高橋是清はホートレー表記
昭和恐慌の研究 - 111 ページ
17 大阪毎日新聞,1933年4月22日 朝刊 「世界的不況は物価下落が原因」？
高橋是清は1933年4月21日の演説で、ホートレーの『中央銀行論』から以下の箇所を引用している。
日本の財務大臣だった高橋是清は1933年4月21日の演説で、ホートレーの『中央銀行論』から以下の箇所を引用している。
In a speech on April 21, 1933, Korekiyo Takahashi, Japan's Minister of Finance, quoted the following passage from Hawtrey's "The Art of Central Banking".
ホートリーはとても興味深いです。
日本の財務大臣だった高橋是清は1933年4月21日の演説で、ホートレーの『中央銀行論』から以下の箇所を引用している。
高橋はいい加減な財務大臣ではなかった…
高橋是清
経済論
中公バックス
429~430頁
「国際経済情勢とわが国の非常時対策」1933年4月21日（財界変動と主要財政。経済演説）
ラルフ・G・ホートリー (Ralph G. Hawtrey), 1879-1971 ホートレー(ホートリー)
The Art of Central Banking, 1932.
Hawtrey is very intresting.
東京銀行集会所
http://trans.kuciv.kyoto-u.ac.jp/tba/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/317b6d2b154d3bab861032f178060f7d.pdf
17 大阪毎日新聞,1933年4月22日 朝刊 「世界的不況は物価下落が原因」？
In a speech on April 21, 1933, Korekiyo Takahashi, Japan's Minister of Finance, quoted the following passage from Hawtrey's "The Art of Central Banking".
Takahashi was not a lax finance minister…
A lax finance minister will incur deficits, and will cover them by increasing the country's floating debt. But addi- tions to the floating debt do not necessarily include advances from the central bank. The Treasury bills or other short- term instruments which the Government has to sell are very desirable investments for the competitive banks, and so long as room can be made for them by reducing the assets of the competitive banks under other headings, no expansion of credit or monetary expansion is involved. When the floating debt threatens to become excessive, a loan will be issued to fund it, and then the tale of financial improvidence can begin all over again.
If the directors of the central bank are people of prudence and integrity (a condition that is hardly likely to be fulfilled in a country where chronic budget deficits are tolerated),
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A lax finance minister will incur deficits, and will cover
them by increasing the country's floating debt. But addi-
tions to the floating debt do not necessarily include advances
from the central bank. The Treasury bills or other short-
term instruments which the Government has to sell are very
desirable investments for the competitive banks, and so long
as room can be made for them by reducing the assets of
the competitive banks under other headings, no expansion
of credit or monetary expansion is involved. When the
floating debt threatens to become excessive, a loan will be
issued to fund it, and then the tale of financial improvidence
can begin all over again.
It may be a generation before this rake's progress begins
to impose any serious strain on the unfortunate country
which suffers from it. And it will not be till the strain
becomes serious that any difficulty will be found in placing
funding loans. It is only then that the Government will
come to the central bank for assistance.
If the directors of the central bank are people of prudence
and integrity (a condition that is hardly likely to be fulfilled
in a country where chronic budget deficits are tolerated),
219
was compounded of two factors, the fall of prices and the reduction of output. In agriculture, output cannot be quickly reduced, and consequently the fall in the prices of natural products was much heavier than in the prices of manufactured goods. The former gave a truer measure of the severity of the depression than the latter. Whenever a central bank took steps to contract credit in order to correct unfavourable exchanges, it was in effect intensifying the depression. People were often found to say that this would not necessarily follow. But, if it did not, the object would not be attained. Compression of the con- sumers' income was the indispensable means, and so long as wages resisted reduction that necessarily meant more unemployment.
Credit restriction was constantly advocated for the purpose of attracting foreign money for short-term in- vestment. It is deplorable that the doctrines which pre- vailed on the subject of Bank rate from the days of Horsley Palmer to those of the Cunliffe Committee have been so far forgotten. It is hardly necessary to repeat that the support gained for the foreign exchange position by at- tracting foreign money is utterly precarious and delusive. And when credit is restricted for that purpose, the deadly effects of deflation are not the less operative because they are not designed.
