https://www.lacan.com/seminars2.htm
The Seminars of Jacques Lacan
ラカン セミナール Jacques Lacan - the Seminars - Lacan dot com
https://www.lacan.com/seminars2.htm
ジャック・ラカンのセミナー
1959-1960
セミナー、ブックVII:精神分析の倫理。
フランス語:フランス語:(Jacques-Alain Millerが編集したテキスト)、パリ:Seuil、1986年。
英語:The Ethics of Psychoanalysis(Jacques-Alain Millerが編集)、ニューヨーク:Norton、1992年。
倫理の根底には欲望がありますが、欲望は「過ち」によって特徴づけられます。分析の唯一の約束は緊縮財政です。それは「私への入り口」、l'entrée-en-Jeです。「私はIdがあった場所に来なければなりません」、分析者はその完全な裸で彼の欲望の真実を発見します。治療の終わりは、欲望の浄化です。ラカンは3つの声明を出している。1つは「自分の欲望に屈した」という罪だけである。「主人公は免責で裏切られることができる人です」; 商品は存在しますが、「欲望へのアクセスの代償を払うことができるもの以外に良いものはありません」、それが知りたいという欲求である限り有効な欲求です。ラカンは死ぬ前に呪いを呼び起こすコロヌスのオイディプスを称賛し、彼は彼をアンティゴネと結びつけ、生きたまま壁に囲まれ、まったく諦めなかった人。どちらも、不死である「二人の死の間」、つまりentre-deux-mortsに入るために生きる権利を拒否しました。
Ledésiretsonの解釈以来、息子の情熱(主題)の分析はより緊急になっています。父は誰ですか?これが原始の大群の恐ろしい父(フロイトのトーテムとタブー)です。ルターの神は「人に対する彼の永遠の憎しみ、世界が生まれる前から存在していた憎しみ」を持っています。聖パウロに関して、誘惑につながる法の父:「私にとって、命につながるはずのまさに戒め-あなたは欲しがらない-は私にとって死であることが証明されました。罪のために、戒めの中で機会を見つける、私を誘惑し、それによって私を殺しました。」ラカンは、「私は物を罪の代わりに置いた」と付け加え、法と物との間の共犯を非難し、「それは悪と呼ばれる」。しかし、父が自分自身を守る方法を知ることができない、または知らないものは何ですか?言葉でつくられたオブジェとは何の関係もありません。それは外部のシニフィアンであり、敵対的な外部のシニフィアンでもあります。原始的な抑圧の前の無言の現実は、それを隠すことができずに純粋なシニフィアンウェブをその場所に置きます。それは無意識の中心ですが、除外されています。それは本物ですが、常に空虚、何もない、私が選んだ、何もない、言葉、記号表現が世界を創造する本物の穴によって表されます。近親相姦の禁止によって認可された致命的な歓喜の場所です。それは彼女の明白な肉欲によってそれを表す母親と、そして宮廷の愛で理想化されて真実を話す女性と関連しています:「私は私の総排出腔にある空虚に他なりません。「歪んだセクシュアリティの考えは70年代のマントラを満たしています:「性的関係のようなものはありません。」もう一方の女性は呪いの重荷を負いますが、物事はすべての被験者の中心に落ち着きます。 「あなたは悪魔の肛門から世界に降り注ぐ無駄です。」しかし、救いは糸によって支えられています。息子の父親への愛の絶妙さのテーマは、 D'unAutreàl'autre。この父は象徴的な父であり、彼は不在のためにますます存在し、体のない父または象徴の栄光の体、信仰のために:彼を保証する他の人はいない」。昇華は物事に立ち向かう試みです:人への真の愛 隣人は、自分のように、物の場所と傷を彼の中で認識することにあります。不信については、モノを拒絶することで、ラカンの精神病の定義であるリアルに再び現れるようになります。
倫理的思考が「アナリストとしての私たちの仕事の中心にある」場合、治療において、倫理は2つの側面から収束します。分析者の側には、罪悪感の問題と文明化された道徳の病原性があります。フロイトは、文明化された道徳の要求と患者の本質的に非道徳的な性的衝動との間の基本的な対立を考えています。道徳が優勢であり、ドライブが強すぎて昇華できない場合、セクシュアリティはひねくれた形で表現されるか、抑圧されます。フロイトは、無意識の罪悪感の彼の理論と、自我がその要求に服従する程度まで残酷になるその内部の道徳的機関である超自我の概念の中で、この考えをさらに発展させます。一方、アナリストは、
ラカンは、アナリストが患者の罪悪感に真剣に受け止めなければならないと主張することで、患者の罪悪感にどのように対応するかという問題に取り組んでいます。罪悪感は、自分の欲望に関連して根拠を与えたことです。」超自我を通して作用する病原性の道徳に関して、ラカンは精神分析は自由な精神ではないと主張している。アナリストの倫理的立場は、彼が治療の目標を策定する方法によって明らかにされます。たとえば、自我心理学は、自我を現実に適応させる際の規範的倫理を提案しています。ラカンはこのスタンスに反対し、行動を欲望に関連付ける倫理を考案します。「あなたはあなたの中にある欲望に従って行動しましたか?」
伝統的な倫理(アリストテレス、カント)は、さまざまな商品が最高の善の地位を争う善の概念を中心に展開しています。ラカンの倫理は善を欲望の道の障害と見なしているので、「善の考えの否認が必要である」。また、健康や幸福などの理想を拒否します。伝統的な倫理は、善と快を結びつける傾向があります。道徳的思考は「快楽主義的な問題の道に沿って発展してきました」。ラカンは、精神分析の経験が快楽の重複を明らかにしたので、そのようなアプローチを取りません。快楽には限界があり、それが違反されると、それは痛みになります。歓喜は、被験者が彼の症状に由来する逆説的な満足であり、彼が彼の満足に由来する苦痛です。最後に、伝統的な倫理は仕事と安全を置きます、人々に彼らの欲望を待たせるように言うことによって、欲望の質問の前に存在を命じました。ラカンは、現在の即時性において、彼の行動と彼の欲求との間の関係に直面するように被験者に強制します。
ラカンは、快楽原則と現実原則の間の反対を介して、ダスディン、シングの概念を導入しますが、後者は前者の修正にすぎないため、この反対は欺瞞的です。2つは、dasDingが動作するコンテキストです。第一に、単語の提示であるWortvorstellungenと物の提示であるSachvorstellungenの間にはフロイトの区別があります。2つのタイプは、前意識のシステムでは結合されていますが、無意識の場合は、物の提示だけが見つかります。これは無意識の言語的性質と矛盾しているようです。ラカンは、ドイツ語で「もの」を表す2つの単語があることを指摘することで異議に対抗します。dasDingとdieSacheです。フロイトは後者を使用して、無意識の中での提示を参照します。そして、あるレベルでSachvorstellungenとWortvorstellungenが反対している場合、象徴的なレベルではそれらは一緒になります。Die Sacheは象徴的なものの表現であり、dasDingは実際の物であり「意味を超えた」ものです。無意識の中に見られるものの提示は、言語の外で無意識の外にあるダス・ディンとは対照的に、言語的な性質のものです。「モノは、私たちがそれを想像することは不可能であるという事実によって特徴付けられます。」それは言語の外であり、無意識の外です。「モノは、私たちがそれを想像することは不可能であるという事実によって特徴付けられます。」それは言語の外であり、無意識の外です。「モノは、私たちがそれを想像することは不可能であるという事実によって特徴付けられます。」
それでも、歓喜に関連して、そして言語の対象であるだけでなく、dasDingは欲望の対象です。絶えず探さなければならない失われた物、忘れられない他者、近親相姦欲望の禁じられた物、母。モノは対象に最高の善として見えますが、対象が快楽原則を破ってそれを達成した場合、対象は「ダスディンがもたらす可能性のある極端な善に耐えられない」ため、苦しみや悪として経験されます。幸いなことに、Thingには通常アクセスできないように見えます。
1960-1961Leséminaire
、Livre VIII:Le transfert(danssadisparité主観的)。
フランス語:(texteétabliparJacques-AlainMiller)、パリ:Seuil、1991年。
英語:未発表
ラカンの関係では、ラカンは分析的治療における転移の逆説的な機能を理解する方法を提供しました。その象徴的な側面(繰り返し)では、対象の歴史の象徴を明らかにすることにより、治療の進行を助けます。彼は、その想像上の側面(愛と憎しみ)において、それは抵抗として機能すると主張します。彼はプラトンのシンポジウムを使用して、アナリストとアナリストの関係を説明しています。アルキビアデスは、ソクラテスを貴重な物体であるアガルマを囲む箱と比較しています。アルキビアデスが隠された財宝をソクラテスに帰するのと同じように、患者もアナリストに自分の欲望の対象を見る。ラカンは、他の人に求めている欲望の対象であるアガルマでオブジェクトを明確に表現します。
以前は繰り返しに重点が置かれていましたが、現在は転移の愛、amour de transfertに重点が置かれています。どちらも切り離せないものですが、視点は変わります。繰り返しを主張するということは、分析の状況で、今ここで扱われる間主観的な関係を見ることを拒否することを意味します。過去に構築されたスピーチは、スピーチによって治療法で分解することができます。治療法は「純粋な象徴的な経験」です。個人レベルでは、間主観的論理を構築するための理論レベルでの「架空の再形成」が可能になります。したがって、分析は、セクシュアリティの側面で、欲望の特定の経験として説明されています。スピーチは転移後にのみ効果があります。ラカンにとって、「転移がアナリストに転移自体に介入するのは、転移がアナリストに与える立場からである」、そして「ラカンが拒否する概念。アナリストがより適切に分析されるほど、アナリストに恋をしたり、アナリストにかなり反発されたりする可能性が高くなります。トレーニング分析では、アナリストになる予定の人の欲望の経済に変化があります。欲望は再構築され、情熱よりも強くなります。ラカンはそれをアナリストにふさわしい欲求と呼んでいます。
シンポジウムでは、アナリストの立場はソクラテスと同一視されていますが、アルキビアデスはアナリストの立場を占めており、ソクラテスの後に自分が望んでいることに気付くでしょう。「彼が欠けているものを彼に教えるために他の人と自分を孤立させること、そして転移の性質によって、彼は彼が愛する限り彼が欠けていることを学ぶでしょう:私は彼の善のためにここにいるのではなく、彼が私を愛するために、そして私が彼を失望させたのです。」
