2021年1月3日日曜日

A response to Greg Mankiw – Part 2 – Bill Mitchell – Modern Monetary Theory

A response to Greg Mankiw – Part 2 – Bill Mitchell – Modern Monetary Theory
4 金持ち名無しさん、貧乏名無しさん (ワッチョイ 9fc9-VdWF)[sage] 2020/02/09(日) 16:42:03.03 ID:7txohOuq0 
659 名前:金持ち名無しさん、貧乏名無しさん (ラクッペ MMe5-Guwz)[sage] 投稿日:2020/01/20(月) 00:10:34.64 ID:XfmCI4o8M
>>1
マンキューのMMT論     himaginary's diary     20200114/Mankiw_on_MMT
マンキューが昨年12月に「A Skeptic's Guide to Modern Monetary Theory」という小論を書いている(H/T マンキューブログ)。以下はその概要。

・自国通貨を発行している国は債務不履行になることはない、というMMTの主張については異論がある。
・政府は、貨幣能力があっても債務を履行しないことが最善の選択だと決断するかもしれない。
・MMT支持者は、インフレについての主流派見解への反証を過大評価している。
・主流派のインフレ理論は、階級闘争ではなく、総需要の過大な伸びに重点を置く。
・ニューケインジアンは、市場支配力が存在する世界では民間の価格設定が最善とはならないことを認めつつも、
経済の複雑さや価格統制の歴史に鑑みるとそれは現実的な解決策にはならない、としている。

660 名前:金持ち名無しさん、貧乏名無しさん (アウアウウー Sa05-6zBS)[] 投稿日:2020/01/20(月) 01:00:03.99 ID:+BVVEHjHa
>>
ミッチェル教授はすでに返答してるな
マンキューは端からMMTを理解する気は無さそうな記事だ
ミッチェル教授、日本語を勉強してるんだな
日本語勉強に英語の観点から言語を理解しようとしても無理なように
主流のレンズでMMT見たってMMTは理解できないってさ

A response to Greg Mankiw ? Part 2
http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=43961
http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=43961

A response to Greg Mankiw – Part 2

In – A response to Greg Mankiw – Part 1 (December 23, 2019) – I provided the E-mail correspondence that preceded the publication of – A Skeptic's Guide to Modern Monetary Theory (December 12, 2019) – by Greg Mankiw. In this blog post, I provide a response to the specific points made in that paper and conclude that if it aims to be a fair 'guide' to MMT (even from a critical perspective) then it fails badly. So let me explain why I hold that view. Today's post is long and will take some reading. It could have been a lot longer. But I intend to take a break from writing the blog until next week (the Quiz will appear as usual though), so you have plenty of time to read this longer than usual post. Normally, I would have spread it out over 3 or 4 parts.

Referencing

I will dispense with this issue quickly.

Some think that it is unfair to critique Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) by drawing on material in our textbook – Macroeconomics – which was published by leading textbook publisher Macmillan in March 2019.

That is the only reference Greg Mankiw draws upon and cites eight mainstream references as an alternative authority.

I don't take exception to that.

First, our textbook purports to represent the body of work we have developed which is now referred to as MMT.

Second, as an undergraduate textbook it clearly simplifies the exposition and does not include all the work that has been published in scholarly books and journal articles.

So that should be understood.

But as it stands, if the textbook exposition simplifies to the point of misleading or creating fictions then it deserves to be criticised.

In my view, as one of the authors, the textbook faithfully conveys the principles of MMT as we know it.

Academic disdain

You get a feel for how Groupthink operates in the opening paragraph of the 'Guide' when Greg Mankiw refers to "top universities" where "prominent scholars" spend their time debating "the fine points of macroeconomic theory" and his reference to "a small corner of academia".

There is implicit disdain being displayed here.

It is true that MMT has risen to public attention in a unique way.

First, we tried the usual academic route – writing papers, presenting at conferences and workshops etc. A lot of work was produced – many papers, books etc – and we were able to put down the major body of work in this manner.

Second, we didn't cut through until we embraced social media first through my blog and then other blogs and then other social media tools.

This has allowed us to present quite complex economic ideas to a non-academic audience and given that audience a framework for understanding why their lives and their communities are being devastated by neoliberal policies that draw on the economics coming out of those "top universities".

People instinctively know something is wrong and the that the predictions from those "prominent scholars" have failed to realise.

But they didn't have a framework for assembling an understanding of those instinctive feelings.

Now they have.

Third, that grassroots development is now filtering upwards to the political space as Greg Mankiw notes.

Fourth, new paradigms rarely emerge out of debates on the "fine points" of the dominant theory. The history of scientific development describes quite a different process.

Groupthink, which is a group dynamic that resists change usually precludes radical developments arising from within the mainstream orthodoxy.

For example, think about the development of – Adult Neurogenesis – by – Joseph Altman – in 1962, which is a typical case of how a mainstream paradigm resists change but is finally usurped by an empirically more robust and logically-consistent alternative paradigm.

American biologist Joseph Altman was an outsider to the mainstream of his profession. He was a doctoral student in "a small laboratory … at the New York University Medical School".

He specialised in neurobiology and discovered adult neurogenesis in the early 1960s. He showed that adult brains could create new neurons but the idea was fiercely denied by contemporary thought at the time.

Clinical practice was based on the dominant notion that there was no capacity for adult neurogenesis.

Altman's work was "largely ignored" by the mainstream profession.

In his – Memoir: The Discovery of Adult Mammalian Neurogenesis – published in 2011, five years before his death, Joseph Altman notes that:

1. "I did have the proper academic credentials; I was known in the neuroscientific community; and most of the scientists who tried to stop my work were younger and many of them were less well established than I was."

2. After receiving initial publicity for his research, including articles in the media, "things started to change in the late 1960s, although it took me several more years to realize that something was amiss. The first wake-up call came when I was supposed to be granted tenure at MIT and my promotion was denied."

3. "there was a concerted attempt by some influential members of the neuroscientific community to marginalize us".

4. "While he refers to several of our papers on adult neurogenesis, he misquotes them" – he, being a leading academic in the field of development neurobiology.

5. "Another introductory text on brain development (Lund 1978), makes no reference at all to adult neurogenesis and quotes none of our papers on that subject."

6. "This neglect of our work continued during the 1980s."

7. "Reference to our published evidence of postnatal neurogenesis was omitted not only by these widely circulated introductory textbooks (of course, I find textbooks that did refer to our work) but also in some more advanced publications."

8. "There was obviously a movement afoot to marginalize us."

9. "(a) by the early 1980s we were starting to have difficulties in getting our grant applications approved; (b) by the mid-1980s we lost all our grant support; and (c) by the early 1990s we had several of our submitted papers outright rejected."

10. "Students and postdoctoral fellows quickly learned while they listened to popular speakers making their rounds, and dominating endless symposia and conferences, as to who was "in" and who was "out"; whom to quote or not quote in your bibliography to make it more likely that it will be reviewed by a peer sympathetic to your approach or findings; and what line of research to pursue in light of what is favored or not favored by the granting agencies at any given time."

