2022年5月17日火曜日

Automation and the Future of Work (English Edition) Benanav, Aaron 2022

Amazon.co.jp: Automation and the Future of Work (English Edition) 電子書籍: Benanav, Aaron: 洋書

シリコンバレーの巨人、政治家、テクノフューチャリスト、社会批評家は、私たちが急速な技術自動化の時代の危機に瀕していると主張し、私たちが知っているように仕事の終わりを告げる。しかし、多くの議論の「ロボットの台本」は、雇用危機の悪化を本当に説明していますか?

自動化と仕事の未来では、アーロン・ベナナブは、私たちの労働生活を遠い未来に形作る構造的な経済動向を明らかにします。技術革新だけでは実現できない場合、私たちをポスト希少性に駆り立てるためにどのような社会運動が必要かと彼は尋ねます。成長する冗長労働者の軍隊を維持する普遍的なベーシックインカムの呼びかけに応えて、彼は反提案を提供します。

https://www.amazon.co.jp/Automation-Future-English-Aaron-Benanav-ebook/dp/B08K3Y1V65/ref=sr_1_1?__mk_ja_JP=%E3%82%AB%E3%82%BF%E3%82%AB%E3%83%8A&crid=2MKA54JKRXC9P&keywords=Aaron+Benanav&qid=1652762022&sprefix=aaron+benanav%2Caps%2C145&sr=8-1

Amazon.co.jp: Automation and the Future of Work (English Edition) 電子書籍: Benanav, Aaron: 洋書

The two divergent classical responses to the evident defects of capitalism are i) Keynes's view that capitalism can be fixed, and ii) Marx's view that it can't and will either self-destruct or be destroyed. Aaron Benanav takes the second, and it is his Marxist agenda, rather than any persuasive logic, which drives his rejection of basic income's claim as 'sticking plaster' to correct the dysfunctionalities of current capitalist economies. Keynes was arguably right in arguing that deficit-funded government infrastructure investment and welfare expenditure, coupled with higher wages to fund demand, rather than the neo-classical proposal for lower wages to price labour back into work, would prove to be effective remedies for involuntary unemployment.

So can UBI funded by debt-free sovereign money correct any of the current economic dysfunctionality of recurrent crisis, pervasive debt, austerity, low pay, in-work poverty, massive inequality, and ecological damage?

Benanav thinks not. He is scathing and derisory of the 'automation theorists' claim that technology is destroying jobs, referring to a 'jeans-wearing elite' (p3) promoting 'technocratic fantasies' (p11) who want to 'wind down the economy' (p72). His alternative explanation that global overcapacity has driven down demand for labour (p26) sits inconsistently with his claim that capital has gone on strike and refused to invest (p70). He is right to point out that productivity paradox can arise as societies seek to load production with social costs, for example by delaying retirement age, but wrong in his claim that productivity does not affect the service sector, when empirical examples from banking, insurance, and law show the opposite.

His rejection of Charles Murray's right wing case for UBI would be shared by most UBI advocates, but he fails to do justice to left wing calls for UBI from advocates like Philippe van Parijs and others he fails to mention, all of whose work cannot be dismissed in the half page Benanav allocates (p75). Contrary to Benanav's claim, research at the Institute for Policy Research at the University of Bath, UK, does show technology to be a major cause in reduced labour share. Benanav cannot dispute clear empirical evidence that labour income has consistently fallen against consumer expenditure for the whole post-war period, necessitating an increase in 'unearned income' from pensions, welfare benefits, dividends, and household debt. It's clear that in a totally automated economy, all income would be UBI, all funded by debt-free sovereign money, and therefore reasonable to propose that in partially automated economies, this is proportionately true.

The extremity and clarity of his Marxist agenda is set out in proposals to 'threaten firms with full socialisation', 'doing away with private enterprise', ie 'a truly existential threat to asset owners' wealth' in order to 'bring capital to heel' giving 'power to democratic organs of the people themselves' (p71). He advocates 'progressive socialisation of the means of production via a planned transfer of asset ownership to society at large', with 'a conquest of production which finally succeeds in wresting the power to control investment decisions away from capitalists' (p79). We've been there before. I personally spent over 15 years in nearly 50 cities of post-Soviet Russia, seeing first hand the dismal results.

His closing advocacy of a socialist nirvana where 'everyone can go to social warehouses and service centres to get what they need, hop on a train, get their teeth cleaned' (p88), all made possible through an abundance derived not from technology, but from 'social relationship' (p89), and threateningly coordinated by 'various committees' (p92), is nowhere explicated. It relies on some combination of human selflessness and purity, and ignores the prevalence of human moral failing. His main complaint about basic income proposals is that they don't adopt his Marxist paradigm, and even dare to offer a more reasoned alternative to it.

Technology has delivered huge increases in standards of living, but it has also sucked income out of the economy, which in turn has led to huge increases in household debt, and in government debt from accumulated deficits to meet social welfare needs. The urgent issues are to get income to people and to get debt out of the economy. Only basic income funded by debt-free sovereign money offers to achieve this. Capitalism has and can morph to more socially responsible definitions. Its overthrow to a Marxist paradigm carries the huge empirically realised threat of tyranny and dictatorship.

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