アルキビアデスは、ソクラテスがアガルマ(望ましい男根)を所有していると推定しているため、望んでいます。しかし、ソクラテスは、愛する対象の立場を拒否して、自分が望んでいると主張します。ラカンの欲望は、2つの主題の間では決して発生しませんが、主題と、オブジェクトの状態に陥った過大評価された存在との間で発生します。主題として他を発見する唯一の方法は、「彼が明確な言語を話し、彼自身の組み合わせで私たちに反応することを認識することです。他は私たちのようにまとまりのある人として私たちの計算に適合できません」。ソクラテスは、アルキビアデスの宣言を避け、フェチで彼の欠如を隠すことを拒否し、彼の愛の真の目的として彼にアガソンを示すことによって、アナリストに行動の仕方を示します。これは「主観的格差」のもう1つの側面です。分析で行われています。一方が持っているものともう一方が欠けているものとの間に関係はありません。陰茎は、オブジェクトaであるため、架空のオブジェクトであり、「シンボルの役割に値する唯一のシニフィアン」として、シニフィアンのシニフィアンとして出現します。これは、識別を可能にする実際の存在、理想の起源を示します。他者の側の自我。」シンポジウムには、神話の形で話す女性、ディオティマがいます。女性の不足が男性の資源に直面している寓話では、女性は望ましい男性の前に最初に積極的な役割を果たします。逆転は、恋愛では自分が持っていないものだけを与えるために起こります。男性は、要求から遠ざかることによって、欲望の対象として明らかにされます。その後、ラカンはソクラテスをヒステリックな言説のモデルにしました。
ソクラテスのように、彼は死への欲求に立ち向かい、「二人の間」を達成したので、アナリストは「彼の欲望の経済における突然変異」を引き起こすことに成功し、無意識と無意識の経験の両方にアクセスできます。死」-entre-deux-morts。記号表現を絶対的な位置に置いた後、彼は「恐れと震え」を廃止しました。「最も貴重なもの、男根、欲望の象徴を保存するために、人は自分の欲望を脇に置きます。」欲望はその空の場所にすぎません。
1961-1962Leséminaire
、Livre IX:L'identification。
フランス語:未発表。
英語:未発表
Le transfert Lacanは、記号による識別を記号による識別として説明しています。ここで、彼は対象者と署名者との関係を調べます。フロイトがグループ心理学と自我の分析(1921、SE XVIII)で分離した3種類の識別で、彼は次のことを発見しました
。1。単一の特徴に基づく父親との原始的な識別:理想のマトリックス- of-the-Ego、父のマークの象徴的な取り入れ、「体のアイデンティティは、すべての時代の父を彼から降りるすべての人々に結びつけます。」
2.愛の関係における回帰的な識別:オブジェクトはそれ自体を拒否するため、対象はオブジェクト(オブジェクトと男根を中心とするもの)と識別します。
3.被験者が他の彼の世界的な状況で認識するヒステリックな識別。
ラカンは、署名者の識別と署名者との識別を主張することにより、最初の2つで構成され、父と男根との関係を中心とした新しいカテゴリーをもたらします。署名者との関係で主題を確立することが重要になります-署名者だけに。口頭と口頭のラカンの違いを示すために、彼の犬、ジャスティンはスピーチはあるが言語はない。彼女が話す限り、彼女は彼を他の人に連れて行くことは決してなく、転移することができず、需要に応えている。「フロイト以来の無意識または理由における手紙の代理店」(エクリ:選択)では、彼は感情と身体の言語を「言語を持たない」人々の「非人間的」側面として言及しています。唯一の救いは「
「手紙の代理店...」では、記号表現は無意識の碑文に変わり、シールは、L '識別では「途切れのない線」、特性unaire、エゴを生み出すことである象徴的な用語になります-理想的です。この特性は記号として発生する可能性がありますが、記号体系に組み込まれると記号記号になります。識別により、同一性の問題が発生します。A = Aと言えますか?いいえ、繰り返しによる違いはすでにあります。したがって、A
A.全体の一つに対して、ラカンは、単なる繰り返しによって作られた単一のマーク、途切れのない線として1を設定します。記号表現は、それが純粋な違いである限り、他のすべてのものがそうではない場合にのみ、単一性を持ちます。つまり、一方が他方です。「戦争は戦争である」や「ラカンはラカンである」などの表現にはトートロジーはありません。本物はこれとは何の関係もありません。純粋な違いを暗示するように機能するのは同じシニフィアンです。繰り返し、シニフィアンは別のシニフィアンの主語を表し、あるシニフィアンではないからです。署名者の識別と署名者との識別は密接に混ざり合っています。形式論理学、固有名詞の研究、否定の複雑な文法...すべてが途切れのない線を「リターン」として定義することに向けて機能します。おんどり、文字、または途切れのない線を作る記号。彼のプロジェクトは、「主題のトポロジー構造」を作成することです。おんどり、文字、または途切れのない線を作る記号。彼のプロジェクトは、「主題のトポロジー構造」を作成することです。「あなたの言説の真実は何ですか?」と尋ねる人に、ラカンは答えます:「私はアナリストです、そしてそれで、私はあなたを失望させなければなりません、私は真実について真実を話しません」。「私があなたに言っていることの真実が保証されることなく、私はあなたを 『私は誰であるか』の道に非常に遠くまで連れて行くことができます、しかしそれにもかかわらず、私があなたに言っていることにおいて、それはまだ真実の問題です。」
1962-1963Leséminaire
、Livre X:L'angoisse。
フランス語:(texteétabliparJacques-AlainMiller)、パリ:Seuil、2004年。
英語:未発表。
ラカンは、抑制、症状、不安(1926、SE XX)で、フロイトは不安以外のすべてについて「不安のある空虚さを残すために」語っていると述べています。対象の構造に関連するこの感情は抑制されませんが、漂流します。それを固定する記号表現のみが抑制されます。ラカンの不安については、angoisseにはオブジェクトがないわけではありませんが、このオブジェクトは不明です。不安は欲望に関連しており、空想は欲望のサポートであるため、出発点は、無意識のレフォーメーションの欲望のグラフで詳しく説明されている幻想です:$ <> a(対象は記号表現/関係/オブジェクトによって禁止されています欲望の対象であるa、架空の部分対象、身体の他の部分から分離可能であると想像される要素)。次に彼は、不安と欲望を関連付けるオブジェクトaの定義に進みます。
オブジェクトaは欲望の原因であり、目的ではありません。一方では、それは「主題が他の分野の記号表現の「切れ目のない線」によってマークされているときの除算の残余」です。オブジェクトaはミラーステージのaとは異なり、鏡面反射ではありません。また、それは「対象のために彼の欲望のイメージが続くものに見える」ものでもありません。それは、父が主である主題の元の憲法の間に失われるものです。身体を考えると、オブジェクトaは、母親からの分離ではなく、身体からの分離によって作成されます。Objet aは、胎盤、l'hommelette、さらには対象に結び付けられ、母親から切り離された乳房です。それらはすべて私たちの欲望の対象であり、女性の不安はありません。記号表現を中心としたシステムでは、
一方、不足が不足するようになると不安が生じます。それは物質的な胸への郷愁ではなく、その差し迫った脅威です。ラカンは、ジョーンの悪夢の分析を使用します。「これは、外国の歓喜の不透明な重さで胸に重くのしかかるインキュバス」、「彼の歓喜の下で対象を粉砕する」、そして「質問者」です。不安は、欲望のように、他者、歓喜、そして他者の要求に関連しています。ラカンはそれを父なる神の恐ろしい戒め「ジュイス!」と結びつけています。たとえば、開いているウィンドウ(The Wolf Man)の突然のギャップに対して、何を、または誰の出現が行いますか?不思議な奇妙さや親しみやすさ、それは欲望と法を組み合わせたものだけが私たちを守ることができるものの恐怖です。これは、被験者が自分自身を構成することを可能にする欠如のサポートを失ったときに起こります:-Φ(欠如の象徴としての男根)。相互の関係において、Φとオブジェクトを配置することは困難です。陰茎は時にはアガルマであり、時には対象をパーツオブジェクトの魅力から救う手術用のリビディナルリザーブです。したがって、法の起源である去勢である「父親の不透明でつかみどころのない欲望」の前での象徴的な去勢に与えられた重要性。
したがって、不安は感情ではなく感情です。疑いの余地がなく、欺瞞的ではない唯一の影響。フロイトは恐怖(特定の対象に焦点を当てる)と不安(そうではない)を区別しますが、ラカンは不安を対象がないわけではないと考えています。それは単に別の種類の対象を含み、他の対象のように象徴することはできません。このオブジェクトはオブジェクトであり、欲望のオブジェクトであり、何かがその場所を埋めるとき、対象が他者の欲求に直面し、その欲求のために彼がどのオブジェクトであるかを知らないときに不安が生じます。また、ラカンは不安と欠如を結びつけます。すべての欲求は欠如から生じ、不安はこの欠如自体が欠如しているときに現れます。「不安は欠如の欠如です」。不安は乳房の欠如ではありません、それはむしろ不安から対象を救うその欠如の可能性です。行動と行動への通過は不安に対する最後の防御です
そして、治療法で何が起こりますか?アナリストは、患者がどれだけの不安に耐えることができるかをどのように測定できますか?アナリストは自分の不安にどのように対処できますか?アナリストの欲求はここに関係しており、彼は不安とともに、機能が構造的である空虚である-Φを制定しなければなりません。
1964年
Leséminaire、Livre XI:Lesquatreの概念fondamentauxde lapsychanalyse。
フランス語:(texteétabliparJacques-AlainMiller)、パリ:Seuil、1973年。
英語:Book XI:心理分析の4つの基本概念(Jacques-Alain Millerが編集)、ニューヨーク:ノートン、1978年。
1964年1月15日、エコールナショナルシュペリウールでのセミナーのオープニングセッションを記念して、有名人(レヴィストロース、アルチュセール、フェルナンブローデル)と新しい若い聴衆の前で、ラカンは彼の教えの検閲と彼の破門について話します公式の精神分析サークルから。彼はアナリストを訓練すると同時に、次の質問を提起することによって非アナリストに対処したいと考えています。精神分析は科学ですか?もしそうなら、どのような条件下で?もしそれが-「無意識の科学」または「主題の推測科学」であるならば、それは私たちに科学について何を教えることができますか?
