2022年1月22日土曜日

Employment Guarantee Programs: A Survey of Theories and Policy Experiences by Fadhel Kaboub 2007

Employment Guarantee Programs: A Survey of Theories and Policy Experiences* by Fadhel Kaboub Drew University fkaboub@drew.edu May 2007


https://www.researchgate.net/publication/5163663_Employment_Guarantee_Programs_A_Survey_of_Theories_and_Policy_Experiences




INTRODUCTION 

The idea of government as the employment guarantee, or the employer of  last resort (ELR), has been present in economic literature since the seventeenth century. The need for an employment guarantee, or ELR, program  became more  urgent  after the  industrial revolution. Capitalist economies  lack an inherent mechanism  to create full employment. The Great Depression was the worst episode  of the system's failure to deliver full employment. At that time, John Maynard  Keynes was one of the few economists who challenged the conventional wisdom by arguing  that capitalism,  when left to its own devices, will not gravitate towards full employment, and suggested that government intervention was required in  order to jump-start the economy and help achieve and maintain full employment.  

 Unemployment had a devastating sociopolitical and humanitarian impact during the Great Depression. The United States started to recover only when the government began spending massively to support the war  effort. But even before WWII had ended, economists began debating whether or not  capitalist economies would fall back into another depression. In his influential book,  Full Employment in a Free Society, Sir William  H. Beveridge called on  the  government  to guarantee full employment, which for him  "means having always more vacant jobs  than  unemployed [people], not slightly fewer jobs. It means that the jobs are at fair wages, of such  a kind, and so located that the unemployed [people] can reasonably be expected  to take them; it means, by consequence, that the normal lag between loosing a job  and finding another will be very short" (Beveridge 1945).  

 At the onset  of  capitalism, William  Petty recognized that unemployment was a serious problem  that needed to be  addressed by society. Unlike many English businessmen and thinkers of his time, Petty  believed that the unemployed "ought neither to be starved, nor hanged, nor given away" (Petty 1899 [1662]). However, Petty was not the humanitarian that we  would like  to think he was; he simply believed that the unemployment pool was an untapped source of  enrichment for the nation, and that the unemployed could be publicly employed to build infrastructure; "at worst this would 


Administration, the Civil Conservation Corps, the National Youth Administration, Rural Electrification Administration, and the Federal Emergency Relief Administration.  

 Despite the immediate success of these agencies, business opposition to the New Deal programs grew strong and Roosevelt quickly backed down and promised the nation that "a balanced budget [was] on the way"; and so was unemployment, which reached 14.3% in 1937, and then rose to 19% in  1938 when Roosevelt decided to slash government spending as a response to inflation fears emerging from  the Federal Reserve Bank, which also doubled reserve requirements between 1936–1937. For these reasons, the New Deal was never meant to be a true  ELR program  since it  did not provide an infinitely elastic demand for labor, but it did empirically show  that the government can act as employer of last resort and provide decent jobs that do not compete with the private sector and that are socially, economically,  and environmentally useful. A new generation of economists began to think about ELR as a serious policy alternative  rather than just an intellectual exercise. And without too much discussion when WWII came along, the deed was done. Full employment was practically maintained throughout the war period with unemployment as low as 1.2% in 1944, the lowest  rate ever recorded in the history of the United States. Concerns over accelerating inflation were taken seriously when the Office of Price Administration (1942–1947) used the March 1942 prices as a ceiling for nearly 90 retail food prices, as well as on residential rent. Rationing was also imposed on key commodities during the same  period. Full employment and price stability were achieved, but only during wartime with a considerable  number of the male working-age adults being in army and the rest of the working-age population employed to support the war effort. Therefore, the U.S. full employment experiment must be taken with caution given the specific circumstances, and the results  should be evaluated  accordingly, even though the there is a lot that could be learned  from  the methods employed at the time.  


JOHN PIERSON'S  ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE INSURANCE 

 John H.G. Pierson (1906–2001) was a Yale-educated economist who held several prominent positions  in the U.S. Department of  Labor and helped draft the  Employment Act of 1946. Frustrated by the miseries of  the Great Depression  and by the unrealistic 


economics textbook models, Pierson began working on what would become  his lifetime "obsession"—full employment. The result was published in his first book,  Full Employment  (1941), and was later refined and  further elaborated in his 1964 book, Insuring Full Employment: A United States  Policy for Domestic Prosperity and World Development.  

