2022年1月1日土曜日

How China Escaped Shock Therapy: Isabella M. Weber 2021/05

 How China Escaped Shock Therapy:    Isabella M. Weber 2021/05

https://love-and-theft-2014.blogspot.com/2022/01/how-china-escaped-shock-therapy.html @

2022/01/01 Stephanie Keltonさんのツイート


How China Escaped Shock Therapy: The Market Reform Debate (Routledge Studies on the Chinese Economy) (English Edition) 1st 版, Kindle版  英語版    Isabella M. Weber


 
 
Stephanie Kelton
⁦‪@StephanieKelton‬⁩
Krugman's tweets, by contrast, are the trite repetition of textbook banalities. They show no knowledge or policy imagination. His slur on Weber – and by extension on Samuelson – is shameful.
Many thanks to Stephanie Kelton for giving an outlet to these remarks." /end
 
2022/01/01 0:30
 
 


Stephanie Kelton
@StephanieKelton
·
38m
What follows is a THREAD, posted on behalf of Professor James Galbraith, who is not on Twitter but who asked me to share his reaction to this.
Quote Tweet

Paul Krugman
@paulkrugman
 · Dec 30, 2021
I am not a free-market zealot. But this is truly stupid 1/ twitter.com/guardian/statu…
Show this thread
5
80
183

Stephanie Kelton
@StephanieKelton
·
38m
"I'll bet that Paul Krugman has not read Isabella Weber's magisterial history, How China Escaped Shock Therapy, recommended by Adam Tooze in Foreign Policy, by Martin Wolf in the Financial Times, and by yours truly in Project Syndicate, among many other plaudits and prizes...
2
9
52

Stephanie Kelton
@StephanieKelton
·
38m
If he had, Krugman might be aware that Professor Weber knows a great deal about price controls and their role in a larger policy setting. And not only in China, but also in the US, which Chinese reformers studied closely in coming to their decisions...
1
6
37

Stephanie Kelton
@StephanieKelton
·
38m
In The Guardian, Weber provides careful parallels to the spring of 1946, when Paul Samuelson – Krugman's own chief mentor – signed a letter to The New York Times urging continued price controls, given ongoing bottlenecks and temporary shortages – precisely today's situation...
1
7
37

Stephanie Kelton
@StephanieKelton
·
38m
The point of strategic price control, then and now, was to prevent an outbreak of inflation, followed by loss of purchasing power and confidence. A further purpose now, not relevant yet in 1946, is to forestall counterproductive hikes in interest rates by the Federal Reserve...
2
11
42

Stephanie Kelton
@StephanieKelton
·
38m
By releasing oil from the SPR, and by intervening in the ports, the Biden administration has shown that it understands the critical role of key prices, and is acting directly to bring them down. Weber's argument is in full sympathy with this selective policy...
3
10
48

Stephanie Kelton
@StephanieKelton
Krugman's tweets, by contrast, are the trite repetition of textbook banalities. They show no knowledge or policy imagination. His slur on Weber – and by extension on Samuelson – is shameful.
Many thanks to Stephanie Kelton for giving an outlet to these remarks." /end


How China Escaped Shock Therapy: The Market Reform Debate (Routledge Studies on the Chinese Economy) (English Edition) 1st 版, Kindle版 

2021/05



ステファニー・ケルトン
ステファニー・ケルトン(StephanieKelton
-
38m
以下は、TwitterをやっていないJames Galbraith教授の代理で投稿されたTHREADですが、この件に対する彼の反応を教えてくださいというものです。
引用ツイート

ポール・クルーグマン
ポール・クルーグマン
 - 2021年12月30日
私は自由市場の狂信者ではない。しかし、これは本当に愚かなことだ1/ twitter.com/guardian/statu...
このスレッドを表示する
5
80
183

ステファニー・ケルトン
ステファニー・ケルトン(@StephanieKelton
-
38m
ポール・クルーグマンがイザベラ・ウェーバーの歴史書『中国はいかにしてショック療法から逃れたか』を読んでいないのは間違いないだろう。
2
9
52

ステファニー・ケルトン
ステファニー・ケルトン(StephanieKelton
-
38m
もしそうなら、クルーグマンは、ウェーバー教授が価格統制とより大きな政策設定におけるその役割について非常によく知っていることに気づくかもしれない。そして、中国だけでなく、中国の改革者たちがその決定に至るまでに綿密に研究したアメリカでも...。
1
6
37

ステファニー・ケルトン
ステファニー・ケルトン(StephanieKelton
-
38m
ウェーバーはガーディアン紙で、1946年の春、クルーグマンの師匠であるポール・サミュエルソンがニューヨーク・タイムズ紙に出した手紙に署名し、ボトルネックと一時的な不足を理由に価格統制を続けるよう求めたこと、まさに今日の状況との類似点を丁寧に説明している...。
1
7
37

ステファニー・ケルトン
ステファニー・ケルトン(StephanieKelton)
-
38m
戦略的な価格統制のポイントは、当時も今も、インフレの発生とそれに続く購買力の喪失と信頼の喪失を防ぐことである。1946年にはまだ関係なかったが、現在では連邦準備制度による逆効果の金利引き上げを阻止することがさらなる目的である...
2
11
42

ステファニー・ケルトン
ステファニー・ケルトン(StephanieKelton
-
38m
バイデン政権は、SPRから石油を放出し、港湾に介入することで、主要価格の重要な役割を理解し、価格を引き下げるために直接行動していることを示した。ウェーバーの主張は、この選択的な政策に全面的に同調するものである...
3
10
48

