cf.
『21世紀のロンバード街』2021/10/8
ペリー・メーリング
https://www.amazon.co.jp/dp/B08765QL8V/ref=monarch_sidesheet
#3
ワルラスの一般均衡モデルを、現実世界の逸脱を補正するときに参照すべき理想化された規範として最もはっきり提示したのは、ジョン・ヒックスだったようだ。彼が最初にそれをやったのは1937年の論文「ケインズ氏と『古典派』たち」で、続いて1939年の著書『価値と資本』だ。ワルラスは、経済を一群の連立方程式として見たことで有名だ。そのそれぞれは、ある特定の商品の供給を、その商品への需要と等しくする。この体系の均衡はすべての方程式を同時に満たす価格集合となる。1960年には、アローとドブリューがワルラス式の一般均衡のアイデアを、完全に厳密な数学的定式化へと発展させていたが、彼らのモデルには一つ問題があった。お金がまったく入ってこないのだ★10。
だからお金を図式に持ち込みたい人は、ちがう出発点を探すしかなかった。それが1938年ヤコブ・マルシャック論文「お金と資産の理論」だ。これが金融ワルラス主義の起源だ。お金をめぐってケインズ革命がたどった、実用的な形となる。ワルラスのアナロジーとして、経済の金融側もまた連立方程式群として扱うというのがその考えだ。それぞれの式はある金融資産の需要と供給を示すものとなる。お金はそうした資産の一つでしかない★11。
★10 Debreu（1959）, Arrow and Hahn（1971）, Hahn（1965）. 30年近く前のLSEでの学生時代に，この問題の重要性に目を向けさせてくれたダグラス・ゲイル（Gale（1982））に感謝する．
★11 マルシャックは明示的にヒックス（Hicks（1935））を先人と認めている．
★12 マルシャックのアプローチを復活させようという他の初期の試みとしてはModigliani（1944）と Patinkin（1956）などがある．
Marschak, Jacob. 1938. “Money and the Theory of Assets.” Econometrica 6（4）: 311-325.
Hicks, John R. 1935. “A Suggestion for Simplifying the Theory of Money.” Economica, new series, 2（5）: 1-19.
────. 1937. “Mr. Keynes and the ‘Classics’: A Suggested Interpretation.” Econometrica 5（2）: 147-159. 邦訳ジョン・R・ヒックス「ケインズ氏と『古典派』たち：解釈の一示唆」，ケインズ『雇用，利子，お金の一般理論』（山形浩生訳，講談社学術文庫，2012年）pp. 521-542 所収
────. 1939. Value and Capital. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 邦訳J・R・ヒックス『価値と資本：経済理論の若干の基本原理に関する研究』（上下巻，安井琢磨・熊谷尚夫訳，岩波文庫，1995年）
────. 1989. A Market Theory of Money. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 邦訳J・R・ヒックス『貨幣と市場経済』（花輪俊哉・小川英治訳，東洋経済新報社，1993年）
Perry Mehrling: The New Lombard Street - YouTube 2011
The complete INET interview with Perry Mehrling, author of the book "The New Lombard Street."
the new lombard street is is the way money markets work in the modern world with modern finance and Wall Street and so forth and in particular I'm interested in this book in the role of the Fed in supporting that at times of crisis so you're referring to Walter Paget's I am Street absolutely studied the Bank of England in the energy sisters 1873 was the new was was what I hope will come to be known as the old Lombard Street he wrote this book Lombard Street a description of the London money market and so that's my inspiration for this book that writing an update now 130 some years later and it's really about the New York money market and the dollar money market so that's very much the the analog I have in mind yes and there are manuals like Martius Diggins book on the money markets that really talk about so the texture institutional detail of instruments my understanding is you're trying to put this book in the context of the academic literature you're trying to show how we see the evaporation of the institutions of the money market that emerged during the era of rational expectations in modern macroeconomics and financial theory that's right the what I'm trying to do is to as I say sometimes listen to the bankers ok and that means Marshall stickum who was listening to the bankers this book sounds like you know what this is is a desk reference for people who trade these money markets but it's quite impossible to sort of it's not a theoretical book it's an institutional book about these individual markets that's on the one side and on the other side.
there's this whole academic literature about policy rational expectations what-have-you and so I'm trying to be an economist who listens to the bankers and tries to abstract from that inductively a theory of how the world how the world works that's what I'm doing I teach other out of I've taught for many years at a Marshall sukham that's where I learned much of what I know about the money markets.
