1950s, attention began to shift to the problems of managing an "Affluent Society" – pollution, equal rights, residual poverty, and "social balance" – the mix of public and private goods and services (Galbraith, 1958). Women's rights emerged as a salient issue, including the right to contraception and (eventually) to reproductive freedom. Meanwhile, pharmaceutical advances placed effective and reliable birth control within easy reach of most families in the middle-classes and above. The "baby boom" in the US ended around 1964, but there appears to have been little concern, in academic circles, about the long-term implications of this fact. Economics, for the most part, ignored it, taking the growth rate of the labor force, once again, as a factor determined outside of economics.

In the 1970s, stern voices warned of a new Malthusian constraint – physical limits on the supply of critical resources and an increasing cost of extracting them from the crust of the earth (Meadows et al., 1972). To these concerns were eventually added a new or anyway emerging set of issues: the carrying capacity of the atmosphere and the implications of a climate crisis. From this point of view, a smaller or more slowly growing population is advantageous. It allows the benefits of economic activity to be spread across a smaller number of people, with higher average wages, consumption and living standards (Bricker and Ibbitsen, 2019). Alternatively, it allows for a longer run with a given resource pool and less environmental damage.

Resources and environmental constraints are harbingers of further Malthusian debacles – floods, droughts, famines, epidemics and wars. They bear, ultimately, on the whole population in proportion to their vulnerability and to their power to protect themselves. Epidemics in particular may be expected to carry off – as Covid-19 did – a larger share of the elderly, whose capacity to resist is already weakened by co-morbidities and chronic conditions such as diabetes, heart disease and cancers. However, none of this may be expected to have a major long-term impact on human populations as a whole, so long as R>1 and reproduction advances. Rather, the substitution of younger for older individuals within the population is an advantage; it increases the share of the active and reduces that of those who have already ceased to make productive contributions. Only in the most extreme cases – nuclear winter comes to mind – are the new Malthusian threats likely to be fatal to the species as a whole.

Yet the ultimate fate of a human society – ours no less than those that have already come and gone – rests on its ability and willingness to reproduce itself over the long run. On this topic, so far as I've become aware through only a cursory examination of the literature, the economics profession has not said very much. As noted, population dynamics are exogenous to neoclassical growth theory. Malthusian and neo-Malthusian disputes have taken up a good deal of space and time, but they affect the exogenous growth rate. As noted, there is a fair amount of work on the implications of slower population growth for economic growth (UN, 2020), for living standards, for climate, and also – a downside – for the financial viability of pension systems. Finally, it is well-established that fertility is lower in the richer countries. The decline of fertility set in during the prosperous 1960s, but accelerated in the 1970s, when the high-income world was passing through a series of crises, including inflation, unemployment, and high energy costs. Fertility declines have continued to deepen in the wake of later crises. Evidently, it is not wealth alone that suppresses fertility; other factors in rich societies are at play.

The economics of the decision to reproduce attracted the early attention of Gary Becker (Becker, 1960, 1981, 1992), and more recently several contributions from feminist economics (Tertilt et al., 2022). These economists are aware that economic conditions and incentives are important, including income level, tax policy, and the availability of child-care and health insurance. But their focus, generally speaking, is on gender equality and women's welfare, and not so much on the larger social outcome.

In Becker's analysis, children are a "consumer durable," yielding "psychic income" to their parents. Writing in the Baby Boom, Becker thought that rising incomes increased fertility, but argued that wealthier women may prefer "quality" to "quantity," and so choose to devote their increased incomes to the raising of a smaller brood of better offspring. Later writers, taking account of the fertility decline, have concentrated on easing the path, for adult women, toward reconciling child-bearing (in limited quantities) with careers, especially professional careers. A general view holds that pro-natalist policies can (and should) foster compatibility between family and career for women in high-income societies (Doepke et al., 2022).

All agree that the decision to reproduce is now firmly and irrevocably under the control of the individuals directly involved; it is no longer under the coercive control of the state, the tribe, the religious group or even the extended family, in most cases. Should we have children, or not? And if so, how many? These are private questions – even, a matter of human rights. Yet, taken together, they have a decisive impact on the conditions that later generations will face.

The main point, let me argue, concerns whether, in the aggregate, private decisions to reproduce lead to an R-value equal to or greater than 1. It concerns the consequences of micro-decisions, taken under specific social and economic conditions, for the macro-structure. On this question, three factors would appear to be highly relevant. They are (a) the ability to control reproduction; (b) the expected cost of raising children to adulthood; and (c) the expected gain or loss, for adults, associated with having or not having a child or an extra child. That gain or loss may be largely economic, but it also includes social incentives and biological instincts. The extent of the gain or loss will depend on the specific economic conditions, and stresses, facing the household. Also, since most humans are somewhat risk-averse, both costs and gains are subject to considerable uncertainties, which act as a deterrent.

So far as the ability to control reproduction is concerned, the battle is largely over and has been since the advent of chemical contraception in the mid-20th century. Important skirmishes continue, affecting notably access to reproductive services, but they are the rear-guard actions of the patriarchy. The effects on women directly affected are harsh, but they are unlikely to have a big impact on reproduction rates – as they once did, for instance in Romania in the 1970s (Mackinnon, 2019). The arrival of pharmaceutical solutions to unwanted pregnancies is a factor that will likely further reduce the practical consequences, in the aggregate, of legislative attacks on abortion clinics.

The other two factors are therefore decisive. And here we confront twin realities of "advanced" – or anyway wealthy – societies. The first is that children are very expensive. They must be fed, housed, clothed, educated and entertained, not to mention tolerated, during which time, in urban settings in which almost all of us live, their economic contribution to the household is nil, and their use in other capacities – washing dishes, taking out the trash – is very limited. Moreover, as the demands of education for a successful life rise – through college and graduate school – the share of the cost falling on the private budget of the parents also rises. All of this must be taken into account in advance. And there is the risk of even-more-expensive complications, such as a disability, an accident, a health crisis, or a run-in with the juvenile justice system. Offsetting economic advantages – such as bearing a musical prodigy or a movie star – may figure, but only as the most remote possibilities.

The absence of offsetting economic advantages is relatively recent. In previous times – only about a century ago – children were useful on the farm and even around the house from an early age. But not only that. Grown children were the principal support of their aging parents, who generally lived with some of their offspring or reasonably nearby. The prospect of being looked-after if one reached an age where this became necessary was a strong inducement to have children in the first place, to care for them, and also to forgo the outside earnings associated with both parents having a job. The family was the security system. In rich countries, this world of intergenerational obligation running in both directions has now largely disappeared.

It is true that this system was (and where it still prevails, still is) rife with other forms of injustice. Adults who could not have children, or did not, or who lost them, or who became estranged, or whose children proved worthless for one reason or another, lacked any such form of protection. Among the intact multigenerational households, harmony was not a universal rule. Parents who had tyrannized over their children would be tyrannized over by them in old age. No doubt both sides often longed for deliverance. No doubt funerals, if they came in the proper order, were often scenes of mixed emotion.

Social Security in the United States – along with Medicare and Medicaid 30 years later – affected a revolutionary transformation in American family life. So did the even more comprehensive and egalitarian pension, social insurance and health care systems introduced in Europe, mostly after the second world war. Similarly in Northern Asia. These systems are often described (by their opponents) as a transfer from the young to the old, while they are defended (by their supporters) as self-supporting investment schemes. Neither characterization is wholly accurate, for both fail to take account of the prior forms of family organization and how these were changed by social insurance.

What public pensions and health insurance actually do, is to spread a burden that was previously specific to the family over the community as a whole. Thus elderly adults who do not have children willing or able to support them have pension and health benefits supplied by the whole working population. And the working population, including those who do not have parents to support (or would not be willing to do so), is obliged to contribute, in the US through the payroll tax, to support their own and other people's parents. The collectivity replaces the family in this function.

Social Security, other pensions, and health insurance thus liberate each part of the community from the other. They enable the elderly to live independently (or in communities of older persons), while freeing working families to concentrate (after paying the payroll tax) on their own needs, and the expenses of their own children. These new arrangements have proved highly popular, at least with seniors in many rich countries, at least through the early stages of elderly life. There does not appear to be much nostalgia for the previous pattern of dependency and care-taking.

Whether this continues to be the case into the end-of-life experience of nursing homes is another question. But by that time, the power of decision has generally passed to the younger generation, which has little desire to bear a burden that can be handled by professionals, reimbursed by the state.

But then, the question arises: why have children in the first place? If one already has a child, or two, why have any more? They are a long-term, costly, risky commitment. They bring no economic return when young. They give back little or nothing, specifically, in economic terms, when grown. As adults they are at best a source of pride, pleasure, and moral support; at worst they evoke a discreet silence, or even active embarrassment, depending on cases. And then we come to the economic gains from limiting family size or forgoing children altogether. These are very substantial.

The typical household unit in a rich country, once established, receives a high income by world standards, but faces an array of long-term fixed costs. There is rent or a mortgage. There are utility bills. There are taxes, including property taxes that are invariant to income. There is health insurance, property insurance, life insurance. There are commuting costs. There are basic groceries. And then there are the costs of having children. Thus even the fairly well-off operate on a thin margin of "free resources." This margin can be eroded by increases in the fixed costs: energy, utilities, interest rates. It is eroded by an increase in the precarity of employment. It is eroded by the politics of austerity.

The problem of thin margins is aggravated by rising income inequality in the society at large. The rich set standards for consumption and security to which the middle and lower classes aspire. This increases the hours that working people are willing to spend at work. Easy access to credit makes it possible to live in a bigger house, own better vehicles, and enjoy a higher living standard in the short run. However, the debt burdens tend to accumulate, adding to the squeeze on incomes. If interest rates rise, a manageable debt burden can become difficult, or even unmanageable, in short order.

Without children, both partners in a household can pursue independent, gainful careers and enjoy the full benefit of their own and each others' incomes. They are not tied to the schedule of schools and play dates or the expenses of higher education for an offspring who will be leaving soon. Women need not interrupt their jobs or delay their careers. The arrival since the 1980s of a precarious employment market, providing services jobs at mediocre wages, places a strong premium on having multiple adult earners in each household. Two incomes are often necessary to maintain a middle-class living standard, and they also provide a bit of insurance against job loss by one partner or another.

A decision to forgo children may have a dramatic effect on the ability to meet other fixed costs, and on the availability of free resources for the enjoyment of life. It is obvious that this effect is more powerful when resource costs – affecting unavoidable expenses such as heat, light and gasoline – rise, than when resources are cheap. It is more powerful when military budgets are bloated while public goods and infrastructure starve. It is more powerful when the prospect for future income growth is weak or uncertain. It is more powerful when income inequality is rising, sharpening the urge to seek a higher income but reducing the means to achieve it. And these, beyond reasonable argument, are major reasons why fertility rates fell in the wealthy countries during the economic crises of the 1970s and again in the US after the great financial crisis of 2008 (Macrotrends, 2023). Many young adults in wealthy countries have realized that children are at best a mixed blessing – and at worst, a bad deal.

Of course, the above is exaggerated. People have children for many non-economic reasons, including religious belief, habit, hopes that may or may not be realistic for the company of progeny in later life, biological instincts, love, and – also – by mistake. Economic reasons may not predominate. But they are a factor. And the key point is that they appear to be unambiguous in the direction of their effect. In rich countries, they militate against child-bearing. They may be large enough to drive R below 1. They do not militate so strongly in poor and agrarian countries, lacking large-scale social insurance and other fixed costs. If one wishes to understand why fertility has already fallen below replacement in all but the world's poorest and "least-advanced" regions, this is almost surely the elephant-in-the-room reason.

In low-income countries, the population is younger than in wealthy lands. In such countries, even if fertility rates are falling the population will rise for a while. The demographic composition of the world will therefore necessarily shift toward the low income, agrarian regions. These are notably in South Asia and Sub-saharan Africa, where populations are young and birth cohorts are large. Yet in India, fertility passed below replacement rates around 2017; in Bangladesh, around 2013. In Pakistan and Nigeria, it remains higher, though has been declining in both since around 1970. (World Bank, 2023)

For the wealthy regions, migration is a mitigating factor. By how much? To be sure, a large differential in available incomes will bring people in. But the availability of that differential is an amalgam of factors, including the difficulty of crossing the border, the probability of obtaining paid employment, the purchasing power of the rich-country wage when transmitted as remittances to the poor country, the risk of deportation, and so forth. So long as the differentials remain reasonably large, all things considered, migration will continue. When they diminish, then net immigration will slow or stop.

After allowing for immigration, a society whose R for population remains below 1 will experience a general aging. This has three predictable consequences. First, it raises the share of non-working and dependent elderly, many with expensive support needs, who must somehow be cared for. Assuming that the incomes of and resources available to the elderly are maintained, this provides employment and incomes for part of the next generation. But it also places a greater tax burden on the larger population. And the social costs compete with the provision of infrastructure for the young: nursing homes compete with kindergartens, hospices with parks and playgrounds. Unless strong measures are taken to maintain services for the young, at additional social cost, the quality of child-rearing tends to fall.