ステファニー・ケルトン
ステファニー・ケルトン(StephanieKelton
それに対して、クルーグマン氏のツイートは、教科書に載っているような陳腐なことの繰り返しだ。知識も政策的想像力もない。ウェーバーへの中傷、ひいてはサミュエルソンへの中傷は恥ずべきものだ。
これらの発言に出口を与えてくれたStephanie Keltonに大いに感謝する。" /終了


What follows is a THREAD, posted on behalf of Professor James Galbraith, who is not on Twitter but who asked me to share his reaction to this.
Quote Tweet
Paul Krugman
@paulkrugman
·
I am not a free-market zealot. But this is truly stupid 1/ twitter.com/guardian/statu…
Show this thread
5
183
"I'll bet that Paul Krugman has not read Isabella Weber's magisterial history, How China Escaped Shock Therapy, recommended by Adam Tooze in Foreign Policy, by Martin Wolf in the Financial Times, and by yours truly in Project Syndicate, among many other plaudits and prizes...
2
52
If he had, Krugman might be aware that Professor Weber knows a great deal about price controls and their role in a larger policy setting. And not only in China, but also in the US, which Chinese reformers studied closely in coming to their decisions...
1
37
In The Guardian, Weber provides careful parallels to the spring of 1946, when Paul Samuelson – Krugman's own chief mentor – signed a letter to The New York Times urging continued price controls, given ongoing bottlenecks and temporary shortages – precisely today's situation...
1
37
The point of strategic price control, then and now, was to prevent an outbreak of inflation, followed by loss of purchasing power and confidence. A further purpose now, not relevant yet in 1946, is to forestall counterproductive hikes in interest rates by the Federal Reserve...
2
42
By releasing oil from the SPR, and by intervening in the ports, the Biden administration has shown that it understands the critical role of key prices, and is acting directly to bring them down. Weber's argument is in full sympathy with this selective policy...
3
48
Krugman's tweets, by contrast, are the trite repetition of textbook banalities. They show no knowledge or policy imagination. His slur on Weber – and by extension on Samuelson – is shameful. Many thanks to Stephanie Kelton for giving an outlet to these remarks." /end

選ばれざる道 いかに心理学が経済学から取り除かれたか ブルーニ2007 THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: HOW PSYCHOLOGY WAS REMOVED FROM ECONOMICS, AND…

 選ばれざる道 いかに心理学が経済学から取り除かれたか ブルーニ2007 THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: HOW PSYCHOLOGY WAS REMOVED FROM ECONOMICS, AND…



THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: HOW PSYCHOLOGY WAS REMOVED FROM ECONOMICS, AND HOW IT MIGHT BE BROUGHT BACK, Luigino Bruni and Robert Sugden, The Economic Journal,2007, 117, 146-173.)

Robert Frostというアメリカの詩人の作品に、"The Road Not Taken"という詩があります。 ひとりの旅人が森の中を歩いていて、分かれ道にくる。 どちらかを選ばなくてはならない。2013/12/25

http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp › article


そして深過ぎる詩 ロバート・フロスト "The Road Not Taken"

2020/06/08 — The Road Not Taken (選ばれざる道). by Robert Frost. Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,. 黄色に彩られた森の中、道は二手に分かれていた.






http://www2u.biglobe.ne.jp › ~itou

行かなかった道 - BIGLOBE

そして私は 誰彼もが選ばない道を選んできたのだそのことが どれだけ大きく私の人生を変えたことかと. THE ROAD NOT TAKEN Robert Frost Two roads diverged in yellow ...






https://ja.m.wikipedia.org › wiki

ロバート・フロスト - Wikipedia

私は、踏みならされていない道を選んだ。 そしてそれが、決定的な違いを生んだ。 名言[編集].
主要作品
詩集
散文
日本語訳
The road not taken








https://lecturablog.com › 翻訳

Robert Frost [The road not taken] ロバート・フロスト「選ばれざる道 ...

2021/04/20 — 今から何十年先になっても語り続ける。 「ずっと昔に、森の中で道が二つに分かれていてね、私は— 私は、踏みならされていない ...

Stable URL

Stable URLs are the best choice for citations, for sharing online, or for sending to a broad audience.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/4121912