In 1930 and 1931 producers all over the world found demand dwindling relentlessly. In desperate efforts to keep going they cut prices deeper and deeper. Their frantic competition for such demand as remained might be compared with the desperate struggles of the prisoners in the Black Hole of Calcutta to save themselves from suffocation by getting near the two small windows which were the only means of ventilation.
It is said that it was only by inadvertence that Surajah Dowlah shut up 146 prisoners in a cell 18 feet by 15 feet. He merely followed precedent in committing prisoners to the guard-room. In their agony the victims sought to bribe the guards to carry an appeal for mercy to Surajah Dowlah. But he was asleep and the guards THE ART OF CENTRAL BANKING dared not awake him. He was very like a central bank.¹ 220 THE CRISIS OF 1931.
As the depression gathered way there were added to the frightful social distresses arising out of unemployment the sinister disorders of a financial crisis. Traders all over the world found the money value of assets of all kinds steadily dwindling; profits were vanishing and turning into losses; bankruptcy, hidden or open, was epidemic. The menace of insolvency was communicated from the traders to the banks. The crisis culminated first in Austria with the failure of the Credit Anstalt in May, 1931, and then, in June and July, spread to Germany. Advances to traders and industrialists to an uncertain but vast amount had become bad debts, and many of those still reputed ulti- mately sound were frozen and temporarily irrecoverable.
"( These are just the conditions which have caused financial crises in the past. A fall of prices gradually undermines the position of debtors. At first creditors do not feel their interests threatened. They have secured themselves with what looks like an adequate margin, and have nothing to fear from the minor fluctuations of the market. But when the fall of prices persists, a stage is eventually reached at which the position of some debtors, previously reputed sound and prudent, becomes doubtful.
Creditors have to make a difficult choice. To enforce payment of a debt at a time of severe depression will cause loss to the debtor. He cannot hope to borrow elsewhere, for if he cannot satisfy the existing creditor as to his solvency, how can he satisfy a stranger? He must sell goods or securi- ties or other assets, which, in the exercise of his best judg- ment of the state of markets, he has hitherto decided not to sell. To do so, he must make price concessions. The creditor will hesitate to drive the debtor to this course. 1 When, the next morning, he sent for Holwell, who had been in com- mand of the garrison and was among the twenty-three survivors, Surajah Dowlah manifested no interest in the fate of the prisoners but wanted to find out where the East India Company's treasure was hidden.
THE ART OF CENTRAL BANKING
Yet, if the unfavourable tendency of the market continues, his forbearance will result in a further deterioration of the debtor's position.
It is likely, therefore, that when creditors start calling up loans or refusing renewals on which the debtors had relied, a considerable number of debtors will already have reached a state of illiquidity amounting almost to insolvency. Action by a few creditors will be a signal for the others. A flood of forced sales will suddenly swamp markets and accelerate the fall of prices, and the latent insolvency will break out into open default and bankruptcy.
The crisis of 1931 differed from earlier crises in its inter- national character. The earlier crises were international in the sense that the fall of prices and the forced sales affected world markets. But among the debts upon which default occurred a relatively unimportant part were due to foreign creditors. In 1931 the outstanding characteristic of the panic was that the foreign creditors of German and Eastern European debtors feared that the foreign exchange market would break down even if the debtors remained solvent.
Indeed, so far as the most important class of debts was con- cerned, those due from banks or guaranteed by them, doubts as to solvency were to a great extent removed by the Austrian Government's guarantee of the Credit Anstalt's deposits and the German Government's guarantee of those of the Darmstädter Bank. The guarantee of the German Government ensured the provision of the means of payment in German currency, but it could not ensure the conversion of that currency into foreign currencies.
The panic took the form of the withdrawal of money by foreign creditors on a huge scale, involving a corre- sponding outflow of gold and foreign exchange from the reserves of the Reichsbank. The Reichsbank had already withstood withdrawals on a more moderate but still formid- able scale in 1929 and 1930. The withdrawals in March and April, 1929, were said to be mainly of French and Belgian balances, and it was alleged at the time that they were a manoeuvre" designed to put pressure on Germany during the deliberations of the Young Committee on Reparations.