 The basic premise of his Economic Performance Insurance (EPI) proposal was that the government should adopt a policy of  guaranteed  full employment. In other words, the government should "stand ready to step in as employer of last resort; or step out, when necessary—[as…] disemployer of first resort. The mechanism to permit that would be a nationwide reserve shelf of additional public  services and public works" (Pierson 1980). But this is only one side of  the equation according to Pierson; the other side is indeed a very crucial one in maintaining full employment in the long run—high levels of consumer demand. It sure can be  achieved through the employer of last resort, but one cannot rule out the possibility of  oversaving to take place in the economy which will cause demand to decrease and, as a result, employment in the private sector to fall as well, thus leading to unemployment again,  unless the number of last-resort jobs is constantly increased to absorb the sluggishness of the system. To avoid this scenario, Pierson's EPI proposal emphasizes the importance of the government  guaranteeing  or underwriting  the volume of consumer spending that is consistent with the full employment  level of production. That could  be done through adjustments of consumer taxes or transfer payments, negative income  tax, reversible  federal sales tax, or federal sales bonus at the retail level, which could be stamps convertible into cash—"income boosters" or I.B.s (Pierson 1980). With his EPI proposal, Pierson showed that  it is important not only to guarantee current  aggregate demand (through the reserve shelf of pubic works), but also  future markets, which would boost expectations and  therefore increase investment. Hence, the double confidence-building feature of the EPI system  would guarantee that there are enough jobs to be had, and that the market will  be held at an adequate level year after year. Furthermore, EPI would kill off  inflationary  expectations. By establishing floors under employment and consumer spending, as  well as ceilings over both, no inflationary spiral could take place. If need be, the government could scale back on consumer 


spending subsidies and/or call for putting some  public works back on the reserve shelf until further notice.  Even though Pierson's EPI proposal was  put forward as a policy for domestic prosperity, it also has its international benefits as well. When domestic full employment is guaranteed through EPI, there would be less pressure on domestic producers to worry about finding more or new markets at the  international level since domestic demand and jobs are already  guaranteed; thus leaving more room  for developing countries to expand their exports and move from  aid to trade (Pierson 1964). 


JOHN PHILIP WERNETTE'S  FULL EMPLOYMENT STANDARD 

 Like Pierson,  John Philip  Wernette (1903–1988) was fearful that the postwar era would be marked by mass unemployment and another Great Depression. In 1945, he published Financing Full Employment, in which he laid out a long-term  economic policy proposal to secure full employment. Wernette proposed to establish a "new fiscal-monetary system," which he called the "Full Employment Standard" (FES). Recognizing that the capitalist system  is inherently unstable,  Wernette advocated the establishment of a Federal Stabilization Board which would "take  over the powers and duties of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, and acquire some  new ones" namely the "control of the total amount of money," and "the creation of new money to be turned over to the Federal government to finance budget deficits and/or  to pay off the Federal debt" (Wernette 1945). Wernette believed that the Federal government has the ultimate responsibility of ensuring the conditions of full employment. Like Pierson and other ELR advocates, Wernette's FES proposal was carefully designed for a dominantly market economy. "The entire purpose of the program  […] is  to keep private enterprise  alive by underwriting a big market for the goods and services which private business can produce" (Wernette 1945). The FES proposal was financed mostly by  printing new money. This is in fact necessary in order to achieve and maintain prosperity  and full employment. And according to  Wernette, an expanding  economy (with a growing population and a rapidly 


rising potential per  capita production) could absorb  immense amounts of new money without creating inflation (Wernette 1945). The orthodox dichotomy between fiscal and monetary policy was absent from  the FES proposal. Indeed, it is the meticulous coordination between the  two that lies at the heart of FES. The Federal Stabilization Board would create  monetary certificates and deposit them in the Federal Reserve banks for the account of  the U.S. Treasury. The Treasury then draws checks to finance deficit spending (without borrowing) on public works projects that are carefully planned and selected not to be  in competition with private enterprise. Wernette developed a very elaborate argument explaining how money is injected into the system  through government spending and is destroyed through taxation. "The function of Federal taxes is  preventing inflation. The federal government literally does not have to collect taxes in  order to get the money for its  expenditures. Like any other sovereign government, our Federal government has the power of creating money" (Wernette 1945). Wernette thus had rediscovered the principle of functional finance which Abba Lerner had laid out in his seminal 1943  Social Research  article, "Functional Finance and the Federal Debt." 

