2024年1月8日月曜日

Power Shift AfricaさんによるXでのポスト

 
 
Power Shift Africa
⁦‪@PowerShftAfrica‬⁩
Fadhel Kaboub, Senior Advisor, ⁦‪@PowerShftAfrica‬⁩:

"The use of "net zero" language serves as a tranquilising drug to avoid the scientifically-proven imperative of ending the #fossilfuel era.

This is like someone sitting on their hands and putting one foot in a bucket of ice and… pic.twitter.com/IXynCq8ja2
 
2024/01/08 19:04
 
 
ファデル・カブブ、上級顧問@PowerShftAfrica :

「『ネット・ゼロ』という言葉の使用は、 #fossilfuel時代を終わらせるという科学的に証明された緊急事態を回避するための精神安定剤として機能します。

これは、誰かが逆向きに座り、片足を氷の入ったバケツに入れ、もう片足を燃えている木炭の入ったバケツに入れて、「 #netzero 」が優れた生存戦略であると考えるのと同じです。」

読み取り: africanarguments.org/2023/12/views-… 

@FadhelKaboub

Fadhel Kaboub فاضل قابوبさんによるXでのポスト

 
 
Fadhel Kaboub فاضل قابوب
⁦‪@FadhelKaboub‬⁩
What Paul&Co. never tell you: The AD line is actually upward sloping, if you take Keynes seriously, but then there won't be an equilibrium point, so the model is useless, which is why we should all pretend Keynes didn't exist--> Flawed model proves mainstream economics was right!
 
2024/01/08 3:26
 
 
Paul&Co.とは決して言わないでください。ケインズを真剣に考えれば、AD ラインは実際には右肩上がりですが、その場合は均衡点が存在しないため、モデルは役に立ちません。だからこそ、私たちは皆、ケインズが存在しなかったふりをすべきなのです>欠陥のあるモデルは主流経済学が正しかったことを証明しています!

love and theft: 債務上限:エコノミストJames K.ガルブレイスは、GOPの提案がソーシャルセーフティネットをガットすると警告する | Democracy Now!2023/05

love and theft: 債務上限:エコノミストJames K.ガルブレイスは、GOPの提案がソーシャルセーフティネットをガットすると警告する | Democracy Now!2023/05

債務上限:エコノミストJames K.ガルブレイスは、GOPの提案がソーシャルセーフティネットをガットすると警告する | Democracy Now!2023/05

アメリカジャネット・イエレン財務長官は、議員が債務上限を引き上げない限り、米国は6月1日までに請求書を支払うための資金を使い果たす可能性があると議会に警告した。下院共和党は先週、債務上限を引き上げる法案を僅差で可決したが、学生の債務救済、食糧援助、メディケイド、再生可能エネルギーを含む多数のプログラムへの支出削減と引き換えにのみだった。一方、民主党は、債務上限の合憲性が一部の法学者によって疑問視されているにもかかわらず、削減を課すことなく債務上限を引き上げる投票を推進している。債務上限、最近の銀行破綻、その他の経済ニュースの詳細については、テキサス大学オースティン校の経済学者兼教授であるジェームズ・ガルブレイス氏と話をします。

エイミー・グッドマン:これはデモクラシー・ナウ!、democracynow.org、戦争と平和レポートです。私はエイミー・グッドマンです。

私たちは今、債務上限の引き上げをめぐる戦いに目を向けます。月曜日、ジャネット・イエレン財務長官は、バイデン政権と議会が合意に達しない限り、米国は早ければ6月1日に債務不履行になる可能性があると警告した。先週、下院共和党は債務限度額の引き上げを承認しましたが、学生の債務救済、食糧援助、メディケイド、再生可能エネルギーなど、多数のプログラムへの支出の大幅な削減と引き換えにのみです。下院民主党は現在、削減を課すことなく債務上限の引き上げに関する完全な下院投票を強制しようとしていますが、この動きは5人の共和党員の支持によってのみ成功します。

一方、一部の法学者は、議会が債務上限の引き上げを承認するかどうかにかかわらず、すべての政府の財政的義務を果たすことを義務付けている修正第14条を指摘しているため、債務上限の合憲性が疑問視されています。

債務上限やその他の経済問題について話すために、ジェームズKが参加します。ガルブレイス、テキサス大学オースティン校リンドン・ベインズ・ジョンソン・スクール・オブ・パブリック・アフェアーズ教授。彼は米国の合同経済委員会の元事務局長です。議会。これに関するThe Nationのための彼の作品は「The Debt Ceiling Explained」という見出しです。もう一度、気持ちで...」

ガルブレイス教授、デモクラシー・ナウへようこそ!あなたが私たちと一緒にいてくれてうれしいです。この議論全体が何であるか、そしてそれに伴う危険性を説明してみませんか?