「象徴を通して現実を扱う立場に主題を置く」実践は、概念を生み出します。ここでは、無意識、繰り返し、転移、そしてドライブの4つが提供されます。1973年のタイトルは、1964年代を支持してしばしば争われてきました:Les fondements de la psychanalyse、これは、それが概念の問題ではなく、それらが4つしかないことを意味しません。ラカンは、精神分析、宗教、科学の間の関係を疑っています。彼らは建国の父と準秘密のテキストを持っていませんでしたか?フロイトは、少なくとも無意識に関しては、「合法的に知っていると推定される対象」でした。「彼は、知っていると推定される対象であるだけでなく、知っていました」。「彼は私たちに、破壊できないと言われるかもしれない言葉でこの知識を与えてくれました。」「」
言及された4つの概念のうち、3つは1953年から1963年の間に開発されました。L'angoisseでのオブジェクトの研究以来重要性が増しているドライブに関して、Lacanはそれらを決して満たすことができないという点で生物学的ニーズとは異なると考えています。ドライブの目的は、目標(最終目的地)に到達することではなく、オブジェクトの周りを一周するという目的(方法自体)に従うことです。歓喜の本当の源は、この閉回路の繰り返しの動きです。フロイトは、トリエブを4つの不連続な要素のモンタージュとして定義しました。オブジェクト; Ziel、目的。そのようなリストは非常に自然に見えるかもしれません。
1.アクティブ(見る)
2。リフレクティブ(自分を見る)
3。パッシブ(自分を見る)
最初の2つはオートエロティシズムです。受動態でのみ、「この主題、他の主題は、ドライブがその循環コースを示すことができる限り、現れます」という新しい主題が現れます。ドライブは常にアクティブであるため、彼は3番目のインスタンスを「見られる」ではなく「自分が見られるようにする」と記述しています。
ラカンは、生殖器ゾーンの優位性が常に不安定であるため、部分的なドライブが完全な組織を達成できるという概念を拒否します。ドライブは部分的であり、全体の一部であるという意味ではありません(性器ドライブ)が、部分的にのみセクシュアリティを表すという意味で、喜びの次元を伝えます。「無意識の現実は性的な現実であり、受け入れられない真実である」とはいえ、死から切り離すことはできない。「オブジェクトaは、対象がそれ自体を構成するために、それ自体を器官として分離したものです。これは、それ自体ではなく、それが欠如している限り、陰茎の欠如の象徴として機能します。分離可能で、欠如とある程度の関係があるオブジェクトである。口頭レベルでは、それは何もない。肛門レベルでは、それは比喩の軌跡である。男根の代わりに糞便を与える-肛門ドライブは贈り物の領域です。視覚的なレベルでは、私たちはもはや需要のレベルではなく、欲望、他者の欲望のレベルにあります。それは無意識の経験に最も近い発動ドライブのレベルでも同じです。」最初の2つは需要に関連し、2番目のペアは欲求に関連します。オブジェクトaの形式で、ラカンはすべての部分的なドライブをグループ化します。胸、糞、陰茎などのパーツオブジェクトにリンクされ、視線と声を追加します。ここでは、ホルベインのアンバサダーを「視線の罠」(piège)として分析するときに、目と視線の分割を主張します。 àに関して)だけでなく、無意識(視線は物体によって飼いならされている)およびトロンペ・ロイルとしても。前景では、浮遊物体、男根の幽霊オブジェクトは去勢の-Φに存在感を与えます。このオブジェクトは、ドライブのフレームワークを介した欲求の組織の中心です。
「LaLettrevolée」(Écrits)の中で、ラカンは「無意識は他者の言説である」と述べています。つまり、「無意識の中で、主題に対するスピーチの影響を見る必要があります」という意味です。無意識とは、対象に対する記号表現の効果です。記号表現とは、抑圧され、無意識の形成に戻るものです。では、どのようにして、記号表現と他者に関連する欲求を性欲と調和させることができるのでしょうか。今では、「ラメラ」の形をした器官である胎盤であり、対象が存在するために分離しなければならない身体の部分です。 ?繰り返しの新しい概念が登場します。その機能は、2つの力から生じます。つまり、記号表現側の自動化と、ドライブ側での見逃されたが望まれる出会いです。ここで、オブジェクトaは「耐え難い性的現実も働いています、何をすべきか?アナリストの役割は、ドライブを「無意識の現実の中に存在させる」ことを可能にすることです。彼は、分離オブジェクトであるオブジェクトaの支持者になるために、理想的な位置から落下する必要があります。耐え難い性的現実も働いています、何をすべきか?アナリストの役割は、ドライブを「無意識の現実の中に存在させる」ことを可能にすることです。彼は、分離オブジェクトであるオブジェクトaの支持者になるために、理想的な位置から落下する必要があります。
1964-1965
セミナー、ブックXII:精神分析の重要な問題。
フランス語:未発表。
英語:未発表。
ラカンにとって根本的な問題は、被験者の言語との関係の問題です。ただし、シンボリック、イマジナリー、リアルの3部作からのリアルを考慮に入れると、状況が変わります。以前は、重要な問題は、識別、転送、および需要の間の関係でした。現在、この質問は「分析の実践に不可欠なトポロジーの形式を保持することを必要とします」。記号表現は、トーラスまたはリング、クロスキャップ、およびトーラスの迷路またはクラインの壺の表面の需要の渦巻きとしてのオイラーの円の3つの形式の穴を備えたメビウスの帯に構造化された状態で戻ります。これらの図は、単純で組み合わせた方法で作成されていますが、それでもコメントするのは複雑です。
トーラスはリングであり、円柱を取り、両端を結合することによって形成された3次元オブジェクトです。トーラスのトポロジーは、対象の構造に対するいくつかの類似点を示しています。対象の中心が外側にあり、偏心している(偏心している)のと同じように、その重心はボリュームの外側にあります。「トーラスの周辺および中央の外部は、単一の領域を構成します。」精神分析は、無意識が純粋に内部の精神システムではなく、「無意識は外にある」という間主観的な構造であるため、コンテナと含まれているものの区別を前提としています-extimité。構造の一般的な概念は、直接観察可能な偶発事象と深い現象との間の対立を意味しますが、これらは即時の経験の対象ではありません。ラカンは、構造に暗示されているような反対に同意しません。観察は常に理論的であるため、彼は観察可能な偶発事象の概念を拒否します。そして彼はまた、構造が経験から何らかの形で離れているという考えを拒否します。なぜなら、それは経験自体の分野に存在するからです。無意識は表面にあり、デフでそれを探すことはそれを見逃すことです。メビウスの帯の両側が連続しているため、構造は現象と連続しています。
したがって、メビウスの帯は、空間を表す通常の(ユークリッド)方法を覆します。これは、2つの側面があるように見えますが、実際には1つの側面しかないためです。両側は、時間の次元、つまりストリップ全体を横断するのにかかる時間によって区別されます。この図は、精神分析が二項対立(愛/憎しみ、内面/外面、記号表現/記号表現、真実/外観)をどのように問題化するかを示しています。反対の用語は、根本的に区別されるのではなく、互いに連続していると見なされます。たとえば、メビウスの帯はファンタジーの横断(latraverséedufantasme)を理解するのに役立ちます。2つの側面が連続しているためにのみ、内側から外側に交差することができます。しかし、ストリップの表面に指を通すと、内側から外側に交差した正確なポイントを特定することはできません。スラヴォイ・ジゼクと一緒に、幻想の横断は、主題の基本的な幻想を乱す行為を達成することを意味し、基本的な象徴的な識別よりもさらに基本的なレベルを解き放ちます。ラカンにとって、「空想は、ハードな現実とは対照的に、単なる想像力の作品ではありません。つまり、現実へのアプローチを曖昧にする精神の産物であり、物事を実際に知覚する能力を意味します。」現実と想像力の間の基本的な反対に対して、ファンタジーは単に後者の側にあるのではなく、対象が現実にアクセスするための小さな想像力、つまり現実感を保証するフレームです。したがって、基本的なファンタジーが粉砕されると、対象は現実を失います。次に、空想を横断することは、物事の実際の状態の明確な認識を曖昧にする空想を払拭する冷静な行為、または毎日の反芻(迷信)からの臨界距離を達成する反射的な行為とは何の関係もありません。単に私たちの想像力と「そこに実際に存在するもの」の間に線が引かれるとき、ファンタジーはサポートとして介入します。それどころか、「空想を横断することは、想像力の分野での対象の過剰な識別を伴います。その中で、そしてそれを通して、対象は空想の制約を破り、合成前の想像力の恐ろしい、暴力的な領域に入ります。均質化する幻想的なフレームの介入によってまだ統一されておらず、飼いならされていない、浮かんでいる。」
ラカンの被験者の構成的偏心の主張に関しては、主観的経験は、被験者の自己体験に関して偏心した客観的な無意識のメカニズムによって規制されているのではなく、制御できないものによって規制されています。標準的な見方では、主観性を構成する次元は、驚異的な自己体験の次元です。ラカンの視点では、アナリストは、自己体験の宇宙を規制する非常に基本的なファンタジーの主題を奪うことができる人です。無意識の主題は、主題の基本的なファンタジーにアクセスできなくなったときにのみ出現し、根本的に抑圧された、とジゼクは主張します。したがって、無意識はアクセスできない現象であり、驚異的な経験を規制する客観的なメカニズムではありません。対象が外部の行動に還元できない幻想的な自己体験の兆候を示すとき、人間の主観性を適切に特徴づけるのは、2つを分離するギャップ、ラ・ベアンスです。件名を空にするのはこのアクセス不能です、$。この関係は、直接自己体験する主題の標準的な概念を完全に覆します。代わりに、空の、非現象的な主題とアクセスできないままの現象との間に不可能な関係があります。この実際の関係は、セミナーXIV、La logique dufantasmeで開発されたLacanのファンタジーのアーティキュレーション$ <> aによって登録されています。件名を空にするのはこのアクセス不能です、$。この関係は、直接自己体験する主題の標準的な概念を完全に覆します。代わりに、空の、非現象的な主題とアクセスできないままの現象との間に不可能な関係があります。この実際の関係は、セミナーXIV、La logique dufantasmeで開発されたLacanのファンタジーのアーティキュレーション$ <> aによって登録されています。件名を空にするのはこのアクセス不能です、$。この関係は、直接自己体験する主題の標準的な概念を完全に覆します。代わりに、空の、非現象的な主題とアクセスできないままの現象との間に不可能な関係があります。この実際の関係は、セミナーXIV、La logique dufantasmeで開発されたLacanのファンタジーのアーティキュレーション$ <> aによって登録されています。
ラカンのトポロジーへの関心は、それが構造の概念を表現するための非直感的で純粋に知的手段を提供するものであると考えているために生じます。彼の位相幾何学的モデルは「想像上の捕獲を禁じる」:知覚が構造を覆い隠す直感的な画像とは異なり、ここでは「象徴的なものが隠されているわけではない」。したがって、トポロジーは構造の主要なパラダイムとして言語に取って代わります。それは構造の単なるメタファーではなく、構造そのものです。
☆
1959-1960
Le séminaire, Livre VII: L'éthique de la psychanalyse.
French: French: (texte établi par Jacques-Alain Miller), Paris: Seuil, 1986.
English: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (edited by Jacques-Alain Miller), New York: Norton, 1992.
At the root of the ethics is desire, but a desire marked by the "fault". Analysis' only promise is austere: it is "the entrance into-the-I," l'entrée-en-Je. "I must come to the place where the Id was," where the analysand discovers, in its absolute nakedness, the truth of his desire. The end of the cure is then the purification of desire. Lacan makes three statements: one is only guilty of "having given in on one's desire"; "the hero is the one who can be betrayed with impunity"; goods exist, but "there is no other good than the one that can pay the price of the access to desire," a desire that is only valid insofar as it is desire to know. Lacan laudes Oedipus at Colonus who calls down curses before dying, and he associates him with Antigone, walled up alive, who has not given in at all. Both have rejected the right to live in order to enter the "in-between-two-deaths," - entre-deux-morts - that is immortality.