And on he went, describing in detail the way the mainstream suppressed his work.

But meanwhile, the evidence base was building which supported the work of his laboratory and creating dissonance for the mainstream paradigm, just as is happening in economics.

Joseph Altman writes:

Scientific theories—unlike political attitudes, religious faiths or aesthetic judgments— are not matters of personal or group preferences … Scientific theories must comply with the objective facts ascertained by empirical observations and research findings; they stand or fall as new data gathered confirm them or refute them … sooner or later the facts will prevail and no matter how powerful or prestigious the supporters of a refuted theory, the theory will eventually be abandoned.

And it wasn't until the evidence was so strongly supporting the neurogenesis idea (Elizabeth Gould in 1999) that the proposition became fashionable.

Neurogenesis is now one of the most significant areas in neuroscience. The clinical practice changed radically in the light of the paradigm shift.

So people had had their lives blighted by the clinical practice they had received which reflected the failed views of the brain.

You can see strong resonance with the communities and people who are having their lives and vitality taken from them by economic policies that are based on the mainstream myths, that people like Greg Mankiw propagate.

Altman's experience helps us understand how the mainstream economics profession sustains its position in the academy as its inability to explain anything important is increasingly exposed.

First, academic disciplines (such as, neurobiologists, economists etc.) work within organised 'paradigms', which philosopher – Thomas Kuhn – identified as "universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a community of practitioners" in his 1966 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

Typically, the body of knowledge that defines the paradigm are "recounted … by science textbooks, elementary and advanced" (Kuhn, 1996: 10).

Kuhn challenged the notion that 'scientific' activity is a linear process, whereby scholars add new empirically supported facts to the knowledge base to replace previously accepted notions.

Rather, Kuhn said that dominant viewpoints persist until they are confronted with insurmountable anomalies, whereupon a revolution (paradigm shift) occurs.

The new paradigm exposes the old theories as inapplicable, introduces new concepts, asks new questions and provides students with a new way of thinking with a new language and explanatory metaphors.

Once supplanted, the old theories are no longer considered valid knowledge. Kuhn also noted that there is a sort of mob rule among practitioners within a dominant paradigm and they vehemently hold onto their views even in the face of logical or empirical anomaly.

Altman's work represented the potential for a paradigm shift and was resisted by the mob until change became ineluctable.

So paradigm change usually comes from an emerging body of work that comes out of a "small corner of academia".

Alleged opaqueness of MMT

I often read mainstream economists claim, just before they launch into a dismissal of MMT, that our work is hard to grasp or even find in any coherent form.

It is usually because they have no interest in reading the body of work and often quote secondary sources (including prior flawed critiques) as their version of MMT.

A classic recent case of this is the paper published by the BIS (October 13, 2019) – Exiting low inflation traps by "consensus": nominal wages and price stability – which attacks MMT as likely to cause hyperinflation, but, uses as its source Op Eds by Paul Krugman and Larry Summers.

None of the MMT literature is cited (or read presumably).

Arrant dishonesty from the central bank for the central banks.

It doesn't even comprehend that MMT is not a policy regime but a way of understanding the monetary system and the capacities of the currency-issuer within that system.

Greg Mankiw plays the same card:

At the outset, I should admit that I found the task of figuring out MMT to be vexing. As I studied it, I was often puzzled about what precisely was being asserted. I hasten to add that the problems I had could have been of my own making. Perhaps after forty years in the profession, I am too steeped in mainstream macroeconomics to fully appreciate MMT. I raise this possibility because MMT proponents may say that I missed the nuances of their approach. But what follows is my honest reaction to MMT after a sincere effort to understand it.

Whether he has tried to understand our work in good faith is not something I can conclude on. His behaviour – sending an E-mail to discuss fine points then writing a paper without further correspondence or recognition of what went before – is not encouraging.

But that is a small issue in the bigger picture.

The other and more significant (telling) reason, mainstream economists find our "MMT to be vexing" is because they try to absorb some of the statements we make back into their own paradigmic structure, using their frames, language, concepts, causalities etc.

Quite clearly when an emerging paradigm comes along with new conceptual structures, new framing, new language, one cannot simply stay 'thinking within the box' and hope to make any sense of what they are coming into contact with.

Groupthink is a trap and a blinker.

I think that is what is going on here.

Turning to substance

Even the language, Greg Mankiw uses is loaded:

MMT begins with the government budget constraint under a system of fiat money.

MMT doesn't begin with a GBC – we reject the concept outright.

Mainstream economics starts with the flawed analogy between the household and the sovereign government such that any excess in government spending over taxation receipts has to be 'financed' in two ways: (a) by borrowing from the public; and/or (b) by 'printing money'.

Neither characterisation is remotely representative of what happens in the real world in terms of the operations that define transactions between the government and non-government sector.

The foundation of many mainstream macroeconomic arguments is the fallacious analogy they draw between the budget of a household/corporation and the government fiscal balance.

The basic analogy is flawed at its most elemental level.

In the real world (and in MMT), there is no parallel between the household (for example) whose spending is clearly revenue-constrained because it uses the currency in issue and the national government, which is the issuer of that same currency.

The choice (and constraint) sets facing a household and a sovereign government are not alike in any financial way.

Clearly, in real terms, both can only buy what is available for sale although the capacity of the government to make those purchases is financially unlimited. After that point, there is no similarity or analogy that can be exploited.

The evolution in the 1960s of the literature on the so-called 'government budget constraint' (GBC), was part of a deliberate strategy to argue that the microeconomic constraints facing the individual applied to a national government as well.

Accordingly, the literature claimed that just as the individual had to "finance" its spending and choose between competing spending opportunities, the same constraints applied to the national government.

The logical development was then to examine the ways in which this 'financing' was done and the alleged consequences of each.

The GBC says, in English, that a fiscal deficit equals Government spending + Government interest payments – Tax receipts and, must, in turn, be 'financed' (equal) by a change in outstanding bonds (issuing debt) and/or a change in high powered money ('printing money').

While the mainstream infer that this statement delivers causality from the financing side to the spending side (as if the currency-issuing government is like a household), in fact, it is merely an accounting statement that is of no particular importance in the MMT framework.

In a stock-flow consistent macroeconomics, as an accounting statement the relationship must always hold. That is, it has to be true if all the transactions between the government and non-government sector have been correctly added and subtracted.

So in terms of MMT, the previous equation is just an ex post accounting identity that has to be true by definition and has no real economic importance.

But for the mainstream economist like Greg Mankiw, the GBC represents an ex ante (before the fact) financial constraint that the government is bound by.

The difference between these two conceptions is very significant and the second (mainstream) interpretation cannot be correct if governments issue fiat currency (unless they place voluntary constraints on themselves to act as if it is).

MMT exposes the voluntary nature of any such constraints and makes them a political issue rather than a binding law as is presented in the mainstream approach.

Further, in mainstream economics, money creation is erroneously depicted as the government asking the central bank to buy treasury bonds, which the central bank, in return, then 'prints' money so that the government can facilitate its spending.

