2023年3月5日日曜日

Problems With Measuring Inequality – Economics from the Top Down

Problems With Measuring Inequality – Economics from the Top Down

Problems With Measuring Inequality

Intersecting Lorenz Curves

Economists often talk about income inequality the same way a doctor would talk about a child's height. Just as a doctor would say "Sylvia continues to grow taller", economists say things like "US income inequality continues to grow". (Full disclosure, I'm sure I've said similar things).

On the surface, there seems to be nothing wrong with this type of pronouncement. But when we look under the hood of inequality measurements, there are some serious problems. Unlike height, inequality has no unambiguous dimension. Inequality is something that we must define before we can measure it. We must decide how we will reduce a complex distribution of income to a single number.

The problem is that a single inequality metric cannot tell us about the shape of the income distribution. And as I hope to show here, this shape is important. It determines where the inequality is located.

Inequality at the bottom vs. inequality at the top

To illustrate the problems with measuring inequality, I'm going to look at two hypothetical societies. Both have a Gini index of 0.6, which is roughly the same as the present-day United States (using data from the World Inequality Database). If you're not familiar, the Gini index is a popular measure of inequality that ranges from 0 (no inequality) to 1 (maximum inequality). So a Gini index of 0.6 is quite large.

The point of this example is to show that the Gini index alone tells us very little about inequality. Why? Because the Gini index doesn't tell us where the inequality is located. I've created one society to have income inequality at the bottom of the distribution, among the poor. The other society has inequality at the top of the distribution, among the rich. [1]

Let's look at the difference between these two societies.

The probability density of income

We'll begin by looking at the probability density of income. 'Probability density' is a fancy way of saying 'the proportion of people with a given income'. In our density plot, income size is shown on the x-axis. On the y-axis we plot the relative number of people with the given income. The higher the y-value of the density curve, the greater the proportion of people with the given income.

Density Plot
Figure 1: Income density plots for a society with inequality at the bottom and a society with inequality at the top

Figure 1 shows the income density curves for our two societies. I've made the median income of both societies equal to 1. So a value of 3 on the x-axis indicates an income that is 3 times the median.

Figure 1A shows a society with inequality at the bottom of the distribution. Figure 1B shows a society with inequality at the top of the distribution. By construction these two societies have the same Gini index. But that's about all that they have in common.

Other measures of inequality are shockingly different. Let's look at the top 1% income share. In Figure 1A, the top 1% of earners take home 7.5% of all income. But in Figure 1B, the top 1% earn over 31% of all income. Bottom income shares are also radically different. In Figure 1A, the bottom 10% of earners take home just 0.1% of all income. But in Figure 1B, the bottom 10% earn 2.6% of all income.

Think about these results. We have three different measures of inequality that each give contradictory results. According to the Gini index, both societies have the same inequality. But according to the top 1% share, the society with inequality at the bottom has less inequality than the society with inequality at the top. But if we measure inequality using the bottom 10% share, the reverse seems to be true.

At this point, I hope your head is spinning. How can three different measures of inequality show three (seemingly) contradictory results? To answer this question we need to look at how our two societies differ.

Differing Class Structure

If you go back to Figure 1, you'll see that I've divided our hypothetical societies into three classes: low income, middle class, and high income. Yes, this class scheme is arbitrary. But it's useful to illustrate the difference between our two societies.

I've used the income thresholds adopted by US statisticians. Individuals with income that is less than 60% of the median are classified as "low income". Individuals with income between 60% and 200% of the median income are classified as "middle class". And individuals with income that is greater than 200% of the median are classified as "high income".

Using these class divisions, let's look at the differences between our two societies. We'll start with class size. Figure 2 shows the proportion of people in each class:

Class Size
Figure 2: Relative class size in our two societies.

In our society with inequality at the bottom (Fig. 2A), the three classes are about the same size. But in our society with inequality at the top (Fig. 2B), the vast majority of people are middle class. The take home is that these two societies are very different.

Next, we'll look at the Gini index within the different classes of each society. Here's the result:

Inequality by Class
Figure 3: The Gini index within each class of our two societies.

