2021年6月5日土曜日

Why the Laffer Curve should really be called the 'Khaldun Curve' - CapX

Why the Laffer Curve should really be called the 'Khaldun Curve' - CapX

Why the Laffer Curve should really be called the 'Khaldun Curve'

Why the Laffer Curve should really be called the 'Khaldun Curve'

Ideas change the world. A good example of this is how the global view of taxation quietly began shifting one afternoon in 1974.

That afternoon, the American economist Arthur Laffer met with Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, who both were working for the Nixon-Ford Administration at the time. The topic at hand was taxes, a pressing matter at a time when the highest marginal tax rate in the US was fully 70 per cent.

During the meeting, Laffer explained that the relationship between the tax revenues and the tax rate was not as simple as one would expect. Doubling the tax rate, for example, does not double the tax revenues, because higher taxes disincentives people from working. To illustrate his point, Laffer famously sketched a curve on a napkin. It showed that both a tax rate at zero per cent and one at hundred per cent would yield no tax revenues.

A tax rate of zero per cent would logically mean zero revenues, and one at 100 per cent would disincentives people completely from working, which also means zero revenues. The implication, Laffer noted, is that somewhere between zero and hundred per cent, there is a tipping point. Above this point, raising the tax rates actually would actually lead to such a damaging effect on economic incentives, that the collected taxes would actually be lower after the tax rate was raised.

Since then, the Laffer Curve has been used by supporters of low taxes around the world to reinforce their ideas. In the US, it has helped to inspire a downward shift in taxation. Ronald Reagan's administration introduced massive changes, which dropped the marginal tax rate to 28 percent. Since then, the taxes have again risen to 39.6 per cent. However, even the proponents of high tax policy are aware of Laffer's warnings: there is a limit to how high taxes can be raised.

The funny thing is that Arthur Laffer's theory was far from new.

He was rediscovering a concept that had been acknowledged during the Golden Age Islamic period of free market policy. Laffer has himself explained that he didn't invent the curve, but took it from Ibn Khaldun, a 14th-century Muslim, North African philosopher. Indeed, many of the ideas we today associate with Western free-market thinkers originated in the Islamic world during the Islamic Golden Age.

The Islamic Golden Age lasted from the 8th century AD to the 13th century. During this period, much of the Middle East and North Africa was ruled by various caliphates. This was an era of scientific progress, economic development, and cultural achievements. Much of this was a continuation of the advancements that had been made in the high-cultures of Persia and Byzantium before the Islamic conquest.

At the beginning of the 6th century AD, the Persian king Khosrow introduced property rights and tax collection reforms, which weakened feudal control and strengthened private ownership. After the Arab conquest of Persia, which occurred in the middle of the 7th century AD, the system of private property was further strengthened which stimulated economic growth and dynamism. A bourgeois class of merchants, capitalists, and craftsmen arose in Persia, which was despised by conservatives who favoured a feudal economy.

In the book Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire, Parvaneh Pourshariati cites a text from this era which shows the contempt that the traditionalists had for the new bourgeois class.

The bourgeois are described thus: "They busy themselves like tradesmen with the earning of money and neglect to garner fair fame. They marry among the vulgar and those who are not their peers, and from that birth and begetting men of lower rank appear."

For a society to accept free markets and the wealth it creates, an intellectual tradition in defence of capitalism needs to exist. This tradition developed in the Middle East many centuries before it reached the west.

Hamid S Hosseini writes about the Islamic economic tradition in the book A Companion to the History of Economic Thought. He explains that medieval Muslim writers held a much more favourable view of economic activity and wealth accumulation than contemporary Christian thinkers.

Hosseini cites several influential Persian Muslim thinkers, who praised wealth accumulation and self-interest. He notes: "In contrast to their European counterparts, medieval Muslim writers praised economic activity and the accumulation of wealth, viewed individuals as acquisitive, and scorned poverty."