"" 221
https://archive.org/details/artofcentralbank0000hawt
高橋是清
経済論
中公バックス
429
となり、しかも五億五千万円以上は制限外発行となり、それ以上通貨を供合す
分を下らざる課税を受けなければならず、かくては産業上の取引と
らしむること到底不可能にして、物価はますます下落し、経済界の建直しは得て望むべからずと
信じましたがため、政府は大英断を以て発券制度の上に根本的改革を施し、保証準備の額を一躍
十億円に拡張し、その上必要なる場合の制限外発行に対する課税最低率を三分に引下げ、以て正
貨の激減したるに拘らず農工商方面の正常なる取引に対する通貨の供給には老も支障なきを期せ
しめたのであります。所謂金融収縮時代に各国の産業に従事せる人々が、如何に資金難に苦悩せ
るかは、想像にあまりあるところでありまして、昨年英国の金融論者として知らる、ホートレー
(R・G・ホートリー。通貨金融論でケインズと対立した)氏の『中央銀行論』中に次のやうなこと
が書いてあります。
『一九三〇年及び三一年に、世界到るところの生産者は需要が仮借なく萎縮していくのを見た。
彼らは生産を維持するために必死となつて価格をドシドシ下げていつた。しかも依然として減退
していく需要に対し彼らが狂気の如く張合つてゐた有様は、さながら往昔カルカツタのブラッ
ク・ホールに幽閉させられたる英人たちが、窒息しまいとして唯一の通風手段であつた二つの小
窓に近寄らうとして死物狂ひになつた事実にも比すべきであつた。
現地人の部族長が間ロ十五フイート、奥行十八フイートの小房に百四十六人の英人捕虜を収容
したのは、あへて殺さんがためではなかつた。しかも可哀相な英人たちは苦しさのあまり番兵に
賄賂を使つて部族長に哀訴を取次いでもらつた、ところが部族長は正にお寝み中でござったので
番兵は起し申すことを差控へた。この部族長は中央銀行ソックリの男であつた、〔翌日窓を開い
国際経済情勢とわが国の非常時対策
429
て見たら英人の大部分は死んでをつたのである]』といふ例を引き、
さらにホートレーは『消費者の所得を圧縮するのはどこでも物価下落と生産低減との二要素の
合成であつた。農業においては、生産量を迅速に減少せしむることの困難なる結果として、農産
物の価格下落は製造品の下落よりもはるかに甚しかつた、故に農産物の価格は製造品の価格より
も不況の深刻さをヨリ真実に示す尺度となる、一体中央銀行が為替安を矯めんとして金利引上げ
その他貸出しを収縮する措置を執ると、必ず結果においては不況を一層甚しからしむるのであつ
た』
•
• 云々と論じてをります。
中央銀行として深く注意すべきことは、世の生産業または商取引をなす人々に対し、常に不足一
を感ぜざる程度に資金の供給をなすべき事であります。
わが国はだんだん金の輪出を禁じ、国内の正貨保有高に比し従来よりも多量の通貨を発行する
事を許したる以上は、わが対外為替の下落を来すべきは当然であります。したがつて国内の資本
が海外に逃避せんとするに至り特に産業振興の見地より低金利政策を実行せんとするに際しては
ここが最も多いのであります。故に政府はわが国の資本を出来得る限り国内における事業に投下
せしめ、以て利潤と労働とを国内に留保せしめ、これによりて経済界の振興に資せしむるの政策
を執るの必要を認め、まづ資本逃避防止法を制定して必要の処置を講じてきたのでありましたが
満兎電題の進展に伴ひ国際政局の複雑化するとともに、為替安を助長するの傾向さらに顕著なる
ものがありましたため、政府はさらに百尺竿頭一歩を進め、為替管理 に関する法律を去る議会に
財界変動と主要財政。経済演説
430
ラルフ・G・ホートリー (Ralph G. Hawtrey), 1879-1971 ホートレー(ホートリー)
The Art of Central Banking, 1932.
