thank you and thank you everybody
for coming um
i think it's important to make clear
what a what total war is not it's not
simply
destructive war.
it's not even
exterminatory war.
i think
you can't simply define total war in
terms of what you do
to the enemy because you also have to
define it in terms of what
total war means for your own society.
i
think a total war
is a war in which a society tries to
mobilize its entire population
and all of its resources when everything
is directed to the war effort
.
now for this reason i think it's very
much a modern phenomenon
in pre-modern society so many people are
simply involved in providing food
providing resources for everybody else.
that it's difficult even to conceive of
total war and you just don't have the
necessary level of social and political
organization
to make total war possible just to give
an example in the hundred years war
between britain and france in the middle
ages
you certainly had a lot of vicious
fighting.
but if fighting was going on
for example in northern france
there wasn't really any effort to bring
the peasants of southern france into the
war effort that kind of level of
social and political organization that
attempt to turn people away from their
farming from the necessary production
of resources simply wasn't conceivable.
so what i argue
is that total war first really became
possible actually at the end of the 18th
century
now you didn't you didn't actually see a
total mobilization
of european nations even even then and i
would argue that in fact
it's always something of an ideal if you
can use that word for something so
terrible
it's not an ideal .
um you know you can't
actually reach it
um but you do see at least the first
concerted attempts to do it
moreover you saw a process taking shape
in which the combatants tried harder and
harder
to get to this point of complete
mobilization until one side simply
collapsed
.
you had a kind of unstoppable
radicalization of warfare.
and you can see this even in the just in
the size of the armies and the battles
even at the start of the french
revolution in the 1790s
battles rarely had more than 30 40 50
000 men involved
altogether but by the battle of vagram
which napoleon fought against austria in
1809 you had 300 000 people on the
battlefield
by 1813 just four years later the battle
of leipzig you had 500 000 people
on the battlefield of whom 150 000 were
killed or wounded.
now this efforts couldn't be couldn't be
sustained ultimately france
simply collapsed despite unprecedented
attempts to
mobilize the society and through
conscription through mobilization of
economic resources.
and so on and so forth.
maybe i'll stop
there and then i can come back to the
game later.
デイヴィッド アヴロム ベル(著者), 楠田 悠貴(訳者)(担当:単訳)(原著:David A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It, Boston & New York: Houghton Miflin Company, 2007, 420 p. (ISBN: 9780618919819))
to my right is david bell david bell is
mellon professor of the humanities at
johns hopkins university and dean of the
faculty he's a contributing editor to
the new republic
he teaches courses in european history
and french revolution
and he's also the author of the cult of
the nation in france inventing
nationalism 1680
to 1800 his new book is the first total
war
napoleon's europe and the birth of
europe as we know it
published by hoot and mifflin recently
in paperback from mariner.
but let's begin uh let's begin with
david bell here
uh david could you just talking about
your book could you
just talk to us a little bit about what
is total war how do you define it
and why do you date it particularly from
the napoleonic period
well.
thank you and thank you everybody
for coming um
i think it's important to make clear
what a what total war is not it's not
simply
destructive war.
it's not even
exterminatory war.
i think
you can't simply define total war in
terms of what you do
to the enemy because you also have to
define it in terms of what
total war means for your own society i
think a total war
is a war in which a society tries to
mobilize its entire population
and all of its resources when everything
is directed to the war effort
now for this reason i think it's very
much a modern phenomenon
in pre-modern society so many people are
simply involved in providing food
providing resources for everybody else
that it's difficult even to conceive of
total war and you just don't have the
necessary level of social and political
organization
to make total war possible just to give
an example in the hundred years war
between britain and france in the middle
ages
you certainly had a lot of vicious
fighting but if fighting was going on
for example in northern france
there wasn't really any effort to bring
the peasants of southern france into the
war effort that kind of level of
social and political organization that
attempt to turn people away from their
farming from the necessary production
of resources simply wasn't conceivable
so what i argue
is that total war first really became
possible actually at the end of the 18th
century
now you didn't you didn't actually see a
total mobilization
of european nations even even then and i
would argue that in fact
it's always something of an ideal if you
can use that word for something so
terrible
it's not an ideal um you know you can't
actually reach it
um but you do see at least the first
concerted attempts to do it
moreover you saw a process taking shape
in which the combatants tried harder and
harder
to get to this point of complete
mobilization until one side simply
collapsed
you had a kind of unstoppable
radicalization of warfare
and you can see this even in the just in
the size of the armies and the battles
even at the start of the french
revolution in the 1790s
battles rarely had more than 30 40 50
000 men involved
altogether but by the battle of vagram
which napoleon fought against austria in
1809 you had 300 000 people on the
battlefield
by 1813 just four years later the battle
of leipzig you had 500 000 people
on the battlefield of whom 150 000 were
killed or wounded
now this efforts couldn't be couldn't be
sustained ultimately france
simply collapsed despite unprecedented
attempts to
mobilize the society and through
conscription through mobilization of
economic resources
and so on and so forth maybe i'll stop
there and then i can come back to the
game later.