The most prominent supporter of low taxes was Ibn Khaldun. Born in 14th century Tunisia, Khaldun was a prominent scholar and one of the founders of economics and social sciences. Khaldun believes that a just government should only, in accordance with Islamic law, impose low taxes. This stimulates business activity and thus creates wealth, which makes it possible to collect more taxes.

However, rulers tend to increase the tax to benefit themselves. High taxes hurt commerce and trade. When tax rates are raised to pay for a bloated government, it will finally cause the tax base to shrink so much that the government cannot meet its obligations.

The modern theory of high taxation is simply that it will ultimately erode the tax base. Khaldun went further, and explained that ultimately the government would be bloated and the tax base eroded – at this point the state would often implode under its own weight, leading to a period of chaos and the rise of a new state.

This in fact is a key explanation for the rise and fall of historic empires, including the Roman Empire, the first Persian Empire and numerous other world powers. Often these empires begun by imposing low taxes, and thrived. With time, as the power of central state grew, so did also taxes – with stagnation and ultimately state failure as the result.

Arthur Laffer started an intellectual tradition of questioning high-tax policies, because he knew of the work of Ibn Khaldun many centuries before, and built on this tradition. Knowing the history of free markets is valuable for guiding the present. The ancient free-market intellectual tradition that existed in the Middle East, and independently also arose in China, is not well known today. Yet, it addressed the very same issues that are relevant today, pointing to the damaging effects of high taxation, government attempt to control market exchange, lack of respect for private property and public debt.

Besides Khaldun, there are numerous other Muslim scholars who contributed to free market economics and whose work deserves a renaissance in the modern world. Al-Mawardi, who was born in the 10th century, believed that public borrowing by the state should only be considered as a last resort and in rare cases.

Abu Yusuf, an 8th-century chief judge of Baghdad who wrote a treatise on taxation and fiscal problems of the state, thought that development projects whose benefit is general should be financed through public revenues. However, projects that benefited specific groups should not be part of public expenditure, but rather funded by the particular group itself. Yusuf applied cost-benefit analysis when he wrote: "the authorities must cancel the project of digging any canal whose damage is greater than its benefits."

That the public sector should only fund projects that favour all of society, and leave projects that favour only one group to be funded privately, would be seen as an extremist small government stance today. But it wasn't very shocking in the Middle East during the Islamic Golden Age period, where limited taxation was the norm. The state did have a role in funding infrastructure and also welfare, including hospitals. Yet it was very much a minimal-government approach.

Libertarian ideals and policies, it turns out, are anything but new. They have been tried out historically, with positive results. This is worth remembering, since ideas and knowledge of the past can both change the present world.

Dr. Nima Sanandaji is the president of the European Centre for Entrepreneurship and Policy Reform (ECEPR) and author of some 30 books. The sources in this article can be found in the book 'The Birthplace of Capitalism: The Middle East'.



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2021年6月4日金曜日

英米日の政府債務残高 藤井聡さんのツイート




2020/09 ケルトン、ブチギレる:米国にも均衡財政を憲法に盛り込めという人たちがいる件。|ゲーテちゃん|note

ケルトン、ブチギレる:米国にも均衡財政を憲法に盛り込めという人たちがいる件。|ゲーテちゃん|note

ケルトン、ブチギレる:米国にも均衡財政を憲法に盛り込めという人たちがいる件。

見出し画像

 ほぼケルトンの追っかけブログとなってますが、今日は短めの記事でTwitterのスレを紹介します。
 ケルトン教授が25日付のツイートで「全くのゴミだわ。こいつらガチで危険だわ」と珍しく語気を強めてブチギレていました。(元ツイート: https://twitter.com/stephaniekelton/status/1309467969739776001?s=21 )
 何事かと見てみたら、どうやらアメリカの無党派団体 **Fix the Debt **とか言う名前からして緊縮マシマシな連中が騒いでるようです。(記事リンク(英文):https://www.tapinto.net/towns/roselle-roselle-park/sections/government/articles/deficits-do-matter-it-s-time-to-address-our-long-term-debt-problem )