Now you can see the difference between having inequality at the bottom of the distribution versus having inequality at the top. When there is inequality at the bottom (Figure 3A), the Gini index is greatest among individuals with low income. But when there is inequality at the top (Figure 3B), the Gini index is greatest among individuals with high income. [2]

The full income distribution in log-scale glory

To really understand the difference between our two societies, we need to look at the income distributions using a logarithmic transformation.

Under a log transformation, the numbers 1, 10, 100, and 1000 become 0, 1, 2, and 3 (respectively). This transformation compresses the distribution, allowing us to better see both the left and right tails. Seeing these tails is important, because that's where the inequality lives.

Using a log transformation, let's replot our income density curves from Figure 1. On the x-axis, we plot the logarithm of income. On the y-axis, we plot the logarithm of income density. Using this transformation, our density curves now look like this:

Log Density Plot
Figure 4: Income density of our two societies using a log transformation.

This log transformation compresses the middle of the distribution (look at how squished the middle class becomes) and highlights the income distribution tails. And yes, I do mean tails (plural). Income distributions have a tail on both the left side (small incomes) and the right side (large incomes). A log density plot highlights both tails.

What matters for inequality is the 'fatness' of each tail. A 'fatter' tail means more inequality. On a log density plot, the fatness of the tail is indicated by the slope of the curve. A shallower slope indicates a fatter tail, meaning more inequality. A steeper slope indicates a thinner tail, meaning less inequality.

With this in mind, lets analyze the trends in Figure 4. Our society with inequality at the bottom has a fat left tail and a thin right tail (Fig. 4A). So in this society, inequality is concentrated at the bottom of the distribution. In our society with inequality at the top, the opposite is true. This society has a thin left tail and a fat right tail (Fig. 4B). So almost all of the inequality occurs at the top of the distribution.

To conclude, both of these income distributions have fat tails, which is why they both have a large Gini index. But one has a fat left tail and one has a fat right tail. So despite having the same Gini index, these societies are very different.

Why the Gini Index is blind to the 'location' of inequality

I hope I've convinced you that there are fundamental problems with using the Gini index by itself. The Gini index gives a measure of how much inequality there is. But it gives no indication about where the inequality lives. To understand this problem, we need to understand how the Gini index is constructed.

The Gini index is defined by something called the 'Lorenz curve'. The Lorenz curve is a way of visualizing how income size relates to the share of total income.

To make a Lorenz curve, we put everyone's income in ascending order (from smallest income to largest income). Then we calculate the percentile of each income (it's rank in percentage terms). Next, we calculate the share of income held by all individuals below each percentile. To make the Lorenz curve, we plot the income percentile on the x-axis and the cumulative share of income on the y-axis. Here's an example.

Lorenz Curve
Figure 5: The Lorenz curve.

To make sense of a given Lorenz curve, we usually compare it to the Lorenz curve for a perfectly equal society. In such a society, the income share held by each percentile is the same as the percentile itself. For instance, the bottom 10% of individuals will earn 10% of all income, the bottom 90% will earn 90% of all income, and so on. In a perfectly equal society, the Lorenz curve is a straight line (the dotted line in Figure 5).

The Gini index is proportional to the area between the observed Lorenz curve and the Lorenz curve for a perfectly equal society. The larger this area, the larger the Gini index.

Gini Index
Figure 6: Defining the Gini index using the Lorenz curve.

Here's the problem with the Gini index. It tells us about the size of the area between the given Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality. But the Gini index doesn't tell us about the shape of this area. And the shape, I argue, is important.

Now that we've defined the Gini index, let's look at the Lorenz curves in our two hypothetical societies:

Intersecting Lorenz curves
Figure 7: The Lorenz curves of our two societies.

Our two societies have the same Gini index because they have the same area between their respective Lorenz curves and the line of perfect equality (Figs 7A & 7B). Yet the shapes of the two Lorenz curves are very different.

The way to interpret the Lorenz curve is to look at its vertical distance from the line of perfect inequality. The greater this distance, the greater the inequality at the given income.

In our society with inequality at the bottom, the Lorenz curve is far from the line of perfect inequality at the bottom of the distribution. In our society with inequality at the top, the Lorenz curve is far from the line of perfect inequality at the top of the distribution.