150
THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL
[JANUARY
For the early neoclassical economists, economics rested on the fundamental
assumption that individuals act on self-interest. Thus, Jevons describes his theory as 'the
mechanics of utility and self-interest (p. 90); Edgeworth's 'economical calculus' begins
with the famous declaration that "The first principle of economics is that every agent is
actuated only by self-interest' (p. 16). This assumption was not to be treated literally, as
claim about the actual motivation of all human beings in all situations. Rather, it was a
defining characteristic of economics as a pure deductive science. It was intended to
represent a core tendency in human motivation, which (it was claimed) had a dom-
inant influence in those areas of human life studied by economists. As Jevons put it,
trying to justify his theory's neglect of ethics, economics is concerned only with 'the
lowest rank of feelings' (p. 93). Pantaleoni offered an evolutionary justification for
assuming self-interest, arguing that a powerful tendency to pursue pleasure and to
avoid pain is implanted in our species by natural selection (pp. 9–16).
Given the assumption of self-interest, economic theories of behaviour were to be
deduced from psychological laws about human wants, which in turn were understood
in terms of the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Pleasure and pain were
treated as sensations, of which the person who experiences them has direct knowledge.
By introspection, and by the study of other people's reports of their introspections, an
investigator could arrive at knowledge of the laws governing pleasure and pain. For the
neoclassical economists, the most significant of these laws concerned the relationship
between stimuli and sensations. In slightly different ways, these economists advanced
the hypothesis that, as the amount of any stimulus increases, the increment of sensation
produced by a given increment of stimulus falls. The law of diminishing marginal utility
- that as consumption of any commodity increases, the increment of pleasure pro-
duced by a given increment of consumption falls – was seen as a special case of this
more general law of psychology.
Thus, one of the most fundamental principles of neoclassical economics was
grounded in a hypothesis about phenomena that are now seen as belonging to the
domain of psychology rather than economics. Consider, for example, the writer cited
by Jevons as having 'most clearly appreciated the nature and importance of the law of
utility', Richard Jennings. Jevons quotes from Jennings's book, Natural Elements of
Political Economy, published in 1855:
To turn from the relative effect of commodities, in producing sensations, to
those which are absolute, or dependent only on the quantity of each com-
modity, it is but too well known to every condition of men, that the degree of
sensation which is produced, is by no means commensurate with the quantity
of the commodity applied to the senses ...
We may gaze upon an object until we can no longer discern it, listen until we
can no longer hear, smell until the sense of odour is exhausted... (quoted by
Jevons, p. 113)
6 In the preface to the 1879 edition of The Theory of Political Economy, Jevons acknowledges his recent
discovery that Hermann Heinrich Gossen, in a book published in 1854, "has completely anticipated me as
regards the general principles and method of the theory of economics'. Jevons characterises Gossen's theory
as resting on a 'natural law of pleasure' (p. 60–4).
© The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2007

150
経済誌
[1月
初期の新古典派経済学者にとって、経済学は「個人は利己的に行動する」という基本的な仮定に基づいていました。
初期の新古典派経済学者にとって、経済学は「個人は利己的に行動する」という基本的な仮定に基づいていました。そのため、ジェヴォンズは自分の理論を「効用と利己心の力学」と表現している。
ジェヴォンズは自分の理論を「効用と利己心の力学」と表現し(p.90)、エッジワースの「経済的微積分」は、「最初のものは、利己心である」という有名な宣言で始まる。
経済学の第一原理は、すべての行為者は利己心によってのみ行動するということである」という有名な宣言で始まる。
経済学の第一原理は、すべての主体は利己心によってのみ動かされるということである」(p.16)という有名な宣言から始まります。この仮定は、文字通りに扱うべきではありません。
この仮定は、すべての状況におけるすべての人間の実際の動機についての主張として、文字通りに扱われるべきではありませんでした。むしろ、それは
純粋な演繹的科学としての経済学の特徴である。意図したのは
これは、人間のモチベーションにおける中核的な傾向を表すものであり、それは、人間のあらゆる分野において圧倒的な影響力を持っていると主張されていました。
それは、経済学者が研究する人間生活の分野に大きな影響を与えていると主張していた。ジェヴォンズはこう言っている。
ジェヴォンズは、自分の理論が倫理を無視していることを正当化しようとして、経済学は「感情の最下位」にしか関心がないと述べている。
ジェヴォンズは、自分の理論が倫理を無視していることを正当化しようとした。パンタレオーニは、自己利益を仮定することを進化論的に正当化した。
パンタレオーニは、自己利益を仮定することを進化的に正当化し、快楽を追求し、苦痛を回避しようとする強力な傾向が
パンタレオーニは、快楽を追求し、苦痛を回避しようとする強力な傾向が、自然淘汰によって我々の種に植え付けられているとし、自利を仮定することを進化論的に正当化した。
自利を前提とすると、経済の行動理論は、人間の心理的な法則から導き出されることになる。
行動に関する経済理論は、人間の欲求に関する心理学的な法則から導き出されるものでした。
喜びの追求と痛みの回避という観点から理解されていた。快楽と苦痛は
喜びと痛みは、それを経験した人が直接知ることのできる感覚として扱われていた。
内観したり、他の人の内観報告を研究したりすることによって、調査者は
喜びと痛みを支配する法則を知ることができる。新古典派経済学者にとって
新古典派の経済学者にとって、これらの法則のうち最も重要なものは、刺激と感覚の関係に関するものである。
刺激と感覚の関係である。新古典派の経済学者たちは、少しずつ異なる方法で
刺激の量が増えれば、ある刺激の増分によって生じる感覚の増分も増えるという仮説を
刺激の量が増えれば、与えられた刺激の増分によって生じる感覚の増分は減少するという仮説を提唱しました。限界効用逓減の法則
- 限界効用逓減の法則とは、ある商品の消費量が増えると、ある量の刺激によって得られる快感の増加分が減少するというものです。
限界効用逓減の法則は、この心理学のより一般的な法則の特殊なケースと考えられました。
限界効用逓減の法則は、この心理学のより一般的な法則の特別なケースと考えられていました。
このように、新古典派経済学の最も基本的な原則の1つは
新古典派経済学の最も基本的な原理の一つは、現在では経済学ではなく心理学の領域に属すると考えられている現象についての仮説に基づいている。
新古典派経済学の最も基本的な原理は、現在では経済学ではなく心理学の領域に属すると考えられている現象に対する仮説に基づいていた。例えば、ジェヴォンズが「最も多くのことを成し遂げた」と引用した作家を考えてみよう。
ジェヴォンズが「効用の法則の性質と重要性を最も明確に理解した」とした作家、リチャード・ジェニングスを考えてみましょう。
ジェヴォンズが「効用の法則の性質と重要性を最も明確に理解した」作家として挙げたリチャード・ジェニングスを考えてみよう。ジェヴォンズは、1855年に出版されたジェニングスの著書『Natural Elements of Political Economy』から引用している。
1855年に出版されたジェニングスの著書『政治経済学の自然法則』から引用している。