Since Le désir et son intépretation, the analysis of the son's passion (subject) has become more pressing. Who is the Father? Here is the terrible Father of the primal horde (Freud's Totem and Taboo); Luther's God with "his eternal hatred against men, a hatred that existed even before the world was born"; the father of the law who, as to Saint Paul, leads to temptation: "For me, the very commandment - Thou shall not covet - which should lead to life has proved to be death to me. For sin, finding opportunity in the commandment, seduced me and by it killed me." Lacan adds, "I have put the Thing in the place of sin," denouncing the complicity between the law and the Thing, "which is called Evil." But what is the Thing against which the Father cannot or does not know how to defend himself? It has nothing to do with the object, which is created by words. It is the outside signifier and also the hostile outside signified: a mute reality prior to primal repression that puts in its place the pure signifying web without being able to hide it. It is the center of the unconscious but it is excluded; it is the Real but always represented by an emptiness, the nonthing, l'a chose, the nothing, a hole in the Real from which the Word, the Signifier, creates the world. It is the place of deadly jouissance sanctioned by the prohibition of incest. It is associated with the mother who represents it by her manifest carnality, and with woman who, idealized in courtly love, speaks the truth: "I am nothing but the emptiness which is in my cloaca." The idea of a distorted sexuality meets the 70s mantra: "There is no such thing as a sexual rapport." Woman, who is the other, bears the burden of the curse, although the Thing is settled at the heart of all subjects who have to recognize it. Who am I? "You are the waste that falls in the world through the devil's anus." However, salvation holds on by a thread: the theme of the exquisiteness of the son's love for the father would be amplified in D'un Autre à l'autre. This father is a symbolic Father, he is all the more present for being absent, a Father without a body or the glorious body of signifiers, a father who can only be the object of an act of faith, for: there is no Other of the Other" to guarantee him. Sublimation is an attempt to confront the Thing: true love for one's neighbor consists in recognizing in him, as in oneself, the place and the wound of the Thing. As for disbelief, by rejecting the Thing it makes it reappear in the Real, which is the Lacanian definition of psychosis.
If ethical thought "is at the centre of our work as analysts," then, in the cure, ethics converges from two sides. On the side of the analysand is the problem of guilt and the pathogenic nature of civilised morality. Freud conceives of a basic conflict between the demands of civilised morality and the essentially amoral sexual drives of the patient. If morality takes the upper hand and the drives are too intense to be sublimated, sexuality is either expressed in perverse forms or repressed. Freud further develops this idea in his theory of an unconscious sense of guilt and in his concept of the superego, that interior moral agency which becomes crueler to the extent that the ego submits to its demands. The analyst, on the other hand, has to deal with the pathogenic morality and unconscious guilt of the patient and with the ethical problems that arise in the cure.
Lacan addresses the issue of how the analyst will respond to the patient's sense of guilt by arguing that he must take it seriously, for whenever the patient feels guilty it is because he has given way to his desire: "the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one's desire." As to the pathogenic morality acting through the superego, Lacan asserts that psychoanalysis is not a libertine ethos. The ethical position of the analyst is revealed by the way that he formulates the goal of the cure. Ego-psychology, for instance, proposes a normative ethics in the adaptaion of the ego to reality. Lacan opposes this stance and devises an ethics relating action to desire: "Have you acted in conformity with the desire that is in you?"
Traditional ethics (Aristotle, Kant) revolves around the concept of the Good, where different goods compete for the position of Supreme Good. Lacanian ethics see the Good as an obstacle in the path of desire, thus "a repudiation of the idea of Good is necessary." It also rejects ideals, such as health and happiness. Traditional ethics tends to link the good to pleasure: moral thought has "developed along the paths of an hedonistic problematic." Lacan does not take such an approach because psychoanalytic experience has revealed the duplicity of pleasure: there is a limit to pleasure, and when it is transgressed, it becomes pain. Jouissance is the paradoxical satisfaction that the subject derives from his symptom, the suffering he derives from his satisfaction. Finally traditional ethics puts work and a safe, ordered existence before questions of desire by telling people to make their desires wait. Lacan forces the subject to confront the relation between his actions and his desire in the immediacy of the present.
Lacan introduces the notion of das Ding, the Thing, via the opposition between the pleasure principle and the principle of reality, this opposition, however, is deluding since the latter is but a modification of the former. Two are the contexts where das Ding operates. Firstly there is Freud's distinction between Wortvorstellungen, word-presentations, and Sachvorstellungen, thing-presentations. The two types are bound together in the preconscious-conscious system, whereas in the unconscious only thing-presentations are found. This seems to contradict the linguistic nature of the unconscious. Lacan counters the objection by pointing out that there are two words in German for "thing": das Ding and die Sache. Freud employs the latter to refer to the thing-presentations in the unconscious, and if at one level Sachvorstellungen and Wortvorstellungen are opposed, on the symbolic level they go together. Die Sache is the representation of a thing in the symbolic, whereas das Ding is the thing in the real, which is "the beyond-of-the-signified." Thing-presentations found in the unconscious are of linguistic nature, as opposed to das Ding, which is outside language and outside the unconscious. "The Thing is characterized by the fact that it is impossible for us to imagine it."
Yet,in relation to jouissance, as well as being the object of language, das Ding is the object of desire. It is the lost object which must be continually looked for, the unforgettable Other, the forbidden object of incestuous desire, the mother. The Thing appears to the subject as the Supreme Good, but if the subject trangresses the pleasure principle and attains it, it is experienced as suffering or/and evil because the subject "cannot stand the extreme good that das Ding may bring on him." It would seem then fortunately that the Thing is usually inaccessible.
1960-1961
Le séminaire, Livre VIII: Le transfert (dans sa disparité subjective).
French: (texte établi par Jacques-Alain Miller), Paris: Seuil, 1991.
English: unpublished
In La relation d'objet Lacan provided a way of understanding the paradoxical function of transference in the analytical cure. In its symbolic aspect (repetition) it helps the cure progress by revealing the signifiers of the subject's history. He argues that in its imaginary aspect (love and hate) it acts as a resistance. He uses Plato's The Symposium to illustrate the rapport between analysand and analyst: Alcibiades compares Socrates to a box enclosing a precious object, agalma. Just as Alcibiades attributes a hidden treasure to Socrates, so too the patient sees his object of desire in the analyst. Lacan articulates the objet a with agalma, the object of desire we seek in the other.
Before, the emphasis was placed on repetition, now it is placed on transference love, amour de transfert: both are inseparable, but the perspective changes. To insist on repetition means to refuse to see in the analytic situation an intersubjective rapport to be dealt with here and now. What speech constructed in the past can be deconstructed in the cure by speech: the cure is "pure symbolic experience." On the individual level, it allows for "the reshaping of the imaginary," on the theorethical level for an intersubjective logic to be constructed. Thus, analysis is described as a particular experience of desire, on the side of sexuality. Speech has an effect only after transference. For Lacan "it is from the position that transference bestows the analyst with that he intervenes in transference itself," and "transference is interpreted on the basis of and with the aid of transference itself." In "The direction of the treatment and the principles of its power" (Écrits: A Selection) Lacan presented countertransference as a resistance of the analyst and raised the problem of the analyst's desire. Here, subjective disparity becomes the rule establishing dissymmetry between the two protagonists vis-à-vis desire: what the patient will discover through the disappointment of transference love. Because in the cure one learns to talk instead of making love, in the end desire, which has been purified, is but the empty place where the barred subject accesses desire. We should note that training analysis does not put the analyst beyond passion; to believe that it does would mean that all passions stem from the unconscious, a notion that Lacan rejects. The better analysed the analyst is, the more likely he is to be in love with, or be quite repulsed by, the analysand. In training-analysis there will be a mutation in the economy of desire in the analyst-to-be: desire will be restructured, so that it will be stronger than passions. Lacan calls it the desire proper to the analyst.
In The Symposium the analyst's position is identified with Socrates', while Alcibiades occupies the position of the analysand, who after Socrates will discover himself desiring. "To isolate oneself with another so as to teach him what he is lacking and, by the nature of transference, he will learn what he is lacking insofar as he loves: I am not here for his Good, but for him to love me, and for me to disappoint him."
Alcibiades desires because he presumes Socrates is in possession of the agalma - the phallus as desirable. But Socrates refuses the position of loved object to assert himself as desiring. For Lacan desire never occurs between two subjects but between a subject and an overvalorized being who has fallen to the state of an object. The only way to discover the other as subject is "to recognize that he speaks an articulated language and responds to ours with his own combinations; the other cannot fit into our calculations as someone who coheres like us." Socrates, by shying away from Alcibiades' declaration, by refusing to mask his lack with a fetish, and by showing him Agathon as the true object of his love, shows the analyst how to behave: such is the other aspect of "subjective disparity" taking place in analysis. There is no rapport between what the one possesses and what the other lacks. The phallus, from being objet a, the imaginary object, emerges as the signifier of signifiers, as "the only signifier that deserves the role of symbol. It designates the real presence that permits identification, the origin of the Ideal-of-the-Ego on the side of the Other." There is a woman in The Symposium, Diotima, who speaks in the form of myth. In the fable where female lack is confronted with male resources, the feminine first has an active role before the desirable masculine. The reversal occurs because in love one only gives what one does not have: the masculine, by shying away from the demand, is revealed as a subject of desire. Later, Lacan would make Socrates the model of hysterical discourse, but also of analytic discourse because he attains the knowledge, the episteme, of love.
Having managed to provoke "a mutation in the economy of his desire," the analyst has access both to the unconscious and to the experience of the unconscious because, like Socrates, he has confronted the desire for death and achieved the "between-two-deaths" - entre-deux-morts. Having placed the signifier in the position of the absolute, he has abolished "fear and trembling." "One puts one's desire aside so as to preserve what is the most precious, the phallus, the symbol of desire." Desire is only its empty place.
1961-1962
Le séminaire, Livre IX: L'identification.
French: unpublished.
English: unpublished
In Le transfert Lacan describes symbolic identification as identification with the signifier. Here, he examines the rapport of the subject to the signifier. In the three types of identification isolated by Freud in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921, S.E. XVIII), he finds:
1. A primitive identification with the father as such based on a single feature: the matrix of the Ideal-of-the-Ego, a symbolic introjection of the father's mark, "An identity of body links the Father of all times to all those who descend from Him."
2. A regressive identification in love relations: the object refuses itself, therefore the subject identifies with the object (one centered around objet aand the phallus).