uh let me just ask a follow-up question
to that uh david
that is what about the 17th century what
about the 30 years war
i mean the way the 30 years war
certainly inspired kyo and
observers to to think that this was like
war on a devastating
scale that never existed before uh is
there a difference let's say between a
kind of endemic war like that and
a total war uh yes i think there is a
very very big difference
the wars of the 17th century were
incredibly destructive
but the destruction was due mostly to
these marauding bands of soldiers the
kind of the sold atesca they were called
who would would ravage large areas
particularly of central europe
but but there wasn't you didn't have in
any of the contending
nations an attempt to mobilize the
entire nations for war and in that sense
it's very similar to the hundred years
war
if you had uh for example the france
which was one of the participants in the
hundred in the
30 years war um you didn't you didn't
you know
most of france was not really even
touched by it the areas that were
devastated
that were were treated very very badly
you had huge loss of population
nonetheless you didn't have this kind of
total mobilization of
everybody in the society which makes for
a total war
uh the civil rights movement was based
on studying gandhi
and uh the uh
after the soviet invasion of
czechoslovakia uh
the czechs started studying gandhi and
uh
it um it was this
it was this example um
that uh that made a huge impression
and greatly advanced the
the techniques of non-violence of course
modern non-violence is much more based
on
media than it used to be it is all all
about
i mean the civil rights movement was all
about how do we get this on television
the whole world is watching.
yes
i just wanted to say i i agree with that
and entirely i think one interesting
thing about
the history of sort of christian
non-violence christian pacifism
is that christians also have and have
traditionally had such a strong sense of
original sin
so that while you preach pacifism you
preach non-violence it comes together
with a kind of deep conviction that we
can never actually do it that we're too
bad to do it that we're too corrupt to
it
so i think one of the interesting things
in history is when you start having a
kind of secular
pacifism a secular non-violence which is
grounded in sort of a theory of history
that says violence is primitive and we
can get beyond it by evolving
yeah i mean that's it it always is a
tactic and a practical tactic
gandhi was a very pragmatic man he had a
goal
and he asked himself what do we have to
do to achieve this goal
and people often say well you know
non-violence is
is fine against nice people but you know
if you got really brutal people
uh uh what can you do if people are
really brutal then your only not
option is non-violence which was exactly
what they
uh concluded in in in central europe
well if you know if they have all the
guns and they have all the power
the the only option is non-violence well
the uh the option in the 30s for
say many people in britain were saying
there was a strong
pacifism movement we cannot defy hitler
because
and we don't want to go to war which was
understandable in terms of an impulse i
think it was completely
wrong politically well part of part of
the reasoning in the oxford peace pledge
and those kinds of things
was i mean hitler's response to that was
that this was
you know not masculine this was a you
know this was going to be the reason
that germany was going to be defeated
not
you know and when put in this whole idea
of a kind of sense of the country as a
as a masculine structure that has a
sense of honor which is somehow
analogous to the sense of individual
honor that britain would be defeated
that britain would be defeated because
yeah britain and the united states uh
and you know in the united states
because of its
what he called its mongrel population
that it was not pure blooded
right uh and so because it's not pure
blooded it uh you know it will
be defeated because you need pure blood
to be truly masculine
the problem with with nazi germany was
that there were too
few people who were opposed to it who
had all these people like churchill
who were focused on the communists and
and weren't really that interested in
you know uh uh britain and the united
states were selling arms like crazy to
europe there to germany they were
helping the
the the german economy they had no
interest in
in in helping the jews uh and
you know that that was the story of the
1930s
uh the the the people the peace people
were saying you have to do more to
resist the nazis and
if they had been able to get the floor
if if people had listened to them
uh they might have defeated nazis
without a war yeah sorry but the soviet
side was the car who was supplying
hitler in during the molotov ribbon
draft pack not the west
no but the west was also scotland
yeah i'm just wondering uh more
abstractly can pacifism as a tactic work
without a moment of vulnerability by the
the dominant force you know you talk
about nazi germany if you take a pass at
this stance internally against the nazis
you're dead
and you know the next pacifist comes up
i'm wondering if yes.