Note that our two Lorenz curves intersect one another (Fig. 7C). When this happens, it means that different measures of inequality will give conflicting results about which society is more unequal. When Lorenz curves intersect, we cannot rely on any single measure of inequality. To get the whole story of inequality, we need to use multiple metrics.

Safety nets vs. income caps

My discussion so far has been quite technical. I've tried to show you how two very different societies can still have the same Gini index. Now I'l reflect on what these hypothetical societies mean for the real world.

An income cap, but no safety net

Let's start with our society that has inequality at the bottom. In real-world terms, this is a society with no social safety net. If you live in this society, there is no limit to how poor you can be. To give this context, suppose this society had a median income of $40,000 — about the same as the US. The minimum income in this society would be about a 0.01 cents. So the poor are starving to death.

But while this society allows extreme poverty, it also limits large incomes. In simple terms, we can think of this as an income cap. If the median income was $40,000, the maximum income in this society would be about 1.7 million dollars. In other words, our 'inequality at the bottom' society has no billionaires and virtually no millionaires. To summarize, it is a society with an income cap but no safety net

A safety net, but no income cap

In contrast, our society with inequality at the top has a strong social safety net. If the median income was $40,000, the minimum income would be about $20,000. In effect, this society has a guaranteed basic income.

But while this society has is a strong safety net, it is still very unequal because it allows stupendously large incomes. If the median income was $40,000, the maximum income would be about 600 million dollars. This society is rife with millionaires and, and has plenty of billionaires. [3]

Despite having the same Gini index, our two societies are very different. One limits top incomes, but allows the poor to starve. The other has a universal basic income, but doesn't limit excess at the top.

Which is worse: inequality at the bottom or at the top?

Here's an interesting question. If two societies have the same Gini index, is it more corrosive to have inequality at the bottom or at the top? To my knowledge this question hasn't been researched. (If it has, leave a comment and dispel my ignorance).

Although I don't pretend to have definitive answers, we can get some insight into this question if we reframe it slightly. Is it better to have a safety net or a salary cap? Judging by the use of these policies, inequality at the bottom may be more corrosive.

Many societies have safety nets. They use policies like a minimum wage, welfare, unemployment insurance, and so on. But very few (if any) societies have implemented income caps. (Again, if you know of a society with an income cap, leave a comment).

Professional sports leagues are the only example of a salary cap that I can think of. But note that these leagues cap the income of players. They wouldn't dream of limiting the income of team owners. If anything, the salary cap on players increases the income of owners.

Does the ubiquity of social safety nets (and the lack of real-world income caps) mean that inequality at the bottom is more corrosive than inequality at the top? Probably. At the very least, it means that implementing a safety net is more politically palatable than capping incomes. Few people are willing to tolerate starvation in the midst of plenty. But if their own income is tolerable, many people will ignore the excesses of the rich.

Inequality: Both 'how much' and 'where'

I hope this post has given you some insight into the problems with measuring inequality using a single number. A single measure does not tell us about the location of the inequality.

Now, sometimes this location may not be important. Suppose one society has a Gini index of 0.2 and the other has a Gini index of 0.8. The difference in Gini indexes is so large that the location of inequality (in each society) isn't very important. But as Gini indexes get closer together, the location of inequality becomes important.

To understand this location, we need to use multiple measures of inequality. Fortunately, this is now easy to do. For many countries, the World Inequality Database publishes enough data that we can construct almost any inequality metric we want.

To conclude, we need to move beyond the simple idea that 'inequality' can be captured by a single number. In reality, inequality is a complex phenomenon that deserves non-reductive analysis.


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Notes

[1] If you're a math person, I've used a gamma distribution to generate the income distribution with inequality at the bottom. I've used a power-law distribution to generate the income distribution with inequality at the top. I've added little bit of Gaussian noise to the power-law to make it a bit more realistic. A pure power-law has cut off at the bottom of the distribution. I've added noise to smooth this cut off.

[2] Some of you may be thinking — hey, those class-based Gini indexes in Figure 3 don't add up to the Gini index of the whole society. True! This is because the Gini index is not 'additive'. If we merge two classes, one with a Gini index of 0.4 and one with a Gini index of 0.2, the resulting society won't have a Gini index of 0.6. We can't add Gini indexes. So the results in Figure 3 are not a contradiction.