JAMES GALBRAITH:さて、議論は米国経済の将来についてです。そして、主な危険は、過去に常に起こっていた債務上限の延長と引き換えに、議会が制定し、大統領が支出削減プログラムを承認し、承認し、署名することです。これは、影響を受けるプログラムに依存している人々、主に貧しい人々だけでなく、あらゆる種類の分野で連邦機能に依存する人々、そして第二に、経済全体にとって、連邦政府からの支出の流れが経済の機能にとって基本的なためです。だから、それが根本的な危険があるところです。

債務の上限は、現在のテレビの状況からフレーズを取るために、それは再放送です。それは私たちが以前に何度も経験したショーです。そして、つまり、おそらく解決されない可能性がありますが、締め切りを過ぎた場合、解決に時間がかかるとは信じがたいことです。

エイミー・グッドマン:では、共和党の脅威と、債務上限の引き上げと社会支出とセーフティネットプログラムの削減との結びつについて話してください。

ジェームズ・ガルブレイス:はい、それは私たちが動いている方向です。大統領は、これらの削減に明示的にリンクされた債務上限の延長を支持したり、署名したりしないという非常に明確なレッドラインをレイアウトしたと思いますが、それは、債務上限が延長されるにつれて、政権が別の政治的交渉としてこれらの削減に同意しないという意味ではありません。そして、私の見解では、経済への危険、主な危険はそこにあります。

エイミー・グッドマン:2019年に話すドナルド・トランプ大統領に目を向けたい。

ドナルド・トランプ大統領:債務上限を交渉のくさびとして使うことを考えている人は誰も想像できません。私が最初に就任したとき、私は債務の上限について尋ねました。そして、私は債務上限を理解しており、確かに歴史上最高評価の信用と債務上限を理解しています。そして、私は、シューマー上院議員とナンシー・ペロシに「誰かが交渉するためにそれを使うだろうか」と言ったことを覚えています。彼らは「絶対にない」と言った。それは私たちの国の神聖な要素です。彼らは債務上限を使って交渉することはできません。

エイミー・グッドマン:それで、ガルブレイス教授、トランプがその時言ったこと、そしてトランプから下院議長のケビン・マッカーシーへのスルーラインに答えてもらえますか?

ジェームズ・ガルブレイス:まあ、あなたは私をトランプ大統領と結びつけるという不快な立場に置いたが、私は彼が反対すると言ったことについて何も聞いていなかった。

エイミー・グッドマン:しかし、彼らが今取っている立場は何ですか?

ジェームズ・ガルブレイス:まあ、それは明らかです - 明らかに、彼らはトランプ大統領が言ったことを修正し、自分の党の大統領がいる場合にのみ適用され、大統領が別の政党から来た場合、彼らは別の戦略を採用します。

エイミー・グッドマン:だから、私たちがここで話している社会プログラムと、なぜこれがアメリカ人にとってそのような危険なのかについて話してください。

ジェームズ・ガルブレイス:まあ、それは食糧援助に依存している人々、メディケイドに依存している人々、これまでのところ完全に特定されていない支出削減プログラムで脅かされているものに依存している人々にとって危険です。それが最初のことです。

2つ目は、経済自体が非常に脆弱な状態にあるということです。そして、緊縮財政のプログラムで選挙の年に入り、すでに不況の危機に瀕している、またはおそらく不況に移行している場合、あなたはその問題を悪化させるでしょう。さて、あなたが共和党の戦略家であれば、これは勝利の戦略であることがわかります。大統領は民主党員です。上院は民主党の手の中にある。そして、有権者に関する限り、失業率が上昇し始めると、経済が変わり、動き、景気後退に変わると反応します。だから、その方向に動いている多くの力があります。これは単にその状況に別のものを追加します。

エイミー・グッドマン:ガルブレイス教授、SVB、シリコンバレー銀行からシグネチャー、そして今チェイス・モーガンがファースト・リパブリックのほとんどを買収した銀行の失敗について話してもらえますか?