 ABBA LERNER'S FUNCTIONAL FINANCE THEORY 

 Abba Lerner's (1903–1982) most important contribution to the literature is the principle of "functional finance," which opposes the orthodox view of "sound finance."  


"The central idea is that government fiscal policy,  its spending and taxing, its borrowing and repayment of  loans, its issue  of new money and its withdrawal of money,  shall all be  undertaken with an eye only  to the results  of these actions on the economy  and not to  any established traditional doctrine about  what is  sound  or unsound."  (Lerner 1943; emphasis in original)  


From  a functional finance  perspective, "money is the creature of the state." Money is created when the government spends, and is destroyed when the government levies taxes. The government does not need  to "borrow" its own  money from  the public; 



rather it only "borrows" in order to withdraw  excess money from  the system  and to give savers an alternative interest-bearing asset (bonds).  Similarly, the government does not need to  tax its population in order to finance expenditures; rather the government needs the public to demand its currency to give it value. Hence, there can be no financial constraint on the monopoly-issuer of money (the state). A sovereign state can  make anything generally acceptable and call it "money," as long as the state "is willing to accept the proposed money in payments of taxes and other obligations to itself" (Lerner 1947). From  this perspective, all the worries about the deficit and the national debt become  meaningless when compared to their  function: financing full employment. The employer of last  resort is, in fact,  the spender of last resort, whose responsibility is to keep the rate of aggregate  spending in the economy "neither greater nor less than that  rate which  at the current prices  would buy all the goods [and services] that it is possible to produce."  If the rate of spending is too high, inflation will develop;  and if  it's too low, there will be unemployment (Lerner 1943). 

 This taxes-drive-money (TDM) approach has been one of the cornerstones of most ELR policy proposals. The TDM theory has been challenged by Louis-Philippe Rochon and Matias Vernengo (2003), who claim  that the state can only establish the validity of money, but not its value, and that bank (credit) money takes precedence over state money. They argue that when the state is weak and cannot enforce tax collection, banks may still create money through loans to  finance the hiring of workers to produce new output. Money will be accepted and used in  the economy because workers will use it to buy the output and firms will accept it because  they can use money to pay off the loans they took from  banks. The value of money is  then determined by the interaction between the newly produced output and the number of  money units that firms pay out to the workers who produce it. Although this is certainly a valid scenario, it does not, however, contradict the TDM approach;  it merely shows that the  authority  that controls the creation and  destruction of money, gives it value, and imposes its general acceptability can be either  the state, the banking system, religious authorities, the military, or even the mafia. The loss of state sovereignty (broadly  defined) creates a vacuum  and allows other authorities to emerge and control  monetary processes (see Wray 2004).  


THE SWEDISH FULL EMPLOYMENT MODEL 

 The Swedish (corporatist) model showed that  there is a way to achieve price stability without using unemployment as a disciplinary measure against labor. The model was developed after WWII by trade union economists Rehn and Meidner who envisioned two essential elements that would characterize the Swedish economy for more  than four decades: 1) highly centralized wage bargaining;  and 2) active labor  market policies. The model focused on the "socialization of investment" and offered a practical  alternative to welfarism  by putting a strong emphasis on "the right to work" rather  than "the right to income."  The strong trade unions stressed noninflationary full employment and wage differentials based on skills and training rather than profitability in a given industry. Thus, equitable income  distribution was a basic tenet of the Swedish model. A wage restraint on behalf of labor unions was compensated with a system  that taxed profits and used the proceeds to finance capital accumulation under the workers' control. Swedish employers took the initiative on centralized  wage bargaining in the 1950s with the potential wage-restraint gains and the "peace obligation" (no strikes) as an  end-in-view (Marshall 1995). Thus, a fundamental feature of the Swedish corporatist model was the unity of interest, which was manifested  through a noncentralized  wage restraint and centralized wage bargaining. The National Labour Market Board (AMS) has played a key role in implementing activist labor market policies in Sweden. It  is a tripartite institution (labor majority, business, and government) funded by Parliament via the annual budget appropriation. AMS meets twice a month to make decisions  about labor exchanges, training programs, and wage subsidies for workers who have not  been placed within six months. Only after all employment and training options have been exhausted are individuals entitled to unemployment benefits, and once those benefits are also exhausted, the unemployed has the right by law to work up to six months in  the public service employment which acts as the employer of last resort (Ginsburg 1983).  The theoretical underpinning  of the Swedish model can be found in Keynes' idea of "socialization of investment." The model strongly encouraged private investment 