but I'm connecting that to it to a historical and an theoretical view of of money markets so when you reintroduce the institutional texture the money markets how does the behavior of what's happening in money and finance change relative to the macro views that you just suggested actually dominate the academic yes well one one of the things that you notice when you are a professor as I am is that most of the macroeconomic theories most of the material even even in in textbooks called money and banking abstract from the money market they abstract from the actual operations of the payment system the actual operations there's not discussion the repo markets or the Eurodollar markets in any detail at all and they're abstract from this because the intellectually the economics profession decided that all of that was just plumbing okay and we don't need to pay attention to that and we can sort of just summarize it as supply and demand supply for money demand for money something like that that was either it was thought of at the time as as an intellectual refinement as an analytical deepening that we don't everyone knew all about this institutional detail and so we don't need to continue that but of course in the modern generation no one knows about this institutional detail anymore all we have are these abstract tools and they're not connected with reality anymore and that's what I'm trying to do is to bring back that connection to reality because reality has changed a lot since we developed these tools money in banking textbooks have not money in tax money textbooks have moved 10 percent from where they were in 1955 whereas the accompany actual organization of financial money markets has has changed 360 degrees when you look at the events we experienced 2007 8 & 9 so-called crisis it's been widely reported that the macroeconomics profession didn't see it coming and didn't explain it or even expose to understand entirely what happened when you wrote this book were you motivated by the crisis in relation to your understanding ?
very very much so today's story about that the the crisis began for me in the summer of 2007 when I was noticing in the Financial Times the collapse of these Bear Stearns hedge funds and in this in September of 2007 when I started to teach my money in banking class the overnight interest rates were going haywire the spreads between euro dollar rates and and Fed Funds rates and repo rates so it was very clear to me that something was very deeply amiss in the plumbing of the of the system and I told my students I remember that very first day September 2007 I said we've been building this parallel shadow banking system over the over the last decade or so and it hasn't been through a stress test yet and so we don't know where it's gonna break and I predict you this semester we're gonna find out where it breaks you know we're doing that test in real time right now students thought I was crazy I think maybe the first day but after a month or two they thought maybe I could read the mind of God but all I was really looking at was the short term money spreads and seeing the kind of thing that an economist a hundred years ago would have been paying attention to these short-term money spreads revealing stresses in the in the money market and asking where are those stresses coming from and what kind of actions are in interpreting the kinds of events the world through through that lens the lens that I call the money view lens when you see the crisis in full bloom the Lehman Brothers and others it's certainly an impetus to the economics profession now are in the finance Theory profession to understand what you might call breakdowns in liquidity or breakdowns in what you call the plumbing are you seeing the profession responding in changing research strategies looking at some of these is there a renewed interest in the plumbing I think there is in some circles I think there's there's a cross-cutting influences here okay partly there is probably the dominant view at the moment is the crisis is over we can go back to business as usual but that's not that's not everywhere okay there are plenty of people now talking about about liquidity using that word okay which didn't used to be used to be a dirty word you didn't get to get to speak in academic circles using using words like that talking about the difference between funding liquidity and marketing liquid market liquidity and of course we're now having these new institutions like the Office of Financial Research that's being set up by dodd-frank which is to collect all kinds of information that never was collected before because it was not thought to be useful or relevant okay and now in the aftermath of the crisis it is thought we need to learn about this so we're going to be developing databases and as we develop databases we're gonna have to be developing theories to make sense of those databases so I think it's begun the process of intellectual change has has begun it's it's it's slow and it and it lags behind events in the real world that's that's the story I really tell in the book okay is that it's always the case that in that ideas are lagging behind material developments and so our job as as thinkers as academics is is to try to get as close to the development of as we can