JAMES GALBRAITH: さて、私たちは2つのことが起こっているのを見ています。そのうちの1つは、どちらも金利引き上げ政策の結果であり、昨年、非常に低金利から非常に短期的な範囲で5%以上に急速に移動しました。そのうちの1つは、主に大量に、連邦預金保険公社によって完全に保険をかけられていない預金を持っていたため、何らかの形で暴露された銀行が預金の流出を見たということです。彼らは、長期的な国債に多額の投資を受けたポートフォリオの価値が低下し、その状況で価値を失っています。これは連邦準備制度理事会の金融政策の結果であり、米国の銀行システムの大部分に影響を与えています。だから、それは一つのことです、あなたはかなり広範な銀行問題に発展する可能性のある何かを持っているということです。

そして2つ目は、その結果、銀行部門の集中が高まっていることです。ファーストリパブリックがJPモルガン・チェースに引き継がれたことがわかります。私たちは、最大かつ最も強力な銀行の手に銀行セクターの統合を効果的に見ています。

エイミー・グッドマン:そして、その危険性は何ですか?

JAMES GALBRAITH:その危険性は、特に一握りの銀行家の手に集中した企業権力の危険性です。つまり、結局のところ、J.Pはほんの1世紀ちょっと前でした。モーガン自身は、国の金融システムに対して非常に高いコントロールを持っていました。私たちは今、彼の名前を冠した銀行が実質的に同じ位置にあるシステムに戻っています。

エイミー・グッドマン:ガルブレイス教授、あなたは最近「制裁の贈り物:ロシア経済の評価の分析、2022-2023」と題したワーキングペーパーを書きました。ウクライナ侵攻後のロシアに対する米国の制裁の影響についてお話しいただけますか?

JAMES GALBRAITH:ええ、それは非常に興味深い一連の問題です。なぜなら、西側のアナリストと、ロシア国内から書いている特定の数のアナリストの間で、これらの制裁が非常に大きな影響を与えたという非常に一般的な合意があると思うからです。問題は、その影響の性質は何でしたか?そして、私が読んで評価した西洋のアナリストは、その効果は、事実上、ロシア経済を破壊することであり、それを無関係にすることであり、ロシア経済が崩壊していると主張した。

さて、2022年の前半には、ロシアでは自動車、家電製品、あらゆる種類のものの生産に非常に大きな影響がありました。問題は、ロシア経済が適応する能力を持っていたかどうかです。そして、証拠は、現段階では、制裁に非常にうまく適応しており、実際には、制裁が行ったことは、本質的に、ロシア経済内で支配的な地位を占めていた欧米企業に取って代わるロシア企業に開放することであり、そのプロセスは進行中です。

だから、いくつかの点で、制裁はロシアに政策を課し、ロシア経済の西側からの独立性を高め、私が言うように、ロシア企業に利益の機会を開き、一般的に言えば、ロシアが単独ではできなかったことをしているようです。彼らはまた、代替支払いシステムの作成を促進し、西側の銀行システムとドル準備金とは無関係にロシアの国際貿易の資金調達に取り組みました。したがって、ある意味で、ゾーンが作成されています。つまり、制裁なしでは起こらなかったでしょうが、制裁によって促進されました。

エイミー・グッドマン:それで、今何が起こるべきだと思いますか?

ジェームズ・ガルブレイス:ごめんなさい。私はここでオーディオを失いました。うん。

エイミー・グッドマン:それで、今何が起こるべきだと思いますか?あなたはできますか-

JAMES GALBRAITH:ここでの問題は、西洋の経済アナリストがこれらの質問にどのようにアプローチするか、彼らがもたらすツールの種類です。彼らは事実を持っていると思います。彼らは間違った結論につながる分析フレームワークを適用します。したがって、まず第一に、多くの分野で必要なことは、これらの質問に対する考え方を変え、私たち自身の仮定、私たち自身の理論的枠組みを再検討することです。それは、何よりもまず、私たちがすべきことです。

エイミー・グッドマン:さて、ジェームズ・ガルブレイス、リンドンBの教授、私たちと一緒にいてくれてありがとう。テキサス大学オースティン校ジョンソン・スクール・オブ・パブリック・アフェアーズ、米国合同経済委員会の元エグゼクティブディレクター議会。あなたが書いた「債務上限の説明」にリンクします。もう一度、気持ちで...」

これはDemocracy Now!、democracynow.org、戦争と平和レポートです。私たちが戻ってきたとき、テキサスでの銃乱射事件。当局は、AR-15を使用して5人を射殺したとして告発された男を逮捕した。テキサス州知事グレッグ・アボットは、被害者は「不法移民」だとツイートした。私たちと一緒にいてください。

債務上限:エコノミストJames K.ガルブレイスは、GOPの提案がソーシャルセーフティネットをガットすると警告する | Democracy Now! 2023/05

Debt Ceiling: Economist James K. Galbraith Warns GOP Proposal Would Gut Social Safety Net | Democracy Now!