[3] We usually define millionaires and billionaires in terms of wealth, not income. But it's not hard to convert between income and wealth. The very rich mostly earn income from property. So income is the return to wealth. If the return to capital is 10%, someone with $10 million in assets would earn $1 million. With the same rate of return, you'd need $6 billion to earn $600 million.

2023年3月3日金曜日

mihana@ヤンキー経世済民漫画さんのツイート Neo-chartalist or Marxist Vision of the Modern Money? Critical Comparison Damian Winczewski 2020



マルクス主義が信用貨幣論を理解しないのはカレツキの読みが浅いからだ。
カレツキは完全雇用論だけ書いたのではない。

残念ながら貨幣鋳造費用を重視するマルクス主義はマネタリストに近い。

階級闘争の強調は単なるアリバイ作りに過ぎない。キーンのようにグッドウィルを読むべきだ。
労働組合と協同組合の利益が相反する場合について彼らは考えもしない。
キーンはグッドウィルの説を強調する。
集合力は相対的剰余価値に格下げされたからだ。
国債の利子が富裕層へのBIであるというMMTの考えは本来ならマルクス(複利を責めることなく認識だけ指摘していた)を補完する。
信用貨幣論を理解していて尚且つ集合力を本質と捉えたプルードンへ帰るべきだろう。




Neo-chartalist or Marxist Vision of the Modern Money? Critical Comparison Damian Winczewski


https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/77950408/RICT_A_1966641_PROOF_Neochartalist_MMT-libre.pdf?1641229349=&response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DNeo_chartalist_or_Marxist_Vision_of_the.pdf&Expires=1677818160&Signature=bBwAABsZ8IeMC~MLegYXlgxuJ81WAnhO31x~P6-mewQK3IQWBuGZMUOn-0aYgtE1lVne6EOVrWXdtVG35IWARK23-pBLuVRgXupXVQmVwdPhZNhOmhwZeeLxgkrhyCMg0gGZ-P1y0c5sIO5qZXAE4mtCq7yXBeDVVD8aZ-D5YpFz~XPi-t8k83lmHAU0vfZfD9DHb4FEas-nnvFiHoN7XF7Kc4iVozg1FRFyvjmW5ZbFJx3m4I9Nwy2fIBkrRRbt34GHVk-ROYiuO5dKrzDHcORaGYvxoShB4H6VSfMep8GYDkmfYu-bv-0UUQIagm6dqEAVdMEf1zzswKdmYgQyYQ__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA


Thus, the affirmation of MMT's reductionist position in the descriptive aspect may lead to serious complications in the normative aspect, i.e., the loss of the state's control over money, or it may reward countries such as the United States, which, due to their position, may force other countries to submit to their financial system (Lapavitsas 2014), which has a positive impact on demand for their currency. (3) Moreover, state-centred MMT actually deprives the working class of subjectivity and denotes its passive role. Thus, the important role of class struggle for the distribution of national income, indicated by Michał Kalecki (1980a), is ignored, the weakness of workers' organizations enables capitalists to increase their rate of profit. Although MMTsupporters proclaim a break with the fetish of a continuous GDP growth (Wray and Tymoigne2013), they do not see any objective obstacles to maintaining a progressive economic policy in capitalism, treating it as a problem of adequate money supply (Andresen 2013). Kalecki's realism is alien to them. He predicted that capitalists would not want to lose control over employment and wages, so they would take all measures to counteract the reform of capitalism (Kalecki 1980b). However, recently some MMT defenders sympathetic to Marxism were arguing that Kalecki's argument actually strengthens their viewpoint: "Kalecki contends that popularization of the 'doctrine of full employment' destroys the capitalist's knee-jerk arguments regarding budgetary crisis and inflation. What remains is the power struggle we all agree wemustfight[for control over central banks]" (Tankus et al. 2019). Although this view is right, it is difficult to deduce it from the neo-chartalists' works without prior knowledge of Marxist literature. Meanwhile, taking into account the dynamics of the relationship between work and capital is crucial to understand why a reform of capitalism consisting in maintaining full employment and stable prices by a "progressive" state apparatus is a fantasy until the power of capital is overthrown. In Shaikh's theory, creating money and increasing budget deficit increases the purchasing power of workers, which has a positive effect on aggregate demand. If the purchasing power of the working class "pumped" by the state increases at the expense of capitalists, it may lead to a reduction in the profit rate and a reduction in the supply of good by capitalists, which in turn leads to an increase in unemployment andinflation, and hypothetically even to stagflation. Thus, in capitalism a progressive economic policy and a stable growth are always limited by the criterion of profitability (Shaikh 2016, 702–745; Johnson 2018). In this sense, the reductionism of neo-chartalism means that, although the norms it recommends with respect to an economic policy are legitimate, they are limited by the production relations in capitalism. Thus, the hope of stabilizing the dynamics of this system may turn out to be vain.