https://dspace.gipe.ac.in/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10973/23644/GIPE-021155.pdf?sequence=3
pp.219~220
https://books.google.co.jp/books?id=blDSJ366pSMC&pg=PA219&dq=Kolkata%E3%80%80hawtrey+1930+central+bank&hl=ja&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjS87WlvM34AhXhp1YBHZJJDPYQ6AF6BAgKEAI#v=onepage&q&f=false
The art of central banking
by Hawtrey, R. G. (Ralph George), 1879-
https://archive.org/details/artofcentralbank0000hawt/page/n11/mode/2up
THE ART OF CENTRAL BANKING
219
was compounded of two factors, the fall of prices and the reduction of output. In agriculture, output cannot be quickly reduced, and consequently the fall in the prices of natural products was much heavier than in the prices of manufactured goods. The former gave a truer measure of the severity of the depression than the latter. Whenever a central bank took steps to contract credit in order to correct unfavourable exchanges, it was in effect intensifying the depression. People were often found to say that this would not necessarily follow. But, if it did not, the object would not be attained. Compression of the con- sumers' income was the indispensable means, and so long as wages resisted reduction that necessarily meant more unemployment.
Credit restriction was constantly advocated for the purpose of attracting foreign money for short-term in- vestment. It is deplorable that the doctrines which pre- vailed on the subject of Bank rate from the days of Horsley Palmer to those of the Cunliffe Committee have been so far forgotten. It is hardly necessary to repeat that the support gained for the foreign exchange position by at- tracting foreign money is utterly precarious and delusive. And when credit is restricted for that purpose, the deadly effects of deflation are not the less operative because they are not designed.
In 1930 and 1931 producers all over the world found demand dwindling relentlessly. In desperate efforts to keep going they cut prices deeper and deeper. Their frantic competition for such demand as remained might be compared with the desperate struggles of the prisoners in the Black Hole of Calcutta to save themselves from suffocation by getting near the two small windows which were the only means of ventilation.
It is said that it was only by inadvertence that Surajah Dowlah shut up 146 prisoners in a cell 18 feet by 15 feet. He merely followed precedent in committing prisoners to the guard-room. In their agony the victims sought to bribe the guards to carry an appeal for mercy to Surajah Dowlah. But he was asleep and the guards dared not awake him. He was very like a central bank.¹
220
THE CRISIS OF 1931.
中央銀行の技術
219
は、物価の下落と生産高の減少という2つの要因によって複合的にもたらされた。農業では、生産量をすぐに減らすことはできず、その結果、天然物の価格の下落は、製造品の価格の下落よりはるかに重かった。前者は、後者よりも恐慌の深刻さをより正確に測ることができる。中央銀行が不利な為替を是正するために信用収縮の措置をとるときはいつでも、それは事実上恐慌を激化させるものであった。このようなことは必ずしも起こらないだろうと言う人がよく見受けられた。しかし，そうでなければ，目的は達成されない。消費者の所得の圧縮は不可欠な手段であり，賃金が引き下げに抵抗する限り，それは必然的に失業の増大を意味した。
信用規制は、短期投資のための外国資金を呼び込むために、常に提唱された。ホースレー・パーマーの時代からカンリフ委員会の時代まで，銀行金利の問題で有効だった教義が，これほどまでに忘れ去られているのは嘆かわしいことである。外国通貨を扱うことによって外国為替ポジションを支えることが，まったく不安定で欺瞞的であることは，繰り返すまでもないだろう。そして，そのために信用が制限されると，デフレの致命的な影響は，それが意図されていないために，より少なく作用することはない。
1930年と1931年に、世界中の生産者は、需要が容赦なく減少していることに気づいた。そのため、生産者は必死になって価格を引き下げた。これは、カルカッタのブラックホールで、囚人たちが唯一の換気口である2つの小さな窓に近づいて窒息しないように必死になっていたのと似ている。
スラジャ・ドーラが146人の囚人を18フィート×15フィートの独房に閉じ込めたのは、ほんの不注意からだったと言われている。前例にならって、囚人を番小屋に入れただけなのだ。被害者たちは苦悩の中で、看守に賄賂を贈り、Surajah Dowlahに慈悲の訴えを持ち込もうとした。しかし、彼は眠っており、看守は彼を起こそうとしなかった。彼は、まさに中央銀行のようだった¹
220
1931年の危機。
Page 219
It is said that it was only by inadvertence that Surajah Dowlah shut up 146 prisoners in a cell 18 feet by 15 feet. He merely followed precedent in committing prisoners to the guard-room. In their agony the victims sought to bribe the guards to carry an appeal for mercy to Surajah Dowlah. But he was asleep and the guards
• The Crisis of 1931.