Mainstream economists call this debt monetisation and you can find out why this is typically not, usually, a viable option for a central bank pursuing a positive policy rate target, by reading the blog posts in the Deficits 101 suite:

1. Deficit spending 101 – Part 1 (February 21, 2009).

2. Deficit spending 101 – Part 2 (February 23, 2009).

3. Deficit spending 101 – Part 3 (March 2, 2009).

The point is that fiscal deficits increase bank reserves and hence the pressure on the overnight interest rate will be downward, all else equal.

The mainstream theory predicts the opposite, which was one of the 'experiments' I noted in my response to Greg Mankiw's E-mail to us in October 2019 to differentiate the two approaches.

The central bank has two options in this case:

(a) conduct open market operations to drain the excess bank reserves and prevent competition in the Interbank market from driving them towards zero. So debt issuance is an interest-rate maintenance operation rather than a funding of government deficit spending operation.

(b) pay a competitive rate on the excess reserves.

If you think about it, there is no real operational difference between (a) and (b). The differences would be in which account the funds are located (government debt or reserves).

Mainstream theory completely misses out on all that.

Rather, it focuses on the 'printing' money aspect and claims that if governments increase the money growth rate (they erroneously call this "printing money") the extra spending will cause accelerating inflation because there will be "too much money chasing too few goods"!

As a consequence, the least worst option for a mainstream economist is for the government to 'fund' its deficit spending by issuing bonds to the non-government sector, as if this reduces the inflation risk of the deficits.

Mainstream economists consider this to be the least worst option because in the GBC framework, the bond issuance pushes up interest rates (as the government is seen to be competing for a finite pool of savings) and 'crowds out' private investment expenditure.

Neither mainstream proposition bears scrutiny – you can read these blog posts for more detail:

1. Will we really pay higher taxes? (April 7, 2009).

2. Will we really pay higher interest rates? (April 8, 2009).

When I replied to Greg Mankiw's E-mail (see A response to Greg Mankiw – Part 1 (December 23, 2019)) – I raised these essential facts about the real world.

He clearly chose to ignore these points of departure.

Further, the whole characterisation that governments only 'print money' if the central bank buys its debt is false.

All government spending involves new 'money' (liquidity) being created by dint of the digital changes to the banking system that the government facilitates. Nothing is 'printed'.

The process is the same irrespective of whether tax revenue balances the spending, whether bond issues are made to match the spending, or whether the central bank just credited bank accounts on behalf of the treasury department.

And:

1. MMT predicts that there is no difference in the inflation risk of the deficit spending arising from these 'funding' choices – noting that MMT does not consider the government to be financially constrained anyway.

2. Issuing debt does not reduce the inflation risk of the spending as the funds to purchase the debt were not being spent anyway.

3. Banks are not reserve-constrained so there is no sense to say that when governments issue debt they are increasing competition in the finite saving pool and pushing up interest rates as a consequence. Bank loans create deposits and banks will make those loans to any credit-worthy borrower who seeks funding, meaning that the whole premise of crowding out (which is central in the mainstream GBC story) is false.

I raised all those points in my response to Greg Mankiw.

It is clear he ignored them, and, instead wrote, in relation to the MMT observation that a sovereign government is never intrinsically revenue constrained":

To be sure, a currency-issuing government can always print more money when a bill comes due. That ability might seem to release the government from any financial constraints. Certainly, if an individual were granted access to the monetary printing press, his or her financial constraints would become much less binding. But I am reluctant to reach a similar conclusion for a national government, for three reasons.

He goes on to juxtapose different options which he thinks justifies his inability to accept the simple MMT proposition.

First, Greg Mankiw writes:

… in our current monetary system with interest paid on reserves, any money the government prints to pay a bill will likely end up in the banking system as reserves, and the government (via the Fed) will need to pay interest on those reserves. That is, when the government prints money to pay a bill, it is, in effect, borrowing. The money can stay as reserves forever, but interest accrues over time. An MMT proponent will point out that the interest can be paid by printing yet more money. But the ever-expanding monetary base will have further ramifications. Aggregate demand will increase due to a wealth effect, eventually spurring inflation.

He understands that an open market operation (sale of debt by the central bank) is equivalent to paying interest on excess reserves. So step 1 is okay.

But, all government deficit spending ends up in the banking system as reserves. There is no "likely will end up" about it.

Government spending creates net financial assets (and reserves) in the currency of issue, taxation destroys those net financial assets (and reserves).

Clearly government spending adds to aggregate demand, which carries an inflation risk – that is core MMT.

But an "ever-expanding monetary base" does not increase that inflation risk. The banks can make loans whenever they like if there are credit-worthy customers coming in search of credit.

If the subsquent deposits (that are created by the loans) are then spent, then there is an inflation risk there.

All spending – whether government or non-government carries an inflation risk. That is core MMT.

Further, while rising stocks of financial wealth may lead to non-government sector entities feeling wealthier and thus increasing their expenditure, this is hardly a problem that will evade policy attenuation.

We just revert back to saying all expenditure whether derived from private income growth, wealth effects or sentiment changes in general carry an inflation risk.

If that risk manifests then policy changes are required.

And, if the goal of the fiscal deficit is to maintain full employment to fill the spending gap left by the non-government saving choices, then if the non-government sector chooses to spend more, then the government has a choice – either reduce its own net spending and/or reduce the non-government's spending – a choice that will depend on political considerations such as the desired size of government relative to the economy, etc.

Second, Greg Mankiw writes:

… if sufficient interest is not paid on reserves, the expansion in the monetary base will increase bank lending and the money supply. Interest rates must then fall to induce people to hold the expanded money supply, again putting upward pressure on aggregate demand and inflation.

So we have a Japan-type situation.

The central bank leaves excess reserves in the system and allows the monetary base to expand.

In the mainstream framework, the money multiplier is a central mainstream proposition but is absent in MMT – in fact, we consider the causality runs in the reverse direction – broad to base.

In mainstream courses, students get taught that the central bank determines the supply of loans in the economy by controlling the quantity of base money (reserves).

They then learn that there is a (constant) ratio of broad money (money supply) to base money, and when the central bank adds reserves, they are multiplied up to create a greater change in bank loans and deposits.

The theory has two elements:

1. Reserves constrain lending – a supply-determined approach.

2. Central banks control reserves.

Again this was a point of departure by MMT from the mainstream that I noted for Greg Mankiw in my E-mail response to him. He clearly chose to ignore it. Whether he understood the distinction I do not know.

Please read these blog posts (among others) for further discussion:

1. Money multiplier and other myths (April 21, 2009).

2. Money multiplier – missing feared dead (July 16, 2010).

The important point to understand is that banks do not loan out reserves. A build-up of bank reserves doesn't increase their capacity to make loans nor does it guarantee that there will be more loan activity.

The latter depends on the number of credit-worthy customers who seek credit.

The central bank will always ensure there are sufficient reserves in the system to maintain integrity of the payments system (cheque clearing etc).

It is an absolute error to think that leaving excess reserves in the system increases the inflation risk of government deficits.

And consider this graph (among others) which shows the M1 money multiplier for the US (calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis).