Kalecki, M. 1980a. "Walka klas a podział dochodu narodowego" [Class Struggle and the Distribution of National Income]. In Dzieła, vol. 2, by M. Kalecki, 126–134. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. 

Kalecki, M. 1980b. "Polityczne aspekty pełnego zatrudnienia" [Political Aspects of Full Employment]. In Dzieła, vol. 1, by M. Kalecki, 339–349. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. 


したがって、記述的側面においてMMTの還元主義的立場を肯定することは、規範的側面において深刻な複雑化、すなわち、国家による貨幣支配の喪失をもたらすかもしれないし、米国のように、その立場上、他国を自国の金融システムに従わせ(Lapavitsas 2014)、通貨需要にプラスの影響を及ぼす国に報いるかもしれないのである。(3) さらに、国家中心のMMTは、実際には労働者階級から主体性を奪い、その受動的な役割を否定している。したがって、Michał Kalecki (1980a)が指摘した国民所得分配のための階級闘争の重要な役割は無視され、労働者組織の弱さが資本家の利潤率向上を可能にする。MMT支持者は、GDPの連続成長というフェティッシュな考え方との決別を宣言しているが(Wray and Tymoigne2013)、資本主義において進歩的な経済政策を維持するための客観的な障害は見られず、適切な通貨供給の問題として扱っている(Andresen 2013)。カレッキのリアリズムは彼らにとって異質なものである。彼は、資本家は雇用と賃金のコントロールを失いたくないので、資本主義の改革に対抗するためにあらゆる手段を講じるだろうと予測した(Kalecki 1980b)。しかし、最近、マルクス主義に共鳴するMMT擁護論者の中には、カレッキの議論はむしろ彼らの視点を強めるものであると主張している。「カレッキは、『完全雇用の教義』の普及が、予算危機とインフレに関する資本家の膝を打つ議論を破壊すると主張している。残るのは、われわれ全員が同意する権力闘争(中央銀行の支配権争い)である」(Tankus et al.2019)。この見解は正しいが、マルクス主義文献の予備知識なしにネオ・シャルタリストの著作から推論するのは難しい。一方、「進歩的」な国家機構による完全雇用と物価の安定維持からなる資本主義の改革が、資本の権力が打倒されるまでの幻想である理由を理解するには、労働と資本の関係のダイナミクスを考慮することが重要である。シャイクの理論では、貨幣を作り財政赤字を拡大することは、労働者の購買力を高め、総需要にプラスの効果をもたらす。国家によって「汲み上げられた」労働者階級の購買力が資本家の犠牲の上に増大すれば、利潤率の低下や資本家による財の供給の減少を招き、その結果、失業率の上昇やインフレ、仮にスタグフレーションに至る可能性もある。このように、資本主義においては、進歩的な経済政策や安定した成長は、常に収益性の基準によって制限される(Shaikh 2016, 702-745; Johnson 2018)。その意味で、ネオ・シャルタリズムの還元主義とは、経済政策に関して推奨する規範は正当であるが、それは資本主義における生産関係によって制限されることを意味する。したがって、このシステムのダイナミクスを安定させるという希望は、むなしいものとなってしまうかもしれない。

ルービニ 動画 2023/03/03 Nouriel Roubini warns of stagflation crisis as interest rate surge sinks economy, not inflation - ABC News

Nouriel Roubini warns of stagflation crisis as interest rate surge sinks economy, not inflation - ABC News

米国を拠点とする経済学者ヌーリエル・ルービニである「ドゥーム博士」と呼ばれる男は、世界は「労働者にとって世界の中で最悪の世界」となる高インフレ、金利の上昇、景気後退の「完璧な嵐」に直面していると警告している。