Second, as average age rises, more women pass beyond the age of child-bearing, having borne a smaller cohort of women-to-follow. The smaller number of women being raised, with unchanged fertility, necessarily entails a further fall in future births. Even if this tendency is offset by a powerful pro-natalist policy, a limited cohort limits the effect on overall population growth. A striking example of this phenomenon is Russia, where the demographic bust of the 1990s yields an echo in a small birth cohort in the 2020s even though fertility rates have somewhat recovered (Shcherbakova, 2022). This is mitigated (for now) by large-scale immigration from Ukraine – and also from other post-Soviet states in even worse predicaments. But there is a limit to migration, even in such extreme situations.

Third, as the overall population ages, the chance of a Malthusian culling increases, since the elderly are more vulnerable to disease, to heat and cold, and to the shock of sudden pauperization. These forces, however, do little to reduce the burden of caring for the elderly, since fixed investments in the infrastructure of care must, generally, be maintained. So the per-person cost of caring for those who continue to survive goes up.

The broad implication is that once the population replacement rate R dips below 1, corresponding to a per-woman fertility rate of less than about 2.1 in a balanced age structure, then, apart from immigration which is inherently a temporary fix, the economic cost/benefit of having children becomes inexorably worse over time. To the extent that a rich society actually needs citizens with specialized and expensive educations – and perhaps it doesn't – it is hard to see any path to reversing this unfavorable balance. A dramatic reduction in resource costs might do it, or a miracle of technology, or successful wars of conquest – but none of these seem very probable.

The UN forecast for the United States is that the present fertility rate just below 1.8 will continue indefinitely (Macrotrends, 2023). If there were no immigration and a balanced age structure, this would correspond to an R value of about 0.9, disregarding the fact that even in rich countries some children do not reach adulthood. At this rate, it would take about ten generations to reduce the US population by about two-thirds. But there does not seem to be any firm basis for such (relative) optimism. Similarly, some long-term demographic projections hold that even after a serious depopulation over many years, the world's population may stabilize (Wilmoth et al., 2023). As Spears (2023) points out, there is no clear basis for this either. No society with fertility below replacement level has yet recovered.

What appears more likely, is a situation in which the burden of caring for the elderly, with austerity, inequality and rising resource costs that place household budgets under increasing pressure, continues to degrade the fertility of the young. Attempts to extend control over resources, by force or fraud, to make the burden easier to bear, are likely to be rebuffed by the robust, younger populations of the remaining resource-rich regions. High income inequality and big defense budgets add to the squeeze. Even as the elderly pass on, the systems established for their maintenance, including advanced and specialized health care, will continue to demand and absorb resources. As basic resources continue to deplete, their unit cost will continue to rise. Downsizing, scrapping and abandonment of unneeded facilities, along with shrinking the predatory financial and military sectors, are prerequisites for renewal. But these are not easily or painlessly achieved.

In short, the development of a large structure of fixed costs and social insurance – the greatest achievement of the 20th century welfare state – combined more recently with mandatory defined-contribution pension contributions, tax-sheltered long-term savings schemes, rising resource and health costs, policy-induced austerity, militarism, and a top-heavy structure of incomes – has forced the great mass of young people in the wealthier countries to make economies where they can. The greatest economy open to them, under the circumstances, is in the private domain of human reproduction. Many have taken the path that was left open. No one can blame them – they did not make the decisions that set the terms of this choice.

But a society – or a species – in this situation would appear to be on a path toward self-extinction. Not immediately, to be sure, but over a few centuries, with the possibility of a severe crisis once the situation passes beyond the circumstances we can presently imagine. This shoe would appear to fit practically all of the rich and near-rich societies in the modern world, especially Japan, Europe, China, Brazil and Russia, alongside the United States.

And when the poor countries finally "develop," what is to keep them from going down the same road?

References

• Adam, D., A Guide to R – the pandemic's misunderstood metric. Nature, 03 July 2020.
• Becker, G., An Economic Analysis of Fertility. Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries, 11:209–231. 1960
• —, A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press. 1981.
• —, Fertility and the Economy. Journal of Population Economics, 5:185–201. 1992.
• Bricker, D. and Ibbitson, J., Empty Planet – The Shock of Global Population Decline. Crown. 2019.
• Burger, J. R., Malthus on Population. Springer. 2021.
• Delamater, P. L. et al., Complexity of the Basic Reproduction Number (R0). Emerging Infectious Diseases vol. 25,1 (2019): 1-4. doi:10.3201/eid2501.171901. 2019.
• Doepke, M. et al., The New Economics of Fertility. International Monetary Fund. 2022.
• Galbraith, J.K., The Affluent Society. Cambridge: Houghton-Mifflin Co. 1958.
• Keynes, J.M., The Economic Consequences of the Peace. London: MacMillan, 1919.
• Mackinnon, A., What Actually Happens When a Country Bans Abortion. Foreign Policy. 2019.
• Macrotrends, US Fertility Rate, 1950-2023, Accessed September 29, 2023.
• Malthus, T. R., An Essay on the Principle of Population. 1798
• Meadows, D. H., Meadows, D. L., Randers, J., Behrens, W. W., Limits to Growth.1972. Dartmouth College Library Digital Production Unit.
• Shcherbakova, E M., Population Dynamics in Russia in the Context of Global Trends. Studies on Russian Economic Development, vol. 33,4 (2022): 409-421. doi:10.1134/S1075700722040098
• Solow, R. M., A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Feb., 1956), pp. 65-94. The MIT Press.1956.
• Spears, D., The World's Population May Peak in Your Lifetime. What Happens Next? The New York Times. 2023. September 18.
• Tertilt, M. et al., A New Era in the Economics of Fertility. VoxEU. 2022.
• United Nations, Department of Economic and Social affairs. World Fertility and Family Planning, 2020: Highlights. 2020.
• Wilmoth, J., Mennozi, C., Bassarsky, L., and Gu, D., As the World's Population Surpasses 8 Billion, What Are the Implications for Planetary Health and Sustainability? UN Chronicle. 2023.
• World Bank Data Catalog. Accessed September 30, 2023.

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James K. Galbraith is Lloyd M. Bentsen, jr. Chair in Government/Business Relations at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin. He holds a PhD in Economics from Yale. He thanks Deepshikha Arora for research assistance on this article.

https://www.postneoliberalism.org/articles/will-austerity-and-precarity-finish-off-the-human-species/

ポスト新自由主義 | 緊縮と不安定は人類を終わらせるだろうか?

1853年、「政治経済学辞典」のためにフルニエによって刻まれたトーマス・ロバート・マルサス(1766-1834)の肖像画

Covid-19パンデミックの当初、数学にマイナーな関心を持つ多くの人々は、コロナウイルス感染症のR値または繁殖率である「R」として知られる概念に精通しました。Rは乗算因子であり、特定の瞬間のケース数「t」に適用され、後で優勢となる数「t+1」が得られます。Rが1を超えると、流行は増加します。そうでなければ減少し、最終的には消滅します(Delamater et al., 2019)。

論理は、原子爆弾の中心にある核分裂反応を含む多くのプロセスで同一です。その例では、ウラン235またはプルトニウム239の原子核に衝突する各中性子は、2つの中性子を放出し、他の核に沿って移動します。したがって、R = 2と80世代後、ほんの数秒で、放出されたエネルギーは、都市を破壊するのに十分な力で、質量を吹き飛ばすのに十分です。逆に、反応が減衰すると、R<1は失敗します。中性子吸収棒はR値を下げ、原子炉の停止を保証します。

Rの概念は、ずっと前に人口統計学で始まりました(アダム、2020)。ヒト集団にとって、はるかに長い時間枠で最も興味深いのは、子供を生殖年齢に成功させるという人口自体の繁殖に適用されるRが1の臨界値よりも小さい場合です。その場合、総人口は減少し、平均年齢は上昇します。結局、結果はいくつかの爆弾の爆発よりもはるかに破壊的かもしれない。

人口は多くの理由で減少する可能性があります。聖書の時代からトーマス・ロバート・マルサス(1798)の時代まで、そしてそれ以降、注目は黙示録の騎手に焦点を当てました:戦争、飢饉、疫病、死。マルサスは、これらは人間の集団を究極の抑制に保ち、熱血種のように交尾して繁殖する人間の爆発的な傾向を（時々）中和すると予見した。

マルサスの世界では、人々は若かった。彼らは概して、幼い頃に肥沃だった。避妊はほとんど知られておらず、禁欲はまれであり、妊娠は危険でしたが、ほとんどの女性が何度も経験し、通常は数人だけが幼児期を過ぎる多くの赤ちゃんを出産しました。それでもRは1を超え、マルサスは人口への究極のチェックについての彼の見解では間違っていなかった。黒死病からアイルランドの飢饉まで、彼の命題の証拠が現れ、再び現れるだろう。ジャガイモの出現は、作物の不作と英国の帝国の自由放任の教義の組み合わせがマルサスの制約を再課す前に、アイルランド人を少なくとも3倍に増やしたため、アイルランドのケースは特に劇的でした。

しかし、その後、物事は変わりました。19世紀後半、アメリカ大陸の穀物と肉はヨーロッパの飢饉の惨劇を消し、人口ブームをもたらしました。同様に、1914年までに人口が1億人から1億5000万人に増加したロシア帝国(ケインズ、1919)。これらの数字は、第一次世界大戦の大虐殺によっても実質的に減少しなかった。20世紀には、公衆衛生、個人衛生、蚊の制御、抗生物質、安価で豊富なエネルギーの奇跡が続き、そのすべてが人体の消耗を軽減しました。裕福な国では、社会保障や同様の年金制度、健康保険は、高齢者にベーシックインカムと所得保障を保証しました。この最も基本的な供給側のインセンティブ（生き続けるための毎月の金銭的インセンティブ）に部分的に対応して、出生時の平均余命はほぼ2倍になりました。人口はさらに急増した。より多くの人々が生まれ、より多くの人が大人になるために生き残り、これまで以上に長く、より健康で生産的な生活を送りました。これは戦後の経済思想の発展の基本的な背景でした。

第二次世界大戦後の数年間、経済学の専門家は経済成長への影響をモデル化することで人口増加に反応しました(Solow、1956)。基本原則は、人口増加は経済活動に重要なインプットを提供する「外因性」要因であり、経済内で決定されない。したがって、労働の成長と資本の成長は、技術的変化と生産性とともに、経済成長理論を支える中心的な概念でした。

1950年代後半、公的および私的な財とサービスの組み合わせである「豊かな社会」の管理の問題に注目が移り始めました(ガルブレイス、1958)。女性の権利は、避妊の権利や(最終的には)生殖の自由の権利を含む顕著な問題として浮上した。一方、医薬品の進歩により、効果的で信頼性の高い避妊は、中産階級以上のほとんどの家族に簡単にアクセスできる場所に配置されました。米国の「ベビーブーム」は1964年頃に終わりましたが、学界では、この事実の長期的な影響についてはほとんど懸念されなかったようです。経済学は、ほとんどの場合、それを無視し、労働力の成長率を再び経済学の外で決定された要因として受け止めました。

1970年代、厳しい声は、重要な資源の供給に対する物理的な制限と地球の地殻からそれらを抽出するコストの増加という新しいマルサスの制約を警告しました(Meadows et al., 1972)。これらの懸念に、最終的には、大気の収容能力と気候危機の影響という新しい、またはとにかく新興の一連の問題が追加されました。この観点から、より小さい、またはよりゆっくりと成長する人口が有利です。これにより、経済活動の恩恵を少数の人々に広げることができ、平均賃金、消費、生活水準が高くなります(Bricker and Ibbitsen, 2019)。あるいは、与えられた資源プールで長期的な実行を可能にし、環境被害を減らすことができます。

資源と環境制約は、洪水、干ばつ、飢饉、伝染病、戦争など、マルサスのさらなる大失敗の前触れです。彼らは最終的に、彼らの脆弱性と自分自身を守る力に比例して、全人口に負担します。特に流行は、Covid-19が行ったように、糖尿病、心臓病、癌などの併存疾患や慢性疾患によってすでに抵抗する能力が弱まっている高齢者のより大きな割合を引き継ぐと予想されます。しかし、R>1と繁殖が進歩する限り、このどれもヒト全体に大きな影響を与えるとは予想されない。むしろ、人口内の高齢者の若者の代替は利点です。それはアクティブな人の割合を増やし、すでに生産的な貢献をしなくなった人々のシェアを減らします。核の冬が頭に浮かぶ最も極端な場合にのみ、新しいマルサスの脅威は種全体にとって致命的である可能性が高い。