despite high tax rates on profits. Firms were allowed to put their "excess profits" into taxexempt "investment funds," thus encouraging capital accumulation. These investment funds in fact date back to 1938 and have been used primarily as counter-cyclical tools rather than a true socialization of investment. In 1983, five independent regional wageearner funds were created with majority representation from  employers. The funds were financed through taxes on profits and government  funds, with the obligation to invest in Swedish firms in the risk market. By 1990, the funds owned about 5% of the total stock market value, and each were similar in size to medium-sized  private institutional shareholders. In order to achieve  partial  socialization of the means of production, wageearner funds were supposed to gradually transfer title of ownership to trade unions (not to the state). Despite the success  of the trial period, the funds  were abolished in 1991 by the Conservative government (Marshall 1995). The unemployment rate remained below 3%  until the late 1980s, but according to Mike Marshall (1995), the unity of interest  began to fade away in the 1970s and 1980s with the emergence of white-collar unions opposing the reduction of wage differentials between high and low profit industries, as well as a move towards local bargaining. This was followed by the dismantling of the wage-earner funds by the 1991 Conservative government, the failure of  the labor movement  to build the necessary political support for the project of "socialization of investment,"  as well as the relocation of many Swedish firms now free to move elsewhere in search  of lower labor costs and higher profits (Marshall 1995). Unemployment reached a record high 9.6% in July 1993, and has since fluctuated between 4 and 7%—a rather  unrecognizable range for the Swedish full employment  tradition. 


CONTEMPORARY ELR PROPOSALS 

It was Hyman P. Minsky (1965, 1966, 1986) who revived the ELR idea in the mid-sixties and continued to promote it for the next three decades. Other ELR advocates include: Mathew Forstater (1999, 2002), Wendell Gordon (1997), Philip Harvey (1989), Jan Kregel (1991, 1999), Raymond Majewski  (2004),  William  Mitchell (1997,  1998, 2005), 


Edward Nell (1988), Dimitri Papadimitriou (1998), William  Vickrey (1992), and L. Randall Wray (1998), among others. 

 From  the mid-nineties to the present, seminars, workshops, and research funding continued to  materialize.  Beginning at The  Levy Economics Institute of Bard College  in New York, and continuing at the Center for  Full Employment and Price Stability (CFEPS) in Kansas City (Missouri) and at  the Center for Full Employment and Equity (CofFEE) in Newcastle (Australia), the  ELR model developed into a more rigorous policy proposal drawing from  previous ELR  ideas and addressing issues pertinent to contemporary economic conditions as well as political concerns. To begin with, the "lastresort" part was eventually  dropped from  the name  due to its negative connotation. Names such as Public Service Employment  (PSE), Buffer Stock Employment (BSE), or Job Guarantee (JG) are now preferred to  ELR. Although most of the work has been geared towards advanced economies like the United States and Australia, the gist of the ELR model could be adapted to other countries and adjusted to  accommodate their institutional characteristics (e.g. Argentina and India). 

 According to Minsky, ELR can create "an infinitely elastic demand for labor at a floor or minimum  wage that  does not depend upon long- and short-run profit expectations of business. Since only government can divorce the offering of employment from  the profitability of hiring workers,  the infinitely elastic demand  for labor must be created by government" (Minsky 1986).  