Debt Ceiling: Economist James K. Galbraith Warns GOP Proposal Would Gut Social Safety Net

U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has warned Congress that the United States could run out of money to pay its bills by June 1 unless lawmakers raise the debt ceiling. House Republicans last week narrowly passed a bill to raise the debt ceiling, but only in exchange for sweeping spending cuts to numerous programs, including student debt relief, food assistance, Medicaid and renewable energy. Democrats, meanwhile, are pushing for a vote to raise the debt ceiling without imposing cuts, even as the constitutionality of the debt ceiling has been questioned by some legal scholars. For more on the debt ceiling, recent bank failures and other economic news, we speak with James Galbraith, economist and professor at the University of Texas at Austin.

AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org, The War and Peace Report. I'm Amy Goodman.

We turn now to look at the fight over raising the debt ceiling. On Monday, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned the United States could default on its debts as early as June 1st unless the Biden administration and Congress reach a deal. Last week, House Republicans approved raising the debt limit, but only in exchange for sweeping spending cuts to numerous programs, including student debt relief, food assistance, Medicaid and renewable energy. House Democrats are now attempting to force a full House vote on raising the debt ceiling without imposing the cuts, but the move will only succeed with the support of five Republicans.

Meanwhile, the very constitutionality of the debt ceiling is coming into question, as some legal scholars point out the 14th Amendment mandates that all the government's financial obligations be met, regardless of whether Congress authorizes lifting the debt ceiling.

To talk about the debt ceiling and other economic issues, we're joined by James K. Galbraith, professor at the Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin. He's a former executive director of the Joint Economic Committee in the U.S. Congress. His piece for The Nation about this is headlined "The Debt Ceiling Explained. Once More, With Feeling…"

Professor Galbraith, welcome back to Democracy Now! It's great to have you with us. Why don't you lay out what this whole debate is about and the dangers involved?

JAMES GALBRAITH: Well, the debate is about the future of the United States economy. And the chief danger is that a program — that in exchange for extending the debt ceiling, which has always happened in the past, that the Congress will enact and the president will approve, sign off on, a program of swindging spending cuts that will be very bad for people who are dependent on the programs that will be affected, mainly poor people but also people who depend on federal functions in all kinds of areas, and, secondly, for the economy as a whole, because the spending flows from the federal government are fundamental to the functioning of the economy. So, that's where the fundamental danger is.

The debt ceiling is a — to take a phrase from the current television situation, it's a rerun. It's a show we've been through many times before. And, I mean, it could conceivably not be resolved, but it's very hard to believe that it would take long to resolve it if they went over the deadline.

AMY GOODMAN: So, talk about the Republican threats and the linking of the lifting of the debt ceiling with the cuts to social spending and safety net programs.

JAMES GALBRAITH: Yes, that is the direction that we are moving in, is to have a — I don't think we will — I think the president's laid out a very clear red line that he would not support or sign an extension of the debt ceiling that was explicitly linked to those cuts, but that doesn't mean that the administration won't agree to those cuts as a separate political bargain as the debt ceiling is extended. And that's where the danger to the economy lies, the main danger, in my view.

AMY GOODMAN: I want to turn to President Donald Trump speaking in 2019.

PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: I can't imagine anybody ever even thinking of using the debt ceiling as a negotiating wedge. When I first came into office, I asked about the debt ceiling. And I understand debt ceilings, and I certainly understand the highest-rated credit ever in history and a debt ceiling. And I said, I remember, to Senator Schumer and to Nancy Pelosi, "Would anybody ever use that to negotiate with?" They said, "Absolutely not." That's a sacred element of our country. They can't use the debt ceiling to negotiate.

AMY GOODMAN: So, Professor Galbraith, can you respond to what Trump said then, and also the throughline from Trump to the House speaker, Kevin McCarthy?

JAMES GALBRAITH: Well, you've put me in an uncomfortable position of associating myself with President Trump, but I didn't hear anything in what he just said to object to.

AMY GOODMAN: But what is the position that they are all taking now?

JAMES GALBRAITH: Well, it's clearly — clearly, they would amend what President Trump said to say that it applies only when there's a president of their own party, and when the president is from a different party, then they adopt a different strategy.