しかし、人間社会の究極の運命は、すでに行ったり来たりしているものに劣らず、長期的に自分自身を再現する能力と意欲にかかっています。このトピックについては、文献の大まかな調査だけで気付いた限り、経済学の専門家はあまり言っていません。前述のように、人口動態は新古典主義の成長理論に外因性です。マルサスとネオマルサスの紛争は、かなりの時間と空間を取りましたが、外因性成長率に影響を与えます。前述のように、人口増加の鈍化が経済成長(国連、2020)、生活水準、気候、そして年金制度の財政的実行可能性への影響については、かなりの量の作業があります。最後に、豊かな国では出生率が低いことは十分に確立されています。出生率の低下は繁栄した1960年代に起こされましたが、高所得の世界がインフレ、失業、高いエネルギーコストを含む一連の危機を経験していた1970年代に加速しました。後の危機の後、生殖能力の低下は深まり続けている。明らかに、豊饒を抑制するのは富だけではありません。豊かな社会の他の要因が作用しています。

繁殖の決定の経済学は、ゲイリー・ベッカー(ベッカー、1960、1981、1992)の初期の注目を集め、最近ではフェミニスト経済学(Tertilt et al., 2022)からのいくつかの貢献を集めました。これらの経済学者は、所得水準、税政策、育児や健康保険の利用可能性など、経済状況やインセンティブが重要であることを認識しています。しかし、一般的に言えば、彼らの焦点は男女平等と女性の福祉であり、より大きな社会的成果にはあまりありません。

ベッカーの分析では、子供たちは「消費者の耐久性」であり、両親に「精神的な収入」をもたらします。ベビーブームで書いたベッカーは、収入の増加は出生率を高めると考えたが、裕福な女性は「量」よりも「質」を好むかもしれないので、増加した収入をより良い子孫の小数の育成に捧げることを選択すると主張した。後の作家は、生殖能力の低下を考慮して、成人女性のための出産(数量限定)とキャリア、特にプロとしてのキャリアの調和への道を緩和することに集中してきました。一般的な見解では、プロナリストの政策は、高所得社会の女性の家族とキャリアの互換性を促進することができる(そしてそうすべきである)と考えている(Doepke et al., 2022)。

複製の決定は現在、しっかりと取消不能に直接関係する個人の管理下にあることに同意します。ほとんどの場合、もはや国家、部族、宗教団体、さらには大家族の強制的な管理下にはありません。私たちは子供を持つべきですか、それとも産むべきではありませんか?もしそうなら、いくつですか?これらは個人的な質問であり、人権の問題です。しかし、まとめると、彼らは後世代が直面する状況に決定的な影響を与えます。

主なポイントは、総計で、再現する私的な決定が1以上のR値につながるかどうかに関するものです。これは、特定の社会的および経済的条件下で行われたマイクロ決定がマクロ構造に及ぼす影響に関するものです。この質問では、3つの要因が非常に関連しているようです。それらは、(a)生殖を制御する能力、(b)子供を成人に育てるための予想されるコスト、および(c)子供または余分な子供を持つかどうかに関連する大人の予想される利益または損失です。その利益または損失は主に経済的かもしれませんが、社会的インセンティブや生物学的本能も含まれます。利益または損失の程度は、世帯が直面する特定の経済状況とストレスに依存します。また、ほとんどの人間はややリスクを嫌うため、コストと利益の両方がかなりの不確実性にさらされ、抑止力として機能します。

生殖を制御する能力に関する限り、戦いはほとんど終わり、20世紀半ばの化学避妊の出現以来です。重要な小競り合いが続き、特に生殖サービスへのアクセスに影響を与えますが、それらは家父長制の後衛行動です。直接影響を受ける女性への影響は厳しいですが、1970年代のルーマニアなど、かつてのように、生殖率に大きな影響を与える可能性は低いです(Mackinnon, 2019)。望まない妊娠に対する医薬品ソリューションの到着は、中絶クリニックに対する立法攻撃の実際的な結果をさらに減らす可能性が高い要因です。

したがって、他の2つの要因は決定的です。そしてここで私たちは「先進的」、またはとにかく裕福な社会の双子の現実に直面しています。1つ目は、子供たちはとても高価だということです。彼らは食事、収容、服装、教育、娯楽を受けなければならず、私たちのほとんどが住んでいる都市環境では、家庭への経済的貢献はゼロであり、皿洗い、ゴミ出しなどの他の能力での使用は非常に限られています。さらに、大学や大学院を通じて、成功した生活のための教育の需要が高まるにつれて、両親の民間予算に落ちるコストのシェアも上昇します。これらすべてを事前に考慮する必要があります。そして、障害、事故、健康危機、少年司法制度との衝突など、さらに高価な合併症のリスクがあります。音楽の天才や映画スターを負うなど、経済的利点を相殺することは、最も遠い可能性としてのみ考えられるかもしれません。

経済的優位性の相殺の欠如は比較的最近のものです。以前は、わずか約1世紀前、子供たちは幼い頃から農場や家の周りでも役に立ちました。しかし、それだけではありません。成長した子供たちは、一般的に子孫の一部と一緒に、または合理的に近くに住んでいた高齢の両親の主な支援でした。これが必要になった年齢に達した場合に世話をされるという見通しは、そもそも子供を持ち、子供の世話をし、また、両方の親が仕事を持つことに関連する外部の収入を放棄する強い誘因でした。家族はセキュリティシステムでした。豊かな国では、両方向に走るこの世代間の義務の世界は今やほとんど消えてしまった。

このシステムは、他の形態の不正が蔓延していた（そしてまだ普及している）ことは事実です。子供を持つことができなかった、または子供を持たなかった、または子供を失った、疎遠になった、または子供が何らかの理由で価値がないことが判明した大人は、そのような保護を欠いていました。無傷の多世代の世帯の中で、調和は普遍的なルールではなかった。子供を専制した親は、老年期に専制圧されるだろう。間違いなく、双方はしばしば救出を切望していた。葬儀は、適切な順序で来れば、しばしば複雑な感情のシーンだったことは間違いありません。

30年後の米国の社会保障は、メディケアとメディケイドとともに、アメリカの家庭生活の革命的な変革に影響を与えました。主に第二次世界大戦後、ヨーロッパで導入された、さらに包括的で平等主義的な年金、社会保険、医療制度も同様でした。北アジアも同様です。これらのシステムは、多くの場合、若者から老人への移転として（反対者によって）説明されますが、自立投資スキームとして（支持者によって）擁護されます。どちらの特徴も完全に正確ではありません。どちらも、以前の家族組織の形態と、これらが社会保険によってどのように変更されたかを考慮していないためです。

公的年金と健康保険が実際に行うことは、以前は家族に特有の負担をコミュニティ全体に広げることです。したがって、子供を喜んで、または支援できない高齢者は、全労働人口から提供される年金と健康給付を受けています。そして、支援する親がいない（またはそうする意思がない）人を含む労働人口は、米国では、給与税を通じて、自分や他の人の親を支援するために貢献する義務があります。集団はこの機能で家族に取って代わる。

したがって、社会保障、その他の年金、健康保険は、コミュニティの各部分を互いに解放します。彼らは、働く家族が自分のニーズと自分の子供の費用に集中できるように(給与税を支払った後)ながら、高齢者が独立して(または高齢者のコミュニティで)生活できるようにします。これらの新しい取り決めは、少なくとも多くの豊かな国の高齢者の間で、少なくとも高齢者生活の初期段階を通じて非常に人気があることが証明されています。以前の依存と世話のパターンに対するノスタルジアはあまりないようです。

これが老人ホームの終末期の経験に当てはまり続けるかどうかは別の問題です。しかし、その時までに、決定の力は一般的に若い世代に渡されており、専門家が処理できる負担を負担し、州によって払い戻される意欲はほとんどありません。

しかし、その後、疑問が生じます:そもそもなぜ子供がいるのですか?すでに1人か2人の子供がいるなら、なぜもっと子供がいるのですか?彼らは長期的で、費用がかかり、危険なコミットメントです。彼らは若い頃は経済的リターンをもたらさない。彼らは成長したときに、特に経済的にはほとんどまたは何も返しません。大人として、彼らはせいぜい誇り、喜び、道徳的支援の源です。最悪の場合、彼らはケースに応じて、慎重な沈黙、あるいは積極的な恥ずかしさを呼び起こします。そして、家族の規模を制限したり、子供を完全に放棄したりすることによる経済的利益が得られます。これらは非常に実質的です。

豊かな国の典型的な世帯単位は、一度設立されると、世界基準で高い収入を受け取りますが、長期的な固定費に直面しています。家賃か住宅ローンがあります。公共料金があります。所得に不変の固定資産税を含む税金があります。健康保険、損害保険、生命保険があります。通勤費がかかります。基本的な食料品があります。そして、子供を持つ費用があります。したがって、かなり裕福な人でさえ、「フリーリソース」の薄いマージンで動作します。このマージンは、エネルギー、公益事業、金利などの固定費の増加によって侵食される可能性があります。それは雇用の不安定さの増加によって侵食される。それは緊縮政治によって侵食されている。

薄いマージンの問題は、社会全体の所得格差の拡大によって悪化しています。富裕層は、中産階級と下層階級が熱望する消費とセキュリティの基準を設定しました。これにより、働く人々が喜んで仕事に費やす時間が増加します。クレジットへの簡単なアクセスは、より大きな家に住み、より良い車を所有し、短期的にはより高い生活水準を享受することを可能にします。しかし、債務負担は蓄積する傾向があり、収入の圧迫に加わります。金利が上昇すると、管理可能な債務負担が短期間で困難になったり、管理できなくなったりする可能性があります。

子供がいなければ、家庭の両パートナーは独立した有益なキャリアを追求し、自分とお互いの収入の完全な利益を享受することができます。彼らは学校のスケジュールや遊びの日付、またはすぐに去る子孫のための高等教育の費用に縛られていません。女性は仕事を中断したり、キャリアを遅らせたりする必要はありません。1980年代以降、平凡な賃金でサービスの仕事を提供する不安定な雇用市場の到来は、各世帯に複数の成人所得者を持つことに強いプレミアムを課しています。中産階級の生活水準を維持するためには、2つの収入がしばしば必要であり、また、あるパートナーまたは別のパートナーによる失業に対する少しの保険を提供します。

子供を放棄するという決定は、他の固定費を満たす能力と、人生の楽しみのための無料のリソースの利用可能性に劇的な影響を与える可能性があります。この効果は、資源が安い場合よりも、熱、光、ガソリンなどの避けられない費用に影響を与える資源コストが上昇すると、より強力であることは明らかです。公共財やインフラが飢えている間、軍事予算が肥大化すると、より強力になります。将来の所得成長の見通しが弱いまたは不確実な場合、より強力です。所得格差が拡大すると、より強力になり、より高い所得を求める衝動が鋭くなりますが、それを達成するための手段が減少します。そして、これらは、合理的な議論を超えて、1970年代の経済危機の間、そして2008年の大金融危機の後、米国で再び裕福な国で出生率が低下した主な理由です(マクロトレンド、2023)。裕福な国の多くの若者は、子供たちがせいぜい複雑な祝福であり、最悪の場合、悪い取引であることに気づきました。

もちろん、上記は誇張されています。人々は、宗教的信念、習慣、後世の子孫の会社にとって現実的かもしれないし、そうでないかもしれない希望、生物学的本能、愛、そしてまた、間違いなど、多くの非経済的な理由で子供を持っています。経済的な理由が優勢ではないかもしれない。しかし、彼らは要因です。そして、重要なポイントは、彼らが効果の方向に明確に見えるということです。裕福な国では、彼らは出産に反対する。彼らは1以下のRを運転するのに十分な大きさかもしれません。彼らは貧しい国や農業国ではそれほど強くなく、大規模な社会保険やその他の固定費を欠いています。世界で最も貧しく「最も進歩していない」地域を除いて、なぜ出生率がすでに代替品を下回っているのかを理解したいのであれば、これはほぼ確実に象の部屋の理由です。

低所得国では、人口は裕福な土地よりも若い。そのような国では、たとえ出生率が低下していても、人口はしばらくの間増加するだろう。したがって、世界の人口構成は必然的に低所得の農業地域にシフトするだろう。これらは特に南アジアとサブサハラアフリカで、人口は若く、出生コホートが多い。しかし、インドでは、2017年頃に出生率が置換率を下回った。バングラデシュでは2013年頃。パキスタンとナイジェリアでは、依然として高いままですが、1970年頃から両方とも減少しています。(世界銀行、2023年)

裕福な地域にとって、移住は緩和要因です。いくらで？確かに、利用可能な収入の大きな差が人々を連れてくるでしょう。しかし、その差の利用可能性は、国境を越えることの難しさ、有給雇用を得る確率、貧しい国への送金として送信されたときの豊かな国の賃金の購買力、強制送還のリスクなど、さまざまな要因の融合です。差が合理的に大きい限り、すべてのことを考慮すると、移行は続きます。それらが減少すると、純移民は減速または停止します。