感覚を生み出す商品の相対的な効果から、絶対的なもの、あるいは依存性のあるものへと転換すること。
感覚を生み出す商品の相対的な効果から、絶対的な効果、すなわち各商品の量にのみ依存する効果に転じることは
感覚を生み出す商品の相対的な効果から、絶対的な効果、つまり各商品の量のみに依存する効果へと転換するには、生み出される感覚の度合いは
生産される感覚の程度は、感覚に適用された商品の量とは決して一致しない。

感覚の度合いは、感覚に適用された商品の量には決して見合わないということは、人間のあらゆる状態でよく知られている...
私たちは、もはや識別できなくなるまで対象物を見つめ、もはや聞くことができなくなるまで耳を傾け、もはや嗅ぐことができなくなるまで匂いを嗅ぐことができる。
匂いの感覚がなくなるまで、匂いを嗅ぐことができる......(Quoted by
Jevons, p. 113)
6 ジェヴォンズは、1879年に出版された『政治経済学の理論』の序文の中で、最近発見した
1854年に出版された本の中で、ヘルマン・ハインリッヒ・ゴーセンが「経済学の一般原則と方法に関して、私を完全に先取りしていた」ことを発見したと認めている。
経済学の理論の一般的な原理と方法に関して、私を完全に先取りしていた」と認めている。ジェヴォンズはゴッセンの理論を
ジェヴォンズはゴッセンの理論を、「快楽の自然法則」に基づいていると評している(p.60-4)。

© The Author(s). Journal編集部 © Royal Economic Society 2007

www.DeepL.com/Translator(無料版)で翻訳しました。


2007]
THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
151
As the second sentence in this quotation makes clear, this is a general hypothesis
about diminishing sensitivity to sensory stimuli, and not simply about tastes for
economic commodities.
Contemporaneously with the development of neoclassical economics, the hypothesis
of diminishing sensitivity was being formulated and tested by people who are now seen
as founders of scientific psychology. Gustav Theodor Fechner proposed the revolu-
tionary thesis that mental phenomena could be measured by finding quantitative
relationships between material stimuli and mental sensations. This idea was the foun-
dation of the research programme of psychophysics. The publication in 1860 of Fech-
ner's book Elemente der Psychophysik is often considered as the birth of modern
psychology. Fechner's work was based on a regularity found by the physiologist Ernst
Heinrich Weber: the change in magnitude of a given stimulus that produces a just
noticeable change in sensation is proportional to the total stimulus. Treating a just
noticeable change as the unit of sensation, Fechner used this regularity as a method of
measuring the magnitude of sensations: according to the Fechner-Weber law, if stimulus
increases geometrically, sensation increases arithmetically. This research programme
was continued by Wilhelm Wundt, who is generally regarded as the first experimental
psychologist. Wundt's most influential book, Grundzuge der physiologischen Psychologie
(1874) – published at the moment of the marginal revolution in economics – proposed
the scientific investigation of people's introspections about their experiences of
consciousness.
In understanding the relationship between psychology and economics at this time, it
is important to recognise that, in both disciplines, introspection was treated as a
legitimate source of data. The behaviourist movement in psychology, which denied the
scientific status of introspection, dates only from the second decade of the twentieth
century. (The founding text of behaviourism, John Broadus Watson's paper 'Psycho-
logy as the behaviourist views it', was published in 1913.) And in assessing, with the
benefit of hindsight, the potentialities of the nineteenth-century form of psychologic-
ally-based economics, we must remember that the methodology of psychology is no
longer narrowly behaviourist." Modern psychology standardly uses 'constructs' which
have no directly observable correlates but which are treated as valid to the extent that
they play a useful role in explanatory theories; constructs (such as happiness) which
refer to individuals' affective states are in general use. The research programme of
psychophysics initiated by Fechner is an integral part of modern psychology.
As many neoclassical economists noticed, the hypothesis of diminishing marginal
utility of consumption can be interpreted as an implication of the Fechner-Weber law."
Edgeworth was particularly aware of current work in psychophysics. Indeed, the title he
chose for his major work, Mathematical Psychics, suggests that he saw it as a contribution
to psychology as well as to economics. Edgeworth states as an axiom that 'Pleasure is
measurable, and all pleasures are commensurable', by which he means not only that
* It is perhaps unfortunate that "behavioural economics' has been adopted as the label for work at the
interface of psychology and economics. Behavioural economics is distinguished by an interest in actual
behaviour (as opposed to a normative ideal of rationality), but it is not behaviourist in the methodological
sense.
* More specifically, the Fechner-Weber law could be interpreted as supporting the hypothesis advanced by
Daniel Bernoulli in the eighteenth century, that utility is a logarithmic function of wealth.