Try justifying a theory that requires this aggregate (ratio) to be pretty much constant. There are many ways to compute the conceptual money multiplier that students find in their textbooks that link the money base to the broad money supply – but all deliver a similar story of variability.

Third, Greg Mankiw writes:

… the increase in inflation reduces the real quantity of money demanded. This fall in real money balances, in turn, reduces the real resources that the government can claim via money creation … Faced with these circumstances, a government may decide that defaulting on its debts is the best option, despite its ability to create more money. That is, government default may occur not because it is inevitable but because it is preferable to hyperinflation.

Note we are still operating within the GBC framework. He has not been able to free himself from that flow of reasoning.

A rising inflation rate does not alter the ability of a currency-issuing government to purchase real goods and services through government spending.

That ability is only constrained by what is available for sale in the currency the government issues.

Clearly, if the nation runs out of available real resources or if the government tries to aggressively seek to use a greater share of the existing productive resources by competing with the existing users through market bids, then an inflationary spiral will result.

That is the inflation constraint.

Whether there are excess reserves or not has no particular bearing on that real resource constraint.

Failing to differentiate the two concepts of contraints – GBC (financial), MMT (real) – and conflating the two as if they are intrinsically linked shows that Greg Mankiw cannot escape the straitjacket that he operates within.

That is a common problem for people trying to learn something new. They keep trying to absorb the new into the old and in many cases that is impossible.

So they conclude that trying to learn the new is a vexing task and blame the new for being opaque (as above).

I am currently learning Japanese. If I tried to understand the language in terms of English constructs I would not make much progress. The challenge is to avoid thinking like that. So I have to just flow with the new framework and it is then much easier to make progress.

Greg Mankiw continues:

This discussion brings us to the theory of inflation. I have been adopting the mainstream view, explained most simply by the quantity theory of money, that a high rate of money creation is inflationary. Proponents of MMT question that conclusion. They assert that "no simple proportionate relationship exists between rises in the money supply and rises in the general price level."

Apparently, we overstate "the case against the mainstream view" because "the correlation between inflation and money growth is 0.79" for the US since 1870.

We can argue correlation coefficients until the cows come home.

They are lower, say for Japan.

But they remain statements of 'correlation' whereas the quantity theory of money is a view of causation. Elementary statistics classes are taught not to conflate the two – correlates with causes.

Further, MMT is about fiat currency monetary systems. In the US, that system really only began in 1971 after President Nixon suspended the convertibility under the Bretton Woods system.

Greg Mankiw also basically tells us that at any rate "mainstream macroeconomists also go beyond the most simplistic quantity theoretic reasoning."

To the extent, apparently, that "central banks target interest rates in the short run and inflation in the longer run and that monetary aggregates play a small role".

Which leaves me to wonder, exactly what is the inflation theory that Greg Mankiw is invoking when he simplistically says that expanding bank reserves will ultimately cause inflation.

All his prior reasoning suggests a pretty basic quantity theory approach.

The point is that if his critique of MMT was reasonable and carried empirical weight, then we should have seen:

(a) Accelerating inflation in Japan long ago given the scale of expansion of the Bank of Japan's balance sheet, the extent of its ownership of outstanding Japanese government bonds, and the size of their continuous fiscal deficits.

(b) The ECB should have easily satisfied its price stability target of 2 per cent instead of running huge bond-buying programs and failing every year to go close the generating the inflation levels it desires.

(c) The US should have experienced accelerating inflation post Lehman's given the US Federal Reserve's bond-buying program.

As I outlined when I responded to his initial E-mail entreaty:

1. At the empirical level, mainstream macroeconomics struggles to explain why the broad monetary aggregates have not grown commensurately (as if multiplied) with the dramatic expansion of the asset side of central bank balance sheets.

2. Mainstream theory predicted inflationary consequences arising from Quantitative Easing (QE) because they considered the increase in base money would feed in, via the money multiplier, to broad money, which, via the Quantity Theory, would drive up prices as bank lending accelerated.

MMT predicted that bank lending would not accelerate as a result of QE because the sluggish lending was not due to a deficiency of reserves (banks do not loan out reserves) but, rather, a shortfall of creditworthy borrowers due to the uncertain conditions following the GFC.

There is no doubt which predictions were accurate.

Greg Mankiw then moves on to refine the discussion concerning inflation theory and it is hard to understand what point he is actually making in relation to being a 'guide' to MMT.

First, inflation arises from multiple causes emanating from the supply-side and the demand-side. As he notes, MMT fully explains the various ways in which a continuous price rise can occur.

A core idea in MMT is that, as Greg Mankiw quotes from our textbook: "all spending (private or public) is inflationary if it drives nominal aggregate demand above the real capacity of the economy to absorb it."

From day one, we have emphasised this is how a demand-side inflation can occur.

But it is hard to see where Greg Mankiw gets the justification to make his next assertion that:

The advocates of MMT, however, make this possibility seem more hypothetical than real.

There is no diffidence in our statement that he had previously quoted.

If government spending drives nominal aggregate spending growth to fast relative to supply capacity then it is highly likely there will be inflationary pressures.

The basic accounting is obvious and fully explained in the textbook. GDP is equal to the value of final goods and services produced in a year. Value is computed as Price times Quantity.

At the aggregate level, if the economy is operating at full capacity so Quantity is unable to rise, then more spending will increase GDP but via the prices rises (to ration the excess demand).

Firms are typically quantity-adjusters below full employment (so absorb extra spending by increasing production and sales) and price-adjusters once full capacity is reached. Bottlenecks may appear in sectoral markets before other markets reach full capacity. It is not an exact science when the supply-side capacity is exhausted.

That is core MMT and we inherit that sort of reasoning from the Keynesian literature.

At this stage, his motivation appears to be to say that there is nothing new in MMT that cannot be explained by the New Keynesian literature, and he harks back to the 1970s and 1980s developments in disequilibrium theory and efficiency wages, which was all the rage in the 1980s.

So the reader is forced to wade through some ageing neoclassical literature where markets do not clear because firms are assumed to have market power and this causes unemployment which can be attenuated with government deficits.

This really just restates the argument that sticky wages and prices will generate unemployment in the short-run until market forces eventually cause prices to adjust towards their neoclassical optimum.

So if we construct this 'neoclassical world' where the market tendencies are in accord with competitive, profit maximisation and marginal productivity theory (real wages equal marginal products and prices equal marginal costs) then if we put rigidities into the price clearing process, we would get below full employment equilibria occurring.

Apparently, "(i)n that sense, MMT is akin to new Keynesian analysis".

I asked myself, what "sense" exactly are we talking about?

That economies are rarely at full employment? Is this because the real wage outcome is excessive so labour demand is insufficient to fully employment people and the unemployment creates unsold goods in the product market?

This whole debate has been done to death many times (Marx, Keynes, and on into the 1970s and 1980) and the reasonable position to conclude is that cutting real wages will not reduce unemployment..

The mainstream claim that Mankiw supports is that if real wages were reduced, firms would offer more work, and unemployed workers will spend more – thus eliminating the dual excess supplies – labour and products.