 In the C-FEPS/CofFEE version of ELR, the government  guarantees  a real job opportunity for anyone ready, willing, and able  to work at a fixed socially-established basic wage (plus benefits), thus exogenously  setting the price of  labor. With ELR, the government will provide a price anchor and  establish greater price stability. During a recession, the size of the ELR pool increases  to absorb workers displaced from  the private sector, and when the economy booms  it automatically shrinks when ELR workers find employment in the private sector, hence it operates as a buffer stock employment program. The ELR wage is fixed, while the quantity of labor in the buffer stock fluctuates. Private sector employers can obtain labor at a mark-up over the ELR fixed wage; hence the price-stabilization feature of the program.  Furthermore, ELR reduces the depreciation  of skills caused by unemployment, it contains  a training component to 


prepare participants for private sector employment. ELR also gives more opportunities and freedom of choice for both workers and employers. Participation in the program  is voluntary, so it is not a "make work" program. In addition, ELR does not displace private sector jobs since it offers  jobs which are undersupplied  or not supplied at all by the private sector, including companions to the  elderly, public school  classroom assistants, safety monitors, low-income  housing restoration engineers, environmental safety monitors, daycare assistants for ELR workers, community and cultural historians, and ELR artists or musicians (Wray 1998).  Building on Lerner's functional finance theory, ELR advocates argue that the government always has the financial capacity  to pay for the program. Unemployment only develops "because government spending is  insufficient relative to private savings" (Mitchell 2001). The size  of  the deficit necessary  to maintain full employment is irrelevant; and so is the national debt for the simple reason  that the logic of government finances is totally different  from  that of households or firms. ELR proponents show that tax payments  do not  and  cannot  finance government spending;  for at the aggregate level, only the government can be the "net" supplier  of fiat money. As a result, the starting point is government expenditure. Once government spends (creates  or supplies) fiat money to purchase goods and services, it provides the private sector with the necessary amount of money to meet tax liabilities, save, and maintain transaction balances. The government can safely run a deficit up to the point where it has provided the quantity of non-interest-earning fiat money and interest-earning bonds desired by the public (Wray 1998). ELR critics often claim  that the program  would increase labor bargaining power since it eliminates  the threat of  unemployment, thus putting  more pressure on the wageinflation spiral. In response, ELR supporters argue that a  skilled  pool of  employable  ELR workers presents a greater "threat" to private sector employees than the traditional reserve army  of the unemployed. Thus, one  should not expect runaway inflation to develop under the ELR program  (Wray 1998).  Furthermore, the additional amount of government spending can hardly be inflationary given the low cost of running the program. Critics, however, argue that  the inflationary outcome  will eventually depend  on whether ELR workers produce sealable or nonsealable output. 


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Estimates for the U.S., U.K., and Australia  have shown that the cost of financing ELR ranges between less than 1%  of GDP for the United States  to about 3.5% of GDP in Australia (Mitchell & Watts 1997; Gordon 1997;  Kitson, Michie, and Sutherland 1997; Majewski 2004). However, these estimates overstate the real cost of financing the program  because they ignore the multiplier  effects generated by the new income  earned by ELR workers. ELR proponents also argue that the program will pay for itself through the reduction in other social spending  associated  with unemployment (unemployment benefits, food stamps, crime, police and courts, etc…).  

Gordon correctly concludes that:


 "beyond this,  there is an important sense in which the job guarantee program  would not cost anything. The  goods  or services produced by  the labor of the beneficiary  of the job guarantee increase the gross national product and the  national welfare by  as  much as the worker is paid as reliably  as  does any 'free  market'  labor. The laborer is 'earning'  the wage or salary received. Also, and importantly, the worker under the  job guarantee program  has a job of which the worker can be as proud as are other citizens with their jobs." (Gordon 1997) 