AMY GOODMAN: So, talk about the social programs that we're talking about here and why this is such a danger to Americans.

JAMES GALBRAITH: Well, it's a danger to people who depend upon food assistance, who depend on Medicaid, who depend on anything that's being threatened in this so far not fully specified program of spending cuts. That's the first thing.

The second thing is that the economy itself is in very fragile condition. And if you go into an election year on a program of austerity and you're already hovering on the brink of a recession, or perhaps moving into one, you're going to compound that problem. Now, it's, I think, pretty easy to see, if you are a strategist for the Republican Party, that this is a winning strategy. The president is a Democrat. The Senate is in Democratic hands. And so far as the voters are concerned, they react when the economy turns, moves — turns toward recession, when unemployment starts going up. So you have a lot of forces moving in that direction. This simply adds another one to that, to that situation.

AMY GOODMAN: Professor Galbraith, can you talk about the failure of the banks, from SVB, the Silicon Valley Bank, to Signature and now Chase Morgan buying up most of First Republic?

JAMES GALBRAITH: Well, we are seeing two things happening. One of them is the — both of them are the consequence of the policy of raising interest rates, which has been moved very rapidly over the last year from very low interest rates to now above 5% on the very short-term end of the spectrum. One of them is that the banks which were exposed in one way or another because they had deposits that were largely, in large quantities, not insured by the — not fully insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have seen deposit outflows. They've seen a fall in the value of portfolios that were heavily invested in long-term government bonds, which lose value in that situation. This is a consequence of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy, and it's affecting a large swath of the banking system in the United States. So, that's one thing, is you have something which could develop into a fairly widespread set of banking problems.

And the second is that the consequence of this is the increasing concentration of the banking sector. You see that First Republic was taken over by JPMorgan Chase. We're seeing, effectively, consolidation of the banking sector in the hands of the largest and most powerful banks.

AMY GOODMAN: And what's the danger of that?

JAMES GALBRAITH: The danger of that is the danger of concentrated corporate power, particularly in the hands of a handful of bankers. I mean, after all, it was only a little more than a century ago that J.P. Morgan himself had a very high degree of control over the financial system of the country. We're now moving back toward a system in which the bank that bears his name is in practically similar position.

AMY GOODMAN: Professor Galbraith, you recently wrote a working paper titled "The Gift of Sanctions: An Analysis of Assessments of the Russian Economy, 2022-2023." Can you talk about the impact of U.S. sanctions against Russia following its invasion of Ukraine?

JAMES GALBRAITH: Yeah, it's a very interesting set of issues, because there is, I think, very general agreement amongst the analysts in the West, and also a certain number of them who are writing from inside Russia itself, that these sanctions did have a very, very substantial impact. The question is: What was the nature of that impact? And the Western analysts, the ones that I read and assessed, argued that the effect was — effectively, it was to destroy the Russian economy, was to render it irrelevant, it was to — that the Russian economy was imploding.

Well, it is true that in the first part of 2022 there were substantial — there were very major impacts on production of automobiles, appliances, all kinds of things, in Russia. The question is whether the Russian economy had the capacity to adapt. And the evidence is, at this stage, that it's adapting quite well to the sanctions, and that, in fact, what the sanctions did was to open up for Russian companies, essentially, to take the place of the Western ones that previously held dominant positions inside the Russian economy, and that process is underway.

So, it would appear, in some respects, that the sanctions have imposed policies on Russia which are increasing the independence of the Russian economy from the West, opening up, as I say, profit opportunities for Russian businesses, and, generally speaking, doing things which Russia could never have done on its own. They also fostered the creation of an alternative payment system, working on the financing of Russia's international trade independently of the Western banking system and of the dollar reserve. So, in some sense, a zone is being created, which is — which would not have happened without the sanctions, been facilitated by the sanctions.

AMY GOODMAN: So, what do you think should happen now?

JAMES GALBRAITH: I'm sorry. I lost the audio here. Yeah.

AMY GOODMAN: So, what do you think should happen now? Can you —

JAMES GALBRAITH: Well, the problem here is the way in which Western economic analysts approach these questions, the kinds of tools they bring to bear. They have the facts, I think. They apply an analytical framework which leads to the wrong conclusions. So, what should happen, first of all, foremost, which is necessary in a number of areas, is to change the way we think about these questions, to reexamine our own assumptions, our own theoretical frameworks. That's, first and foremost, what we should do.