（今日のお話は、私にとっての危機の始まりは、2007年の夏、フィナンシャル・タイムズ紙でベア・スターンズのヘッジファンドの破綻に気づいたときでした。そして、2007年9月、銀行業界のお金のクラスを教え始めたとき、オーバーナイト金利は、ユーロドルの金利とFed Funds金利、レポ金利間のスプレッドは異常な状態になり、システムの配管に何か深い狂いがあったことは明らかでした。この並列シャドーバンキングシステムは過去10年以上にわたって構築されてきましたが、まだストレステストを受けていないので、どこで壊れるか分かりません。今学期には、どこで壊れるか分かるでしょう。今、リアルタイムでテストをしているのです。学生たちは、私がおかしいと思いました。最初の日はそうだったかもしれません。でも1、2ヶ月後には、私が神の心を読んだのだろうと思いました。私が実際に見たのは短期資金のスプレッドだけです。 そして、そのストレスはどこから来るのか、どのような行動が世の中の出来事を解釈することになるのかを、私が「マネー・ビュー・レンズ」と呼んでいるレンズを通して考えていました。流動性の崩壊や配管の崩壊と呼ばれるものを理解するために、金融理論の専門家は今、研究戦略を変えることで対応しているのでしょうか。 流動性という言葉は、以前は汚い言葉として使われることはなく、学界ではあまり使われることはありませんでした。 そして今、危機の余波の中で、私たちはこのことについて学ぶ必要があると考え、データベースを開発することになりました。知的な変化のプロセスは始まっています それはゆっくりで、現実の世界の出来事に遅れをとっています 私がこの本で本当に伝えたいことは、思想が物質的な発展に遅れをとっているのはいつものことで、思想家、学者としての私たちの仕事は、できるだけその発展に近づけるように努力することです）
to appreciate their old thinking needs to be made new because the world is being made no everyday there were many traditional scholars that looked at the money markets who talked about budget or before that Henry Thornton or Ralph Hawtrey Denis Robertson the early John Maynard Keynes what happened to that so-called British banking school why did it evaporate from consciousness well this is a this is a story of intellectual history that you're you're asking certainly I identify myself as being in exactly that tradition those those names are the names that are in my pantheon and and on my bookshelf and the place where I and I very much see myself as trying to look at the world I tell my students all the time what would Badgett say if he were around today and looking out at the world and he knew a little bit of modern finance you know the instruments are different many of the issues are the same the technology is different we have computers and all of that and electronic exchanges but what would badges say today so that's the intellectual tradition that I myself am rooted in and I don't think it ever went completely away in the sense that there are people in central banks very much
I would say Charles Goodhart is very much in that in that in that tradition and and many people who actually are in the markets themselves are that tradition never sort of went away because it does engage with a certain reality that people in their jobs have to engage with where it went away was in academia okay where academia win a different direction and particularly in America I think maybe more so than then then in in the UK think where where the economics profession after World War Two re re oriented itself as a kind of technocratic policy discipline that's giving advice to the mandarins in Washington and from a scientific point of view and so taking it's taking our our hands out of the messy day to day of actual institutions and and historical understanding and having this abstract scientific approach that gets us above the fray that positioning of economics I think has a lot to do with how certain kinds of styles of analysis fell out of fell out of favor it's an interesting question because you say you get above the fray but you might miss the whole game if you don't understand the institutional content absolutely particularly as you say when you're giving scientific advice I think of it it's like medical diagnosis of the patient you're giving this to people in Washington who in charge of regulation if you miss specify the context and the institutional environment then you're not giving advice on the regulatory environment that exists diagnosing the patient without looking at the patient looking at the charts not not at the patient maybe not even the charts maybe a hypothetical vision of what a human being should be you raise a very interesting point that and during this crisis as you as I'm sure you recall the there was a big shift in that you know the money markets are collapsing and so the question is who knows something about the money markets can and who can give us advice about this and it turned out that most of the people who were most prominent in the policy circles didn't actually know anything about this so this was sort of my moment I happen to know something about this and so I got involved and was writing for the FT and and making some policy proposals and it was that that made Princeton press come to me and ask me do you think you have a book in you about this and that happened right after Lehman actually that so I say I was started to talk to my students about this in the fall of 2007 but it was the fall of 2008 okay when I got the contract to write this book and I I thought yes okay I think this book now needs to be written okay and we'll of course the crisis wasn't over yet and I got a bit distracted by and it's not over now I think it's continuing is continuing to run what do you see from your vantage point that leads you to suggest that the crisis is not over yet I think dodd-frank in particular the the legislation that was supposed to say it's all over go home nothing to see here has very much engaged with the banking system that we know about the traditional banking system and it's it's made some suggestions for reforming that and and and and tightening up but it's not really engaged with the modern with the shadow banking system with thee which is where the shift of our credit system from a bank lending system to a capital market system this is the big thing that's that's sort of happened in the in the last several decades and that requires an intellectual response that requires us now rethinking about the whole issue of regulation the whole issue of monetary policy for that matter in this new in this new world dodd-frank hardly touches that that new world and I think mostly because no one knew no one gave them advice you know these are these are congressmen making making policy and that's what that's the task ahead of us to develop some intellectual framework where we could give some good advice about what sort of what sort of framework would be necessary in order to make this brave new world of capital market credit system to make it work to make it safe to make it work for people to make it work for economic development.