 記事のタイトルは「財政赤字はやはり問題だ:長期債務の問題に取り組む時がきた」という、まあお察しな文言。
 で、「考えうる限り最悪のアイデアの一つ」と教授が吐き捨てる彼らの提案がこれ↓
 「私たちは国を(正しい)軌道に戻す必要がある。まず、議会に均衡財政を義務付ける合衆国憲法改正案を可決するよう訴えること。 49の州が均衡財政を義務付けられているのに、なぜ連邦政府にも義務付けないのか?」

 家計じゃなくて州財政を持ち出して、連邦政府の予算も均衡しなきゃダメだ!と喚いているわけですね。MMTによる説明をご存知の方には当たり前の話ですが、同じ政府でも通貨発行権を持つ連邦政府を州政府と同列に語れる訳がないでしょう。 
 さらにコロナ不況についてはこんな見解を披露します。
 「現在の危機は、経済が繁栄を維持している間に国の借金を削減しなければならないことを示している。さもなければ、景気後退や緊急事態に対処する能力が阻害される。」

 これに対してケルトン教授→「冗談にも程がある。現在の危機は正反対のことを示している。つまり、あなた達が問題にしてることはこれっぽっちも問題じゃない。何十年にもわたる債務と赤字の増加にしたって、議会がコロナ不況と闘う上では何ら障害にはならなかった。」

 実際、コロナ不況対策で米国議会は財政出動拡大を承認しています。予算案は財政赤字の総額に関わらず通っているわけで、結果的に膨れ上がった財政赤字を見て「大変だ」と青ざめているに過ぎない。 
 まあ均衡財政を憲法改正案に入れろという国賊連中は、日本にもおりますしね。財政均衡論者のしつこさには嫌気がさすでしょうが、大変なのは日本だけじゃないよということで、こちらもしぶとく応戦するしかありません。
 はい、申し上げたとおり今回は短いですが紹介は以上です。最後はケルトンの言葉でどうぞ。
「アホなこと広めてんじゃないよ。」

2015 ルーカス批判批判 Criticizing the Lucas Critique: Macroeconometricians' Response to Robert Lucas by Aurélien Goutsmedt, Erich Pinzón-Fuchs, Matthieu Renault, Francesco Sergi :: SSRN

Criticizing the Lucas Critique: Macroeconometricians' Response to Robert Lucas by Aurélien Goutsmedt, Erich Pinzón-Fuchs, Matthieu Renault, Francesco Sergi :: SSRN

Abstract

The standard history of macroeconomics considers Lucas (1976) – "the Lucas Critique" – as a pathbreaking innovation for the discipline. According to this view, Lucas's article dismissed the traditional macroeconometric practice calling for new ways of conceiving the quantitative evaluation of economic policies. The Lucas Critique is considered, nowadays, as a fundamental principle of macroeconomic modeling (Woodford, 2003), and yet its interpretation and application still represent unsolved issues in economics (Chari et al., 2008). Even if the influence of Lucas's contribution cannot be neglected, something seems to be missing in the narrative: the reactions of the economists that were directly targeted by the Critique. Modeling practices of economic policy evaluation were not overthrown immediately after Lucas (1976), creating a divide between theoretical and applied macroeconomics (Brayton et al., 1997). In this paper we propose a careful account of Lucas's argument and of some of the previous works anticipating the substantial outline of the Critique (like Frisch's notion of autonomy). Then, we discuss our own interpretation of Lucas (1976), where we find two different perspectives: (1) a prescriptive perspective which tells how to build a good macroeconometric model (which is the standard and popular interpretation of the article); and (2) a positive perspective that regards the Lucas critique as an attempt to explain a specific real-world phenomenon: stagflation. Third, we classify the reactions of the Keynesian macroeconometricians following this line of interpretation. On the prescriptive side, the Keynesians protested against the New Classical solution to Lucas's critique (the use of the rational expectation hypothesis in particular). Klein, for instance, proposed an alternative microfoundational program to empirically study the formation of expectations. On the positive side, the Keynesians put into question the relevance of the Lucas Critique to explain the rise of both unemployment and inflation in the 1970s, trying to test the impact of policy regime changes and of shifts in agents' behavior. We argue that the explanation of the stagflation is to be found elsewhere. The purpose of this paper is to study the reactions of the macroeconometricians criticized by Lucas. We focus especially on those macroeconometricians who worked on policy evaluation and who held an expertise position in governmental institutions. We categorize the different reactions to the Critique, in order to enrich the understanding of the evolution of modeling and expertise practices through the analysis of the debates – which have not yet been completely solved.