© The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royai Economic Society 2007


2007]
走らない道
151
この引用文の第2文で明らかなように、これは感覚刺激に対する感度の低下に関する一般的な仮説であり
感覚刺激に対する感度の低下についての一般的な仮説であって、単に経済商品の
感覚刺激に対する感度の低下に関する一般的な仮説です。
新古典派経済学の発展と時を同じくして、「感度の低下」という仮説が提唱されました。
新古典派経済学の発展と同時期に、科学的心理学の創始者といわれる人々が、感受性の逓減という仮説を立て、検証していた。
科学的心理学の創始者といわれる人々が、感度低下の仮説を立て、検証していた。グスタフ・テオドール・フェヒナーは、「精神現象は、自分の心の中にあるものだ」という革命的な仮説を提唱した。
フェヒナーは、物質的な刺激と精神的な感覚との間に定量的な関係を見出すことによって、精神現象を測定することができるという画期的な論文を発表しました。
フェヒナーは、物質的な刺激と精神的な感覚との間に定量的な関係を見出すことによって、精神現象を測定することができるという画期的な論文を提案した。この考えは、心理学の研究プログラムの基礎となった。
この考えは、心理物理学の研究プログラムの基礎となりました。1860年には、フェヒ
ナーの著書『Elemente der Psychophysik』が1860年に出版されたとき、近代心理学が誕生したと考えられている。
心理学の誕生と考えられている。フェヒナーの研究は、生理学者のエルンスト・ハインリッヒ・ウェーバーが発見した規則性に基づいていた。
ハインリッヒ・ヴェーバーが発見した規則性に基づいています。それは、ある刺激の大きさの変化が、感覚のわずかな変化をもたらすことです。
感覚の顕著な変化をもたらす刺激の大きさの変化は、全刺激に比例する。顕著な変化を感覚の単位とすると
この規則性を利用して、フェヒナーは感覚の大きさを測る方法として
フェヒナーはこの規則性を感覚の大きさを測る方法として用いました:フェヒナー・ウェーバーの法則によると、刺激が幾何学的に増加すると
フェヒナー・ウェーバーの法則によれば、刺激が幾何学的に増加すれば、感覚は算術的に増加する。この研究プログラムは
この研究を続けたのが、実験心理学者の第一人者とされるヴィルヘルム・ヴントです。
ヴィルヘルム・ヴントは、最初の実験心理学者として知られています。ヴントの最も影響力のある著書「Grundzuge der physiologischen Psychologie」(1874年)は、日本で出版されました。
(1874年)は、経済学における限界革命の瞬間に出版されました。
意識の経験についての人々の内省を科学的に調査することを提案しました。
意識を科学的に調査することを提案した。
この時期の心理学と経済学の関係を理解する上で、重要なことは
この時代の心理学と経済学の関係を理解する上で重要なのは、どちらの学問分野でも、内観が正当なデータ源として扱われていたということです。
正当なデータとして扱われていました。心理学における行動主義の動きは、内観の科学的地位を否定していました。
内観の科学的地位を否定した心理学の行動主義運動は、20世紀の第2の10年間に始まった。
行動主義は、20世紀後半から始まった。(行動主義の創始者であるジョン・ブロードウス・ワトソンの論文「Psycho-
行動主義の創始者であるジョン・ブロードウス・ワトソンの論文「行動主義者の考える精神医学」は1913年に発表された)。) そして、後知恵で評価すると
19世紀の心理学に基づいた経済学の可能性を後から評価する際には
心理学に基づいた経済学の19世紀型の可能性を評価する際には、心理学の方法論がもはや狭義の行動主義ではないことを忘れてはならない。
もはや狭義の行動主義者ではないことを忘れてはならない。" 現代の心理学は、標準的に、直接観察可能な相関関係を持たない「構成要素」を使用している。
直接観察可能な相関関係はないが、説明に有用な役割を果たしている範囲で有効なものとして扱われる「構成概念」を標準的に使用している。
説明理論の中で有用な役割を果たす程度に有効なものとして扱われます。
個人の感情的な状態を意味する「幸福」などの概念が一般的に用いられています。フェヒナーが始めた心理物理学の研究プログラム
フェヒナーが始めた心理物理学の研究プログラムは、現代の心理学には欠かせないものとなっている。
多くの新古典派経済学者が気づいたように、消費の限界効用が逓減するという仮説は......。
消費の限界効用逓減の仮説は、フェヒナー・ウェーバーの法則の暗示と解釈することができる」。
エッジワースは、心理物理学における最新の研究を特に意識していました。実際、彼の主著である
経済学だけでなく心理学にも貢献していると考えていたようです。
経済学だけでなく、心理学にも貢献していると考えていたようです。エッジワースは、公理として次のように述べています:「快楽は測定可能である。
喜びは測定可能であり、すべての喜びは共有可能である」と公理として述べていますが、これは以下のことを意味するだけではありません。
* 行動経済学」が、心理学と経済学の接点における研究のラベルとして採用されているのは、おそらく不幸なことです。
行動経済学」が、心理学と経済学の接点における研究のラベルとして採用されているのは、残念なことかもしれません。行動経済学は、(規範ではなく)実際の行動への関心によって区別されます。
行動経済学は、(合理性という規範的な理想とは対照的に)実際の行動への関心によって区別されますが、方法論的な意味での行動主義ではありません。
の意味での行動主義ではない。
* より具体的には、フェヒナー・ウェーバーの法則は、8世紀にダニエル・ベルヌーイが提唱した仮説を裏付けるものと解釈されます。
具体的には、18世紀にダニエル・ベルヌーイが提唱した「効用は富の対数関数である」という仮説を裏付けるものと解釈できる。


© The Author(s). 雑誌編纂©Royai Economic Society 2007

www.DeepL.com/Translator(無料版)で翻訳しました。





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2021/07 Dismal Economics by James K. Galbraith - Project Syndicate



2021/07 Dismal Economics by James K. Galbraith - Project Syndicate
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Dismal Economics

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AUSTIN – Self-regarding economics departments at prestigious academic institutions no longer bother to teach the history of economic thought – a field that I studied at Yale University in 1977, forever compromising my academic career. Why was the topic abandoned – and even shunned and mocked? Students with a skeptical turn of mind would not be wrong to suspect that it was for scandalous reasons (as when, in past centuries, inconvenient aunts were locked away in garrets).