well we're very glad you wrote the book and started us on that path to understanding and rebuilding this system as you've told me in private conversations over the months the securitization markets broke down and we went back and tried to fix the banking system while they interact people don't seem to have what you might call a good grasp of the interconnection between securitization banking or how shadow markets replicated a banking system and created what they used to call maturity transformation borrow short lend long and created the same instabilities that deposit insurance were designed to to eliminate so when I look at the new Lombard Street I'm very grateful that you've set us on the road of illuminating the structures the fault lines and the challenges that we see in this modern money market if there's any chance to diminish or avoid that next crisis I'm sure you all have contributed to it thanks very much thank you.
本「The New Lombard Street」の著者である Perry Mehrling との INET インタビューの完全版。
新しいロンバード・ストリートとは、現代の金融やウォール街などで現代の世界で金融市場が機能する方法であり、特に、危機の時にそれをサポートするFRBの役割について、この本に興味があります。ウォルター・パジェットの『ロンバードストリート』を参考にして、イングランド銀行のエナジー・シスターズを完全に研究した 1873 年が新しいものであり、古いロンバード・ストリートとして知られるようになることを願っていた 彼がこの本を書いた ロンバード・ストリート ロンドンの金融市場の説明それがこの本のインスピレーションであり、130年後の今、更新を書いています。それは本当にニューヨークのマネーマーケットとドルのマネーマーケットについてです。それはまさに私が心に留めている類似物です。そうです。金融市場に関する Martius Diggins の本のようなマニュアルが実際に語られているので、金融商品の組織的な詳細については、私の理解では、あなたはこの本を金融市場の文脈に当てはめようとしているのです。現代のマクロ経済学と金融理論における合理的な期待の時代に出現した金融市場の制度の蒸発を私たちがどのように見ているかをあなたが示そうとしている学術文献.私がやろうとしていることは正しい.銀行家の話を聞いてください。つまり、銀行家の話を聞いていたマーシャル スティッカムです。
この本はご存知のように思えますが、これらのマネー マーケットを取引する人々のためのデスク リファレンスですが、理論的な本ではないと分類することはまったく不可能です。これらの個々の市場についての制度的な本であり、反対側には、政策の合理的な期待に関する学術文献全体があります。そこから抽象化 世界がどのように機能するかの帰納的な理論 世界がどのように機能するか それが私がやっていることです 私は他の人に教えています私はそれを短期金融市場の歴史的および理論的見解に結び付けているので、金融市場の制度的構造を再導入すると、何がどのように行動するのか.お金と金融で起こっていることは、あなたが今提案したマクロの見方と比較して、実際に学問を支配しているはい、そうです、あなたが教授であるときに気付くことの1つは、マクロ経済理論のほとんどは、ほとんどの資料でさえさえあるということですお金と銀行と呼ばれる教科書でさえ、彼らはマネーマーケットからの要約であり、彼らは支払いシステムの実際の操作から実際の操作を抽象化していますが、レポ市場やユーロドル市場についての詳細な議論はまったくありません。知的に、経済学の専門家は、それはすべてただの配管問題であると判断しましたが、私たちはそうではありません.これに注意を払う必要はありません。それを要約すると、需要と供給、マネーの供給、マネーの需要、そのようなものでした。誰もがこの制度の詳細についてすべてを知っているわけではないので、それを続ける必要はありませんが、もちろん、現代の世代では、この制度の詳細について誰も知りません。そしてそれが私です」私がやろうとしているのは、現実とのつながりを取り戻すことです。なぜなら、私たちがこれらのツールを開発して以来、現実は大きく変化したからです 銀行のお金の教科書には、税金のお金はありません お金の教科書は、1955 年当時の場所から 10% 移動しましたが、付随する実際の組織2007 年 8 & 9 年に経験した出来事を見ると、金融市場は 360 度変化しました いわゆる危機 マクロ経済学の専門家はそれが来るとは考えておらず、説明もせず、完全に理解することさえしなかったと広く報告されていますあなたがこの本を書いたときに何が起こったのですか？
私にとって危機が始まったのは 2007 年の夏で、フィナンシャル タイムズでこれらのベア スターンズ ヘッジ ファンドの崩壊に気づいたときであり、これは 2007 年 9 月に私が銀行のクラスで夜通しお金について教え始めたときでした。金利はユーロドルレートとフェッドファンドレートとレポレートの間のスプレッドを混乱させていたので、システムの配管に非常に深刻な問題があることは非常に明白でした. 2007 年 9 月 1 日 私は、過去 10 年ほどにわたってこの並行シャドー バンキング システムを構築してきましたが、まだストレス テストを行っていないため、どこで問題が発生するかはわかりません。学期中にどこが壊れているかを見つけます。リアルタイムでそのテストをしている今、生徒たちは私が頭がおかしいと思った 多分初日だと思うが、1、2ヶ月後には私が神の心を読むことができるかもしれないと思ったが、私が本当に見たのは短期のお金のスプレッドと100 年前の経済学者がこれらの短期マネー スプレッドに注意を払っていたであろう種類のものを見て、マネー マーケットのストレスを明らかにし、それらのストレスがどこから来ているのか、そしてその種類を解釈する際にどのような行動があったのかを尋ねます。そのレンズを通して世界の出来事を リーマン・ブラザーズやその他の危機が満開になるのを見るとき、私はお金のレンズと呼んでいます。確かに経済学の専門家への推進力は現在、金融理論の専門家であり、流動性の崩壊または配管と呼ばれるものの崩壊と呼ばれるものを理解することです。配管工事への新たな関心 一部のサークルにはあると思います ここには分野横断的な影響があると思います 部分的には現時点でおそらく支配的な見方があります 危機は終わったので、通常どおりのビジネスに戻ることができますが、それはそうではありませんどこでもというわけではありません。今では、流動性について話している人がたくさんいます。その言葉は、以前は汚い言葉でした。資金調達の流動性とマーケティングの流動性市場の流動性の違いについて、そのような言葉を使用して学界で話すことができます。もちろん、現在、ドッドによって設立されている金融調査局のような新しい機関があります-率直に言うと、これまで収集されたことのないあらゆる種類の情報を収集することです。これは、有用または関連性があるとは考えられていなかったためです。今、危機の余波で、これについて学ぶ必要があると考えられているため、開発する予定です。データベースを開発するにつれて、それらのデータベースを理解するための理論を開発する必要があるので、知的変化のプロセスが始まったと思います.それは遅く、現実世界の出来事に遅れをとっています.それ'この本で私が実際に語っている話は、アイデアが物質的な発展に遅れをとっているということは常にあるということです。世界は毎日ではなくなっているので、彼らの古い考え方を新しくする必要があることを認識している 予算について話したり、