移民を認めた後、人口のRが1未満のままである社会は、一般的な高齢化を経験するだろう。これには3つの予測可能な結果があります。まず、それは何らかの形で世話をしなければならない高価なサポートニーズを持つ非就労者や扶養高齢者の割合を高めます。高齢者の収入と資源が維持されていると仮定すると、これは次世代の一部に雇用と収入を提供します。しかし、それはまた、より多くの人口により大きな税負担をかけます。そして、社会的コストは若者のためのインフラの提供と競合します:老人ホームは幼稚園、公園や遊び場のあるホスピスと競合します。若者のためのサービスを維持するために強力な措置が講じられない限り、追加の社会的コストで、子育ての質は低下する傾向があります。

第二に、平均年齢が上がるにつれて、より多くの女性が出産年齢を超え、従う女性のより小さなコホートを負担しました。繁殖力を変えずに育てられる女性の数が少ないことは、必然的に将来の出産のさらなる減少を伴います。この傾向が強力な親出生主義政策によって相殺されたとしても、限られたコホートは全体的な人口増加への影響を制限します。この現象の顕著な例はロシアで、1990年代の人口統計学的バストは、出生率がやや回復したにもかかわらず、2020年代に小さな出生コホートに反響をもたらします（Shcherbakova、2022）。これは、ウクライナや、さらに悪い苦境にある他のソビエト後の州からの大規模な移民によって（今のところ）軽減されています。しかし、このような極端な状況であっても、移住には限界があります。

第三に、全体的な人口が高齢化するにつれて、高齢者は病気、暑さと寒さ、そして突然の貧困化のショックに対してより脆弱であるため、マルサスの淘汰の可能性が高まります。しかし、これらの力は、一般的にケアのインフラへの固定投資を維持しなければならないため、高齢者のケアの負担を軽減するためにほとんど何もしません。したがって、生き残り続ける人々の世話をする一人当たりのコストが上昇します。

幅広い意味合いは、人口置換率Rが1を下回ると、バランスの取れた年齢構造で約2.1未満の女性1人当たりの出生率に相当すると、本質的に一時的な修正である移民は別として、子供を持つことの経済的コスト/利益は時間の経過とともに容赦なく悪化するということです。豊かな社会が実際に専門的で高価な教育を受けた市民を必要とする限り、そしておそらくそうではない限り、この不利なバランスを逆転させる道を見るのは難しいです。資源コストの劇的な削減、または技術の奇跡、または征服戦争の成功を行うかもしれませんが、これらのどれもあまりありそうにないようです。

国連の米国予測では、1.8をわずかに下回る現在の出生率は無期限に続くだろう(マクロトレンド、2023)。移民とバランスの取れた年齢構造がなければ、これは約0.9のR値に対応し、豊かな国でも一部の子供が成人に達しないという事実を無視します。この速度では、米国の人口を約3分の2に減らすのに約10世代かかるだろう。しかし、そのような（相対的な）楽観主義には確固たる根拠はないようです。同様に、いくつかの長期的な人口統計予測では、長年にわたる深刻な人口減少の後でも、世界の人口は安定する可能性があると主張しています(Wilmoth et al., 2023)。Spears（2023）が指摘しているように、これには明確な根拠もありません。生殖能力が補充レベル以下の社会はまだ回復していない。

より可能性が高いのは、緊縮財政、不平等、資源費の上昇により、高齢者のケアの負担が、家計の圧力が高まり、若者の出生率を低下させ続けている状況です。負担を容易にするために、力や詐欺によって資源の管理を拡大しようとする試みは、残りの資源が豊富な地域の堅牢で若い人口によって拒絶される可能性があります。高い所得格差と大きな防衛予算が圧迫を助長する。高齢者が亡くなりながらも、高度で専門的な医療を含む維持のために確立されたシステムは、資源を要求し、吸収し続けます。基本的な資源が枯渇し続けるにつれて、彼らの単価は上昇し続けるでしょう。不要な施設の縮小、廃止、放棄は、略奪的な金融および軍事部門の縮小とともに、更新の前提条件です。しかし、これらは簡単にも痛みもなく達成されません。

要するに、20世紀の福祉国家の最大の成果である固定費と社会保険の大規模な構造の開発は、最近では、必須の確定拠出年金拠出、税で保護された長期貯蓄制度、資源と医療費の上昇、政策による緊縮財政、軍国主義、収入の最大量構造と組み合わされ、裕福な国の若者にできる限り経済を余儀なくされました。この状況では、彼らに開かれた最大の経済は、人間の生殖の私的領域にあります。多くの人が開かれた道を進んでいます。誰も彼らを責めることはできません - 彼らはこの選択の条件を設定する決定を下しませんでした。

しかし、この状況では、社会、または種は自己絶滅への道を歩んでいるように見えます。確かに、すぐにではなく、数世紀にわたって、状況が現在想像できる状況を超えると深刻な危機の可能性があります。この靴は、現代世界のほぼすべての裕福で裕福な社会、特に日本、ヨーロッパ、中国、ブラジル、ロシア、米国に適合しているように見えます。

そして、貧しい国が最終的に「発展」するとき、彼らが同じ道を進むのを防ぐことは何ですか?

参考文献

• Adam, D., A Guide to R - パンデミックの誤解された指標。自然、2020年7月3日。
• ベッカー、G.、不妊治療の経済分析。先進国の人口統計学的および経済的変化、11:209-231。1960
• —、家族に関する論文。ハーバード大学出版局。1981.
• —、生殖能力と経済。人口経済学ジャーナル、5:185-201。1992.
• Bricker, D. and Ibbitson, J., Empty Planet – 世界人口減少の衝撃。王冠。2019.
• バーガー、J.R.、人口に関するマルサス。スプリンガー。2021.
• Delamater, P.L. et al.、基本生殖数(R0)の複雑さ。新興感染症vol.25,1 (2019): 1-4. doi:10.3201/eid2501.171901.2019.
• Doepke, M. et al., 不妊治療の新しい経済学。国際通貨基金。2022.
• ガルブレイス、J.K.、裕福な社会。ケンブリッジ:ホートン・ミフリン社1958.
• ケインズ、J.M.、平和の経済的影響。ロンドン:マクミラン、1919年。
• Mackinnon, A., 国が中絶を禁止すると実際に何が起こるか。外交政策。2019.
• マクロトレンド、米国の出生率、1950-2023、2023年9月29日アクセス。
• マルサス、T.R.、人口の原則に関するエッセイ。1798
• メドウズ、D.H.、メドウズ、D.L.、ランダース、J.、ベーレンス、W.W.、成長の限界。1972。ダートマス大学図書館デジタル制作ユニット。
• Shcherbakova、E M.、グローバルトレンドの文脈におけるロシアの人口ダイナミクス。ロシア経済発展に関する研究、vol.33,4 (2022): 409-421. doi:10.1134/S1075700722040098
• ソロー、R。M.、経済成長理論への貢献。The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.70、いいえ。1 (1956年2月), pp. 65-94.MITプレス.1956。
• スピアーズ、D.、世界の人口はあなたの生涯でピークに達するかもしれません。次に何が起こりますか?ニューヨークタイムズ。2023.9月18日
• Tertilt, M. et al., 不妊治療の経済学の新時代。VoxEU。2022.
• 国連経済社会局。世界不妊治療と家族計画、2020年:ハイライト。2020.
• Wilmoth, J., Mennozi, C., Bassarsky, L., and Gu, D., 世界人口が80億人を超えるにつれて、惑星の健康と持続可能性への影響は何ですか?国連クロニクル。2023.
• 世界銀行データカタログ。2023年9月30日アクセス。

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ジェームズK。ガルブレイスはロイドMです。ベンツェン、ジュニアリンドンBの政府/ビジネス関係議長テキサス大学オースティン校ジョンソン・スクール・オブ・パブリック・アフェアーズ彼はイェール大学で経済学の博士号を取得しています。彼は、この記事の研究支援についてDeepshikha Aroraに感謝します。

Isabella M. WeberさんによるXでのポスト

	Isabella M. Weber ⁦‪@IsabellaMWeber‬⁩ Recommended reading for all economists and economic policy makers, who are calling for fiscal consolidation. Besides inducing a recession, slashing spending in Germany now is likely to further boost the AfD. pic.twitter.com/5dURD1o3XK   2023/11/28 13:00

https://x.com/isabellamweber/status/1729349860149620794?s=61

国民民主党と日本維新の会が賛成した財務省のデタラメ補正予算を解説

国民民主党と日本維新の会が賛成した財務省のデタラメ補正予算を解説
https://youtu.be/kxJHY0VMjNo
さとうさおり
公認会計士
2023/11/26

ぽてと🐾@政治は未来への投資さんによるXでのポスト 森田康平

	ぽてと🐾@政治は未来への投資 ⁦‪@mirai_youme‬⁩ 森永康平 『インフレには2種類ある。80円で仕入れた物に、20円利益のせて100円で売ってる商品。これが110円になったらインフレだけど、原材料価格が上がってコストが90円になっただけで粗利は20円のまま。これが今起きているコストプッシュ型のインフレ(悪いインフレ)消費税減税が必要』 #消費税廃止 pic.twitter.com/GNohjI3mrX   2023/11/20 7:14

https://x.com/mirai_youme/status/1726363284738359516?s=61

上越零細連さんによるXでのポスト ういこ

	上越零細連 ⁦‪@j_reisairen‬⁩ 「国のリソース、供給力の制限の範囲内で財政出動をすべきだ、といっているわけです。これは世界的にも当たり前の考え方です。」   2023/11/26 15:23

https://x.com/j_reisairen/status/1728660813563756768?s=61

桃太郎＋さんによるXでのポスト 長谷川ういこ

	桃太郎＋ ⁦‪@momotro018‬⁩ #れいわ新選組 #長谷川ういこ『 苦しいのは今。この年末を乗り越えるために全員一律10万円給付を行うべき。そもそも日本経済を駄目にしてきたのは "財政破綻論" に囚われた自公政権と民主党政権による緊縮＆増税の経済政策。その結果30年間デフレ不況。いまこそ #消費税廃止 を強く訴えます』#日曜討論 pic.twitter.com/U5CSNdZT0l   2023/11/26 21:16

https://x.com/momotro018/status/1728749634317697091?s=61

長谷川ういこ 20231126

	人民の犬🐾寅171 ⁦‪@1044jun‬⁩ #立憲民主 と #自民「時間がかる」「消費税で恩恵受けるのは高額所得者❗」で「#消費税減税反対」 と主張。 #れいわ新選組 「一律の現金給付と #消費税廃止 が必要。財政破綻を恐れ、増税とコストカット型の経済政策を行った自公・民主党が30年間日本をダメにした」 #長谷川ういこ #日曜討論 pic.twitter.com/cG1HfrenXN   2023/11/26 10:04

https://x.com/1044jun/status/1728580480482894287?s=46&t=QAfSDzAh-_cN0WvSTaQ0RA

Isabella M. WeberさんによるXでのポスト

	Isabella M. Weber ⁦‪@IsabellaMWeber‬⁩ A 10 minute summary of what I do & do not mean by sellers' inflation, a great discussion on Prices, Profits and Power with Jan Eeckhout, ⁦‪@SoumayaKeynes‬⁩ & Michelle Meagher moderated by ⁦‪@carysroberts‬⁩, and fabulous audience questions ready for you to watch! m.youtube.com/watch?v=4Z4DbK… pic.twitter.com/fpzdZ4R02K   2023/11/26 11:27

https://youtu.be/4Z4DbKovGFc?si=rYkT49QtHAwtoNLc

The Landlord's Game:あの「モノポリー」の元ネタとなった「ランドローズ・ゲーム」とは？ - GIGAZINE

The Landlord's Game

https://gigazine.net/news/20210425-monopoly-landlords-game/

あの「モノポリー」の元ネタとなった「ランドローズ・ゲーム」とは？

2021年04月25日 18時00分

サイコロを振って土地を購入しながら不動産を増やし、どんどん資金を増やしていくすごろく型の対戦ボードゲーム「モノポリー」は世界中で人気があります。そんなモノポリーはオリジナルで考案されたものではなく、20世紀初頭に考案された「ランドローズ・ゲーム」というゲームが下地になっています。

Game Rules - The Landlord's Game - Economic Game Company
https://landlordsgame.info/games/lg-1906/lg-1906_egc-rules.html

The Landlord's Game - Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Landlord's_Game

モノポリーがどういう経緯で生まれて進化していったのかについては、以下の記事を読めばよくわかります。

世界的人気のボードゲーム「モノポリー」はどうやって生まれたのか？ - GIGAZINE

モノポリーの原型となったのが、アメリカの女性ゲームデザイナーであるエリザベス・マギー氏が考案した「ランドローズ・ゲーム」でした。

名前の由来になっている「Landlord」とは英語で「家主」を意味する言葉で、ランドローズ・ゲームは家主が家賃から収入を得る経済構造をゲーム化したものです。

1904年にマギー氏がランドローズ・ゲームの特許を取得した際に提出したボード図案はこんな感じ。四角のボードを取り囲むようにマス目が並んでいるのは、現代のモノポリーとかなり似ています。土地には売値と賃料の2つが書かれており、土地を購入して不動産を買うモノポリーと違って、土地を借りることも可能になっています。