The four books reviewed here each uncover parts of the scandal. Three are brand new, and the other, The Corruption of Economics, first appeared in 1994 and was re-issued in 2006. Its principal author, the American economist Mason Gaffney, kept his remarkable pen flowing until passing away last summer at the age of 96.

Economics Without History

Robert Skidelsky is a historian, an epic biographer of John Maynard Keynes, and a prolific debater in the United Kingdom's House of Lords. He calls What's Wrong with Economics? a "primer," and it is indeed the most accessible of the four books. Skidelsky's education in the history of economics resembles my own: a wide reading of the classical authors – Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Karl Marx, and others – followed by those associated with the "neoclassical" or "marginalist" revolution of the 1870s.

What's Wrong with Economics

It was this latter group that shifted the discipline's focus from social classes (landlords, capitalists, workers) to individual units (households, firms) and declared that these units interacted to maximize not "surplus" but "utility" and efficiency. The marginalists also introduced a "sophisticated" mathematical technique to the field: namely, the differential calculus, with which one can show that maximum efficiency is reached when firms are small and competitive, as this tends to reduce profits to zero.

Although the neoclassical hegemony was disrupted by the Great Depression and the rise of Keynesian models, that period proved to be merely a 40-year digression. The economics profession today is as Skidelsky describes it: an army of neoclassical technicians.

But what, exactly, is this army doing? It is hard to find an answer in Skidelsky's book, largely because he is offering a high-altitude perspective. He makes a point of quoting only the "best" of the mainstream economists, meaning famous twentieth-century names like Paul Samuelson, Milton Friedman, Mancur Olson, Robert Lucas, and others who wrote about economics after having made their marks on the field.

Skidelsky wants economics to be a multidisciplinary subject again. The problem is that economics no longer encourages reflection on its own philosophical foundations. It consists, rather, of the application of settled techniques – constrained optimization of intertemporal utility functions, "computable general equilibria," and the "dynamic stochastic general equilibrium" model in "macroeconomics." With these tools, academics compete for attention, citations, rankings, promotions, and – above all – the approval of those who taught them those tools in the first place.

As such, Skidelsky's appeal for a return to an economics that is rooted in history, sensitive to ethics, and alert to the limits of the "self-regulating" market is doomed to fall on deaf ears. The average economist today has been trained to disparage such things, regarding them as at best a waste of time, and at worst as a threat to one's personal professional standing. "Today we are living through a crisis of liberalism," Skidelsky writes.

"The financial collapse has brought to a head a growing dissatisfaction with the corruption of money. Neoconservatism has sought to justify fabulous rewards to a financial plutocracy while median incomes stagnate or even fall; in the name of efficiency it has promoted the offshoring of millions of jobs, the undermining of national communities, and the rape of nature... What this kind of history offers students of economics is the ability to situate themselves and their teaching in the flow of events."

Try selling that argument to a card-carrying economist. It is not that all economists are evil reactionaries on the take from the Koch empire (though some are). It is that they simply cannot countenance the idea that they are playing a political or ideological role, rather than simply deploying the "tools of economics" to answer a vast variety of specific questions. Their goal is mostly (though not always) well-meaning; they want to improve the world without challenging or changing anything fundamental. Their self-assurance is unshakable.

From Art to Pseudoscience

Where does economists' certitude come from? In The Age of Fragmentation, Italian economist Alessandro Roncaglia, formerly of Sapienza University of Rome, provides a wide-ranging critical history of contemporary mainstream economic thought. Roncaglia is lucid and concise, including in his presentation of dissenting views. Given that we are dealing here with matters of philosophy, logic, and mathematics, The Age of Fragmentation is undoubtedly a challenging read. But the overall effect is clear, unpolemical, and, broadly speaking, devastating to mainstream economics' scientific pretensions.

Age of Fragmentation

The neoclassical origin myth holds that the "marginalist revolution" of the 1870s brought three fundamental changes in economic perspective. The first was the aforementioned shift in focus from social classes to individuals, and correspondingly from production and profit to consumption, choice, and utility. The second was the elimination of considerations of power from economic analysis: the emphasis on struggle, exploitation, and conflict that defined what earlier practitioners called political economy gave way to a view of markets as mechanisms of benign cooperation that turned self-interested behavior into a common good. Following from those changes came the notion of general equilibrium, which imputes to the economy a kind of celestial harmony reminiscent of the serene social philosophy of imperial China (from which the idea was derived).

With these shifts, the new hegemony had been established. By the 1970s, if prior doctrines – such as the labor theory of value – were mentioned to graduate students at all, it was only to assert that economists in the previous century had been forced by some vague but insuperable logical difficulty to abandon the old track for the new one.

But, in fact, it wasn't like that at all. Early marginalists such as Léon Walras, Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger, and Alfred Marshall were not learned students and critics of Marx. They arrived on the scene only a few years after the first volume of Marx's Capital appeared, having swept into economics from the worlds of engineering and early thermodynamics. Parading differential and integral equations that they themselves did not quite understand, they perplexed their contemporaries in math and physics but nonetheless gained a decisive advantage over the mostly innumerate types who did economics in those days.

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Roncaglia shows that despite a vast increase in the expressive algebraic content of economic research, the logical gaps in the early marginalists' models were never closed, nor were most of their errors corrected. The issue is not that modern mainstream economists are mathematically sloppy. It is that the smooth substitutions their equations portray correspond to nothing in the real world.