それ以前にヘンリー・ソーントンやラルフ・ホートリー、デニス・ロバートソン、初期のジョン・メイナード・ケインズに起こったこといわゆる英国の銀行学派はなぜそれが意識から消え去ったのか これはこれは知的歴史の物語です あなたはあなたです確かに私は自分自身をまさにその伝統の中にいると認識しています.それらの名前は私のパンテオンにある名前であり、私の本棚と私と私が自分自身を世界を見ようとしていると非常に見ている場所です.生徒に伝えます.もしバジェットが今日ここにいて世界に目を向けていたら、彼が現代の金融について少し知っていたとしたら、どんなことを言うでしょうか。ツールは異なります。問題の多くは同じですが、テクノロジーは異なります。私たちはコンピューターを持っており、それと電子的な交換ですが、バッジは今日何を言っているので、それは私自身が根付いている知的伝統であり、私はそうではありません.中央銀行に人々がいるという意味で、それが完全になくなったことはないと思います。
チャールズ・グッドハートは、その伝統に非常に深く関わっていると思います。実際に市場にいる多くの人々は、伝統は決して整理されません。仕事をしている人々が関与しなければならない特定の現実に関与しているからです. それがなくなった場所は学界でした.第二次世界大戦後の経済学の専門家が、ワシントンの官吏に科学的観点から助言を与えている一種のテクノクラティックな政策規律として自分自身を再構築した場所を考えてみてください。実際の制度や歴史的理解の乱雑な日々から私たちの手を離し、この抽象的な科学的アプローチを持つことで、経済学の位置付けが特定の種類の分析スタイルの方法と大きく関係していると私は思いますあなたは争いを乗り越えたと言うので、興味深い質問ですが、特に科学的アドバイスをするときに言うように、制度の内容を完全に理解していないと、ゲーム全体を見逃す可能性があります。それは患者の医学的診断のようなものです.これをワシントンの規制担当者に与えているのです.文脈と制度的環境を指定し忘れた場合は.存在する規制環境についてアドバイスを与えていない 患者を見ずに患者を診断する チャートを見ている 患者ではなく、チャートでさえないかもしれない 人間がどうあるべきかについての仮説的なビジョン あなたは非常に興味深い点を提起しますそして、この危機の間に、金融市場が崩壊していることを知っているという点で大きな変化があったことを覚えていると思います.政策サークルで最も著名な人々のほとんどはそうではないことが判明した.これについては実際には何も知らないので、たまたまこれについて何かを知った瞬間だったので、私は関与して FT に寄稿し、いくつかの政策提案を行っていました。これについての本を持っていると思いますか、それは実際にリーマンショックの直後に起こったので、2007 年の秋にこれについて生徒たちに話し始めたと言いますが、2008 年の秋でした。この本を書く契約を結んで、私はそう思いました。この本は今、大丈夫だと思います。もちろん、危機はまだ終わっていません。少し気が散りましたが、まだ終わっていないと思いますあなたの視点から見て、危機はまだ終わっていないことを示唆するものはありますか?率直に言って、特に、すべてが終わったと言うはずだった法律は、ここで見るものは何もありません。私たちが伝統的な銀行システムについて知っている銀行システムに非常に関与しており、それを改革し、強化するためのいくつかの提案を行っていますが、実際には、影の銀行システムを使用して現代とは関与していません。私たちの信用システムが銀行融資システムから資本市場システムに移行したことは大きな問題です。これは過去数十年の間に起こったことであり、それには知的対応が必要であり、規制の問題全体について今再考する必要があります。この新しい世界では、この問題に関する金融政策の問題全体について、ドッド・フランクはほとんど触れていません。その新しい世界と私は主に誰も彼らにアドバイスを与えていないことを誰も知らなかったからだと思います.これらは国会議員であり、政策を策定しています.資本市場信用システムのこの勇敢な新世界を機能させ、人々が安全に機能し、経済発展のために機能させるためには、どのような枠組みが必要なのか。
あなたが本を書き、このシステムを理解し、再構築するための道を歩み始めたことを非常にうれしく思います彼らが相互作用している間、人々は、証券化銀行間の相互関係、またはシャドーマーケットがどのように銀行システムを複製し、満期変換と呼んでいたものを作成したかについて、あなたが言うかもしれないことをよく理解していないようです。預金保険は排除するように設計されていたので、新しいロンバードストリートを見ると、この現代の金融市場で見られる断層線と課題の構造を明らかにする道にあなたが私たちを導いてくれたことに非常に感謝しています. 'その次の危機を
軽減または回避するチャンスはありません。皆さんがそれに貢献してくれたと確信しています。
very very much so
5:14
today's story about that the the crisis
5:17
began for me in the summer of 2007 when
5:21
I was noticing in the Financial Times
5:23
the collapse of these Bear Stearns hedge
5:25
funds and in this in September of 2007
5:28
when I started to teach my money in
5:29
banking class the overnight interest
5:32
rates were going haywire the spreads
5:35
between euro dollar rates and and Fed
5:37
Funds rates and repo rates so it was
5:39
very clear to me that something was very
5:41
deeply amiss in the plumbing of the of
5:43
the system and I told my students I
5:47
remember that very first day September
5:48
2007 I said we've been building this
5:51
parallel shadow banking system over the
5:53
over the last decade or so and it hasn't
5:56
been through a stress test yet and so we
5:58