3. An hysterical identification where the subject recognizes in the other his global situation.
By asserting the identification of the signifier and the identification with the signifier, Lacan brings about a new category consisting in the first two and centered on the rapport to the Father and to the phallus. It becomes crucial to institute the subject in his rapport to the signifier - to the signifier alone. To mark the difference between the preverbal and the verbal Lacan points at his dog, Justine, who has speech but not language: insofar as she speaks, she never takes him for an other, she is not capable of transference and lives in the demand. In "The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud" (Écrits: A Selection) he refers to the language of the affect and of the body as the "nonhuman" aspect of those who "do not have language." The only salvation lies in "the signifying identification" where the preverbal is articulated within the subject's relation to the word.
In "The agency of the letter..." the signifier is turned into an inscription in the unconscious, a seal, which in L'identification becomes the "unbroken line," trait unaire, a symbolic term which is to produce the ego-ideal. Though this trait may originate as a sign, it becomes a signifier when incorporated into a signifying system: identification raises the question of the identical. Can it be said that A = A? No, for there already is a difference due to repetition: hence A
A. Against the One of totality, Lacan institutes the 1 as the single mark, the unbroken line, made by mere repetition. The signifier has a unity only insofar as it is that which all the other ones are not, insofar as it is pure difference: the One as such is the Other. There is no tautology in expressions such as "war is war" or "Lacan is Lacan." The real thing has nothing to do with this, it is the same signifier that functions to connote pure difference, for, in repetition, the signifier represents the subject for another signifier and not for some one. The identification of the signifier and the identification with the signfier closely mingle. Formal logic, the study of the proper name, the complex grammar of negation... everything works toward defining the unbroken line as "a return, the seizing of the origin of a counting before the number." The phallus as the symbolic mark is at the origin since "narcissism and incorporation should be located in the direction of the Father and not in the direction of the parasited mother's body." Lacan's response to the problem of the origin (the chicken or the egg?) is the rooster, the signifier that makes the rooster, the letter or unbroken line. His project is to create "a topological structure of the subject."
To whomever asks, "What is the truth of your discourse?", Lacan answers: "I am an analyst, and as such, I have to to disappoint you, I don't tell the truth about truth." "I can take you very far on the path of the 'who am I' without the truth of what I am telling you being guaranteed, but nevertheless, in what I am telling you, it is still a matter of truth."
1962-1963
Le séminaire, Livre X: L'angoisse.
French: (texte établi par Jacques-Alain Miller), Paris: Seuil, 2004.
English: unpublished.
Lacan states that in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926, S.E. XX) Freud speaks of everything but anxiety just "to leave the emptiness in which there is anxiety." This affect, related to the structure of the subject, is not repressed but adrift; only the signifiers that anchor it are repressed. For Lacan anxiety, angoisse, is not without an object, but this object is unknown. Since anxiety is linked to desire, and fantasy is the support of desire, the starting point is the fantasme elaborated in the Graph of Desire in Les formations de l'inconscient: $<>a (Subject barred by the signifier/relation to/objet a, which is the object of desire, the imaginary part-object, an element imagined as separable from the rest of the body). He then proceeds to define objet a which relates anxiety with desire.
Objet a is the cause of desire, not its aim. On one hand, it is "the residue of division when the subject is marked by the 'unbroken line' of the signifier in the field of the Other." Objet a is different from the a of the mirror stage, it is not specular; neither is it "visible in what continues for the subject the image of his desire." It is what is lost during the original constitution of the subject where the Father is primary. If we consider the body, objet a is not created by the separation from the mother, but from the separation from the body proper. Objet a is the placenta, l'hommelette, and even the breast tied to the subject and detached from the mother. They are all objects of desire for us, and there is no anxiety for the woman. In a system centered on the signifier, objet a seems to be the irreducible Real, "a lack which the symbol does not fill in," a "real deprivation."
On the other hand, anxiety arises when lack comes to be lacking. It is not nostalgia for the material breast, but the threat of its imminence. Lacan uses Jone's analysis of the nightmare, "this being, the incubus, who weighs on our chest with his opaque weight of foreign jouissance," "who crushes the subject under his jouissance," and who is "a questioner." Anxiety, like desire, is linked to the Other, to the jouissance and to the demand of the Other. Lacan links it to the terrible commandment of the Father-God: "Jouis!" For instance, what or whose apparition does for the sudden gap of an opening window (The Wolf Man)? An uncanny strangeness or familiarity, it is the horror of the Thing against which only desire and law combined are able to protect us. This takes place when the subject loses the support of the lack that allows him to constitute himself: - Φ (the phallus as symbol of lack). It is difficult to situate - Φ and objet a in their mutual rapport. The phallus is sometimes the agalma, and sometimes an operating libidinal reserve that saves the subject from the fascination of the part object. Hence, the importance granted to symbolic castration in front of "the father's opaque and ungraspable desire," a castration at the origin of the law.
Anxiety, then, is an affect, not an emotion; the only affect which is beyond all doubt and which is not deceptive. Whereas Freud distinguishes between fear (focused on a specific object) and anxiety (which is not), Lacan posits anxiety as not without an object: it simply involves a different kind of object, one that cannot be symbolized as other objects are. This object is objet a, the object-cause-of-desire, and anxiety arises when something fills the place of it, when the subject is confronted by the desire of the Other and does not know what object he is for that desire. Also Lacan links anxiety to lack. All desire springs from lack, and anxiety appears when this lack is in itself lacking: "anxiety is the lack of a lack." Anxiety is not the absence of the breast, it is rather the possibility of its absence which saves the subject from anxiety. Acting out and passage to the act are last defenses against anxiety
And what happens in the cure? How can the analyst measure how much anxiety a patient can bear? How may the analyst deal with his own anxiety? The desire of the analyst is here involved and he has to institute, along with anxiety, the - Φ, an emptiness whose function is structural.
1964
Le séminaire, Livre XI: Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse.
French: (texte établi par Jacques-Alain Miller), Paris: Seuil, 1973.
English: Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (edited by Jacques-Alain Miller), New York: Norton, 1978.
January 15 1964, marks the opening session of the seminars at the École Nationale Supérieure where, in the presence of celebrities (Lévi-Strauss, Althusser, Fernand Braudel) and a new younger audience, Lacan talks about the censorship of his teachings and his excommunication from official psychoanalytical circles. He wants to train analysts and, at the same time, address the non-analyst by raising the following questions: Is psychoanalysis a science? If so, under what conditions? If it is - the "science of the unconscious" or a "conjectural science of the subject" - what can it teach us about science?
Praxis, which "places the subject in a position of dealing with the real through the symbolic," produces concepts; four are offered here: the unconscious, repetition, transference and the drive. The 1973 title has often been contested in favor of the 1964's: Les fondements de la psychanalyse, which implies neither that it is a matter of concepts, nor that there are only four of them. Lacan is suspicious of the rapport between psychoanalysis, religion and science. Did they not have a founding father and quasi-secret texts? Freud was "legitimately the subject presumed to know," at least as to the unconscious: "He was not only the subject who was presumed to know, he knew." "He gave us this knowledge in terms that may be said to be indestructible." "No progress has been made that has not deviated whenever one of the terms has been neglected around which Freud ordered the ways that he traced and the paths of the unconscious." This declaration of allegiance contrasts with the study of Freud's dream about the dead son screaming "Father, can't you see I'm burning?" The main problem remains that of transference: the Name-of-the-Father is a foundation, but the legacy of the Father is sin, and the original sin of psychoanalysis is Freud's desire that was not analyzed. In "The Freudian thing" (Écrits: A Selection), Lacan presents the Name-of-the-Father as a treasure to be found, provided it implies self-immolation as a sacrificial victim to truth.
Of the four concepts mentioned, three were developed between 1953 and 1963. As to drives, whose importance has increased since the study of objet a in L'angoisse, Lacan considers them as different from biological needs in that they can never be satisfied. The purpose of the drive is not to reach a goal (a final destination) but to follow its aim (the way itself), which is to circle round the object. The real source of jouissance is the repetitive movement of this closed circuit. Freud defined Trieb as a montage of four discontinuous elements: "Drive is not thrust (Drang); in Triebe und Triebschicksale (1915, S.E. XIV) Freud distinguishes four terms in the drive: Drang, thrust; Quelle, the source; Objekt, the object; Ziel, the aim. Such a list may seem quite natural; my purpose is to prove that the text was written to show that it is not as natural as that." The drive is a thoroughly cultural and symbolic construct. Lacan integrates the aforementioned elements into the drive's circuit, which originates in an erogenous zone, circles the object and returns to the erogenous zone. This circuit is structured by the three grammatical voices:
1. the active (to see)
2. the reflexive (to see oneself)
3. the passive (to make oneself be seen).
The first two are autoerotic; only in the passive voice a new subject appears, "this subject, the other, appears in so far as the drive has been able to show its circular course." The drive is always active, which is why he writes the third instance as "to make oneself be seen" instead of "to be seen."
Lacan rejects the notion that partial drives can attain any complete organization since the primacy of the genital zone is always precarious. The drives are partial, not in the sense that they are a part of a whole (a genital drive), but in that they only represent sexuality partially: they convey the dimension of jouissance. "The reality of the unconscious is sexual reality - an untenable truth," much as it cannot be separated from death. "Objet a is something from which the subject, in order to constitute itself, has separated itself off as organ. This serves as symbol of the lack, of the phallus, not as such, but in so far as it is lacking. It must be an object that is separable and that has some rapport to the lack. At the oral level, it is the nothing; at the anal level, it is the locus of the metaphor - one object for another, give the feces in place of the phallus - the anal drive is the domain of the gift; at the scopic level, we are no longer at the level of demand, but of desire, of the desire of the Other; it is the same at the level of the invocatory drive, which is the closest to the experience of the unconscious." The first two relate to demand, the second pair to desire. Under the form of objet a, Lacan groups all the partial drives linked to part objects: the breast, feces, the penis, and he adds the gaze and the voice. Here, he asserts the split between the eye and the gaze when he analyzes Holbein's The Ambassadors as a "trap for the gaze" (piège à regards), but also as a dompte-regard (the gaze is tamed by an object) and a trompe-l'oeil. In the foreground, a floating object, a phallic ghost object gives presence to the - Φ of castration. This object is the heart of the organization of desire through the framework of the drives.
In "La Lettre volée" (Écrits) Lacan states that "the unconscious is the discourse of the Other," meaning that "one should see in the unconscious the effects of speech on the subject." The unconscious is the effect of the signifier on the subject - the signifier is what gets repressed and what returns in the formations of the unconscious. How then is it possible to reconcile desire linked to the signifier and to the Other with the libido, now an organ under the shape of the "lamella," the placenta, the part of the body from which the subject must separate in order to exist? A new conception of repetition comes into play, whose functionning stems from two forces: automatism on the side of the signifier and the missed yet desired encounter on the side of the drive, where objet a refers to the "impossible" Real (that as such cannot be assimilated). If transference is the enactment (la mise en acte) of the reality of the unconscious - what Lacan's deconstruction of the drive wants to bring to light - if desire is the nodal point where the motion of the unconscious, an untenable sexual reality, is also at work, what is to be done? The analyst's role is to allow the drive "to be made present in the reality of the unconscious": he must fall from the idealized position so as to become the upholder of objet a, the separating object.