CHALLENGES FACING ELR   

 Most ELR critics generally support the idea of  full employment, but have doubts about its capability to  deal with structural unemployment, inflation,  and logistical problems. Many still remain skeptical about the economic usefulness of the jobs to be created under ELR and the transferability of the skills learned under the program  to the private sector (Sawyer 2003 and 2005; Kadmos and O'Hara 2000; King 2000). Structural and Technological  Change (STC) is a constant feature of capitalist economies. Currently, however, governments do not have any systematic way of dealing with STC. At best, they react  to STC after it has happened and  after workers have been displaced; only then does retraining begin and the search for solutions is undertaken. Governments only deal with the problem  after it has made appearance on the surface instead of dealing with its root causes. This  is a very inefficient and irresponsible way of dealing with STC. ELR does have  the potential to target STC through careful planning in cooperation with business and union leaders, as  well as technical training experts in order


to constantly study the structural changes  in the economy. This  allows ELR to stand ready to provide job training for displaced workers so that they can reintegrate the labor force in the most effective way. ELR can therefore provide  a systematic preventive program  to minimize the damage caused by STC. STC is an institutional problem; therefore the  solution for  it must be institutionalized as well. ELR must have a watch list of at-risk industries and at-risk regions so that the ELR administration can stand ready to provide ELR jobs and retraining programs in the areas affected and for the skills needed. Laws can also be introduced to make it mandatory for at-risk industries to alert ELR authorities of  imminent closures so that  ELR jobs can be planned accordingly (Kaboub 2006, 2007). The inflation threat  suggested by ELR critics stems from  the claim  that ELR is nothing but a Keynesian aggregate demand stimulus policy and is equivalent to pump priming. With ELR in place, however, full employment is guaranteed regardless of the level of aggregate demand. Furthermore, ELR is to be financed like any other government program, by crediting bank accounts,  not by "borrowing" or "printing money" (taxes are collected by debiting bank accounts), so ELR spending will simply increase bank reserves  (Bell 2000; Mosler 1997–98).  Since ELR workers would receive a living wage, this is often viewed as a trigger for a wage-price inflationary spiral given that  all workers receiving less than the ELR wage will demand higher wages (and similar working conditions and benefits). This will cause a one-time (desirable) wage adjustment across the economy  that might be accompanied by a one-time fall in profits and  does not have to create accelerating inflation. Under ELR, the central bank cannot fight inflation by raising interest rates (to create unemployment) because this would merely increase the size of the ELR pool and the size of the government. The appropriate  central bank policy would be open market operations to maintain the short-term interest  rate at the desired target. In addition, it is noteworthy to  mention that  all estimates indicate that  the cost of financing ELR (including logistics) is too small relative  to GDP to be considered inflationary. 


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ELR AT WORK: ARGENTINA'S  PLAN JEFES DE HOGAR  

After a decade of strict orthodox policies  ranging from  adopting a currency board and opening markets to foreign trade, to  downsizing government and freeing capital, Argentina's economy collapsed, pushing unemployment above 20%. Consumer inflation reached 40% while producer prices skyrocketed by 125%, GDP fell dramatically, and the peso depreciated by more than 200%. It  was under these dire conditions that the  Plan Jefes de Hogar  (Head-of-Household Program,  Jefes  henceforth) was born in January 2002, via presidential decree during the short term of  President Eduardo Duhale, and came into effect in April 2002.  Jefes  was essentially inspired by the C-FEPS/CofFEE ELR model, but unlike ELR, which  guarantees employment for all,  Jefes  limits participation to the heads of households  which contain children under age 18, persons with handicaps, or a pregnant woman. The program  provides a payment of 150 pesos per month to the head of household for a minimum of four hours of work daily.  Jefes  workers participate in community services and small construction or  maintenance activities, or  are directed to training programs  (including finishing basic education). Eighty-seven percent of  Jefes  beneficiaries work in community projects, primarily including agricultural micro-enterprises and various social and  community services, such as cleaning and environmental support in the agricultural sector and improving the sewer systems and water-drainages. Large-scale infrastructure projects, primarily under the jurisdiction of the Ministry  of Infrastructure, also hire  Jefes  workers for the repair of Argentina's roads and bridges. In 2002, after only four months  of the implementation of  Jefes, the indigence rates among participating households had fallen by  nearly 25% and among  individuals by over 18%. The government finances no more than 80% of the various  Jefes  projects. This provision requires that  firms and NGOs executing  Jefes  projects contribute with their own resources. In 2005, Argentina's total government spending on  Jefes  reached about 1.6 million pesos (less than 1% of GDP), which  is a price worth paying for a country that has a national poverty rate above 50%, 9.6  million indigents,  and a child  poverty rate close to 75% (Tcherneva and Wray 2005). 