マギー氏はアメリカの政治経済学者であるヘンリー・ジョージが提唱した「ジョージ主義」の「土地は私的所有が可能である以前に、人類全体の共有財産である」という考えに共感してランドローズ・ゲームを設計しており、その思想は「土地や不動産を所有していると地価税が徴収される」というルールに現れています。

ランドローズ・ゲームの目的は「できるだけ多くの富を獲得すること」であり、ゲーム終了時に現金や不動産を最も多く持っているプレイヤーが勝者となります。「ボードを一周するとお金がもらえる」「刑務所のマスがある」「所有者がいない土地や鉄道は土地代を支払えば購入できる」「他のプレイヤーが所有するマスに止まったら決まっている家賃を支払わなければならない」というモノポリーおなじみのルールは、すでにランドローズ・ゲームで採用されています。

ランドローズ・ゲームは1904年にマギー氏が特許を取得しました。また、1906年、1924年と、ルールを改変する度に新しく特許を申請しています。

しかし、20世紀当初は権利意識が薄かったためか、ランドローズ・ゲームの亜種がいくつも発売されます。その中の1つである「ファイナンス」というゲームを実業家のチャールズ・ダロウがさらに改良を加え、丸いテーブルにマスを書き、アメリカ・デラウェア州の地名を使った「モノポリー」の原型をデザインしました。

1935年におもちゃ会社のパーカー・ブラザーズがモノポリーの権利を買収。その後、パーカー・ブラザーズは、マギー氏が1924年に取得した「ランドローズ・ゲーム」の特許も買い上げています。

なお、1970年代にモノポリーのパロディ製品が発売された時にパーカー・ブラザーズが起こした裁判の中で「モノポリーの起源は誰にあるのか？」という論争になり、パーカー・ブラザーズが購入した特許は有効なのかという点が検証されました。どういう経緯で裁判が起こり、どういう結果に至ったのかは以下の記事にまとめられています。

世界中に愛好家がいるモノポリーのルーツを巡る泥沼劇とは？ - GIGAZINE

by Lewis Minor

Modern monetary theory: a new outlook / The Gaidar Forum 2020 ガルブレイス

https://youtu.be/s2RcrvetsiA?si=9B9CS0G4RuSLltEG

ガルブレイス

	Steven Hail ⁦‪@StevenHailAus‬⁩ One of my favourite debates between leading MMT economists and very prominent neoclassical economists who lack a grasp of the MMT framework is this one between James Galbraith and Kenneth Rogoff in January 2020. You may have missed it at the time. youtu.be/s2RcrvetsiA?si…   2023/11/25 17:35

https://x.com/stevenhailaus/status/1728331649157636251?s=46&t=QAfSDzAh-_cN0WvSTaQ0RA 有力な MMT 経済学者と、MMT の枠組みを理解していない非常に著名な新古典派経済学者の間で行われた私のお気に入りの議論の 1 つは、2020 年 1 月に行われたジェームズ・ガルブレイスとケネス・ロゴフの間の議論です。