1964-1965
Le séminaire, Livre XII: Problèmes cruciaux pour la psychanalyse.
French: unpublished.
English: unpublished.
For Lacan the fundamental problem is that of the subject's relation to language. However, taking into account the Real - from the trilogy of the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real - modifies the situation. Previously, the crucial issues were the rapports between identification, transference and demand; now the queston "will entail the holding out of a form, of an essential topology for analytic praxis." The signifier returns as structured on the Moebius strip with three forms of the hole, the torus or ring, the cross-cap, and Euler's circles as the maze of the torus or of the spiral of the demand on the surface of the Klein bottle. These figure though constructed in a simple and combinatory way, are nevertheless complicated to comment.
The torus ia a ring, a three dimensional object formed by taking a cylinder and joining the two ends together. The topology of the torus illustrates some analogies against the structure of the subject: its centre of gravity falls outside its volume, just as the centre of the subject is outside, being decentered (ex-centric). The "peripheral and central exteriority of the torus constitutes one single region." Psychoanalysis posits the distinction between container and contained much as the unconscious is not a purely interior psychic system but an intersubjective structure, "the unconscious is outside" - extimité. A common concept of structure implies the opposition between directly observable contingencies and deep phenomena, which are not the object of immediate experience. Lacan disagrees with such an opposition as implicit in the structure. He rejects the notion of observable contingencies, since observation is always already theoretical; and he also rejects the idea that structures are somehow distant from experience, since thay are present in the field of experience itself: the unconscious is on the surface and looking for it in the dephts is to miss it. As the two sides of the Moebius strip are continuous, so structure is continuous with phenomena.
Thus, the Moebius strip subverts our normal (Euclidean) way of representing space, for it seems to have two sides but in fact has only one. The two sides are distinguished by the dimension of time, the time it takes to traverse the whole strip. The figure illustrates how psychoanalysis problematizes binary oppositions (love/hate, inside/out, signifier/signified, truth/appearance): the opposed terms rather than be radically distinct, are viewed as continuous with each other. For instance, the Moebius strip helps to understand the traversing of fantasy (la traversée du fantasme): only because the two sides are continuous it is possible to cross over from inside to outside. Yet, when passing a finger round the surface of the strip, it is impossible to determine the precise point where one has crossed over from inside to outside. With Slavoj Zizek, the traversing of the fantasmeimplies to accomplish an act that disturbes the subject's fundamental fantasy, unhinging the level that is even more fundamental than basic symbolic identifications. For Lacan, "fantasy is not simply a work of imagination as opposed to hard reality, meaning a product of the mind that obfuscates the approach to reality, the ability to perceive things as they really are." Against the basic opposition between reality and imagination, fantasy is not merely on the side of the latter, it is rather that little piece of imagination by which the subject gains access to reality - the frame that guarantees the sense of reality. Thus when the fundamental fantasy is shattered, the subject sustains a loss of reality. Then, traversing the fantasme has nothing to do with a sobering act of dispelling the fantasies that obscure the clear perception of the real state of things or with a reflective act of achieving a critical distance from daily ruminations (superstitions). Fantasy intervenes as support when a line is drawn between what is simply our imagination and "what really exists out there." On the contrary, "traversing the fantasme involves the subject's over-identification with the field of imagination: in it, and through it, the subject breaks the constrains of fantasy and enters the terrifying, violent territory of pre-synthetic imagination, where disjecta membra float around, not yet unified and domesticated by the intervention of a homogenizing fantasmatic frame."
As for Lacan's assertion of the subject's constitutive decentrement, subjective experience is not regulated by objective unconscious mechanisms decentred with regard to the subject's self-experience and as such beyond control, but by something more unsettling. For a standard view the dimension that is constitutive of subjectivity is that of phenomenal self-experience. In Lacan's perspective the analyst is the one who can deprive the subject of the very fundamental fantasy that regulates the universe of self-experience. The subject of the unconscious emerges only when the subject's fundamental fantasy becomes inaccessible, is primordially repressed, argues Zizek. Thus, the unconscious is the inaccesible phenomenon, not the objective mechanism that regulates phenomenal experience. When the subject displays signs of a fantasmatic self-experience that cannot be reduced to external behaviour, what characterizes human subjectivity proper is the gap, la béance, that separates the two: fantasy becomes unattainable; it is this inaccessibility that makes the subject empty, $. The rapport totally subverts the standard notion of a directly self-experiencing subject. Instead, there is an impossible rapport between the empty, non-phenomenal subject and the phenomena that remain inaccessible. This actual rapport is registered by Lacan's articulation of fantasy, $ <> a, developed in Seminar XIV, La logique du fantasme.
Lacan's interest in topology arises since he sees it as providing a non-intuitive, purely intellectual means of expressing the concept of structure. His topological models "forbid imaginary capture": unlike intuitive images in which perception eclipses structure, here "there is no hidden of the symbolic." Hence, topology replaces language as the main paradigm of structure: it is not a mere metaphor for structure, it's structure itself.
1959-1960
Le séminaire, Livre VII: L'éthique de la psychanalyse.
French: French: (texte établi par Jacques-Alain Miller), Paris: Seuil, 1986.
English: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (edited by Jacques-Alain Miller), New York: Norton, 1992.
At the root of the ethics is desire, but a desire marked by the "fault". Analysis' only promise is austere: it is "the entrance into-the-I," l'entrée-en-Je. "I must come to the place where the Id was," where the analysand discovers, in its absolute nakedness, the truth of his desire. The end of the cure is then the purification of desire. Lacan makes three statements: one is only guilty of "having given in on one's desire"; "the hero is the one who can be betrayed with impunity"; goods exist, but "there is no other good than the one that can pay the price of the access to desire," a desire that is only valid insofar as it is desire to know. Lacan laudes Oedipus at Colonus who calls down curses before dying, and he associates him with Antigone, walled up alive, who has not given in at all. Both have rejected the right to live in order to enter the "in-between-two-deaths," - entre-deux-morts - that is immortality.
Since Le désir et son intépretation, the analysis of the son's passion (subject) has become more pressing. Who is the Father? Here is the terrible Father of the primal horde (Freud's Totem and Taboo); Luther's God with "his eternal hatred against men, a hatred that existed even before the world was born"; the father of the law who, as to Saint Paul, leads to temptation: "For me, the very commandment - Thou shall not covet - which should lead to life has proved to be death to me. For sin, finding opportunity in the commandment, seduced me and by it killed me." Lacan adds, "I have put the Thing in the place of sin," denouncing the complicity between the law and the Thing, "which is called Evil." But what is the Thing against which the Father cannot or does not know how to defend himself? It has nothing to do with the object, which is created by words. It is the outside signifier and also the hostile outside signified: a mute reality prior to primal repression that puts in its place the pure signifying web without being able to hide it. It is the center of the unconscious but it is excluded; it is the Real but always represented by an emptiness, the nonthing, l'a chose, the nothing, a hole in the Real from which the Word, the Signifier, creates the world. It is the place of deadly jouissance sanctioned by the prohibition of incest. It is associated with the mother who represents it by her manifest carnality, and with woman who, idealized in courtly love, speaks the truth: "I am nothing but the emptiness which is in my cloaca." The idea of a distorted sexuality meets the 70s mantra: "There is no such thing as a sexual rapport." Woman, who is the other, bears the burden of the curse, although the Thing is settled at the heart of all subjects who have to recognize it. Who am I? "You are the waste that falls in the world through the devil's anus." However, salvation holds on by a thread: the theme of the exquisiteness of the son's love for the father would be amplified in D'un Autre à l'autre. This father is a symbolic Father, he is all the more present for being absent, a Father without a body or the glorious body of signifiers, a father who can only be the object of an act of faith, for: there is no Other of the Other" to guarantee him. Sublimation is an attempt to confront the Thing: true love for one's neighbor consists in recognizing in him, as in oneself, the place and the wound of the Thing. As for disbelief, by rejecting the Thing it makes it reappear in the Real, which is the Lacanian definition of psychosis.
If ethical thought "is at the centre of our work as analysts," then, in the cure, ethics converges from two sides. On the side of the analysand is the problem of guilt and the pathogenic nature of civilised morality. Freud conceives of a basic conflict between the demands of civilised morality and the essentially amoral sexual drives of the patient. If morality takes the upper hand and the drives are too intense to be sublimated, sexuality is either expressed in perverse forms or repressed. Freud further develops this idea in his theory of an unconscious sense of guilt and in his concept of the superego, that interior moral agency which becomes crueler to the extent that the ego submits to its demands. The analyst, on the other hand, has to deal with the pathogenic morality and unconscious guilt of the patient and with the ethical problems that arise in the cure.
Lacan addresses the issue of how the analyst will respond to the patient's sense of guilt by arguing that he must take it seriously, for whenever the patient feels guilty it is because he has given way to his desire: "the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one's desire." As to the pathogenic morality acting through the superego, Lacan asserts that psychoanalysis is not a libertine ethos. The ethical position of the analyst is revealed by the way that he formulates the goal of the cure. Ego-psychology, for instance, proposes a normative ethics in the adaptaion of the ego to reality. Lacan opposes this stance and devises an ethics relating action to desire: "Have you acted in conformity with the desire that is in you?"
Traditional ethics (Aristotle, Kant) revolves around the concept of the Good, where different goods compete for the position of Supreme Good. Lacanian ethics see the Good as an obstacle in the path of desire, thus "a repudiation of the idea of Good is necessary." It also rejects ideals, such as health and happiness. Traditional ethics tends to link the good to pleasure: moral thought has "developed along the paths of an hedonistic problematic." Lacan does not take such an approach because psychoanalytic experience has revealed the duplicity of pleasure: there is a limit to pleasure, and when it is transgressed, it becomes pain. Jouissance is the paradoxical satisfaction that the subject derives from his symptom, the suffering he derives from his satisfaction. Finally traditional ethics puts work and a safe, ordered existence before questions of desire by telling people to make their desires wait. Lacan forces the subject to confront the relation between his actions and his desire in the immediacy of the present.
Lacan introduces the notion of das Ding, the Thing, via the opposition between the pleasure principle and the principle of reality, this opposition, however, is deluding since the latter is but a modification of the former. Two are the contexts where das Ding operates. Firstly there is Freud's distinction between Wortvorstellungen, word-presentations, and Sachvorstellungen, thing-presentations. The two types are bound together in the preconscious-conscious system, whereas in the unconscious only thing-presentations are found. This seems to contradict the linguistic nature of the unconscious. Lacan counters the objection by pointing out that there are two words in German for "thing": das Ding and die Sache. Freud employs the latter to refer to the thing-presentations in the unconscious, and if at one level Sachvorstellungen and Wortvorstellungen are opposed, on the symbolic level they go together. Die Sache is the representation of a thing in the symbolic, whereas das Ding is the thing in the real, which is "the beyond-of-the-signified." Thing-presentations found in the unconscious are of linguistic nature, as opposed to das Ding, which is outside language and outside the unconscious. "The Thing is characterized by the fact that it is impossible for us to imagine it."