AMY GOODMAN: Well, James Galbraith, I want to thank you so much for being with us, professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, former executive director of the Joint Economic Committee in the U.S. Congress. We will link to the piece you wrote, "The Debt Ceiling Explained. Once More, With Feeling…"

This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org, The War and Peace Report. When we come back, the mass shooting in Texas. Authorities have caught the man accused of using the AR-15 to shoot dead five people. The Texas Governor Greg Abbott tweeted that the victims were "illegal immigrants." Stay with us.

Modern Monetary Theory is an unconventional take on economic strategy - The Washington Post 2012

Modern Monetary Theory is an unconventional take on economic strategy - The Washington Post

Modern Monetary Theory is an unconventional take on economic strategy

correction

An earlier version of this article included an incorrect anecdote regarding a Modern Monetary Theory meeting. This version has been updated.

About 11 years ago, James K. "Jamie" Galbraith recalls, hundreds of his fellow economists laughed at him. To his face. In the White House.

It was April 2000, and Galbraith had been invited by President Bill Clinton to speak on a panel about the budget surplus. Galbraith was a logical choice. A public policy professor at the University of Texas and former head economist for the Joint Economic Committee, he wrote frequently for the press and testified before Congress.

What's more, his father, John Kenneth Galbraith, was the most famous economist of his generation: a Harvard professor, best-selling author and confidante of the Kennedy family. Jamie has embraced a role as protector and promoter of the elder's legacy.

But if Galbraith stood out on the panel, it was because of his offbeat message. Most viewed the budget surplus as opportune: a chance to pay down the national debt, cut taxes, shore up entitlements or pursue new spending programs.

He viewed it as a danger: If the government is running a surplus, money is accruing in government coffers rather than in the hands of ordinary people and companies, where it might be spent and help the economy.

"I said economists used to understand that the running of a surplus was fiscal (economic) drag," he said, "and with 250 economists, they giggled."

Galbraith says the 2001 recession — which followed a few years of surpluses — proves he was right.

A decade later, as the soaring federal budget deficit has sharpened political and economic differences in Washington, Galbraith is mostly concerned about the dangers of keeping it too small. He's a key figure in a core debate among economists about whether deficits are important and in what way. The issue has divided the nation's best-known economists and inspired pockets of passion in academic circles. Any embrace by policymakers of one view or the other could affect everything from employment to the price of goods to the tax code.

In contrast to "deficit hawks" who want spending cuts and revenue increases now in order to temper the deficit, and "deficit doves" who want to hold off on austerity measures until the economy has recovered, Galbraith is a deficit owl. Owls certainly don't think we need to balance the budget soon. Indeed, they don't concede we need to balance it at all. Owls see government spending that leads to deficits as integral to economic growth, even in good times.

The term isn't Galbraith's. It was coined by Stephanie Kelton, a professor at the University of Missouri at Kansas City, who with Galbraith is part of a small group of economists who have concluded that everyone — members of Congress, think tank denizens, the entire mainstream of the economics profession — has misunderstood how the government interacts with the economy. If their theory — dubbed "Modern Monetary Theory" or MMT — is right, then everything we thought we knew about the budget, taxes and the Federal Reserve is wrong.

"Modern Monetary Theory" was coined by Bill Mitchell, an Australian economist and prominent proponent, but its roots are much older. The term is a reference to John Maynard Keynes, the founder of modern macroeconomics. In "A Treatise on Money," Keynes asserted that "all modern States" have had the ability to decide what is money and what is not for at least 4,000 years.

This claim, that money is a "creature of the state," is central to the theory. In a "fiat money" system like the one in place in the United States, all money is ultimately created by the government, which prints it and puts it into circulation. Consequently, the thinking goes, the government can never run out of money. It can always make more.

This doesn't mean that taxes are unnecessary. Taxes, in fact, are key to making the whole system work. The need to pay taxes compels people to use the currency printed by the government. Taxes are also sometimes necessary to prevent the economy from overheating. If consumer demand outpaces the supply of available goods, prices will jump, resulting in inflation (where prices rise even as buying power falls). In this case, taxes can tamp down spending and keep prices low.

But if the theory is correct, there is no reason the amount of money the government takes in needs to match up with the amount it spends. Indeed, its followers call for massive tax cuts and deficit spending during recessions.

Warren Mosler, a hedge fund manager who lives in Saint Croix in the U.S. Virgin Islands — in part because of the tax benefits — is one proponent. He's perhaps better know for his sports car company and his frequent gadfly political campaigns (he earned a little less than one percent of the vote as an independent in Connecticut's 2010 Senate race). He supports suspending the payroll tax that finances the Social Security trust fund and providing an $8 an hour government job to anyone who wants one to combat the current downturn.