But what the New Keynesian literature that Greg Mankiw suports never really came to terms with was the difference between nominal demands (desired) and effective demands for goods and services. The latter are backed by cash whereas the former reflect latent desires, which may be unlimited.

We discuss this important point at length in the textbook. There are pages devoted to the rejection of marginal productivity theory and the idea that 'factors of production' are rewarded according to their contribution to production.

It really takes us back to the debate in the C19th between Marx, Ricardo and Say. Marx clearly won that debate but it wasn't until Keynes published the General Theory in 1936 that the western economists took heed and understood that mass unemployment cannot be explained by sticky prices.

In TSV (Vol II, Ch XVII, para 712) Marx anticipated the modern distinction between nominal and effective demand which lies in the understanding of the real contribution of Keynes.

Marx noted that in denying the possibility of a general glut, Ricardo appeals to unlimited needs of consumers for commodities and any particular saturation would be quickly overcome by increased demands for other commodities.

Marx (TSV, Vol II, Ch XVII, para 712) rhetorically asked for an explanation of the connection between 'over-production' and 'absolute needs' and quoted Ricardo's denial of the "possibility of a general glut in the market":

Too much of a particular commodity may he produced, of which there may he such a glut in the market, as not to repay the capital expended on it; but this cannot be the case with respect to all commodities; the demand for corn is limited by the mouths which are to eat it, for shoes and coats by the persons who are to wear them; but though a community, or a part of a community, may have as much corn, and as many hats and shoes, as it is able or may wish to consume, the same cannot be said of every commodity produced by nature or by art. Some would consume more wine, if they had the ability to procure it. Others having enough of wine, would wish to increase the quantity or improve the quality of their furniture. Others might wish to ornament their grounds, or to enlarge their houses. The wish to do all or some of these is implanted in every man's breast; nothing is required but the means, and nothing can afford the means, but an increase of production …

Marx retorted:

Could there be a more childish argument? It runs like this: more of a particular commodity may be produced than can be consumed of it; but this cannot apply to all commodities at the same time. Because the needs, which the commodities satisfy, have no limits and all these needs are not satisfied at the same time. On the contrary. The fulfilment of one need makes another, so to speak, latent. Thus nothing is required, but the means to satisfy these wants, and these means can only be provided through an increase in production. Hence no general overproduction is possible.

What is the purpose of all this? In periods of over-production, a large part of the nation (especially the working class) is less well provided than ever with corn, shoes etc., not to speak of wine and furniture. If over-production could only occur when all the members of a nation had satisfied even their most urgent needs, there could never, in the history of bourgeois society up to now, have been a state of general over-production or even of partial over-production. When, for instance, the market is glutted by shoes or calicoes or wines or colonial products, does this perhaps mean that four-sixths of the nation have more than satisfied their needs in shoes, calicoes etc.? What after all has over-production to do with absolute needs? It is only concerned with demand that is backed by ability to pay. It is not a question of absolute over-production—over-production as such in relation to the absolute need or the desire to possess commodities. In this sense there is neither partial nor general over-production; and the one is not opposed to the other.

Note the reference to the capitalist market being "only concerned with demand that is backed by ability to pay. It is not a question of absolute over-production – over-production as such in relation to the absolute need or the desire to possess commodities."

This wisdom lies at the heart of the modern problem of high unemployment and stagnant growth. Keynes didn't offer much more than you can find in this work by Marx.

The New Keynesians have nothing in common with this view.

The textbook also rejects the New Keynesian demand for labour concept. In Chapters 13 and 14, we present the alternative approach that bears no relationship to the New Keynesian approach.

There is no way MMT can be subsumed back into New Keynesian thinking as a special case, in the same way that Keynes' General Theory was absorbed back into the 'Neoclassical synthesis' and lost the most important insights.

Firms create employment in response to demand for their products. They might be confronted by millions of desperately hungry workers who want to work but they still won't put them on because there is insufficient effective demand to justify expanding production.

A latent or notional demand for a crust of bread is not a demand backed by cash!

Mainstream economists have never really understood that. Marx knew it. Keynes and Kalecki knew it. Clower and Leijonhufvud elaborated on it again in the 1960s but the conservative, free market types couldn't see past Say's Law!

At any rate, Greg Mankiw's divergence into the core neoclassical literature only serves to highlight how different the mainstream approach is to the way MMT constructs the issue of inflation and unemployment.

Conclusion

Greg Mankiw's track record is not a shining light of predictive accuracy.

In 2010, he wrote a paper based on a Presidential Address to the Eastern Economics Association – Spreading the Wealth Around: Reflections Inspired by Joe the Plumber.

The substance of his argument is interesting in itself but not germane to the topic here.

In the introduction, though, he wrote about the motivation for considering tax rises (in 2010) in the US:

Another, perhaps more important, reason is that the US federal government is running a large budget deficit and faces an ominous fiscal gap looming on the horizon. As the baby boom generation retires and starts claiming Social Security and Medicare, government spending will slowly and steadily continue to rise as a share of the economy. It is possible that Congress will suddenly read Milton Friedman's book Capitalism and Freedom, become committed classical liberals (in the 19th century use the term), and decide to scale back the size and scope of government. But, more likely, Congress will find past entitlement promises hard to break, and so it will have little choice but to raise taxes to levels unprecedented in US history

An MMT economist would never make such statements.

And Greg Mankiw still hasn't worked out why!

That is enough for today!

(c) Copyright 2019 William Mitchell. All Rights Reserved.



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The Important Things to Know About the (New) Green New Deal Resolution Proposed by Ocasio-Cortez | GQ

The Important Things to Know About the (New) Green New Deal Resolution Proposed by Ocasio-Cortez | GQ 

The Important Things to Know About the (New) Green New Deal Resolution Proposed by Ocasio-Cortez | GQ

In Congress, a "simple resolution"—the form this one takes—is a non-binding expression of the sentiments of a given chamber. Unlike a bill, it does not have the force of law. As I write this sentence, the , from Florida Republican Bill Posey, is one "expressing support for the designation of July 12 as Collector Car Appreciation Day and recognizing that the collection and restoration of historic and classic cars is an important part of preserving the technological achievements and cultural heritage of the United States." If climate change were a gigantic pile of garbage dumped in front of your house, this is the legislative equivalent of writing a strongly-worded letter urging the relevant authorities to clean it up.

How is it different from the Green New Deal for which Ocasio-Cortez was advocating back in December?

That proposal would have gone several steps further than this resolution, by establishing a House select committee that would have spent the next two years conducting research, holding hearings, consulting experts, and then drafting a bill that would enact a Green New Deal into law. It is the legislative equivalent of, say, getting together with your neighbors to present the relevant authorities with a proposal for how to clean up the gigantic garbage pile, and to accomplish that task by a specific, predetermined date.

That sounds better. Why didn't we get that?