Yet,in relation to jouissance, as well as being the object of language, das Ding is the object of desire. It is the lost object which must be continually looked for, the unforgettable Other, the forbidden object of incestuous desire, the mother. The Thing appears to the subject as the Supreme Good, but if the subject trangresses the pleasure principle and attains it, it is experienced as suffering or/and evil because the subject "cannot stand the extreme good that das Ding may bring on him." It would seem then fortunately that the Thing is usually inaccessible.
1960-1961
Le séminaire, Livre VIII: Le transfert (dans sa disparité subjective).
French: (texte établi par Jacques-Alain Miller), Paris: Seuil, 1991.
English: unpublished
In La relation d'objet Lacan provided a way of understanding the paradoxical function of transference in the analytical cure. In its symbolic aspect (repetition) it helps the cure progress by revealing the signifiers of the subject's history. He argues that in its imaginary aspect (love and hate) it acts as a resistance. He uses Plato's The Symposium to illustrate the rapport between analysand and analyst: Alcibiades compares Socrates to a box enclosing a precious object, agalma. Just as Alcibiades attributes a hidden treasure to Socrates, so too the patient sees his object of desire in the analyst. Lacan articulates the objet a with agalma, the object of desire we seek in the other.
Before, the emphasis was placed on repetition, now it is placed on transference love, amour de transfert: both are inseparable, but the perspective changes. To insist on repetition means to refuse to see in the analytic situation an intersubjective rapport to be dealt with here and now. What speech constructed in the past can be deconstructed in the cure by speech: the cure is "pure symbolic experience." On the individual level, it allows for "the reshaping of the imaginary," on the theorethical level for an intersubjective logic to be constructed. Thus, analysis is described as a particular experience of desire, on the side of sexuality. Speech has an effect only after transference. For Lacan "it is from the position that transference bestows the analyst with that he intervenes in transference itself," and "transference is interpreted on the basis of and with the aid of transference itself." In "The direction of the treatment and the principles of its power" (Écrits: A Selection) Lacan presented countertransference as a resistance of the analyst and raised the problem of the analyst's desire. Here, subjective disparity becomes the rule establishing dissymmetry between the two protagonists vis-à-vis desire: what the patient will discover through the disappointment of transference love. Because in the cure one learns to talk instead of making love, in the end desire, which has been purified, is but the empty place where the barred subject accesses desire. We should note that training analysis does not put the analyst beyond passion; to believe that it does would mean that all passions stem from the unconscious, a notion that Lacan rejects. The better analysed the analyst is, the more likely he is to be in love with, or be quite repulsed by, the analysand. In training-analysis there will be a mutation in the economy of desire in the analyst-to-be: desire will be restructured, so that it will be stronger than passions. Lacan calls it the desire proper to the analyst.
In The Symposium the analyst's position is identified with Socrates', while Alcibiades occupies the position of the analysand, who after Socrates will discover himself desiring. "To isolate oneself with another so as to teach him what he is lacking and, by the nature of transference, he will learn what he is lacking insofar as he loves: I am not here for his Good, but for him to love me, and for me to disappoint him."
Alcibiades desires because he presumes Socrates is in possession of the agalma - the phallus as desirable. But Socrates refuses the position of loved object to assert himself as desiring. For Lacan desire never occurs between two subjects but between a subject and an overvalorized being who has fallen to the state of an object. The only way to discover the other as subject is "to recognize that he speaks an articulated language and responds to ours with his own combinations; the other cannot fit into our calculations as someone who coheres like us." Socrates, by shying away from Alcibiades' declaration, by refusing to mask his lack with a fetish, and by showing him Agathon as the true object of his love, shows the analyst how to behave: such is the other aspect of "subjective disparity" taking place in analysis. There is no rapport between what the one possesses and what the other lacks. The phallus, from being objet a, the imaginary object, emerges as the signifier of signifiers, as "the only signifier that deserves the role of symbol. It designates the real presence that permits identification, the origin of the Ideal-of-the-Ego on the side of the Other." There is a woman in The Symposium, Diotima, who speaks in the form of myth. In the fable where female lack is confronted with male resources, the feminine first has an active role before the desirable masculine. The reversal occurs because in love one only gives what one does not have: the masculine, by shying away from the demand, is revealed as a subject of desire. Later, Lacan would make Socrates the model of hysterical discourse, but also of analytic discourse because he attains the knowledge, the episteme, of love.
Having managed to provoke "a mutation in the economy of his desire," the analyst has access both to the unconscious and to the experience of the unconscious because, like Socrates, he has confronted the desire for death and achieved the "between-two-deaths" - entre-deux-morts. Having placed the signifier in the position of the absolute, he has abolished "fear and trembling." "One puts one's desire aside so as to preserve what is the most precious, the phallus, the symbol of desire." Desire is only its empty place.
1961-1962
Le séminaire, Livre IX: L'identification.
French: unpublished.
English: unpublished
In Le transfert Lacan describes symbolic identification as identification with the signifier. Here, he examines the rapport of the subject to the signifier. In the three types of identification isolated by Freud in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921, S.E. XVIII), he finds:
1. A primitive identification with the father as such based on a single feature: the matrix of the Ideal-of-the-Ego, a symbolic introjection of the father's mark, "An identity of body links the Father of all times to all those who descend from Him."
2. A regressive identification in love relations: the object refuses itself, therefore the subject identifies with the object (one centered around objet aand the phallus).
3. An hysterical identification where the subject recognizes in the other his global situation.
By asserting the identification of the signifier and the identification with the signifier, Lacan brings about a new category consisting in the first two and centered on the rapport to the Father and to the phallus. It becomes crucial to institute the subject in his rapport to the signifier - to the signifier alone. To mark the difference between the preverbal and the verbal Lacan points at his dog, Justine, who has speech but not language: insofar as she speaks, she never takes him for an other, she is not capable of transference and lives in the demand. In "The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud" (Écrits: A Selection) he refers to the language of the affect and of the body as the "nonhuman" aspect of those who "do not have language." The only salvation lies in "the signifying identification" where the preverbal is articulated within the subject's relation to the word.
In "The agency of the letter..." the signifier is turned into an inscription in the unconscious, a seal, which in L'identification becomes the "unbroken line," trait unaire, a symbolic term which is to produce the ego-ideal. Though this trait may originate as a sign, it becomes a signifier when incorporated into a signifying system: identification raises the question of the identical. Can it be said that A = A? No, for there already is a difference due to repetition: hence A
A. Against the One of totality, Lacan institutes the 1 as the single mark, the unbroken line, made by mere repetition. The signifier has a unity only insofar as it is that which all the other ones are not, insofar as it is pure difference: the One as such is the Other. There is no tautology in expressions such as "war is war" or "Lacan is Lacan." The real thing has nothing to do with this, it is the same signifier that functions to connote pure difference, for, in repetition, the signifier represents the subject for another signifier and not for some one. The identification of the signifier and the identification with the signfier closely mingle. Formal logic, the study of the proper name, the complex grammar of negation... everything works toward defining the unbroken line as "a return, the seizing of the origin of a counting before the number." The phallus as the symbolic mark is at the origin since "narcissism and incorporation should be located in the direction of the Father and not in the direction of the parasited mother's body." Lacan's response to the problem of the origin (the chicken or the egg?) is the rooster, the signifier that makes the rooster, the letter or unbroken line. His project is to create "a topological structure of the subject."To whomever asks, "What is the truth of your discourse?", Lacan answers: "I am an analyst, and as such, I have to to disappoint you, I don't tell the truth about truth." "I can take you very far on the path of the 'who am I' without the truth of what I am telling you being guaranteed, but nevertheless, in what I am telling you, it is still a matter of truth."
1962-1963
Le séminaire, Livre X: L'angoisse.
French: (texte établi par Jacques-Alain Miller), Paris: Seuil, 2004.
English: unpublished.
Lacan states that in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926, S.E. XX) Freud speaks of everything but anxiety just "to leave the emptiness in which there is anxiety." This affect, related to the structure of the subject, is not repressed but adrift; only the signifiers that anchor it are repressed. For Lacan anxiety, angoisse, is not without an object, but this object is unknown. Since anxiety is linked to desire, and fantasy is the support of desire, the starting point is the fantasme elaborated in the Graph of Desire in Les formations de l'inconscient: $<>a (Subject barred by the signifier/relation to/objet a, which is the object of desire, the imaginary part-object, an element imagined as separable from the rest of the body). He then proceeds to define objet a which relates anxiety with desire.
Objet a is the cause of desire, not its aim. On one hand, it is "the residue of division when the subject is marked by the 'unbroken line' of the signifier in the field of the Other." Objet a is different from the a of the mirror stage, it is not specular; neither is it "visible in what continues for the subject the image of his desire." It is what is lost during the original constitution of the subject where the Father is primary. If we consider the body, objet a is not created by the separation from the mother, but from the separation from the body proper. Objet a is the placenta, l'hommelette, and even the breast tied to the subject and detached from the mother. They are all objects of desire for us, and there is no anxiety for the woman. In a system centered on the signifier, objet a seems to be the irreducible Real, "a lack which the symbol does not fill in," a "real deprivation."
On the other hand, anxiety arises when lack comes to be lacking. It is not nostalgia for the material breast, but the threat of its imminence. Lacan uses Jone's analysis of the nightmare, "this being, the incubus, who weighs on our chest with his opaque weight of foreign jouissance," "who crushes the subject under his jouissance," and who is "a questioner." Anxiety, like desire, is linked to the Other, to the jouissance and to the demand of the Other. Lacan links it to the terrible commandment of the Father-God: "Jouis!" For instance, what or whose apparition does for the sudden gap of an opening window (The Wolf Man)? An uncanny strangeness or familiarity, it is the horror of the Thing against which only desire and law combined are able to protect us. This takes place when the subject loses the support of the lack that allows him to constitute himself: - Φ (the phallus as symbol of lack). It is difficult to situate - Φ and objet a in their mutual rapport. The phallus is sometimes the agalma, and sometimes an operating libidinal reserve that saves the subject from the fascination of the part object. Hence, the importance granted to symbolic castration in front of "the father's opaque and ungraspable desire," a castration at the origin of the law.
Anxiety, then, is an affect, not an emotion; the only affect which is beyond all doubt and which is not deceptive. Whereas Freud distinguishes between fear (focused on a specific object) and anxiety (which is not), Lacan posits anxiety as not without an object: it simply involves a different kind of object, one that cannot be symbolized as other objects are. This object is objet a, the object-cause-of-desire, and anxiety arises when something fills the place of it, when the subject is confronted by the desire of the Other and does not know what object he is for that desire. Also Lacan links anxiety to lack. All desire springs from lack, and anxiety appears when this lack is in itself lacking: "anxiety is the lack of a lack." Anxiety is not the absence of the breast, it is rather the possibility of its absence which saves the subject from anxiety. Acting out and passage to the act are last defenses against anxiety
And what happens in the cure? How can the analyst measure how much anxiety a patient can bear? How may the analyst deal with his own anxiety? The desire of the analyst is here involved and he has to institute, along with anxiety, the - Φ, an emptiness whose function is structural.