Roncaglia also reminds us that the classical tradition in economics did not disappear altogether. Though confined to an ever-shrinking margin of the field, it has persisted, notably in the work of scholars such as Piero Sraffa ("The Revolutionary"), Joan Robinson, Nicholas Kaldor, and the great Italian theorist Luigi Pasinetti, who is still active at 90.

As these economists recognized, the classical tradition's concepts of diminishing and increasing returns served specific and distinct functions. For example, diminishing returns explained rent – the extra product, above wages and competitive profits, accruing to the owners of the more fertile grades of land. And increasing returns captured progress over time as trade expanded, technology improved, the division of labor increased, and costs fell. It is neoclassical wishful thinking to believe that firms with declining costs can comprise industries that are stably competitive in the neoclassical sense. This observation should be obvious in a world dominated by companies like Google, Facebook, and Amazon, yet it still flies over the heads of latter-day antitrusters.

Here, Sraffa's 1926 conclusion about Marshall's theory, quoted by Roncaglia, bears repeating: "Marshall's theory... cannot be interpreted in a way which makes it logically self-consistent and, at the same time, reconciles it with the facts that it sets out to explain... I think... that it should be discarded."

But Marshall's theory of market equilibrium based on perfect competition was not discarded. Instead his intellectual heirs abandoned the effort to fit economic theory into evolutionary time – that is, into the real world – and continued to pursue ever-more complex calculations of optimization. Their trick was to stretch that concept through time by means of present-value discounting while still assuming that all decisions will be made once and for all at the outset. In their "rational expectations" models, each factor is rewarded according to its "marginal product," and the equilibrium thereafter is disturbed only by "random errors" or "exogenous shocks."

Because the neoclassical school is preoccupied with "efficiency," as determined by "Pareto optimality," it has no need for discussions of distributive justice. As a result, the key classical concept of land disappeared from economic science – as did the Ricardian axiom that rent is surplus and therefore the most appropriate object of taxation.

Needless to say, studying such a subject requires a particular combination of intellectual complacency, deference, middling mathematical skills, and careerism. I was struck by these qualities in my fellow students 45 years ago at Yale. Though the economics department there was relatively tolerant, we knew even then that overly persistent dissent was a bad career move. But this didn't really matter for most students. The problems summarized in Roncaglia's book were so deeply buried in the symbolic notation of formal models that most were unaware of their existence.

The Revolt of the General Theory

The defeat and suppression of the classical perspective – with its evolutionary, institutionalist, and developmental descendants – cleared the way for a dogmatic economics that exalted self-regulating competitive markets. Not incidentally, the new hegemony lent itself to the view that governments should intervene only to remove institutional rigidities – monopolies, trade unions, managed prices, food and fuel subsidies, and so forth – preventing realization of the competitive ideal.

As we have seen, this perspective soon ran into serious – but temporary – difficulties with the Great Depression, mass unemployment, and the rise of Keynes, whose theory is revived in Harvard University economist Stephen A. Marglin's Raising Keynes. At 896 pages and with a minimalist red-lettered cover, those in charge of marketing Marglin's book are evidently basking in the afterglow of Thomas Piketty's global bestseller Capital in the Twenty-First Century. But make no mistake: Raising Keynes is a far better and more carefully composed book.

Raising Keynes

Marglin has carried out the daunting task of rewriting, almost chapter for chapter, Keynes's 1936 General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money – complete with myriad graphics and mathematical appendices. Moreover, he gives us what he believes would have been Keynes's response to all of the subsequent interpretations, criticisms, and inversions of his work, most of which came from economists at MIT (including Samuelson, Franco Modigliani, and Robert Solow) and the University of Chicago (such as Friedman, Lucas, and George Stigler).

Marglin's basic argument is stated in two parts. First, he focuses on the "Keynesian first-pass model" in the context of the static, general equilibrium framework favored by John Hicks (this is known in textbooks as the IS-LM model). He concludes that within that framework, Keynes's theory is reduced to dealing with "frictions and rigidities," implying that "if only" markets were competitive in the neoclassical mode, mass unemployment could not exist.

This view, overwhelmingly dominant among mainstream economists to this day, justifies what journalists call "Keynesian policies": easy money and budget deficits to fight unemployment. The implication is that eliminating pesky rigidities is just too hard (unless done at gunpoint, as in General Augusto Pinochet's Chile, or by external diktat, as in many later cases, notably Greece at the hands of the International Monetary Fund a decade ago).

In his "second-pass model," Marglin resets Keynes in a dynamic frame, dealing with events and changes that occur through time – a manner of thinking that we know from Roncaglia to have been habitual among the classical economists. Crucial elements that can change over time include a business's hopes and fears for future profits, investors' desire for yield relative to the security of holding cash, and the willingness of banks to supply loans – thereby creating "bank money" – to those seeking economic gain. In this world – the real world – decisions with uncertain prospects are taken sequentially, and it is the decisions themselves that matter – not whether they happened to be based on "rational" forecasts or whether the course of events was disturbed by some unforeseeable shock.

Like Keynes, Marglin argues, correctly, that in this world, persistent involuntary unemployment cannot be resolved by cutting wages and breaking unions, even if you can get away with doing these things. Here, Marglin is, in effect, restating what Keynes's closest collaborators always argued. My first encounter with Robinson came in a University of Cambridge lecture hall in 1974. She had been sitting in to heckle Frank Hahn, one of the leading neoclassicists there at the time. As undergraduates fled the scene, I introduced myself and she invited me to lunch. Once seated in the buttery of the University Library, she started in: "You can't put time on the IS-LM diagram. Time comes out of the blackboard." I had no idea what she was talking about, but she certainly did (and now so do I).