Because Nancy Pelosi, along with Democratic leaders of other House committees on whose jurisdictions the Green New Deal Select Committee might have occasionally infringed, decided it wasn't necessary. Instead, we got a Select Committee on the Climate Crisis, which sounds serious enough but will try to examine the subject without its own subpoena power, and without a mandate to accomplish any particular task. Party leadership, in other words, has concluded that regularly-scheduled municipal trash pickups will (probably) be sufficient to (eventually) clean up the gigantic garbage pile, and that no further action is required at this time.

Are concerns over committee jurisdiction a silly reason not to do something bold to address what Pelosi herself has called "the existential threat of our time"?

They are.

What does she think about the Green New Deal resolution?

"It will be one of several or maybe many suggestions that we receive," she told POLITICO this week. "The green dream or whatever they call it—nobody knows what it is, but they're for it, right?"

Is this a weirdly dismissive way of talking about a thing that, according to a recent poll, is backed by 80 percent of voters, including 92 percent of Democrats and 64 percent of Republicans?

It is!

Why is it that every time Democrats come up with an idea about which a broad cross-section of the country is actually excited, their knee-jerk reaction is to water it down to the point where it becomes unrecognizable as the thing people once liked?

I am as baffled as you are.

If the Green New Deal resolution won't have any binding effect, why does it matter?

Because even if current leadership isn't ready to take bold action on the subject, if a majority of Democrats were support the resolution, it would at least send a powerful message about the direction in which the party's rank-and-file—especially its younger future leaders—hope to take it in the years to come.

What are the odds of that event occurring?

Not too long, but...long. Pelosi's comments do not bode well for the resolution's chances of passage, and who knows how Democrats in swing districts—especially those who just won their seats in November—are going to feel about taking an early vote on something this progressive. (Sometimes, all the encouraging polling data in the world is no match for a politician's cautiousness.) Also, it should go without saying that nothing resembling this has a chance of getting through the Republican-held Senate, and Mitch McConnell would rather express human emotion in public than even bring it to the floor for a vote.

If it doesn't pass, will it be relevant for any other reason?

Yes, because no matter what the House does, Ocasio-Cortez and company have already succeeded in making the Green New Deal a key agenda item as the Democratic Party mulls over its options for 2020. (So far, Kamala Harris, Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sanders, Kirsten Gillibrand, and Cory Booker are all onboard; Joe Biden has yet to weigh in.) This reflects the emerging consensus that there is real value in this sort of aspirational messaging—"Build the Wall," for example, has become shorthand for an entire political ethos, not just a reference to a construction project—and that championing policies a majority of Americans support is a good strategy for recapturing the White House. And with the enthusiastic backing of a hypothetical Democratic president, next time the House has the chance to take action on a honest-to-God Green New Deal bill, it's a good bet that its members won't be quite as skittish.



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2021年1月2日土曜日

mitchell2019:260

 