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A major concern for ELR advocates is that the  Jefes  program  is financed through a World Bank loan in dollars and therefore  it is impossible for the community projects designed to improve the living conditions  of the poorest to generate dollars for repayment. Recent developments, however, show  that the World Bank loans were actually used to repay foreign debt (not to finance  Jefes). In December 2005, Argentina announced that it would pay off its IMF debt  ahead of schedule and stop borrowing from international institutions,  while at the same  time  continuing to implement  Jefes.  Jefes  has also increased income  of poor  households, although it has not pulled them  above the poverty line because the program  restricts participation to heads of household and because the income  it provides  is below the official poverty line. Thus, ELR proponents argue that  Jefes  is just a step in the right direction and that  it has to: 1) be extended to allow participation of anyone ready, willing,  and able to work; 2) pay living wages; and 3) increase its education and training component to meet current needs (Tcherneva and  Wray 2005). There has been a large influx of women  into the program  who previously were outside the labor force. Women account for over 60% of program  participants. The Argentine Ministry of Labor reports  that there has been mobility from  Jefes  into the private sector, and that  the program  has an overwhelmingly positive impact on growth with an estimated multiplier effect of 2.57.  Tcherneva and Wray (2005) conclude that  "the program  has been a tremendous success, providing jobs  to 2 million workers or about 5% of the population, and about 13% of  the labor force," and that despite  the huge size of  the program, local communities did not experience any shortage of ideas to find useful work for  Jefes  participants. The program  is decentralized (operated in coordination  with municipalities, NGOs, and nonprofit organizations), which has increased  political participation and fostered grassroots democracy among traditionally  marginalized groups. 


ELR IN INDIA: NATIONAL RURAL EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE 

On September 5, 2005, the Indian Parliament  passed the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA 2005). The law guarantees 100 days per year of employment on 


In December 2005, Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin announced that a pilot experiment of the proposed ELR program  would be conducted in six districts. The experimental program  will be  evaluated in the  first quarter of 2007 before being officially adopted nationwide. Workers laid off from  companies of less than 300 employees will be eligible for a "Professional Transition  Contact" (contrat de transition professionnelle: CTP). The CTP workers will sign a contract  with a government agency that will guarantee practically the same  remuneration as  their prior employment. CTP workers will be employed in private companies or public organizations.  The program not only guarantees "activity  income" for those who are actively seeking work, but will also provide "individualized coaching"  and follow up for the passive unemployment category, in addition to  a job training component to facilitate mobility to new occupations due to structural and  technological changes. The CTP contract will be financed by unemployment insurance and that companies who use the services of  CPT workers; and if  need  be, the government will cover the remaining cost. The total cost of the program  is estimated at 70 billion euros or 4% of  GDP (3% activity  income, .4% training programs, and .6% individualized follow up) if all the unemployed were to enter the program  immediately (Attali and Champain 2005). This would be a less expensive program  than the current 4.2% of GDP spent on unemployment compensations and other employment programs. Like other ELR schemes, the CTP program is a full employment  policy that does not increase the deficit and national debt, nor does it create inflationary pressures since the unemployment insurance is totally financed by workers and employers. 


GIVING ELR A CHANCE 

Throughout the history of the economics discipline, and especially after the Great Depression, there has never been a shortage  ELR schemes. Historically, when given a chance, ELR schemes were successful but  business opposition, labor disorganization, lack of political support, and misunderstanding of the working of government finances proved to be the greatest obstacles to maintaining full employment in capitalist societies. Full employment policies in the United States  (New Deal period), Sweden (Corporatism), 



and most recently in Argentina (Jefes de Hogar), show that ELR schemes  can deliver high employment levels without inducing accelerating inflation.  India and France are today on their way to implementing ELR  schemes designed to fit their specific institutional characteristics.  Like any other policy, ELR might  have logistical problems, but its social, political, economic, and environmental benefits by far outweigh its costs (financial or otherwise). All countries have  some  sort of public service employment schemes that operate as ELR schemes, but those are so limited in size and scope that their impact is minimal due to self-imposed constraints and/or Washington Consensus policy constraints.  

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