don't know where it's gonna break and I
6:00
predict you this semester we're gonna
6:01
find out where it breaks you know we're
6:03
doing that test in real time right now
6:05
students thought I was crazy I think
6:08
maybe the first day but after a month or
6:11
two they thought maybe I could read the
6:13
mind of God but all I was really looking
6:15
at was the short term money spreads and
6:17
seeing the kind of thing that an
6:20
economist a hundred years ago would have
6:22
been paying attention to these
6:23
short-term money spreads revealing
6:25
stresses in the in the money market and
6:27
asking where are those stresses coming
6:29
from and what kind of actions are in
6:32
interpreting the kinds of events
6:34
the world through through that lens the
6:36
lens that I call the money view lens
6:47
when you see the crisis in full bloom
6:51
the Lehman Brothers and others it's
6:56
certainly an impetus to the economics
6:57
profession now are in the finance Theory
6:59
profession to understand what you might
7:02
call breakdowns in liquidity or
7:04
breakdowns in what you call the plumbing
7:06
are you seeing the profession responding
7:10
in changing research strategies looking
7:13
at some of these is there a renewed
7:15
interest in the plumbing I think there
7:19
is in some circles I think there's
7:22
there's a cross-cutting influences here
7:24
okay partly there is probably the
7:28
dominant view at the moment is the
7:30
crisis is over we can go back to
7:32
business as usual but that's not that's
7:36
not everywhere okay there are plenty of
7:38
people now talking about about liquidity
7:41
using that word okay which didn't used
7:43
to be used to be a dirty word you didn't
7:45
get to get to speak in academic circles
7:47
using using words like that talking
7:50
about the difference between funding
7:52
liquidity and marketing liquid market
7:53
liquidity and of course we're now having
7:56
these new institutions like the Office
7:58
of Financial Research that's being set
8:00
up by dodd-frank which is to collect all
8:02
kinds of information that never was
8:04
collected before because it was not
8:06
thought to be useful or relevant okay
8:08
and now in the aftermath of the crisis
8:10
it is thought we need to learn about
8:12
this so we're going to be developing
8:14
databases and as we develop databases
8:16
we're gonna have to be developing
8:18
theories to make sense of those
8:19
databases so I think it's begun the
8:22
process of intellectual change has has
8:26
begun it's it's it's slow and it and it
8:29
lags behind events in the real world
8:31
that's that's the story I really tell in
8:35
the book okay is that it's always the
8:37
case that in that ideas are lagging
8:39
behind material developments and so our
8:43
job as
8:45
as thinkers as academics is is to try to
8:49
get as close to the development of as we
8:52
can to appreciate their old thinking
8:55
needs to be made new because the world
8:57
is being made no everyday there were
9:09
many traditional scholars that looked at
9:11
the money markets who talked about
9:12
budget or before that Henry Thornton or
9:15
Ralph Hawtrey Denis Robertson the early
9:20
John Maynard Keynes what happened to
9:22
that so-called British banking school
9:24
why did it evaporate from consciousness
9:28
well this is a this is a story of
9:33
intellectual history that you're you're