オーストラリアの従業員は、すでにルービニ博士の議論に感謝しているかもしれません。

今週の統計局の国民会計によると、インフレ調整時給が5.4%急落したため、一人当たりの実質世帯可処分所得は5四半期連続で減少し、実質賃金は2012年の水準からほとんど変わらなかった。

多くのオーストラリア人にとって、価格が上昇し続けても経済が縮小している状況であるスタグフレーションがすでにここにあるように感じるかもしれません。

しかし、ルービニ博士は、年が展開するにつれて、いわゆる先進国全体で事態がはるかに悪化すると予想しています。

ヌリエル・ルービニは部屋に座っている
ヌリエル・ルービニは、世界的な金融危機を事前に警告したと評価されている経済学者の一人です。7.30 レポート)

「このスタグフレーション率の危機が今年発生すると信じています」と彼はThe Businessに語った。

「米国とヨーロッパ、および他の先進国からのインフレに関する最新の数字は、インフレが今非常に粘着性であることを示した。

「中央銀行は、インフレと戦うためにもっと金利を上げなければならないため、ジレンマに陥っています。しかし、もし彼らがそうするなら、経済はすぐに縮小し始めるでしょう、そして彼らがそうしないなら、私たちはインフレとインフレ期待の脱アンカーを持つことができます。

「だから、インフレ率が2%に戻っていない時期に、米国とヨーロッパ、他の先進国で不況が予想されます。」

「大きなスタグフレーション債務危機」

1970年代から1980年代初頭にかけて世界が耐えた庭の品種のスタグフレーションよりも悪いことに、ルービニ博士はこれが「大きなスタグフレーション債務危機」に進化すると予想しています - 70年代の最悪の要素のいくつかと世界的な金融危機を組み合わせています。

「今、私たちは完璧な嵐に直面している - インフレ、不況、スタグフレーション、潜在的な債務危機」と彼は警告した。

「先進国の債務比率は[1970年代に]GDPの100%に過ぎず、今日では民間および公的債務でGDPの420%です。

「ですから、この場合、原油価格を言うようなショックがある場合、インフレだけでなく、不況とスタグフレーションだけでなく、私が大きなスタグフレーション債務危機と呼ぶものを得ることができます。なぜなら、金利が非常に高いため、その[債務]比率は持続不可能になったからです。」

経済的なコンセンサスは、インフレがピークに達し、今年と来年も緩和し続けるということですが、ルービニ博士は、インフレショックはまだ終わっていないと警告するアナリストの少数派グループの一人であり、定着するリスクがあります。

「ゴールドマン・サックスは、エネルギーだけでなく、その全体の商品価格が今年43%上昇する可能性があると予測している」と彼は観察した。

「これは、イスラエルとイランの間の中東での戦争がなくてもです。商品価格の急騰が発生した場合、ヘッドラインインフレは低くなるどころか高くなるだろう。

「労働者にとって世界の中で最悪の」

彼は、連邦準備制度理事会や他の中央銀行は、経済が不況に陥るまで金利を引き上げ続け、最終的にはインフレを目標レベルに戻そうとすることを「打ち負かされる」ことを余儀なくされると信じています。

「2%のインフレ目標を達成するためには、FRBファンド金利が確実に6%以上でなければならないと思う」とルービニ博士は主張した。

「しかし、金利を6%に引き上げると、本当のハードランディングになります。

「その後、金融市場も暴落し、株式市場が厳しく修正され、債券が高くなり、民間部門による借入のための信用スプレッドが上昇するため、深刻な財政的苦痛に陥ります。

「その財政的苦痛は不況をより深刻にし、収入と生産量の縮小によるより深刻な不況は、家計、企業、企業、さらには一部の金融機関や深刻な債務問題を抱えている貧しい国の一部の政府による債務不履行の数を増加させるだろう。」

ルービニ博士はまた、働く人々は、仕事を維持する人々を含め、迫り来る危機によって最も大きな打撃を受ける可能性が高いと警告した。

「雇用の喪失、失業、労働市場の弱さ、賃金がインフレよりも低くなっているため、スタグフレーションは最悪です」と彼は言いました。

「価格が賃金よりも上昇しており、仕事や収入を失う人もいるため、仕事を持っている人や実質賃金にも全面的です。

したがって、スタグフレーションは労働者にとって世界の中で最悪です。

投稿更新

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-03/nouriel-roubini-warns-of-stagflation-crisis/102045718

Nouriel Roubini warns of stagflation crisis as interest rate surge sinks economy, not inflation

Play Video. Duration: 10 minutes 20 seconds
Nouriel Roubini warns of a "perfect storm of recession, stagflation and debt" ahead.