当時は見逃していたかもしれません。



Introduction
0:02[Music]
0:13so good morning again for the people
0:19gathered in this audience this is one of the first sessions of this forum of the
0:2511th guide our forum held in the run epi' it so happens that well of course
0:37it's a major political event but also it's an academic forum and our session
0:45today is devoted to more of an academic subject at least half of it is academic
0:53it is about the modern monetary theory or a new monetary theory in a very
1:00popular thing something discussed very much in the economic science in academic
1:08science the discussions are going on on pages of scientific journals and there's
1:18a lot of discussion in the political circles and the United States and Europe and Russia the people were interested in
1:27this particular subject have heard this term many times already and thought
1:35about it and I hope that this session is
1:40going to help figure out what it is all about what is the modern monetary
1:48theories are all about is it an academic a purely theoretical thing or can it be
1:55used in practice today we have three
2:02main participants panelists professor of Harvard University cannot Rogoff
2:08professor of Texan University in Austin James Galbraith and minister of economic
2:14development of the Russian Federation Maxim aureus skin we also have three
2:20experts as participating well the third expert is still coming
2:27it's a look of you again chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Moscow exchange
2:34then I'll examine director center of macroeconomic research of spare Bank and
2:39director center of financial technologies of Skull Kowalik subhana is still coming first let's start
2:48off with a question to the panelists the first main question is what the
2:54modern monetary theory is all about but
What is modern monetary theory
3:04I would say my read of modern monetary theory and with all respect which I do
3:11have for my fellow panelists I would say it's not modern it's not monetary and
3:18it's not a theory it's not modern the idea traces back to Appa Lerner in the
3:241940s he was a great economist this idea of functional finance most importantly
3:30it's not monetary it's really about fiscal policy it's about the idea that
3:35you can run large deficits using and this is my view of it very very short
3:42term debt call it money but it's not really any more than bankers or it's
3:47like pay interest paying bank reserves in order to finance that program and
3:54it's not theory in the conventional modern economic sense and that you don't
3:59really see equations there are reams of papers it's true in academic journals
4:05there are primers on modern monetary theory but they don't use equations and
4:12I think they're there it's I think it's fair to say there's not quite a unified theory I'm very sympathetic to the idea
4:21of promoting inclusive growth and certainly in my country there's great
4:27scope for the government to do a much better job than it does in lessening
4:34income inequality making the economy more productive I think however that there's not a
4:41shortcut to this through these ideas and modern monetary theory and I'd lastly
4:48say I mentioned that it's not really a theory it's not really empirical either some people say Japan used modern
4:57monetary theory although certainly governor Kuroda of the Central Bank of Japan denies this I do think and I will
5:05talk about it more if you look at history there are many Latin American countries that use something like modern
5:14monetary theory and I refer to a book by my late my thesis advisor the light root
5:21occurred Jorn Bush with Sebastian Edwards at UCLA we also have Jeffrey Sachs in the audience and he has many
5:28excellent writings but I particularly point to his intermediate macro textbook
5:34with Philippe Loraine that also gives many examples that I would interpret of
5:39saying why this is a dangerous idea so let me stop there thank you
5:48what an interesting start of this discussion James question to you what's your
5:54opinion based monetary systems actually
6:07work and it has policy implications but it is above all above all an analysis of
6:14the functioning of actual credit based systems the word modern and the phrasing
6:21is borrowed and this is very consciously done from the treatise on money
6:27published in 1930 by John Maynard Keynes who in his opening pages describes the
6:35modern monetary systems as those that have been in place for at least the last
6:40five thousand years so the question of what is modern and what is not can be
6:46discussed but that's the meaning of the term and the use in the phrase modern monetary
6:51theory in a credit-based system the
6:56quiddity is created by lending which is to say when the bank makes loans that
7:04creates a deposit which is Bank money or it may be created by Fiat which is to
7:10say by the expenditure of the state taxes are and enforceable loan contracts
7:17are necessary but they're not necessary to raise money for the state or for the
7:23bank but rather to give value to the money that is created you have to have
7:28money of the states money in order to pay the states taxes a country with
7:34sovereign control over its money country which is effectively independent in this
7:39sense and such countries do exist is constraint but it's constrained by its
7:47real resources by its human capital and its physical capital in the capacity of
7:53what it can do and by its organizational capacities and its ability to mobilize
7:59those resources it is not constrained by financial factors and that is why when
8:06Keynes wrote about this what he said back in the 1930s was that anything we
8:12can actually do we can afford the financing of these matters is not a
8:17constraint and less by arbitrary and capricious and unnecessary measures it
8:23is made into a constraint as the result of following and effective misguided
8:29economic orthodoxy so modern monetary theory stands with Keynes it stands with
8:35a bird learner and it stands with the common sense of how money and credit systems actually work
The theme of modern monetary theory
8:46mr. Gilbreth has just said that many points of the new or modern monetary
8:54theory had been proposed by Keynes and
9:00in Japan and etc nonetheless what we're talking about here while we started
9:07talking about the story right now what do you think about this maxime well first of all well the theme
9:18of modern monetary theory there's a lot of publications on this subject they vary sometimes they're contradictory to
9:25each other this is a popular subject not only in the economic environment but the political environment as well a lot of
9:32references to this theory right now and they say that the founding founders who wrote the first papers on this they
9:38never expected this kind of turn to the evaluation of modern monetary theory and
9:45some people are negative about this terrible remember back way in the soy -
9:51and they say I never read the pastor nor the water but I can discuss this and the
9:57same applies here some people don't know about it but still discuss it but you know in any theory in any paper you can
10:07find sound ideas and you don't have to borrow all of it from them there are
10:13good ideas there some ideas are not properly interred interpreted let me go
10:19through some of these ideas like it says directly inflation is the main measure
10:25of the inefficiency of economic post as the Galbraith built about this leave constraints in real resources in the
10:32economy on the side of the supply well that's the real constraint and we have
10:38inflation if the demand goes beyond on what we are constrained about the high
10:45inflation or low inflation there's also ways in science of economy being sick
10:51something's wrong in the economy bonnet goes beyond the certain range a second
10:57thing here and I think this is a correct idea the nominal nominal indicators should not ever be
11:03considered out of context and their inflation is zero percent or something
11:09that depends on the context of the economy Ike in the eurozone you can see
11:14right now that over the past 10 years the level of budget deficit was lower
11:20and should be for normal development of the economy the eurozone suffered while
11:26they selected the paths of suffering so to speak and during the past 10 years
11:31they have been in a situation of high unemployment or the size of the debt in
11:37know the situation of Japan or China or other countries you should always consider those situations based on the
11:45context this idea replacement or private investment by government spending again
11:52this should be considered within context to understand what's happening in a particular economy and what should be
11:59the response to a particular action if we have a shortage of expenses within
12:04the economy evidently government expenses would not replace private
12:09investment it would support private investment and private expenses and if
12:15we're at the limit of our production capacity then in this very situation
12:21government expenditure would replace private investment indeed and when
12:26somebody says that you can print money indefinitely and have unlimited budget
12:32deficit this is of course that right as well I heard this idea from the colleagues mr. Gilbert said that the
12:40constraint of the area resources this is the key idea and I agree with us and
12:46this comes from New Keynesian theory this approach of overheating the the
12:54economy and gaps appearing out of that that would be based into large large
13:00extent lack of demand in the economy a lot of discussion around the steam and
13:07why so I think there's a simple answer to that people see what has happened
13:12in the modern economy like back in the 1930s the response to the Great
13:21Depression what Keynesian theory came about as a response and people see what's happening
13:27in the eurozone high level of unemployment for a long period of time and no clear economic response to that
13:36and with the situation in the in Japan and a state that is more than 200% of
13:42GDP and nothing's happening a problem with borrowing or the cost of that all
13:49these cases over the past twelve years so that the economic what people tried
13:55to respond to the situation try to explain what's happening this is normal
14:01that this discussion started that brings that will bring us forward we don't no doubt about that
14:07thank you maxime I spoke about the
14:13eurozone and although monetary theory in
14:19literature would be associated with the United States of America the key study but well recently christine lagarde the
14:27governor of the central bank of Europe said that we believe we should move to a
14:32new mix of European economic policy with some key elements one of them is budgetary policy not only an amount of
14:40expenses but the structure of expenses as well this is one of the ideas that has been discussed and then interaction
14:48of monetary and fiscal policy within the modern monetary Theory so my question is
14:55this to the panelists what's your take of this phrase do you think that the new
15:03governor of the European Bank it would be calling for the increase in budget
15:09expenses in accordance with the 1010 teens from modern monetary theory James
The essentials of modern monetary theory
15:25so going back 50 years I'd note a lot of them and I will say that all competent
15:31central bankers and all competent Treasury officials do in fact grasp the
15:38essentials of how the modern monetary system works this is their business banking and central banking are about
15:45extending credit providing liquidity for economic activity and they act on those
15:50principles when it is necessary to do so whether they will admit to this in public is another matter occasionally in
15:59the case of for example Ben Bernanke in the middle of the crisis they would admit to it and say so frankly that what
16:05they're doing is extending and creating new liquidity and they're doing so by means of essentially electronic
16:11transactions but usually they don't admit to it no that's for Madame Lagarde
16:17she is trained as a lawyer and as a lawyer it is a principle that you say
16:23what is most convenient for your case and not what you necessarily personally believe so I can't speak for what she
16:30believes and I suspect that when she makes the comment that you quote that
16:35what she is doing is trying to protect the European Central Bank which is now responsible for from pressures to act on
16:42economic matters that they would prefer to pass off to national governments and legislatures who probably won't act on
16:49them either but this is therefore a political matter so if she is in agreement with me on a basic idea which
16:57is that it is necessary at the present juncture for national governments to take responsibility for a major part of
17:05what how the economy functions to ensure high employment an adequate rate of growth and public investments necessary
17:11to improve the standard of living and for environmental sustainability this is probably not out of conviction on her
17:18part but rather what the French call an alley hasta Colvin all's however I'm not going to complain and I will take what I
17:25can get when I have a practical alliance with the central banker I'm happy to make use of it without necessarily
17:33holding them to a deep belief in the and any particular principles and
17:38particularly not if the central banker happens to have a training in law okay
17:44can it go that's what do you think about such I mean I agree except for the
The European Central Bank
17:51comments about that agree with professor Delroy said obviously it's the
17:59government's responsibility to try to promote growth public investments important private investment investment
18:07in education there are many tools for doing this the European Central Bank which Minister spoke about it is a very
18:16difficult case because there isn't a central government I think something an
18:22amazing number people don't understand probably in Russia they do but in the United States and United Kingdom
18:29I think they don't is that the central bank is independent but it does not have
18:34its own balance sheet the government owns a hundred percent the central bank
18:40when the central bank creates credit it's not doing anything anything that
18:47the Treasury couldn't do it felt like it but what the central bank for its
18:53independence I think that's been one of the great achievements of the last 2530
18:58years but it does not have the political legitimacy of the government there are
19:04limits so we can come to it later but there been proposals including by Ben
19:09Bernanke for helicopter money where the central bank steps in where the fiscal
19:15authorities fail to in order to pass out money to people it if it were to do that
19:22it would quickly not be independent it just doesn't have the political
19:27legitimacy but Europe's more complicated because there is not a single European
19:33fiscal Authority not a meaningful one there's not a single European government and I actually feel the European Central
19:41Bank has stretched to what it can do and it does massive read this
19:46fusion from the rich countries of the north to the poorer countries in the
19:52South under the table but it's not able to do nearly enough and and lastly on
19:58Madame Lagarde I think she'll be a great president of the European Central Bank but it's a it is a very difficult job
20:04because it's the central bank is being asked to do far more than it really has
20:11the political legitimacy to do and until the national governments step in and I
20:17think actually unify more I don't I think we need to see a centralized fiscal Authority in Europe we're gonna
20:25continue this very difficult relationship well that never goes to 50
The failure of macroeconomic policy
20:32cuz I bless you for our professors our girls have been in agreement on this I
20:39think that what has been said is quite correct Madame Lagarde is a politician
20:45pash is also a person who acts practically and she is very realistic 3%
20:55of the GDP was kind of a Dogma and one should not follow Dogma in real life we
21:01should follow the reality of our life eurozone is the example of a failure of
21:08macroeconomic policy I agree with what my colleague said that is that a lot of it has to do with lack of fiscal union
21:15in the eurozone there are institutional reasons for what has happened when
21:22Madame Lagarde says today that expenditures should increase and the
21:29budget should grow who in Europe is going to do that the Germans don't want to do that although they can and the
21:37rest of the eurozone it would be perfect if Germans started spending their money
21:42in Italy in Spain and in Greece then we would see a better balanced situation
21:48and things would be going in the right direction however we see institutional constraints in the lack of a fiscal
21:56union so Madame Lagarde with the zero interest
22:01rates and central bank can do their little to simulate growth she can only
22:07talk about budget policy not mentioning
22:13anyone specifically she realizes that this is the only way to overcome deficit
22:18and lack of demand that Europe is witnessing today indeed all panelists
22:26talked about the need to be careful with
22:32things like budget deficit and debt we have heard the example of Japan where
22:41the data is in excess of two percent to have a percent of GDP but that is hardly
22:48a threat to their stability we also hear
22:53a lot about the possibility of a new financial crisis that would also have to
22:59do with the challenges in the financial market in this context what are your
23:05thoughts in modern conditions extra financial stimulus does it present
23:11economic risks or not Kevin would you if
23:16you look at the history in countries where modern monetary theory has been
23:22applied and I would list Shelley 1972-1973 Peru 1985 to 1989 Argentina
23:32under the Turner's and Fernandez regime from 2003 to 2015
23:37I'd also include Venezuela and a number of other Latin countries maybe Turkey
23:43maybe Israel Sebastian Edwards co-author of the book with Rhea Dorn Bush with less France it
23:50works for a while the the prediction if we implement this I think from history
23:58is that you'll get an economic case for a number of years and how long that will last depends on initial conditions in
24:05the case of Argentina and Venezuela very favorable
24:10oddities prices I think flattered how well it did in an Argentine it really lasted quite a long time
24:18however if and we haven't really spoken about this but you subordinate the
24:24central bank to the government in Argentina one of my former students was
24:30a quite senior official at the central bank and afterwards and said literally under the curtain errs the central
24:36bank's job was to load trucks with cash and ship them to the Treasury for the
24:42Treasury was found that's a bit of a facetious but you are eventually going
24:47to run into problems if it's not sustainable eventually you get inflation
24:53eventually you get exchange rate depreciation and then there's a whole dynamic coming in with exchange controls
24:59and these episodes have typically ended with very high inflation and budget
25:06collapse and I emphasize importantly and this is in Dorne Bush and Edwards book
25:12and also and other writings that the real exchange the real wage rate
25:19actually ends up lower at the end of all this than it is at the beginning so the
25:25questions what can you do on a sustainable basis and I've just again
25:30realized the point that subordinating the central bank to the fiscal
25:36authorities it's a catastrophic mistake it's been one of the great innovations
25:41for the last 35 or 40 years and in the case of Russia I was here in 2015
25:47January of 2015 and I have to say things look pretty grim oil prices that
25:53collapse there were the sanctions it looked like Russia and Russia had a lot of foreign currency debt
26:00looked like the possibility for natural crisis very high and I would say the
26:05Russian central bank reacted you know with great energy and technocratic
26:12expertise I mean of course it's not as independent in Russia as it is in the
26:17United States and Europe they clearly had the president support its more independent fiction okay but we can agree they did I
26:28think they did an incredible job you did not have a financial crisis you can complain about the ruble being lower and
26:35that's just something not to take lightly because in these cases where the central bank's been subordinated there's
26:42no line of defense James well let me
26:47come back to the basic point about modern monetary theory with all respect to Kenneth Rogoff it is not a set of
26:55policy prescriptions that you pull out of the air to apply in particular circumstances it is a descriptive
27:02analysis of how credit based financial systems actually work now they work in
27:07the United States how they work in Japan how they work in any country especially those which have a degree of sovereignty
27:13over their money and credit systems now the question had to do with whether what
27:19they exists of the risks of excessive budget deficits actually are and in the