Marglin is faithful to Keynes except to the extent that he has internalized the MIT Keynesians views, methods, equations, and graphs. This leads him to take Keynes's expositional concessions to the terminology of static models as more essential than they were. It also leads him to overlook the theory of money that Keynes set forth at enormous length six years previously, in A Treatise on Money (even though he quotes that text). He avers, condescendingly, that Keynes was expressing intuitions but "lacked the tools" to make a proper job of his own General Theory. If any of that were true, Keynes would have been justly forgotten, and Marglin would have had no reason to write his book.

Nevertheless, Marglin has taken 80 years of neoclassical distortions of Keynes, presented them with great clarity in their own language, and then pounded them into dust, pushing the detritus back into the faces of the high priests of the neoclassical synthesis, the New Keynesians, and the New Classical Economists. Raising Keynes issues a challenge that they would be cowardly to refuse – which is not to suggest that they won't do their best to ignore it.

The Man Who Said Too Much

Unfortunately, Sraffa's name and work do not appear in Marglin's book. This critical omission means that Marglin misses altogether the links between Keynes and the classical tradition, not least Ricardo's work on the question of taxation and the role of redistribution as a spur to increase efficiency (the opposite of the neoclassical efficiency-equity tradeoff). For the classical school, taxation was not a source of distortion of otherwise fair and just markets. It was a way to discourage the unproductive, wasteful, and inessential elements of those markets, thereby relieving the burden on both labor and capital.

The inessential element par excellence was rent, the predatory class were the landlords, and the fuel for general improvements was to be found by taxing land rents and using the proceeds to build roads, bridges, waterworks, hospitals, schools, and the means of security. That was Ricardo's view, on behalf of the capitalists, and it would later find its most formidable proponent in the late nineteenth-century American journalist Henry George.

Skidelsky, Roncaglia, and Marglin do not mention George, because he has largely been dropped from the history of economic thought. But George's book Progress and Poverty sold millions of copies around the world in the half-century between 1870 to 1920. His proposed Single Tax (on land rent) influenced early twentieth-century Liberal Party governments in the United Kingdom, California water policies, and the politics of New York City (where George challenged Wall Street directly by running for Mayor) as well as many other cities across America. Indeed, the future leader of republican China, Sun Yat-sen, was a Georgist, and through him George still exerts a large influence over the People's Republic, which can finance history's greatest wave of public works because the Revolution gave the government effective control of land. 

Georgism brought us the progressive income tax and direct election to the US Senate. There are Georgist institutes and journals in America to this day, but they are considered disreputable, and are ignored by neoclassical, Marxian, and Keynesian economists alike. Their ideas go unmentioned and untaught in economics departments, and their groups are unrepresented even among the many tolerated splinter associations that meet each year as the Allied Social Sciences Association, under the aegis of the American Economic Association (AEA).

Why is that? In The Corruption of Economics, Gaffney and fellow Georgist Fred Harrison begin their inquiry with the observation that America's nineteenth-century universities, like its railroads, were land-grant institutions, vested with warrants to vast acreages under the 1862 Morrill Act. They were thus not only noble outposts of practical learning but also highly appealing vehicles for enterprising captains of land speculation. For these men, to found and run a university combined honor, influence, glory, and a not inconsiderable chance to become very rich. But the Georgist idea that land alone should be taxed – so as not to tax either profits or wages – threatened to create a dangerous political alliance between capital and labor against the landlord.

Corruption of Economics

The land-grant universities therefore hired and promoted a retinue of mediocrities willing to wage a war of derision and dismissal against George's noxious creed. These were the founders of modern American economics, and Gaffney and Harrison document their words, commitments, careerism, and venality in rich detail, leaving no doubt about their true characters and beliefs. Their names – Richard Ely, Francis Walker, and John Bates Clark – are now forgotten, or would be except for the fact that each is or has been commemorated annually with a lecture or medal offered by the AEA.

Gaffney and Harrison argue that in American academia, Marxians historically could be tolerated in small numbers precisely because they posed no real threat. They were a minor concession to tendencies that had greater force elsewhere, and, conveniently, their doctrine (that capital is opposed dialectically to labor) left out the landlords.

But it was not only Georgists who were kicked off of mainstream economics' ladder of prestige. So, too, were followers of Thorstein Veblen, who threatened the neoclassicals with evolutionary methods, anthropological analogy, and satire. Kaldor, Robinson, Sraffa, and other followers of Keynes who never played along with the neoclassical straitjacket of static equilibrium were similarly banished from the curriculum, as were those influenced by my father, John Kenneth Galbraith, who noted the dominance of organizations over markets. Each was treated the same way: with disdain and ad hominem (ad feminam in Robinson's case) disparagement. (Eventually, the Marxians, too, were purged, once the end of the Cold War fatally weakened their position.)

And so, neoclassical economics perpetuates itself by replicating a single set of methods in a handful of leading journals to which no dissenters have access. There, the faithful continue to offer analyses that are of no interest to anyone who has grasped the evolutionary methodology common to all the important dissenting schools. Under neoclassical economics, the subject is defined by what it excludes: the simple fact that things change over time. Its practitioners harbor an affinity for Intelligent Design – the belief in a transcendent celestial harmony that is at odds with the development of actual scientific thought since Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species appeared in 1859.

The latest group of are the advocates of Modern Monetary Theory, who have developed Keynes and Hyman Minsky's real-time, uncertainty-driven, bank-money chartalism into a full-fledged critique of fraud and regulatory failure in the financial sector. In leading universities, governed at their highest levels these days by financiers, this group, no surprise, is treated as beneath contempt.