The theory's followers come mainly from a couple of institutions: the University of Missouri-Kansas City's economics department and the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, both of which have received money from Mosler. But the movement is gaining followers quickly, largely through an explosion of economics blogs. Naked Capitalism, an irreverent and passionately written blog on finance and economics with nearly a million monthly readers, features proponents such as Kelton, fellow Missouri professor L. Randall Wray and Wartberg College professor Scott Fullwiler. So does New Deal 2.0, a wonky economics blog based at the liberal Roosevelt Institute think tank.

Their followers have taken to the theory with great enthusiasm and pile into the comment sections of mainstream economics bloggers when they take on the theory. Wray's work has been picked up by Firedoglake, a major liberal blog, and the New York Times op-ed page. "The crisis helped, but the thing that did it was the blogosphere," Wray says. "Because, for one thing, we could get it published. It's very hard to publish anything that sounds outside the mainstream in the journals."

Most notably, Galbraith has spread the message everywhere from the Daily Beast to Congress. He advised lawmakers including then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) when the financial crisis hit in 2008. Last summer he consulted with a group of House members on the debt ceiling negotiations. He was one of the handful of economists consulted by the Obama administration as it was designing the stimulus package. "I think Jamie has the most to lose by taking this position," Kelton says. "It was, I think, a really brave thing to do, because he has such a big name, and he's so well-respected."

Wray and others say they, too, have consulted with policymakers, and there is a definite sense among the group that the theory's time is now. "Our Web presence, every few months or so it goes up another notch," Fullwiler says.

The idea that deficit spending can help to bring an economy out of recession is an old one. It was a key point in Keynes's "The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money." It was the chief rationale for the 2009 stimulus package, and many self-identified Keynesians, such as former White House adviser Christina Romer and economist Paul Krugman, have argued that more is in order. There are, of course, detractors.

A key split among Keynesians dates to the 1930s. One set of economists, including the Nobel laureates John Hicks and Paul Samuelson, sought to incorporate Keynes's insights into classical economics. Hicks built a mathematical model summarizing Keynes's theory, and Samuelson sought to wed Keynesian macroeconomics (which studies the behavior of the economy as a whole) to conventional microeconomics (which looks at how people and businesses allocate resources). This set the stage for most macroeconomic theory since. Even today, "New Keynesians," such as Greg Mankiw, a Harvard economist who served as chief economic adviser to George W. Bush, and Romer's husband, David, are seeking ways to ground Keynesian macroeconomic theory in the micro-level behavior of businesses and consumers.

Modern Monetary theorists hold fast to the tradition established by "post-Keynesians" such as Joan Robinson, Nicholas Kaldor and Hyman Minsky, who insisted Samuelson's theory failed because its models acted as if, in Galbraith's words, "the banking sector doesn't exist."

The connections are personal as well. Wray's doctoral dissertation was advised by Minsky, and Galbraith studied with Robinson and Kaldor at the University of Cambridge. He argues that the theory is part of an "alternative tradition, which runs through Keynes and my father and Minsky."

And while Modern Monetary Theory's proponents take Keynes as their starting point and advocate aggressive deficit spending during recessions, they're not that type of Keynesians. Even mainstream economists who argue for more deficit spending are reluctant to accept the central tenets of Modern Monetary Theory. Take Krugman, who regularly engages economists across the spectrum in spirited debate. He has argued that pursuing large budget deficits during boom times can lead to hyperinflation. Mankiw concedes the theory's point that the government can never run out of money but doesn't think this means what its proponents think it does.

Technically it's true, he says, that the government could print streams of money and never default. The risk is that it could trigger a very high rate of inflation. This would "bankrupt much of the banking system," he says. "Default, painful as it would be, might be a better option."

Mankiw's critique goes to the heart of the debate about Modern Monetary Theory — and about how, when and even whether to eliminate our current deficits.

When the government deficit spends, it issues bonds to be bought on the open market. If its debt load grows too large, mainstream economists say, bond purchasers will demand higher interest rates, and the government will have to pay more in interest payments, which in turn adds to the debt load.

To get out of this cycle, the Fed — which manages the nation's money supply and credit and sits at the center of its financial system — could buy the bonds at lower rates, bypassing the private market. The Fed is prohibited from buying bonds directly from the Treasury — a legal rather than economic constraint. But the Fed would buy the bonds with money it prints, which means the money supply would increase. With it, inflation would rise, and so would the prospects of hyperinflation.