27:26world these vary with the circumstances that a country faces with the world
27:31conditions with the external balance of the country and with the policy tools that are in use so we have the case of
27:38Japan that Japan has very high deficits in public debt as you mentioned over 200
27:44percent GDP but no inflation and no impairment of its access to credit
27:49markets it is a country with a sovereign monetary system in which the public debt
27:54is held partly by the Bank of Japan partly by the Japanese private sector courtly outside the United States in the
28:01Second World War ran budget deficits of 25 percent of GDP for four consecutive years along with
28:09price controls a degree of rationing and it had a two percent bond rate on u.s.
28:15government thought that's no problem of financing what was effectively a
28:20doubling of the size of the American economy in that period Greece in the
28:25modern world is in a different situation it lacks sovereign control over its credit system
28:31then entirely dependent upon the set of rules constraints which are imposed upon it from the outside and entirely
28:38dependent upon the sufferance if you like of its creditors who have been
28:43extremely harsh toward the country but broadly in the world economy since the
28:481980s there have been no major resource constraints apart from the environmental
28:54ones that we are not dealing with and a number of large countries notably China
29:00but also to a substantial degree the United States and to a degree Japan as
29:06well have taken pretty good advantage of that of those conditions in order to
29:11maintain of rates of growth social stability and in the case of China an
29:17enormous amount of Economic Development this is what you can do when you set your mind to it Europe is another case it has not partly
29:26because European countries have been what shall we say in thrall to a
29:31financial orthodoxy which has advantaged creditors but greatly disadvantaged the
29:37debtor countries within the European Union you can see this consequences of this is a deep social economic crisis of
29:45but also a political crisis which is presently unfolding for example in France so this is a difference between
29:51the successful application of a resource using policy and the reluctance or the
29:57failure to use the resources which would otherwise be available I and the cases
30:04that Ken mentioned a country's Argentina for example faced a deep crisis as the
30:11result of the failure of hyper Orthodox policies in the early 2000s able to
30:16recover from that for 10 or 15 years of course favourable external conditions helped a good policy helped and things
30:25don't last forever conditions turned unfavorable in 2014 or so things became difficult again but
30:32Argentina and the other countries inventions are examples of countries which do not have the capacity at least
30:39are not willing to exercise capacity to control their internal
30:44monitoring credit systems in the way that is not a problem for the United
30:49States Japan and which other countries including Russia have to take certain steps in order to assure that they do in
30:56fact have an adequate degree of control
Inflation
31:03so what is the rush of you on this well what is important to understand in this
31:11situation is that budget deficit constraints have to do with inflation
31:18the presenters we have today would agree with this it's a matter of source of
31:27demand whether it's stimulated by the government whether it's stimulated through credit what is the balance in
31:34the economy what are the goals of a national economy goals can be very different there are different political
31:41agendas as well but it all works as long as demand does not create inflation what
31:49was the mistake that Argentina and Venezuela made countries that cannot
31:54mentioned and mr. Galbraith also mentioned that when they saw inflation
32:01they never stopped they continued to stimulate demand thinking that this will
32:07bring them to the positive as well but inflation is a big key problem that
32:15sends you a message about an upcoming problem in the economy lack of demand or
32:22excessive demand and this is something to look at when you want to achieve good
32:28results as of Japan well Japan was forced to come to this situation they
32:33went through a period of trials and tribulations they experienced a long period of stagnation and we see that in
32:41recent years despite the fact that they had no issues with inflation they have
32:48been taking steps to increase sales tax
32:53to tighten their policy and we see the
32:59negative consequences we see a deterioration of the situation a set of
33:05improvements I think that China is a good example of successful work look at
33:11the last 20 or 30 years China has been working very thoroughly
33:18on stimulating demand depending on what is happening they keep stable level of
33:27demand look at the situation they have
33:32there we see the mix of demand which
33:38depends on the face of an economic cycle at some point in time they had zero
33:43deficit today the official numbers are around 6% of the GDP private loans are
33:51not growing so they increase the budget deficit they creates a good balanced
33:58public demand and private demand there is really no border between these two
34:04things in China public expenditures and private banks there's a lot of
34:11government banks which offer loans to those industries which are looked at as
34:19priority areas for economic development if you look at the big picture China is
34:27a country that has not suffered from any big forces over the 30 years period
34:32inflation is very stable it's around 2 percent during this whole time so we can
34:39learn quite a bit from China they have good experience
34:46one of the statements of the modern economic theory is the requirement of
34:55for countries to be sovereign in monetary terms for a country to be able
35:02to issue currency and more in national currency what adieu gentlemen think
35:10about this is very relevant for Russia the ability to issue debt and to more in
35:19national currency to give national currency the status of reserve currency
35:27do you think this is relevant in today's world we understand that no matter what
35:35you call a policy whether you think that it is in line with the modern monetary
35:43theory or not what should it be James would you don't face a hard currency
Currency
35:58constraint on their public finances they don't have to raise funds from outside in order not to service their debts but
36:06the point I would make about that is that the ability to borrow in your own currency is dependent upon policy and
36:13institutions important example of this in the modern world is China which does
36:19not have the RMB the renminbi is not a reserve currency yet may be coming into
36:26one but it has not been one in recent decades and yet China is able to pursue
36:31an independent domestic policy because it maintains capital controls I was in
36:38the 1990s for a period of four years chief technical adviser to the State Planning Commission of the People's
36:45Republic for macroeconomic reform and one of the issues that came up was whether they should liberalize the
36:52capital account and permit a free transfer of ass in and out of the country and along with
36:58several distinguished senior economists from the United States when we argued very strongly against that and they did
37:04not do it having maintained that degree of control it's not perfect but having
37:10maintained that degree of control China has been able to finance the
37:16extraordinary growth and development of the past 25 years now the United States
37:22doesn't have capital control it doesn't need it maintains a large and liquid market for government bonds and in the
37:31case of the United States we have the immortal words of the late 19th century of the German Chancellor Otto von
37:38Bismarck that almighty providence looks after drunks fools and the United States of America
37:45the distinction between being able to or not being able to issue bonds that serve
37:51as the store of value is in fact a critical marker of whether a state is truly sovereign in its sphere again I
38:02mentioned earlier Greece where I had the privilege of working for four or five months at the side of the Finance
38:08Minister in 2015 Greece lost this privilege when Greek
38:13bonds were transferred from Greek law to British law in 2012 up to that point the
38:20state could in fact haircut its own bonds at the stroke of a pen if it was in fact necessary afterwards it could
38:27not is a straightforward legal transfer of sovereignty over a critical matter from the government of Greece to the to
38:35the power to the creditors in effect so it is important to be able to borrow
38:41your own currency it is a privilege that is accorded to the countries at the
38:47center of the world monetary system but other countries can achieve the same effect if they're willing to implement
38:54the appropriate policies and I should add that capital control was something
38:59that was clearly envisaged in the charters of the International Monetary Fund in 1944-45 so it is not a new
39:08their procedure by any means on capital controls have been used they've been used by Malaysia they've been used by
39:15Chile they've been used by numerous countries that are fully part of the world system as well as by China in its
39:22transition period yeah yeah let me make
Sovereign debt
39:28a few points first of all it's very difficult in today's world for most
39:33countries to be a completely sovereign than finance because of the dominance of
39:39the dollar the Japan has something like
39:4570% of its imports denominated in dollars 50% of its exports you can go to
39:53France and look at European French corporates and they are now issuing
39:59something like thirty thirty five percent of their debt in dollars because
40:04that's what's the demand for and so that there's a certain amount of sovereignty that's not there for most countries the
40:12United States is in a very privileged position the second point I want to make is that when we talked about debt in the
40:19modern state what we're really talking about is what I term in my work senior
40:25market debt and it's not really capturing the whole picture of a country's liabilities I think there are
40:33other things which are you can in principle walk away from but it's very difficult with pensions being an old-age
40:40support being a leading example take the case of Italy the deaths famously
40:46something like a hundred thirty percent of GDP but that's nothing compared to
40:52their pensions publicly provided pensions are 16% of GDP not of
41:01government spending of GDP in Italy and even in the United States they're seven percent I think the right way to look at
41:08govern government out in the modern state is it's this little sliver of senior market debt that is going to get
41:15paid because there are a lot of resources but there's a ton of debt below it and just referring to what's
41:21going on in this senior debt and seeming to spend it because you don't have a problem
41:27because it's senior and you had and you have a lot of resources and you know
41:34lastly Russia I think certainly falls more in the
41:39category of an emerging market here then it falls in the category of Japan in the
41:45United States in terms of its true monetary independence in the world and
41:51that isn't to say that hasn't done very well and been able to maintain
41:57macroeconomic stability but I think it's done so by following these Orthodox
42:02principles that are time-tested and you
42:07know we can talk about Japan and China later but there are a lot of countries in the world and there have been a lot
42:14of problems over history when you have a central bank that's similar to
42:19government with no seriously knew all I
42:26first would like to respond to Kenneth's what has just said problems have
42:31problems it's not when they finance something but when they failed to response to excess demand when the
42:38inflation starts growing and they respond to that by imposing structure
42:45policy and then that could be a problem like a Russian case 2015-2016 our
42:50analysis right now shows that the strongest anti-inflation imposed was the
42:57reduction of budget deficit that was the channel from big
43:04I mean indicators that we had we reduced budget deficit very much and debt cooled
43:11down inflation brought down the inflation inflation is a measure I would say know how the policy economic policy
43:18efficient is now our currency
43:25sovereignty and debt sovereignty it's a key thing for a sovereign economic
43:30policy unless you have your own currency where the world developed that market
43:35you cannot pursue your independent economic policy you would always be
43:41dependent on the outside world some countries would delegate this to other
43:47countries there are all sorts of regimes like currency board etc were fully
43:54disovered t know in currency policy should begin out to other countries and
43:59the economy in particular country would be determined by those other countries
44:05that would reduce the risks of making big mistakes but on the other hand that economic policy would be developed not
44:12on the basis of the situation in a particular country urine but based on some other reasons one great example
44:18there is Europe because on the one hand in terms of the monetary policy the
44:24countries have lost their sovereignty there's the fiscal Commons fiscal policy a banking Union
44:30it's a half-hearted economic Union and that has resulted in a situation where
44:36Greece and other countries don't have their sovereign economic policy as a result that they have those problems in
44:42the European zone that we see happening of the past 10 20 years and getting back
44:51to this issue of our currency and that sovereignty it's an absolutely important
44:58condition for modern economic policy sovereign money while we
45:03keep on getting back to an issue of how what what is or what is within this full
45:12scope of the fiscal policy and in the modern monetary theory our
45:18monetary and fiscal posts are intertwined in a way but the kernel
45:23coordination of material and fiscal policy is something being considered in
45:29the traditional macroeconomics but in the modern world in this discussion of
45:34modern monetary theory my question to the panelists what do you think about transformation of the understanding
45:41transformational monetary policy in the future can it monetary policy
45:50institutions have actually been very successful and in many countries fiscal policy institutions have not been
45:57successful they were very political it's interesting I'm at the American Economic
46:03Association meetings and there are many papers on how fiscal policy can work in a Keynesian cross islm diagram that
46:10completely oblivious to political economy so in my country the United
46:16States when the Democrats are in power and let's say really in power
46:22stimulating the economy means making the government larger and by the way I agree
46:28with that at the moment of where we are the Republicans when they're in power
46:35they think well let's make let's do tax cuts than try to aim to make the economy
46:41smaller it creates quite a bit of instability perhaps there are some
46:46countries where you don't face this political volatility but I think the idea that fiscal policy can provide
46:53surgical precision in stabilization this is misguided and it very much goes to
47:00the question of what Maxime gave the case where Russia reacted as he rightly
47:05says in all macroeconomic policy very appropriately at least to prevent the
47:11crisis they're in in many situations
47:18it's very difficult for the politicians to do that we talk about ok we'll do big
47:25deficits big spending and when things got tough we'll pull back that is not easy to do in in the in the
47:32heat of battle and I think we're having an independent central bank that sort of
47:37prevents there being a financial crisis prevents there from being an inflation crisis and pulsing back in a more
47:45technical way has worked in many many countries is a very important role if we
47:52create an independent fiscal policy or more technocratic fiscal policy in perhaps you have one here I not going to
48:00comment but if you do then you can do a lot more with fiscal policy then you can
48:06do if fiscal policy is very volatile and and unpredictable and I'll and I'll add
48:13lastly I worked at the United stories early or central pay was my first job
48:20out of graduate school and that was a long time ago 1980 and interestingly it
48:27was just developing them as a center of technocratic expertise if you went back
48:32to 1970 it was the US Treasury that all had all the technocratic expertise it
48:39was the US Treasury that navigated the change out of floated from fixed
48:45exchange rates and floating exchange rates so the these issues are certainly linked if you build up the technocratic
48:52expertise the independence and other institutions you can share more of the
48:58macroeconomic stabilization responsibilities let me start
Central bank governance
49:06that's this question by addressing the issue of central bank governance and
49:11central bank independence I think it's obvious that having a central bank that is independent does
49:17not protect any country or region from financial crisis but European Central
49:23Bank has been independent Europe has been in deep crisis and especially was in deep crisis over most of the past
49:30decade I think the Europeans made a great deal of trouble for themselves by
49:35chartering a supranational central bank that was essentially accountable to
49:41nobody and not accountable to any democratic institution in Europe very nominally and
49:47ineffectively to the European Parliament in this respect it seems to me that the
49:53United States has a much better model while we talk about central bank
49:58independence in the United States the United States Federal Reserve is in fact a statutory agency created by the United
50:06States Congress in the Federal Reserve act like other regulatory agencies it is
50:12independent of the executive branch but it is not independent of the Congress it
50:17is accountable legally and constitutionally to the United States Congress and has since the middle 1970s
50:24been responsible for reporting to Congress on a very regular basis about
50:30its policy that hearings that we call the conduct of monetary policy hearings and that later the humphrey-hawkins
50:36hearings I know about this quite well because I drafted the statutory language in the middle 1970s that governs
50:43congressional accountable reserve accountability to the US Congress and it's under a mandate which is not
50:51strictly an ideological mandate about price stability based upon a set of economic ideas which have fallen out of
50:58fashion since they were powerful in the 1980s but a dual mandate a multiple
51:04mandate but principally a dual mandate that emphasizes both full employment and
51:09reasonable price stability so the Federal Reserve is an entity which is
51:14responsive to the elected United States Congress in principle Congress gives it
51:20a lot of leeway that's appropriate but the responsibility and the legal relationship is not one of full
51:26independence as is often planted I think that is a reason why the United States
51:31was able to react more responsibly and more effectively to the financial crisis
51:36in the decade ago than was the case in Europe in terms of going of the future
51:43it seems to be quite clear that we have gone through a generation in the West where economic growth has been largely
51:51largely propelled by the periodic nation of private debts mortgage debts
51:59household debts automobile debt student loan debts all of these things are essentially the drivers of consumption
52:05spending in the United States and these things are they're cyclical they go up
52:11and they go down or we are coming to the after ten years or so we are very far
52:18into a period of expansion fueled by private debt and this is not going to go
52:24on forever so the future definitely lies with the alternative which is economic
52:32initiatives taken by public sector actors or by public and private
52:37partnerships and we see this in the world as well as in our own in the
52:43Western countries we see this specifically in China where the belt and Road initiative is probably the single
52:50most important thing that is happening in the world today that will change the structure of the global economy going
52:56forward nothing like it is emanating from the West at the present time so it's very important to recognize the
53:03Chinese are not relying on private households taking out debt in order to build out what they view as the crucial
53:10infrastructure for their resource supply and their international relations and their trade relations in the future as
53:17well as their the security of their international relations in the West we have initiatives which see and have the
53:25potential to do similar things they are going under the name of the green New Deal they are not yet fully developed
53:33and they're certainly not at that we do not have governments in place that are prepared to implement them but to the