mitchell2019:260

Conflict theory of inflation and inflationary biases 

A series of articles in the journal Marxism Today in 1974 illustrated the proposition that inflation was the result of a distributional conflict between workers and capital. These articles were written with reference to the early 1970s, when inflation rates rose in many Western economies. One article by Pat Devine stated that the inflation process was a structural construct embedded in the intrinsic capital labour conflict. He argued that the increased bargaining power of workers (that accompanied the long period of full employment in the post-Second World War period) and the declining productivity growth in the early 1970s imparted a structural bias towards inflation which was manifested in the inflation breakout in the mid-1970s that “ended the golden age.” He further claimed that the prolonged growth of money wages was “unprecedented in the history of capitalism” (Devine, 1974: 80). Capitalists increased prices to maintain profitability and thus countered the attempt to raise real wages. Large, oligopolistic firms with price setting power engaged in non-price competition (for example, product quality). These firms, however, were interdependent because their market shares were sensitive to their pricing strategies. When a firm was faced with nominal wage demands, its management knew that its rivals would face similar pressure and that their competitive positions would not depend on the absolute price level while the government continued to ensure that effective demand was sufficient to maintain full employment. On the other hand, a firm could lose market share if it increased prices while other firms maintained lower prices. As a result, firms had little incentive to resist the wage demands of their workers and strong incentives to protect their profits by passing on the demands in the form of higher prices. This structural depiction of inflation as being embedded in the class dynamics of capital and labour, both of which had increased capacity to set prices and defend their real shares of income, implicates Keynesian-style approaches to full employment. There was also an international component to the structural theory. It was argued that the Bretton Woods system (see Chapter 9) imparted deflationary forces on economies that were experiencing strong domestic demand growth. As national income rose and imports increased, central banks were obliged to tighten monetary policy to maintain the agreed exchange rate parity and the constraints on monetary growth acted to choke off incompatible claims on the available income. However, when the Bretton Woods system of convertible currencies and fixed exchange rates collapsed in 1971, the structural biases towards inflation came to the fore with floating exchange rates. Devine (1974: 86) argued that: floating exchange rates have been used as an additional weapon available to the state. Given domestic -inflation, floating rates provide a degree of flexibility in dealing with the resultant pressure on the external payments -position. However, if a float is to be effective in stabilising a payments imbalance it is likely to involve lower real incomes at home. If a reduction in real wages (or their rate of growth) is not acquiesced in there will then be -additional pressure for higher money wages and if this cannot be contained the rate of inflation will increase and there will be further depreciation. The structuralist view also noted that the mid-1970s crisis, which marked the end of the Keynesian period, was not only marked by rising inflation but also by an ongoing profit squeeze due to declining productivity growth and increasing external competition for market share. The profit squeeze led to firms reducing their rate of investment (which reduced aggregate demand growth), which combined with harsh contractions in monetary and fiscal policy, created the stagflation that bedevilled the world in the second half of the 1970s. The resolution to the structural bias proposed by economists depended on their ideological persuasion. On the one hand, those who identified themselves as Keynesians proposed incomes policies (which we shall explore in more detail later in this chapter) as a way of mediating the distributional struggle and achieving nominal income claims that were compatible with the available output. On the other hand, the emerging Monetarists considered the problem to be an abuse of market power by the trade unions and this motivated demands for policymakers to legislate to reduce the bargaining power of workers. The rising unemployment was also not opposed by capital because it was seen as a vehicle for undermining the capacity of the trade unions to make wage demands. From the mid-1970s, the combined weight of persistently high unemployment and increased policy attacks on trade unions in many advanced nations reduced the inflation spiral as workers were unable to pursue real wages growth, and productivity growth outstripped real wages growth. As a result, there was a substantial redistribution of income towards profits during this period. The rise of Thatcherism in the UK and Reaganomics in the USA exemplified the increasing dominance of the Monetarist view in the 1980s. Demand pull inflation While economists distinguish between cost push and demand pull inflation, the demarcation between the two types of inflation is not as clear cut as one might think. Demand pull inflation refers to the situation where prices start accelerating continuously because nominal aggregate demand growth outstrips the capacity of the economy to respond by expanding real output. We have learned from the national accounts that aggregate demand is always equal to GDP, which is the market value of final goods and services produced in some period. We represent that as the product of total real output (Y) and the general price level (P), that is, PY. It is clear that if there is growth in nominal spending (that is, GDP) that cannot be met by an increase in output (Y) then the general price level (P) has to rise. The dominant view of inflation in the 1960s was based on Keynes’ notion of an inflation gap, which he outlined in his 1940 pamphlet, How to Pay for the War: A Radical Plan for the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In the General Theory (1936), Keynes had developed the notion of effective demand to help understand how an equilibrium corresponding to less than full employment could arise in a monetary economy. He now wanted to show how there would be a transition to a fully employed economy during wartime. With the onset of the Second World War, large-scale spending programmes were implemented as part of the war effort. Keynes argued that as employment rose, rising household incomes would drive up consumer spending, which would cause inflation to accelerate even if money wage rates were constant. While Keynes’ plan was devised in the context of wartime spending when faced by tight supply constraints (that is, a restricted ability to expand output), the concept of the inflationary gap has been generalised to describe situations of excess demand where aggregate demand is growing faster than the aggregate supply capacity can absorb it. Keynes defined the inflationary gap as an excess of planned expenditure over the available output at pre--inflation or base prices. The pre-inflation benchmark output was that corresponding to the full utilisation of capacity. Thus, if an economy could meet the growth in nominal expected demand by rapidly expanding the capacity to produce goods and services, an inflationary gap would not open. This idea was distilled into the demand pull theory of inflation. Once full employment was reached, then nominal demand growth beyond that level would be inflationary. Thus inflation would tend to increase when unemployment fell (see Chapter 18 for an analysis of the Phillips curve which posits this type of relationship). The theory claimed that as nominal demand growth pushes the unemployment rate towards its irreducible minimum (frictional unemployment), wage and price inflation would start to rise. In other words, an inflationary gap would be created by the emergence of excess aggregate demand. There are several factors present in the real world that attenuate these demand effects on the inflation rate. First, firms incur extensive costs when they change prices, which leads to a ‘catalogue’ (or ‘menu’) approach whereby firms will forecast their expected costs over some future period and set prices according to their desired return. They then signal those prices in their catalogues and advertising to consumers and stand ready to supply whatever is demanded at that price (up to exhaustion of capacity). In other words, they do not frequently alter their prices to reflect changing demand conditions. Only periodically will firms typically revise their price catalogues. Second, trust and reliability are important in economic transactions. For example, firms seek to build relationships with their customers that will ensure product loyalty. In this context, firms will not wish to vary prices after they have been communicated to consumers. Third, firms also resist cutting prices when demand falls because they want to avoid so-called adverse selection problems, whereby they gain a reputation only as a bargain price supplier. Firms value ‘repeat sales’ and thus want to foster consumer goodwill. Circumstances change somewhat when the economy approaches full productive capacity. Then the mix between output growth and price rises becomes more likely to be biased toward price rises (depending on the bottlenecks in specific areas of productive activity). At full capacity, GDP can only grow via inflation (that is, nominal values increase only). At this point the inflationary gap is breached. When the US government prosecuted the Vietnam War effort in the 1960s, the inflation rate began to rise. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the demand pull pressures of the spending associated with the war effort combined with sharp rises in oil prices following the formation of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries cartel (OPEC). OPEC’s oil prices quadrupled in 1973 and generated huge cost shocks to oil-dependent economies such as the US and Japan. Cost push and demand pull inflation: a summary Cost push inflation requires certain aggregate demand conditions for it to be sustained. In this regard, it is hard to differentiate between an inflationary process which was initiated from supply side pressures from one that was initiated by demand side pressures. For example, an imported raw material shock means that a nation’s real income that is available for distribution to domestic claimants is lower. This will not be inflationary unless it triggers an ongoing distributional conflict as domestic claimants (workers and capital) try to pass on the real loss to each other. However, that conflict needs ‘oxygen’ in the form of ongoing economic activity in sectors where the spiral is robust. In that sense, the conditions that will lead to an accelerating inflation – high levels of economic activity – will also sustain an inflationary spiral emanating from the demand side. 17.4The Quantity Theory of Money As we saw in Chapter 11, the Classical theory of employment is based on the view that the real variables in the economy – output, productivity, real wages, and employment – are determined by the equilibrium outcome in the labour market. By way of summary, the real wage is determined exclusively by labour demand and labour supply, which also determine the real level of economic activity at any point in time. Say’s Law, which follows from the loanable funds doctrine (see Chapter 11), is then invoked to assume away any problems in matching aggregate demand with this supply of goods and services. Under this doctrine saving and investment will always be brought into balance by movements in the interest rate, which is construed as being the price of today’s consumption relative to future consumption. Thus two relative prices – the real wage in the labour market and the real interest rate in the loans market – ensure that full employment occurs (with zero involuntary unemployment). This separation between the explanation for the determination of the real economic outcomes and the -theory of the general price level is referred to as the classical dichotomy, for obvious reasons. The later Classical economists believed that if the supply of money is doubled, for example, there would be no impact on the real performance of the economy. All that would happen is that the price level would double. The classical