9:35
asking certainly I identify myself as
9:38
being in exactly that tradition those
9:40
those names are the names that are in my
9:42
pantheon and and on my bookshelf and the
9:45
place where I and I very much see myself
9:47
as trying to look at the world I tell my
9:51
students all the time
9:52
what would Badgett say if he were around
9:54
today and looking out at the world and
9:56
he knew a little bit of modern finance
9:58
you know the instruments are different
9:59
many of the issues are the same the
10:02
technology is different we have
10:03
computers and all of that and electronic
10:05
exchanges but what would badges say
10:07
today so that's the intellectual
10:08
tradition that I myself am rooted in and
10:13
I don't think it ever went completely
10:15
away in the sense that there are people
10:16
in central banks very much I would say
10:19
Charles Goodhart is very much in that in
10:21
that in that tradition and and many
10:24
people who actually are in the markets
10:27
themselves are that tradition never sort
10:30
of went away because it does engage with
10:32
a certain reality that people in their
10:35
jobs have to engage with where it went
10:37
away was in academia okay where academia
10:40
win a different direction and
10:42
particularly in America I think maybe
10:45
more so than then then in in the UK
10:48
think where where the economics
10:50
profession after World War Two re re
10:54
oriented itself as a kind of
10:57
technocratic policy
10:59
discipline that's giving advice to the
11:01
mandarins in Washington and from a
11:04
scientific point of view and so taking
11:07
it's taking our our hands out of the
11:10
messy day to day of actual institutions
11:12
and and historical understanding and
11:15
having this abstract scientific approach
11:17
that gets us above the fray that
11:20
positioning of economics I think has a
11:23
lot to do with how certain kinds of
11:26
styles of analysis fell out of fell out
11:29
of favor it's an interesting question
11:40
because you say you get above the fray
11:43
but you might miss the whole game if you
11:45
don't understand the institutional
11:47
content absolutely particularly as you
11:49
say when you're giving scientific advice
11:51
I think of it it's like medical
11:54
diagnosis of the patient you're giving
11:57
this to people in Washington who in
11:58
charge of regulation if you miss specify
12:01
the context and the institutional
12:03
environment then you're not giving
12:06
advice on the regulatory environment
12:08
that exists diagnosing the patient
12:10
without looking at the patient looking
12:13
at the charts not not at the patient
12:16
maybe not even the charts maybe a
12:19
hypothetical vision of what a human
12:21
being should be you raise a very
12:22
interesting point that and during this
12:26
crisis as you as I'm sure you recall the
12:30
there was a big shift in that you know
12:33
the money markets are collapsing and so
12:36
the question is who knows something
12:37
about the money markets can and who can
12:39
give us advice about this and it turned
12:41
out that most of the people who were
12:43
most prominent in the policy circles
12:45
didn't actually know anything about this
12:47
so this was sort of my moment I happen
12:50
to know something about this and so I
12:53
got involved and was writing for the FT
12:56