1964
Le séminaire, Livre XI: Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse.
French: (texte établi par Jacques-Alain Miller), Paris: Seuil, 1973.
English: Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (edited by Jacques-Alain Miller), New York: Norton, 1978.
January 15 1964, marks the opening session of the seminars at the École Nationale Supérieure where, in the presence of celebrities (Lévi-Strauss, Althusser, Fernand Braudel) and a new younger audience, Lacan talks about the censorship of his teachings and his excommunication from official psychoanalytical circles. He wants to train analysts and, at the same time, address the non-analyst by raising the following questions: Is psychoanalysis a science? If so, under what conditions? If it is - the "science of the unconscious" or a "conjectural science of the subject" - what can it teach us about science?
Praxis, which "places the subject in a position of dealing with the real through the symbolic," produces concepts; four are offered here: the unconscious, repetition, transference and the drive. The 1973 title has often been contested in favor of the 1964's: Les fondements de la psychanalyse, which implies neither that it is a matter of concepts, nor that there are only four of them. Lacan is suspicious of the rapport between psychoanalysis, religion and science. Did they not have a founding father and quasi-secret texts? Freud was "legitimately the subject presumed to know," at least as to the unconscious: "He was not only the subject who was presumed to know, he knew." "He gave us this knowledge in terms that may be said to be indestructible." "No progress has been made that has not deviated whenever one of the terms has been neglected around which Freud ordered the ways that he traced and the paths of the unconscious." This declaration of allegiance contrasts with the study of Freud's dream about the dead son screaming "Father, can't you see I'm burning?" The main problem remains that of transference: the Name-of-the-Father is a foundation, but the legacy of the Father is sin, and the original sin of psychoanalysis is Freud's desire that was not analyzed. In "The Freudian thing" (Écrits: A Selection), Lacan presents the Name-of-the-Father as a treasure to be found, provided it implies self-immolation as a sacrificial victim to truth.
Of the four concepts mentioned, three were developed between 1953 and 1963. As to drives, whose importance has increased since the study of objet a in L'angoisse, Lacan considers them as different from biological needs in that they can never be satisfied. The purpose of the drive is not to reach a goal (a final destination) but to follow its aim (the way itself), which is to circle round the object. The real source of jouissance is the repetitive movement of this closed circuit. Freud defined Trieb as a montage of four discontinuous elements: "Drive is not thrust (Drang); in Triebe und Triebschicksale (1915, S.E. XIV) Freud distinguishes four terms in the drive: Drang, thrust; Quelle, the source; Objekt, the object; Ziel, the aim. Such a list may seem quite natural; my purpose is to prove that the text was written to show that it is not as natural as that." The drive is a thoroughly cultural and symbolic construct. Lacan integrates the aforementioned elements into the drive's circuit, which originates in an erogenous zone, circles the object and returns to the erogenous zone. This circuit is structured by the three grammatical voices:
1. the active (to see)
2. the reflexive (to see oneself)
3. the passive (to make oneself be seen).
The first two are autoerotic; only in the passive voice a new subject appears, "this subject, the other, appears in so far as the drive has been able to show its circular course." The drive is always active, which is why he writes the third instance as "to make oneself be seen" instead of "to be seen."
Lacan rejects the notion that partial drives can attain any complete organization since the primacy of the genital zone is always precarious. The drives are partial, not in the sense that they are a part of a whole (a genital drive), but in that they only represent sexuality partially: they convey the dimension of jouissance. "The reality of the unconscious is sexual reality - an untenable truth," much as it cannot be separated from death. "Objet a is something from which the subject, in order to constitute itself, has separated itself off as organ. This serves as symbol of the lack, of the phallus, not as such, but in so far as it is lacking. It must be an object that is separable and that has some rapport to the lack. At the oral level, it is the nothing; at the anal level, it is the locus of the metaphor - one object for another, give the feces in place of the phallus - the anal drive is the domain of the gift; at the scopic level, we are no longer at the level of demand, but of desire, of the desire of the Other; it is the same at the level of the invocatory drive, which is the closest to the experience of the unconscious." The first two relate to demand, the second pair to desire. Under the form of objet a, Lacan groups all the partial drives linked to part objects: the breast, feces, the penis, and he adds the gaze and the voice. Here, he asserts the split between the eye and the gaze when he analyzes Holbein's The Ambassadors as a "trap for the gaze" (piège à regards), but also as a dompte-regard (the gaze is tamed by an object) and a trompe-l'oeil. In the foreground, a floating object, a phallic ghost object gives presence to the - Φ of castration. This object is the heart of the organization of desire through the framework of the drives.
In "La Lettre volée" (Écrits) Lacan states that "the unconscious is the discourse of the Other," meaning that "one should see in the unconscious the effects of speech on the subject." The unconscious is the effect of the signifier on the subject - the signifier is what gets repressed and what returns in the formations of the unconscious. How then is it possible to reconcile desire linked to the signifier and to the Other with the libido, now an organ under the shape of the "lamella," the placenta, the part of the body from which the subject must separate in order to exist? A new conception of repetition comes into play, whose functionning stems from two forces: automatism on the side of the signifier and the missed yet desired encounter on the side of the drive, where objet a refers to the "impossible" Real (that as such cannot be assimilated). If transference is the enactment (la mise en acte) of the reality of the unconscious - what Lacan's deconstruction of the drive wants to bring to light - if desire is the nodal point where the motion of the unconscious, an untenable sexual reality, is also at work, what is to be done? The analyst's role is to allow the drive "to be made present in the reality of the unconscious": he must fall from the idealized position so as to become the upholder of objet a, the separating object.
1964-1965
Le séminaire, Livre XII: Problèmes cruciaux pour la psychanalyse.
French: unpublished.
English: unpublished.
For Lacan the fundamental problem is that of the subject's relation to language. However, taking into account the Real - from the trilogy of the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real - modifies the situation. Previously, the crucial issues were the rapports between identification, transference and demand; now the queston "will entail the holding out of a form, of an essential topology for analytic praxis." The signifier returns as structured on the Moebius strip with three forms of the hole, the torus or ring, the cross-cap, and Euler's circles as the maze of the torus or of the spiral of the demand on the surface of the Klein bottle. These figure though constructed in a simple and combinatory way, are nevertheless complicated to comment.
The torus ia a ring, a three dimensional object formed by taking a cylinder and joining the two ends together. The topology of the torus illustrates some analogies against the structure of the subject: its centre of gravity falls outside its volume, just as the centre of the subject is outside, being decentered (ex-centric). The "peripheral and central exteriority of the torus constitutes one single region." Psychoanalysis posits the distinction between container and contained much as the unconscious is not a purely interior psychic system but an intersubjective structure, "the unconscious is outside" - extimité. A common concept of structure implies the opposition between directly observable contingencies and deep phenomena, which are not the object of immediate experience. Lacan disagrees with such an opposition as implicit in the structure. He rejects the notion of observable contingencies, since observation is always already theoretical; and he also rejects the idea that structures are somehow distant from experience, since thay are present in the field of experience itself: the unconscious is on the surface and looking for it in the dephts is to miss it. As the two sides of the Moebius strip are continuous, so structure is continuous with phenomena.
Thus, the Moebius strip subverts our normal (Euclidean) way of representing space, for it seems to have two sides but in fact has only one. The two sides are distinguished by the dimension of time, the time it takes to traverse the whole strip. The figure illustrates how psychoanalysis problematizes binary oppositions (love/hate, inside/out, signifier/signified, truth/appearance): the opposed terms rather than be radically distinct, are viewed as continuous with each other. For instance, the Moebius strip helps to understand the traversing of fantasy (la traversée du fantasme): only because the two sides are continuous it is possible to cross over from inside to outside. Yet, when passing a finger round the surface of the strip, it is impossible to determine the precise point where one has crossed over from inside to outside. With Slavoj Zizek, the traversing of the fantasmeimplies to accomplish an act that disturbes the subject's fundamental fantasy, unhinging the level that is even more fundamental than basic symbolic identifications. For Lacan, "fantasy is not simply a work of imagination as opposed to hard reality, meaning a product of the mind that obfuscates the approach to reality, the ability to perceive things as they really are." Against the basic opposition between reality and imagination, fantasy is not merely on the side of the latter, it is rather that little piece of imagination by which the subject gains access to reality - the frame that guarantees the sense of reality. Thus when the fundamental fantasy is shattered, the subject sustains a loss of reality. Then, traversing the fantasme has nothing to do with a sobering act of dispelling the fantasies that obscure the clear perception of the real state of things or with a reflective act of achieving a critical distance from daily ruminations (superstitions). Fantasy intervenes as support when a line is drawn between what is simply our imagination and "what really exists out there." On the contrary, "traversing the fantasme involves the subject's over-identification with the field of imagination: in it, and through it, the subject breaks the constrains of fantasy and enters the terrifying, violent territory of pre-synthetic imagination, where disjecta membra float around, not yet unified and domesticated by the intervention of a homogenizing fantasmatic frame."
As for Lacan's assertion of the subject's constitutive decentrement, subjective experience is not regulated by objective unconscious mechanisms decentred with regard to the subject's self-experience and as such beyond control, but by something more unsettling. For a standard view the dimension that is constitutive of subjectivity is that of phenomenal self-experience. In Lacan's perspective the analyst is the one who can deprive the subject of the very fundamental fantasy that regulates the universe of self-experience. The subject of the unconscious emerges only when the subject's fundamental fantasy becomes inaccessible, is primordially repressed, argues Zizek. Thus, the unconscious is the inaccesible phenomenon, not the objective mechanism that regulates phenomenal experience. When the subject displays signs of a fantasmatic self-experience that cannot be reduced to external behaviour, what characterizes human subjectivity proper is the gap, la béance, that separates the two: fantasy becomes unattainable; it is this inaccessibility that makes the subject empty, $. The rapport totally subverts the standard notion of a directly self-experiencing subject. Instead, there is an impossible rapport between the empty, non-phenomenal subject and the phenomena that remain inaccessible. This actual rapport is registered by Lacan's articulation of fantasy, $ <> a, developed in Seminar XIV, La logique du fantasme.
Lacan's interest in topology arises since he sees it as providing a non-intuitive, purely intellectual means of expressing the concept of structure. His topological models "forbid imaginary capture": unlike intuitive images in which perception eclipses structure, here "there is no hidden of the symbolic." Hence, topology replaces language as the main paradigm of structure: it is not a mere metaphor for structure, it's structure itself.
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