•
Page 220
1 When, the next morning, he sent for Holwell, who had been in com¬ mand of the garrison and was among the twenty-three survivors, Surajah Dowlah manifested no interest in the fate of the prisoners but wanted to find out where the East India Company's treasure was hidden.
As the depression gathered way there were added to the frightful social distresses arising out of unemployment the sinister disorders of a financial crisis. Traders all over the world found the money value of assets of all kinds steadily dwindling; profits were vanishing and turning into losses; bankruptcy, hidden or open, was epidemic. The menace of insolvency was communicated from the traders to the banks. The crisis culminated first in Austria with the failure of the Credit Anstalt in May, 1931, and then, in June and July, spread to Germany. Advances to traders and industrialists to an uncertain but vast amount had become bad debts, and many of those still reputed ulti- mately sound were frozen and temporarily irrecoverable.
"( These are just the conditions which have caused financial crises in the past. A fall of prices gradually undermines the position of debtors. At first creditors do not feel their interests threatened. They have secured themselves with what looks like an adequate margin, and have nothing to fear from the minor fluctuations of the market. But when the fall of prices persists, a stage is eventually reached at which the position of some debtors, previously reputed sound and prudent, becomes doubtful.
Creditors have to make a difficult choice. To enforce payment of a debt at a time of severe depression will cause loss to the debtor. He cannot hope to borrow elsewhere, for if he cannot satisfy the existing creditor as to his solvency, how can he satisfy a stranger? He must sell goods or securi- ties or other assets, which, in the exercise of his best judg- ment of the state of markets, he has hitherto decided not to sell. To do so, he must make price concessions. The creditor will hesitate to drive the debtor to this course. 1 When, the next morning, he sent for Holwell, who had been in com- mand of the garrison and was among the twenty-three survivors, Surajah Dowlah manifested no interest in the fate of the prisoners but wanted to find out where the East India Company's treasure was hidden.
THE ART OF CENTRAL BANKING
Yet, if the unfavourable tendency of the market continues, his forbearance will result in a further deterioration of the debtor's position.
It is likely, therefore, that when creditors start calling up loans or refusing renewals on which the debtors had relied, a considerable number of debtors will already have reached a state of illiquidity amounting almost to insolvency. Action by a few creditors will be a signal for the others. A flood of forced sales will suddenly swamp markets and accelerate the fall of prices, and the latent insolvency will break out into open default and bankruptcy.
The crisis of 1931 differed from earlier crises in its inter- national character. The earlier crises were international in the sense that the fall of prices and the forced sales affected world markets. But among the debts upon which default occurred a relatively unimportant part were due to foreign creditors. In 1931 the outstanding characteristic of the panic was that the foreign creditors of German and Eastern European debtors feared that the foreign exchange market would break down even if the debtors remained solvent.
Indeed, so far as the most important class of debts was con- cerned, those due from banks or guaranteed by them, doubts as to solvency were to a great extent removed by the Austrian Government's guarantee of the Credit Anstalt's deposits and the German Government's guarantee of those of the Darmstädter Bank. The guarantee of the German Government ensured the provision of the means of payment in German currency, but it could not ensure the conversion of that currency into foreign currencies.
The panic took the form of the withdrawal of money by foreign creditors on a huge scale, involving a corre- sponding outflow of gold and foreign exchange from the reserves of the Reichsbank. The Reichsbank had already withstood withdrawals on a more moderate but still formid- able scale in 1929 and 1930. The withdrawals in March and April, 1929, were said to be mainly of French and Belgian balances, and it was alleged at the time that they were a manoeuvre" designed to put pressure on Germany during the deliberations of the Young Committee on Reparations.