53:39extent that we decide that we're going to face in particular the climate challenge the energy transition and
53:45building out a society in which one can live better on a sustainable resource
53:51base we are going to have to do that using the instruments of state power and
53:57that means using fiscal policy explicitly in the future so that's where if we're going to have something other
54:03than a permanent situation of secular stagnation which our societies will not
54:09tolerate for a long period of time we have to be prepared to reacquire let's
54:15say the initiative that is defined by a degree of public purpose objectives that
54:21we face and effective that we tackle as a society and indeed as a global community what historically and opinion
Monetary and fiscal policies
54:33has been that monetary policy is one thing and fiscal policies differencing
54:39one is an enforcement of our demand and inflation and the second is for structural change and growth but we see
54:46an exhaust they think that in the world experience this is no longer so the borders are no longer there in the
54:52monetary policy a lot of structural effects like Europe and the United States zero interest rates results in
54:59the increase in the price of exits the change in the wealth of the economy structure of the income in the economy
55:06or change in the structure of our loans like the example of the United States the change of regulation there on the
55:14banking side has resulted in very serious changes and what happened in the American economy and the world economy
55:21in in the future the action many
55:28reactionary changed this structure that's on the one side on the other side there's the Japanese situation well two
55:35hundred forty percent government debt of GDP a lot of budget deficit if they
55:41start experiencing surplus demand at a certain point a time and to constraint
55:47that is not what been the increase in interest rates in the case of Japan increase in interest rates would result
55:53in Station one inflation would be stepped up because the budget in deficit with the growth through payment of more
56:00interests on our rates and etc Amahl the main instrument would be
56:06fiscal policies through increase in change in taxes or expenses only through
56:11this channel in the case of excesses Devon Japanese would be able to control situation cannot express that very well
56:19that's wallets technocratic approach result oriented approach we see two examples and mr.
56:26Galbraith also yet that example I would change I can compare a China and
56:32eurozone eurozone does have an independent central bank independent fiscal policy American in the country
56:39and we see the result it's non technocratic approach Anna's not is not
56:45result oriented China is different it's a in the universe from common
56:50policy and then government by the authorities of China and everything's
56:57under their control and no independence and technocratic approach brings better
57:04result in China than eurozone you should not be blindly guided by certain
57:10principles you have to analyze the situation in the real way controlling
57:15the demand at controlling the supply now the borderlines no longer there between monetary and
57:22fiscal and that that's going to continue like this in the future if a country managers to build the system and a
57:29system that would be result oriented not influenced by political trend they would achieve better results and then like
57:35unless and another countries where in Argentine as an example you know if
57:41there is pulse again get against the upper hand politic in the upper hand that would be a problem in the course of
57:48this discussion we've discussed more on the developed countries more but has
57:53been said before Russia is an emergent market emerging economy so at the end of
58:02this discussion like to hear the opinion of the panelists what do you think
58:11Russia should be doing and other emerging emerging economies should be doing and as an emerging economy
58:18what can Russia do to accelerate its growth James
Monetary sovereignty
58:27about taking advice from economists who just got off the airplane but I think
58:33that's a lesson that that's not to be learned here oh they saw just a few
58:39basic principles one is that monetary sovereignty requires effective
58:45management of financial relationships between a country and the rest of the
58:51world that's very clear and in particular that includes capital flows
58:56between the country and this is course a major issue when it has been in the
59:01Russian Federation so in Part A it's a
59:07question of the internal distribution of wealth and the relationship of the
59:12citizenry to the national government and the effective distribution of capital
59:19holdings from the effective taxation of concentrated wealth is a crucial element
59:24in assuring that one has a stable democratic and financially sovereign economy this is something also it's very
59:32important with respect to how the national resource patrimony is managed
59:37second point I would make that seems to me from my experience with Russia to be
59:42important here is that Russia has a great strength in developing high levels
59:50of amenities which are essentially consumption goods that are shared in
59:57common by the population that is say a very high quality of education a very high quality of urban life a very high
1:00:04quality of parts and culture and other aspects of of national life which are
1:00:11not necessarily specifically owned by particular individuals and therefore can
1:00:18be provided reasonably economically and sustainably to the broad population the
1:00:23more one can do that and build a high quality life on that basis the better off you are in the world where you have
1:00:30difficulty with essentially with with the general availability of resources and the third point I would make is that
1:00:37economic growth particularly as we men which is essentially a question of
1:00:43measuring transactions growth in that particular number is not the most
1:00:49important variable what is important is the quality of life what is important is
1:00:54the the health status and the life expectancy of the population what is
1:01:00important is the sustainable management of environmental and natural resources
1:01:05and what is important is the social stability on all of these things these are complex matters which were not
1:01:11adequately captured by a variable that was invented for entirely different purposes in the 1930s and 1940s in
1:01:20particular for the management of the mobilisation of the war economy in the 1940s so one has to have a good sense of
1:01:28what the objectives are the high rate of growth may facilitate getting to some of
1:01:33these objectives but it may well not be what the most important most important priorities are gonna get in time
1:01:39hey get it first of all I want to thank my fellow panelists Jamie and Maxine for
1:01:47many excellent comments and for this discussion I want to quickly make two points before I come to your question
1:01:53one is I think professor Galbraith raised the point about sustainability at
1:01:59virtually every economist at least in the United States favors having carbon
1:02:05tax I would say global carbon tax although I think something needs to be
1:02:12done from the advanced countries helping support this in the less developed
1:02:18economies where it could be very expensive I've made my own proposals second on China I will only say my 2009
1:02:26book was Carmen Reinhart was entitled this time is different because we go through it's a quite quantitative book
1:02:33we go through one case after another where countries said well this works it note you know because this time is
1:02:39different China is the this time is different story and I think they're as they have to slow
1:02:47down significantly in the coming years to a much lower growth rate that's going to be a very painful process lastly on
1:02:56on Russia I do think it's salient to look at the IMF report card on Russia
1:03:02not to say they're always right by any stretch of the imagination but it's a starting point and I would say the way I
1:03:10read the article for that I am NOT wrote in the last few for Russia is
1:03:16macroeconomic policy a ray - micro economic policy see - that there are so
1:03:24many things that could be done to improve growth they start with antitrust policy the excessive power of the state
1:03:35problems with the legal system I completely agree that the Russian
1:03:41people are extraordinarily creative and in fact Russian Russians around the
1:03:49world are leaders and technology and ads and and many things but Russia has not
1:03:57been entirely successful in harnessing this at home and that's where the real
1:04:02growth opportunities are in Russia yes supported by us good fiscal policy and
1:04:10macroeconomic management that's important but the areas where the really big room for improvement is much more in
1:04:17building up to private sector dynamism I don't think the problem in Russia is it all the problem that the private sector
1:04:24has grown and the public sector has and it's just the opposite no Soviet that
1:04:30lasted three three treatises I can
1:04:37bring up three points one is relevant for any emergent economy in
1:04:42macroeconomic policy I like what carrot said we should be more technology
1:04:49oriented we should not follow dogmas and myths we should look at real situations
1:04:56and act accordingly inflation is a
1:05:02bright indicator that shows problems in the economy lack of demand or excessive
1:05:08demand in Russia there are two things in Russia we have achieved quite a lot
1:05:15through avoiding high inflation this was a serious achievement and today the
1:05:21situation is radically better than five or ten years ago what's important is
1:05:27that Russia should not drive itself into the low demand trap there are also
1:05:33informal causes for that we can see that
1:05:39there are certain threats in Japan in
1:05:44Russia we don't have that the third point is where I go with Canada we
1:05:49should focus on long-term growth factors because this will bring not long-term
1:05:56success we should reduce barriers in the economy make the system more efficient
1:06:02better distributes resources in the economy that is always beneficial for long-term development this is something
1:06:09to always bear in mind we should look at the long term factors and avoid
1:06:17short-term mistakes thank you very much to all panelists now I would like to
1:06:24pass the floor to the experts that we have invited to our session while like
1:06:30the again over to you what kind of comments can you share with us I would
1:06:38rather ask a question I really want to hear the answers that our panelists
1:06:45could give me we have witnessed this interesting
1:06:50discussion we talked about the modern
1:06:55monetary theory several people mentioned
1:07:01the following the main central bank's
1:07:07today carry out a fairly soft monetary policy low interest rates we don't see
1:07:15high inflation mr. Rifkin said this at least that's how
1:07:21I understand it there are a lot of resources available the world economy has quite significant resources and
1:07:31those resources can support this soft policy addressing the demand is this the
1:07:41right understanding or or is this primitive interpretation of what I heard
1:07:49also there is another consideration that
1:07:54is some people believe that today we are witnessing economic growth which is
1:07:59based on high level of that corporate that are sovereign debts we're talking
1:08:06about major economies because that's where we are witnessing it's Japan and
1:08:15the United States although their cumulative total debt is lower than in
1:08:21other parts of the world maybe the formula is changing in the modern monetary theory the debt variable
1:08:30is playing a much bigger role than it did in the past when death is low it is
1:08:41supported by savings when there are savings in the economy those savings get
1:08:47transferred into the debt if there is a distortion if several
1:08:53banks or governments add more servings
1:08:59artificially that creates inflation has this changed I'm sorry maybe my
1:09:07questions are too abstract or if I were
1:09:13to talk about the first question why there is no inflation there is only one answer it means that the demand that is
1:09:19creates it is not sufficient it's not higher than the production capacity of
1:09:27specific economists and of the global economies look at Japan look at the
1:09:32European Union in Europe they had high unemployment for a long period of time
1:09:38and they definitely could cope with higher level of the amount easily but they didn't do that for understandable
1:09:46in situational reasons as of the debt level well let me make one correction
1:09:53it's not the savings creates debt when that is created that is related to
1:10:03savings this is like a double record in the central bank which is like any
1:10:08commercial bank essentially with hungover debt many would focus on
1:10:16sovereign debt budget deficit creates assets in the private sector when the
1:10:25debt level is high it's so difficult to achieve growth without greater private
1:10:34sector assets in Japan they are trying to create assets this way we have a
1:10:41different situation in this country a private debt is not high in our economy the rates are high and there is
1:10:48a potential for private growth still which is quite good we think that
1:10:58there is good potential there is no universal cure for all economies though
1:11:03one cannot say that 3% of budget deficit is the constraint that everybody should
1:11:08follow every economy is different and unique and the differences are very
1:11:14significant so they have to use different tools to dress up our
1:11:20situations Maxim's explanation is
1:11:53certainly part of the story but it surprised everyone and I haven't really
1:11:59seen completely coherent theory I I suspect of course there are countries
1:12:05where we have seen it Argentina is a dramatic example but I think people who
1:12:11promise you it's not going to come back wonders no it's really is really something that's that's foolish I do
1:12:19think the footprint of the financial crisis is bigger and longer lasting than people are quite understanding it's made
1:12:27people very nervous about something else happening it's made people more hesitant
1:12:33about investment but there are other factors and for example the falling cost
1:12:40of investment goods has been a big factor in pushing down interest rates
1:12:45it's also true inequality has been a factor in pushing down interest rates
1:12:51because wealthy people have a lower spending proportion of their income and
1:12:57I think if we have a more progressive fiscal policy in the United States it
1:13:03actually doesn't need to budget deficits just read it it could but just
1:13:08redistributing income and and who the level of redistributions low in the
1:13:14United States compared to many other countries just redistributing income will be quite a macroeconomic boost and
1:13:20there's potential for saying that in other places in the world ok very
1:13:25briefly the reasons why there is no inflation there has been no inflation essentially in the world economy since
1:13:32the 1980s and that is due to a very change situation with respect to
1:13:37resources in a very chain change situation with respect to wages the
1:13:42power of the unions was broken in the United States and in the world situation the fall of the Soviet Union the rise of
1:13:49China created as essentially disinflationary disinflationary situation in the world economy as a
1:13:56whole the price level is now set at the world level on most essential things with respect to interest rates the fact
1:14:03that the monetary policy was used as the primary line of response to the to this
1:14:11situation and then especially to the crisis 10 years ago has meant there has been a lock-in of low interest rates as
1:14:18the long-term interest rates have come down as an expectation that low interest
1:14:23rates will be maintained it becomes very much harder for central banks to raise the short rates because it creates
1:14:29financial chaos when they do so they talk about it occasionally they try and then they pull back because they see
1:14:35that it's causing a great many disruptions particularly in asset markets on which they rely to sustain
1:14:41the illusion of economic prosperity so I don't think the situation I think the
1:14:47situation that we have now is historically different from what it was in the early post-war period and what it
1:14:54was before the financial crisis I agree with Ken on that that there's we're in a situation where achieving high rates of
1:15:01growth for a number of reasons structurally much more difficult than it was before
1:15:10now what right mechanic it was I am mayor ladies and gentlemen colleagues
1:15:15thank you very much for a very interesting panel I think one important
1:15:21conclusion that we arrived at so it was something that mr. Raskin said there are
1:15:27no silver bullets no universal Q is there are many countries where this
1:15:32situation as such that one can increase
1:15:37sovereign spending and increase public debt and this will not bring
1:15:43catastrophic consequences but this does not mean that this logic I can be fold
1:15:48in all parts of our life and this is something that mr. hua Goff said I would
1:15:55like to follow up and what mr. rushdy said that is a connection between savings and investment this was talked
1:16:03about a little but I have a few questions I have always been taught and
1:16:10I taught my students as savings are good in long term savings are translates into
1:16:15investment investment increases our production capacities economic growth is
1:16:21getting faster in the last two decades
1:16:26I've been witnessing a change in the last 10 years we have seen secular
1:16:32stagnation a lot of things in the world do not translate into investment
1:16:40corporations are more risk-averse they do not invest we see low interest rates
1:16:47we see growing debt which does not turn into greater production capability
1:16:53before financial crisis we have seen some investment that that was investment
1:16:59in various bubbles comms came first and then housing this brings about the
1:17:07question should I continue to teach my students that savings is good or should I review my attitudes to this part of
1:17:16macroeconomic let me respond to you by saying this if
1:17:25you want to achieve economic growth you cannot do it without investment how can
1:17:32you create demand for investment what happens in developed economies why there's less demand why invest if the
1:17:41current capacity is sufficient to satisfy the existing demand to create
1:17:50greater investment you have to increase consumption because it would create demand there's got to be a good balance
1:17:56that is an answer to your question there is no universal cure to increase investment you have to use different
1:18:04instruments there's got to be proper balance of demand and the investment
1:18:12should match the demands of this combination I can give you the desirable
1:18:19results so you have to do somewhat technocratic and scientific a cumulative
1:18:26demand she'll be right and you should follow the right policy to achieve that
1:18:35goal some areas require greater investment in some areas you have to
1:18:40focus on redistribution of wealth we see
1:18:45that this issue is becoming much more talked about in the United States we
1:18:52have to teach our students that there are no universal infamous sets can help
1:19:00in every situation it's been a fallacy
1:19:10for 200 and some years and it's still a fallacy it's efficient to say yes
1:19:18Funston yeah we we don't actually teach you no sorry and I don't think we quite
1:19:26teach that savings is but we the consumption is good but as Maxime
1:19:32said you need savings to have investments so that you can keep on consuming and consuming more and the
1:19:38questions the balance and certainly the fact the interest rate has fallen so far is certainly illustrative at the end of
1:19:46the day of having pressure from savings relative to investment and I think
1:19:52certainly one of the factors generating this has been the really good investment opportunities are not in the advanced
1:19:59countries they're aging there already at the technological frontier the really
1:20:04good investment opportunities are elsewhere however in many emerging
1:20:10markets we could look at the Middle East we could look at Asia they really don't want to hold all their money locally
1:20:16because even though the returns are high the risks are also high and we see this
1:20:21flood of money coming into the advanced economies the my own view is this is
1:20:28probably a cycle and not a trend that goes on forever but it's very difficult to predict
1:20:37responsible change comes thank you to all the panelists unfortunately we were
1:20:43an inch short of time and I hope that we've been able to you sedate something
1:20:50on modern monetary Theory of course they will continue to be differences on this
1:20:56matter thank you very much