Keywords: History of macroeconomics, Keynesian economics, Lucas Critique, Macroeconometrics, Rational Expectations.

The Deeper Anxieties of the Inflation Hawks by James K. Galbraith - Project Syndicate

The Deeper Anxieties of the Inflation Hawks by James K. Galbraith - Project Syndicate

The Deeper Anxieties of the Inflation Hawks

Following an increase in consumer prices during the first quarter of the year, commentators who were already wringing their hands about inflation have now doubled down on their position. But the economic arguments used to justify such fears simply do not stand up to scrutiny.

AUSTIN – In a recent commentary for The Washington Post, former US Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence H. Summers stated that "the consumer price index rose at a 7.5 percent annual rate" in the first quarter of 2021. I could not reproduce this number from the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI-U website, which reports a year-on-year increase (April 2020-April 2021) of 4.2%, driven largely by a sharp 49.6% rebound in gasoline prices from their pandemic crash. When food and energy prices are excluded, the inflation rate over the past year comes to just 3%.

Odder still is Summers's rationale for projecting future inflation risks:

"Inflationary pressures are mounting from the boost in demand created by the $2 trillion-plus in savings that Americans have accumulated during the pandemic; from large-scale Federal Reserve debt purchases, along with Fed forecasts of essentially zero interest rates into 2024; from roughly $3 trillion in fiscal stimulus passed by Congress; and from soaring stock and real estate prices."

This is odd logic, beginning with the conjecture that savings cause inflation. John Maynard Keynes argued the reverse: excess savings are withheld from demand, causing unemployment. And Summers's own neoclassical school normally holds that high savings are a good thing, because they sustain low interest rates and lead to more business investment. So far as I know, no economist has ever before suggested that savings, as such, cause inflation.

Likewise, while it's true that when the Fed buys up unwanted private debts, mostly from banks, the sellers get cash, shielding them from losses they might otherwise have suffered, this protection has no direct connection to their lending habits. As the economist Hyman Minsky pointed out, banks make loans when they have creditworthy customers. They neither lend their reserves, nor do they need reserves in order to lend.

Next is the claim that the Fed's forecasts of future low interest rates are inflationary. Actually, the Fed's interest-rate forecast is contingent on its inflation forecast, and its current position is that it expects price pressures to be transitory, and will react by raising rates if that turns out to be wrong. If the Fed agreed with Summers about future inflation, it would have said so in its inflation forecast; the interest-rate forecast has no independent role.

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Summers then points to the $3 trillion of fiscal stimulus already enacted. But some $2 trillion of this is stored in private savings for now, so this point is redundant with the first one. Finally, he mentions "soaring stock and real estate prices." Yet we heard no such warnings from him in the late 1990s, when he was Treasury secretary during a massive stock boom. And rightly so: the boom did not cause an increase in inflation.

What is really at work here? Summers may simply be attempting to revive the old Phillips curve concept, which states that, as unemployment falls, wages – and therefore prices – rise. But if this pattern ever existed, it disappeared 50 years ago, and even the slowest-thinking economists largely abandoned the Phillips curve by the mid-1990s. Since then, almost all new US jobs have been created in the services sectors, where "tight" labor markets have little effect on wages and none on consumer prices.