"" 221
不況が進むにつれて、失業から生じる恐ろしい社会的苦境に加えて、金融危機という不吉な障害が発生した。世界中の貿易商が、あらゆる種類の資産の貨幣価値がどんどん下がっていることに気づいた。倒産という脅威は、トレーダーから銀行へと伝わっていった。この危機は、1931年5月のクレディ・アンシュタルトの破綻によってまずオーストリアで頂点に達し、6月と7月にはドイツに波及した。商社や実業家への貸し出しが、不確かではあるが膨大な量になり、まだ健全といわれているものの多くが凍結され、一時的に回収不能になったのである。
「これらは、過去に金融危機を引き起こした状況に過ぎない。物価の下落は、債務者の立場を徐々に悪化させる。債権者は最初、自分たちの利益が脅かされているとは感じない。彼らは十分なマージンを確保しており、市場の些細な変動は何ら恐れることはない。しかし、価格の下落が続くと、それまで健全で慎重であると評価されていた一部の債務者の立場が疑わしくなってくる段階に到達する。
債権者は難しい選択を迫られる。厳しい不況の中で債務の支払いを強制することは、債務者に損失を与えることになる。既存の債権者に支払い能力を納得させることができなければ、どうやって見知らぬ人を納得させることができるだろうか。市場の状況について最善の判断を下し、これまで売却しないと決めていた商品、証券、その他の資産を売却しなければならない。そのためには、価格的な譲歩をしなければならない。債権者は債務者をこのような方向に追いやることをためらうだろう。翌朝、生存者23人のうち守備隊の指揮を執っていたホルウェルを呼び寄せたとき、スラジャ・ドーラは捕虜の運命には関心を示さず、東インド会社の財宝がどこに隠されているかを探ろうとした。
中央銀行の技術
しかし、市場の不利な傾向が続けば、彼の差し控えは債務者の立場をさらに悪化させる結果となる。
したがって、債権者が債務者の頼みの綱であった融資の引き上げや更新の拒否を始めたときには、すでにかなりの債務者が債務超過に近い非流動的状態に陥っている可能性がある。一部の債権者の行動は、他の債権者へのシグナルとなる。そして、潜在的な債務超過は、公然の債務不履行と倒産へと発展していくのである。
1931年の危機は、それ以前の危機とは異なり、国家間の危機であった。それ以前の危機は、価格の下落と強制的な売却が世界市場に影響を与えたという意味で、国際的な危機であった。しかし、債務不履行が発生した負債のうち、比較的重要でない部分は、外国の債権者に対するものであった。1931年のパニックの特徴は、ドイツや東欧の債務者の外国債権者が、債務者が支払能力を維持していても、外国為替市場が崩壊することを恐れたことであった。
実際、最も重要な債務である銀行からの債務や銀行が保証する債務に関しては、オーストリア政府によるクレディ・アンシュタルトの預金保証とドイツ政府によるダルムシュテッター銀行の預金保証によって、支払い能力に関する疑念がかなり取り除かれた。ドイツ政府の保証は、ドイツ通貨による支払い手段の提供を保証するものであったが、その通貨を外国通貨に交換することは保証できなかった。
パニックは、外国の債権者による大規模な資金の引き出しという形で起こり、それに伴ってライヒスバンクの準備金から金と外国為替が流出した。1929年、1930年の2年間は、それほどでもないが、かなり大きな資金引き揚げがあった。1929年3月と4月の引き出しは、主にフランスとベルギーの残高であると言われ、当時は、賠償に関するヤング委員会の審議中にドイツに圧力をかけるために行われた「作戦」であったと言われていた。
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『消費者の所得を圧縮するのはどこでも物価下落と生産低減との二要素の
合成であつた。農業においては、生産量を迅速に減少せしむることの困難なる結果として、農産
物の価格下落は製造品の下落よりもはるかに甚しかつた、故に農産物の価格は製造品の価格より
も不況の深刻さをヨリ真実に示す尺度となる、一体中央銀行が為替安を矯めんとして金利引上げ
その他貸出しを収縮する措置を執ると、必ず結果においては不況を一層甚しからしむるのであつ
た』
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