"You can't just fund any level of government that you want from spending money, because you'll get runaway inflation and eventually the rate of inflation will increase faster than the rate that you're extracting resources from the economy," says Karl Smith, an economist at the University of North Carolina. "This is the classic hyperinflation problem that happened in Zimbabwe and the Weimar Republic."

The risk of inflation keeps most mainstream economists and policymakers on the same page about deficits: In the medium term — all else being equal — it's critical to keep them small.

Economists in the Modern Monetary camp concede that deficits can sometimes lead to inflation. But they argue that this can only happen when the economy is at full employment — when all who are able and willing to work are employed and no resources (labor, capital, etc.) are idle. No modern example of this problem comes to mind, Galbraith says.

"The last time we had what could be plausibly called a demand-driven, serious inflation problem was probably World War I," Galbraith says. "It's been a long time since this hypothetical possibility has actually been observed, and it was observed only under conditions that will never be repeated."

According to Galbraith and the others, monetary policy as currently conducted by the Fed does not work. The Fed generally uses one of two levers to increase growth and employment. It can lower short-term interest rates by buying up short-term government bonds on the open market. If short-term rates are near-zero, as they are now, the Fed can try "quantitative easing," or large-scale purchases of assets (such as bonds) from the private sector including longer-term Treasuries using money the Fed creates. This is what the Fed did in 2008 and 2010, in an emergency effort to boost the economy.

According to Modern Monetary Theory, the Fed buying up Treasuries is just, in Galbraith's words, a "bookkeeping operation" that does not add income to American households and thus cannot be inflationary.

"It seemed clear to me that . . . flooding the economy with money by buying up government bonds . . . is not going to change anybody's behavior," Galbraith says. "They would just end up with cash reserves which would sit idle in the banking system, and that is exactly what in fact happened."

The theorists just "have no idea how quantitative easing works," says Joe Gagnon, an economist at the Peterson Institute who managed the Fed's first round of quantitative easing in 2008. Even if the money the Fed uses to buy bonds stays in bank reserves — or money that's held in reserve — increasing those reserves should still lead to increased borrowing and ripple throughout the system.

Mainstreamers are equally baffled by another claim of the theory: that budget surpluses in and of themselves are bad for the economy. According to Modern Monetary Theory, when the government runs a surplus, it is a net saver, which means that the private sector is a net debtor. The government is, in effect, "taking money from private pockets and forcing them to make that up by going deeper into debt," Galbraith says, reiterating his White House comments.

The mainstream crowd finds this argument as funny now as they did when Galbraith presented it to Clinton. "I have two words to answer that: Australia and Canada," Gagnon says. "If Jamie Galbraith would look them up, he would see immediate proof he's wrong. Australia has had a long-running budget surplus now, they actually have no national debt whatsoever, they're the fastest-growing, healthiest economy in the world." Canada, similarly, has run consistent surpluses while achieving high growth.

To even care about such questions, Galbraith says, marked him as "a considerable eccentric" when he arrived from Cambridge to get a PhD at Yale, which had a more conventionally Keynesian economics department. Galbraith credits Samuelson and his allies' success to a "mass-marketing of economic doctrine, of which Samuelson was the great master . . . which is something the Cambridge school could never have done."

The mainstream economists are loath to give up any ground, even in cases such as the so-called "Cambridge capital controversy" of the 1960s. Samuelson debated post-Keynesians and, by his own admission, lost. Such matters have been, in Galbraith's words, "airbrushed, like Trotsky" from the history of economics.

But MMT's own relationship to real-world cases can be a little hit-or-miss. Mosler, the hedge fund manager, credits his role in the movement to an epiphany in the early 1990s, when markets grew concerned that Italy was about to default. Mosler figured that Italy, which at that time still issued its own currency, the lira, could not default as long as it had the ability to print more liras. He bet accordingly, and when Italy did not default, he made a tidy sum. "There was an enormous amount of money to be made if you could bring yourself around to the idea that they couldn't default," he says.

Later that decade, he learned there was also a lot of money to be lost. When similar fears surfaced about Russia, he again bet against default. Despite having its own currency, Russia defaulted, forcing Mosler to liquidate one of his funds and wiping out much of his $850 million in investments in the country. Mosler credits this to Russia's fixed exchange rate policy of the time and insists that if it had only acted like a country with its own currency, default could have been avoided.

But the case could also prove what critics insist: Default, while technically always avoidable, is sometimes the best available option.