Moreover, today's US labor markets aren't even close to tight. The ratio of employment to population is still at least four percentage points below where it was a year ago, and it seems to be flattening after a sharp rebound. That means there are still about five million people who were working in 2019 but are not working today. The reasons are unknown. Perhaps employers haven't wanted them back, or the jobs on offer aren't very good. Maybe they will return later – this year or beyond – when the buffer provided by all those savings runs low. 

What, then, is driving Summers's inflation fear? When an economist of his stature makes such specious claims, one can only wonder if there isn't something else on his mind.

To be sure, there are some actual price risks. A big one is financial speculation – in oil, metals, timber for home construction, and so forth. It is not uncommon for financial players to bid up prices by taking these goods off the market early in a boom. (The Chinese know this and are duly cracking down on the hoarding of copper and other metals.)

Another risk would emerge if the Fed took the advice of inflation hawks. For most businesses, interest is a cost like any other, and an increase in that cost would be passed through, in part, to consumer prices. It is interesting that Summers doesn't mention either of these, which could be mitigated with tough financial-sector regulation – and, of course, by not raising interest rates.

But deeper worries may be lurking beneath the surface of Summers's essay. One concerns that $2 trillion in savings. Through direct payments and expanded unemployment insurance, a fair amount of that sum went to working-class households – the first big chunk of change for many such families in decades. Having some cash could make them less likely to borrow – and thus less dependent on banks. Workers might even hold out for higher wages, creating the "labor shortage" of which Summers speaks (at least temporarily). More generally, when people have a bit of a financial cushion, they are harder to boss around.

A second source of anxiety may be spotted in Summers's call for "clear statements that the United States desires a strong dollar." This is the secret angst of the hard-money men, an insecure lot who fret that their position on the global totem pole might not be entirely secure. Perhaps they are right. Today's dollar-centered world reflects the power alignments of the period between the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War in 1989. US power has since eroded, opening the possibility that the world's monetary system could one day flip.

That may not happen anytime soon. But if and when the moment comes, it will follow from decades of decline, from better strategies pursued elsewhere, from the self-inflicted wounds of the Reagan, Clinton, and Bush eras, from the sacrifice of America's industrial base in the 1980s, from the fragility of the global order that emerged in the 1990s, and from the military overreach of the 2000s. Against all that, a few "clear statements" won't mean much.

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2021/06/04 ケルトン プレゼン FPA NorCalさんのツイート

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 さ
 
FPA NorCal
⁦‪@FPANorCal‬⁩
Thought-provoking presentation by ⁦‪@StephanieKelton‬⁩ this morning. Central banks need new tools and fiscal spending to support a balanced economy. Interest rate lever drives people into debt leading to booms and busts.
#fpanorcal2021 pic.twitter.com/7lmQO7Fd7B
 
2021/06/04 2:00
 
 
考えさせられるプレゼンテーション@StephanieKelton今朝。中央銀行は、バランスの取れた経済をサポートするために、新しいツールと財政支出を必要としています。金利レバーは人々を借金に追い込み、ブームと破綻をもたらします。
#fpanorcal2021


Biden vs. Larry vs. MMT

• Contra Summers, MMT is not about unlimited deficit spending

• MMT is about replacing an artificial budget constraint with a real resource constraint-i.e. inflation

• Supply constraints matter

• Contra Biden and Summers, government spending can be entirely "paid for" but highly inflationary

• Only MMT stresses this point and pushes for change in scorekeeping




バイデンvsラリーvsMMT
- サマーズに反して、MMTは無制限の赤字支出ではない。
- MMTは、人工的な予算制約を、現実の資源制約、すなわちインフレに置き換えることである。
- 供給制約の問題
- BidenとSummersに反して、政府支出は完全に「支払い済み」であるが、非常にインフレになりやすい。
- MMTだけがこの点を強調し、スコアキーピングの変更を推し進めている