sort of gandhi's
uh revelation is that you need to pick
your spot pick your moment
and then have that pacifism build to to
a point of success i mean you need that
opening
but it's like i mean i think
non-violence
because it is a tactic what kind of
tactic is it in a large sense that in a
large sense it's a kind of tactic of
publicity which means you need people
who are going to listen to you you need
people who are going to pay attention to
it
if you don't have that it can't work but
i mean
nazi germany was very concerned about
their public image in the world
uh most most governments no matter how
horrible they are
are are trying to make themselves look
okay to the world
and that's you know that's that that's
uh that's where the leverage is that's
why i don't know i don't see where they
ever where did the nazis ever change
their policies because of the
their public image well where were these
strengths
when were they ever pressured to no but
teresians thought as an example after
all they wanted to show exactly
show to the red cross and you know an
international opinion that the jews were
being taken care of
and they certainly wanted care of yeah
well exactly.
i think it's time to open up the panel
to questions from the audience
um yes the question is with women
entering the military
in israel and the united states and
other countries will this change the
nature of war for the better or the
worse anyone like to feel that
well one interesting thing is that women
have actually always been involved in
warfare to a far greater extent than
most
even most military historians realize i
mean if you go back for example to
france in the area that i look at
um you had hundreds of women who
actually enrolled in the french armies
in masculine uniforms some
were some were discovered to be women
and were allowed to continue fighting
got pensions afterwards the armies of
the period generally had
you know as much as a as much as a third
of the total population going along with
the armies was often female
it was they were not simply the camp
followers of legend but they were doing
everything from
from cooking to even digging ditches to
being support
people so women have often of course
have always been involved in wars
victims
but they were also being involved in war
as
support personnel and even as uh and
even as combatants
well i'm not sure what we have is really
quite something in middle ages of course
too i mean
there are many statements out that the
most dreaded thing about warfare was me
lying there wounded on the battlefield
and the woman's going to come along and
hit you over the head with a mallet or
something like that because this is
exactly i mean
the women would clean up after the
battles.
i think politicians have lied
and been deceptive throughout history
there's there's there is a distinction
between
a kind of totalitarian system which we
are not in.
i mean
we can be here today and have somebody
like mark denouncing the bush
administration if this were 1984
we would have the thought police coming
in and arresting him i hope that's not
going to happen
on season.
An important subplot of the economic struggle between Britain and France – the need to accumulate gold and silver – remained of vital importance. Not only did gold reserves symbolize government and market confidence, but precious metals were the preferred means of payment for Continental subsidies, immediately convertible to military use, although many British loans were not made in scarce specie but with drafts guaranteed by the government.79…