The man dubbed "Dr Doom", US-based economist Nouriel Roubini, is warning that the world is facing a "perfect storm" of high inflation, rising interest rates and recession that will be "the worst of all worlds for workers".

Employees in Australia may already feel some appreciation for Dr Roubini's argument.

This week's National Accounts from the Bureau of Statistics showed real household disposable income per capita fell for the fifth straight quarter as inflation-adjusted hourly pay plunged 5.4 per cent, with real wages virtually unchanged from 2012 levels.

For many Australians, it may feel like stagflation — a situation where the economy is shrinking even as prices keep rising — is already here.

But Dr Roubini expects things to get much worse across the so-called advanced economies as the year unfolds.

Nouriel Roubini sits in a room
Nouriel Roubini is one of the economists credited with having forewarned of the global financial crisis.(7.30 Report)none

"I do believe that this stagflation rate crisis is going to emerge this year," he told The Business.

"The latest numbers on inflation coming from the US and Europe, and other advanced economies, showed that inflation now is quite sticky.

"Central banks are in a dilemma, because they have to raise rates more to fight inflation. But, if they do so, the economy is going to start to contract quite soon, and if they don't then we could have a de-anchoring of inflation and inflation expectations.

"So I expect that we're going to have a recession in the US and Europe, in other advanced economies, at a time where inflation is not back to 2 per cent."

The 'great stagflationary debt crisis'

Worse than the garden variety stagflation the world endured through much of the 1970s and early 1980s, Dr Roubini expects this to evolve into a "great stagflationary debt crisis" — combining some of the worst elements of the 70s with the global financial crisis.

"Now we're facing the perfect storm — inflation, recession, stagflation and a potential debt crisis," he warned.

"The debt ratio in advanced economies was only 100 per cent of GDP [in the 1970s], today it is 420 per cent of GDP, in private and public debt.

"So, in this case, if we have those shocks to say oil prices, not only do you get inflation, not only do you get recession and stagflation, but you get what I call a great stagflationary debt crisis, because with interest rates so high, then that [debt] ratio has become unsustainable."

While the economic consensus is that inflation has peaked and will continue to ease this year and next, Dr Roubini is among a minority group of analysts who warn that the inflation shock is far from over and risks becoming entrenched.

"Goldman Sachs predicts that commodity prices, not just energy, the entire gamut of them, may increase 43 per cent this year," he observed.

"This is even without a war in the Middle East between Israel and Iran. If that spike in commodity prices occurs, then headline inflation is going to be higher rather than lower."

'Worst of all worlds for workers'

He believes that will force the Federal Reserve and other central banks to keep raising interest rates until their economies fall into recession and eventually they "wimp out" of trying to get inflation back to their target levels.

"I think that the Fed funds rate will have to be certainly above 6 per cent to achieve a 2 per cent inflation target," Dr Roubini argued.

"But if you raise interest rates to 6 per cent then you're going to have a real hard landing.

"Then you'll have also a crash in financial markets, you'll have a severe correction of equity markets, you'll have bonds going higher, you'll have credit spreads for borrowing by the private sector rising, so you'll have severe financial distress.

"That financial distress is going to make the recession more severe, and a more severe recession by having a contraction of income and output is going to increase the number of defaults by households, businesses, corporates, and even some financial institutions and some governments in poor countries that have serious debt problems."

Dr Roubini also warned that working people would likely be hit hardest by the looming crisis, including those who kept their jobs.

"Stagflation is the worst, because loss of jobs, unemployment, weakness of the labour market and wages are growing less than inflation, because you have stagflation," he said.

"So it's across the board to even those who have a job, to their real wages, because prices are rising more than wages, and some people lose their jobs and their income.

"So stagflation is the worst of all worlds for workers."