and and making some policy proposals and
13:00
it was that that made Princeton press
13:02
come to me and ask me do you think you
13:04
have a book in you about this and that
13:07
happened right after Lehman
13:08
actually that so I say I was started to
13:10
talk to my students about this
13:11
in the fall of 2007 but it was the fall
13:14
of 2008 okay when I got the contract to
13:17
write this book and I I thought yes okay
13:20
I think this book now needs to be
13:22
written okay and we'll of course the
13:26
crisis wasn't over yet and I got a bit
13:28
distracted by and it's not over now I
13:30
think it's continuing is continuing to
13:32
run what do you see from your vantage
13:43
point that leads you to suggest that the
13:46
crisis is not over yet
13:47
I think dodd-frank in particular the the
13:50
legislation that was supposed to say
13:53
it's all over
13:54
go home nothing to see here has very
13:58
much engaged with the banking system
14:00
that we know about the traditional
14:02
banking system and it's it's made some
14:04
suggestions for reforming that and and
14:07
and and tightening up but it's not
14:09
really engaged with the modern with the
14:12
shadow banking system with thee
14:14
which is where the shift of our credit
14:18
system from a bank lending system to a
14:20
capital market system this is the big
14:22
thing that's that's sort of happened in
14:26
the in the last several decades and that
14:28
requires an intellectual response that
14:30
requires us now rethinking about the
14:32
whole issue of regulation the whole
14:34
issue of monetary policy for that matter
14:36
in this new in this new world
14:39
dodd-frank hardly touches that that new
14:41
world and I think mostly because no one
14:46
knew no one gave them advice you know
14:48
these are these are congressmen making
14:51
making policy and that's what that's the
14:54
task ahead of us to develop some
14:56
intellectual framework where we could
14:58
give some good advice about what sort of
15:00
what sort of framework would be
15:03
necessary in order to make this brave
15:05
new world of capital market credit
15:08
system to make it work to make it safe
15:10
to make it work for people to make it
15:11
work for economic development
15:14
well we're very glad you wrote the book
15:16
and started us on that path to
15:18
understanding and rebuilding this system
15:21
as you've told me in private
15:23
conversations over the months the
15:26
securitization markets broke down and we
15:28
went back and tried to fix the banking
15:30
system while they interact people don't
15:34
seem to have what you might call a good
15:38
grasp of the interconnection between
15:40
securitization banking or how shadow
15:43
markets replicated a banking system and
15:46
created what they used to call maturity
15:48
transformation borrow short lend long
15:51
and created the same instabilities that
15:53
deposit insurance were designed to to
15:56
eliminate so when I look at the new
15:59
Lombard Street I'm very grateful that
16:01
you've set us on the road of
16:03
illuminating the structures the fault
16:05
lines and the challenges that we see in
16:07
this modern money market if there's any
16:10
chance to diminish or avoid that next
16:13
crisis I'm sure you all have contributed
16:14
to it thanks very much thank you
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