By contrast, Napoleon raised the money he required by punitive taxation of the nations that he had conquered, which paid dearly for military weakness. He forced Spain into signing the ‘Treaty of Subsidies’ in October 1803, money that Spain did not have in its Treasury, but needed to bring from Mexico. The first shipment was seized by the British in 1804, which action caused Spain to declare war on Britain.80 As we shall see, the rest of the silver reached France by means of complex international mercantile networks. Extracting money from other Continental powers was easier for the emperor. Austria paid 75 million francs in 1805 and 164 million when defeated again. Between 1806 and 1812 Prussia provided a sum estimated at between 470 and 514 million francs. With this money, and in contrast to Britain, France maintained the convertibility of its paper currency to gold: it was essential that it did so, for its reputation for defaulting extended back to the last days of the ancien régime. In spite of the apparent stability of the French currency, foreign investors chose London as a safe and profitable home for their capital.81
以下の方が早い
返信削除財政=軍事国家の衝撃―戦争・カネ・イギリス国家 1688-1783― 単行本 – 2003/7/30
ジョン・ブリュア (著), John Brewer (原著), & 1 その他
https://www.tkfd.or.jp/research/detail.php?id=3486
まず、歴史上もっとも名高い中央銀行であるイングランド銀行は（ただし、「最古」の中央銀行はスウェーデンのリクスバンク）、名誉革命後の17世紀末に設立されたが、その当初の役割は財政ファイナンスだったと言われる。当時の英国は、効率的な徴税制度を発達させる一方で、一時的な戦費の調達にはイングランド銀行を中心とする国債の発行・流通市場を整備することで、安定した財政力を手にした（＝財政革命）。近年の英国近世史では、このことで強大な国力を誇りながら、徴税請負制度に依存し戦費調達面に弱点を有したフランスとの18世紀を通じた覇権争いに勝利することができたとされている[2]。
[2] ジョン・ブリュア『財政＝軍事国家の衝撃』（名古屋大学出版会、2003年）参照。
財政ファイナンスのためにイングランド銀行を設立したイギリスと、徴税請負人に依存し続けたフランスとを対比して考えると、中央銀行は徴税請負人が近代化したシステムと言うこともできる。（極論すぎる！）
早川英男「 コロナ・ショック下の金融と経済（第２回）コロナ禍で変わる中央銀行の役割」
コロナ・ショック下の金融と経済（第２回） コロナ禍で変わる中央銀行の役割 | 研究活動 | 東京財団政策研究所
返信削除https://www.tkfd.or.jp/research/detail.php?id=3486
2020/07
早川英男
https://www.amazon.co.jp/財政-軍事国家の衝撃―戦争・カネ・イギリス国家1688-1783-ジョン-ブリュア/dp/4815804656/ref=sr_1_1?__mk_ja_JP=カタカナ&dchild=1&keywords=ジョン・ブリュア『財政＝軍事国家の衝撃&qid=1628826029&sr=8-1
返信削除https://www.amazon.co.jp/dp/4815804656/
ref=sr_1_1?__mk_ja_JP=カタカナ&dchild=1&keywords=ジョン・ブリュア『財政＝軍事国家の衝撃&qid=1628826029&sr=8-1
love and theft: 2020/07 早川英男 コロナ・ショック下の金融と経済（第２回） コロナ禍で変わる中央銀行の役割 | 研究活動 | 東京財団政策研究所
返信削除https://love-and-theft-2014.blogspot.com/2021/08/202007.html?m=1
ブリュア『財政＝軍事国家の衝撃』
返信削除は
イギリス中心でフランスとの比較は弱い
返信削除中野富国#6
戦争と中央銀行
このオランダで発達した公債制度が、一七世紀に、大規模な君主国家であるイギリスに持ち込まれる。これにより、イギリスは比類なき資金調達力を手に入れ、強大な海軍力を擁して、覇権国家へとのし上がっていくことになるのである。イギリスの公債のシステムは、まさにティリーの言う「資本化強制」を典型的に実践した制度だと言ってよい。
オランダの公債制度は、次のような過程を経てイギリスに移植され、さらなる進化を遂げた。
オランダでは、政府が発行した年金国債を、一般市民が将来の年金用に定常的に購入する体制が構築されていたため、政府は円滑な資金調達を行うことができた。この体制は「ダッチ・ファイナンス」と呼ばれ、当時最先端の国債管理の仕組みであった。このダッチ・ファイナンスが、イギリスに持ち込まれたのである。
その契機となったのは、一六八八年の名誉革命であった。この時、ホラント州のオレンジ公ウィリアムがウィリアム三世としてイギリス国王に即位したが、ウィリアム三世と彼にオランダからついてきた顧問たちは、ダッチ・ファイナンスをモデルとした金融制度を導入したのである。その目的は、対仏戦争の戦費調達であった。こうして一六九二年一二月、国債に関する最初の法律が成立し、翌年一月から、トンティン年金国債の発行が開始された★35。
さらに続く一六九四年、対仏戦争を遂行するために巨額の戦費を調達しなければならないイギリス政府に対する長期融資を目的として、イングランド銀行が創設された。イギリス政府は、イングランド銀行に銀行券発行業務を独占させることを認め、イングランド銀行券と同行の預金債務を徴税の支払手段として受け入れた。イングランド銀行券に「国民通貨」としての地位を与え、これによってイングランド銀行券による資金調達の道を確保したのである★36。
イングランド銀行の創設もまた、戦争を起源としているのである。もっとも、戦争金融のために銀行が利用されるという例は、中世後半やルネッサンス期にも見出すことができる。一三世紀後半から一四世紀前半にかけて、イギリスにおけるイタリア人銀行家たちは、エドワード一世のために、ウェールズとスコットランドとの戦争の費用を融資した。彼らはまた、百年戦争におけるエドワード三世のフランス侵攻にも融資を行った。一五世紀のバルセロナ市は、カタルーニャのカスティリア朝スペインから離脱のために、市立銀行からの融資を利用した。一六世紀から一七世紀にかけてのヴェネツィアもまた、銀行システムを戦争金融に活用した。
★35 Brewer （1988: p.133）; 富田（2006: pp.66-67, 116）
★36 楊枝嗣朗『歴史の中の貨幣：貨幣とは何か』文眞堂、２０１２年、p.205。
John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783, Harvard University Press, 1988
富田俊基『国債の歴史：金利に凝縮された過去と未来』東洋経済新報社、２００６年、p.108。