dichotomy that emerged in the 19th century stands in contradistinction to the earlier ideas developed by economists such as David Hume that there is a trade-off between unemployment and inflation that could be manipulated (in policy terms) by the central bank varying the money supply (Hume, 1752). It is of no surprise that the Classical employment model relies in part on the notion of a dichotomy for its conclusions. Its origins were based on a barter model in which there is an absence of money and owner-producers trade real products. Clearly, this conception of an economy has no application to the monetary economy we live in. Classical monetary theory was only intended to explain the level and change in the general price level. The main attention of the Classical economists was in trying to understand the supply of output and the accumulation of productive capital (and hence economic growth). The theory of the general price level that emerged from the Classical dichotomy was called the Quantity Theory of Money, which was outlined in Chapter 11. The theory had its origins in the work of French economists in the 16th century, in particular, Jean Bodin. Why would we be interested in something a French economist conceived in the 16th century? The answer is that just as the main ideas of Classical employment theory still resonate in the public debate (for example, the denial that mass unemployment is the result of a deficiency of aggregate demand), the theory of inflation that arises from the Quantity Theory of Money is still influential. Indeed, it forms the core of what became known as Monetarism in the 1970s. As we have learned already from this textbook, economics is a contested discipline and different schools of thought advance conflicting policy frameworks. Monetarism and its more modern expressions form one such school of thought in macroeconomics and rely on the Quantity Theory of Money for their inflation theory. We will also see that the crude theory of inflation that emerges from the Quantity Theory of Money has intuitive appeal and is not very different to what we might expect the average layperson to believe: that growth in the money supply causes the value of money to decline (that is, causes inflation). The Quantity Theory of Money was very influential in the 19th century. The theory begins with what was known as the equation of exchange, which is an accounting identity. We write the equation as: (17.1) MsV ≡ PY You are familiar with the terms on the right-hand side. PY is the nominal value of total output (which is simply the definition of nominal GDP in the national accounts) given that P is the price level and Y is real output. Ms is the quantity of money in circulation (the money supply, say M2 which was defined in Chapter 10), which is a stock (so many dollars at a point in time). V is called the income velocity of circulation, and is the average number of times the stock of money turns over in the generation of aggregate income. There is no theoretical content in the Equation (17.1) as it stands, since it is an identity. We thus need to -introduce some behavioural elements in order to use Equation (17.1) as a theory of the general price level. BOX 17.1VELOCITY EXAMPLE To understand velocity, we can consider the following example of an imaginary and simple -economy. Assume the total stock of money is $100, which is held by the two people that make up this economy. In the current period (say a year), Person A buys goods and services from Person B for $100. In turn, Person B buys goods and services from Person A for $100. The total transactions equal $200 yet there is only $100 (money stock) in the economy. Thus each dollar must be used twice over the course of the year. So the velocity in this economy is two. The velocity of circulation converts the stock of money into a flow of monetary spending and renders the left-hand side of Equation (17.1) commensurate with the right-hand side. In this regard, it is important to see the Quantity Theory of Money and Say’s Law as being mutually reinforcing planks of the Classical theory. Say’s Law was proposed to justify the presumption that full employment output would be continuously supplied and sold, which meant that the Quantity Theory of Money would ensure that changes in the stock of money would only impact on the price level. As Keynes observed, price level changes do not necessarily correlate with changes in the money supply, and this led to his rejection of the Quantity Theory of Money. Another way of stating this is that the velocity of money need not be fixed, and real output need not tend to the full employment level. In turn, Keynes’ understanding of how the price level could change without a change in the money supply was informed by his rejection of Say’s Law. He recognised that total employment is determined by effective demand and that a capitalist monetary economy could experience deficient effective demand. However, the Classical theorists considered that a flexible real wage would ensure that full employment is attained, at least as a normal state where competition prevails and there are no artificial real wage rigidities imposed. As a result, they considered Y to be fixed at the full employment output level. Additionally, they considered V to be constant given that it is determined by customs and payment habits. For example, people are paid on a weekly or a fortnightly basis and shop say, once a week for their needs. Equation (17.2) depicts the resulting causality that defines the Quantity Theory of Money as an explanation of the general price level. The horizontal bars above the V and Y indicate that they are assumed to be constant. It follows that changes in MS will directly and only impact on P. (17.2) MsV ≡ PῩ ∴Ms→P To understand this theory more deeply it is important to note that the Classical economists considered the role of money to be confined to acting as a medium of exchange to free people from the tyranny of the necessity of a double coincidence of wants under the barter system. In other words, money would overcome the problem of a farmer who had carrots to offer but wanted some plumbing done, and could not find a plumber desiring any carrots, for example. Money is thus seen as the means of lubricating the exchange of goods and services. There is no other reason why a person would wish to hold it under this limited conception of money. The underlying view is that if individuals found they had more money than in the past, then they would try to spend it. Logically, it follows that they consider a rising stock of money to be associated with the growth in aggregate demand (spending). As Equation (17.2) shows, monetary growth (and the assumed extra spending) would directly lead to price rises because the economy is already assumed to be producing at its maximum productive capacity and the habits underpinning velocity are stable. For now you should note two empirical facts. First, capitalist economies are rarely at full employment. Since economies typically operate with spare productive capacity and often with high rates of unemployment, it is hard to maintain the view that there is no scope for firms to expand real output when there is an increase in nominal aggregate demand. Thus, if there is an increase in availability of credit and borrowers use the deposits that are created by the loans to purchase goods and services, firms with excess capacity are likely to respond by raising real output to maintain market share rather than raising prices. Second, the empirical behaviour of the velocity of circulation demonstrates that the assumption that it is constant is implausible. Figure 17.1 uses data provided by the US Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and shows the velocity of circulation, which is constructed as the ratio of nominal GDP to the M2 measure of the money supply. The US Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis defines this measure “as the rate of turnover in the money supply–that is, the number of times one dollar is used to purchase final goods and services included in GDP” (2016). The evidence does not support the claims of the Quantity Theory of Money. No simple proportionate relationship exists between rises in the money supply and rises in the general price level. Figure 17.1Velocity of M2 money stock, US, 1950–2015 Source: Authors’ own. Data from US Treasury via US Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. Shaded areas indicate US recessions. 17.5Incomes Policies Governments facing a wage-price spiral have from time to time considered the use of so-called incomes policies if they were reluctant to introduce a sharp contraction in the economy, which might otherwise discipline the combatants in the distributional struggle. Incomes policies in general, are measures that are aimed to control the rate at which wages and prices rise, as the economy moves toward, or is at full employment. Progressive economists often advocate their use to rein in cost pressures and avoid the need to reduce overall spending, which creates higher involuntary unemployment. Incomes policies have been introduced in various forms at various times in a number of countries as a way of reducing supply side cost pressures and allowing employment to stay at a higher level. For example, in 1962, the US government introduced wage price guideposts, which allowed for an average rate of nominal wage increase equal to the average annual rate of productivity growth in the overall economy. This means that per-unit labour costs of production remained constant. Other nominal incomes, including profits, were also to be tied to this rule. Taken together, it was considered that this rule would stabilise the growth in nominal incomes (and directly link real income growth to productivity growth), thereby reducing any inflationary pressures associated with the maintenance of full employment. Its application would thus distribute productivity gains across all income earners and thus reduce the distributional conflict, which might otherwise instigate a wage-price spiral. However, a problem with the rule is that workers in above-average productivity growth sectors are undercompensated, and workers in below-average sectors are overcompensated. Also, workers would be unable to pursue money wage increases in response to profit pushes by firms. For a time, the guidelines seemed to work. But as US government expenditure grew as a result of the Vietnam War effort and unemployment fell below four per cent, wage increases began to exceed average productivity growth. By 1966, the guidelines provided no discipline on the growth of nominal incomes in the US. It was clear that the US government was unable to compel employers to follow the guideposts in the wage bargaining process. Despite the failure of the wage price guideposts, the Republican administration under Nixon reintroduced an incomes policy in 1971. Initially, this was in the form of a 90-day freeze on wages and other nominal incomes. Later, compulsory growth guidelines were set for wages and prices growth. In 1973, the government introduced yet another freeze on prices, followed by sector-by-sector price rises in line with cost increases with a freeze on profit margins, so workers were exposed to rising prices of oil and food. The experiment ended in April 1974. It was considered a success when it was in place, but when the controls were eliminated, prices and wages began to rise again, although wage and price pressures coming from the demand side were subdued. The problem was ongoing pressure from the cost (supply) side, in particular from energy and food (largely grains) prices, which led to higher price inflation. Workers were unable to secure money wage increases in line with price inflation, which contributed to the divergence between real wage growth and productivity growth. On the other hand, in the UK and Australia, the institutional structures that made economies more susceptible to distributional conflict in the late 1960s and early 1970s also made the operation of incomes policies difficult. Highly-concentrated industries, with large firms exercising significant price setting power, were interacting with strong trade unions. These firms were in a strong position to pass on wage demands in the form of higher prices, and governments were reluctant, or unable constitutionally, to mandate strict wage price controls in normal times. However, incomes policies have worked more effectively in some European nations, for example, Austria and the Scandinavian countries. These nations have long records of collective bargaining and are more attuned to tripartite negotiations than the English-speaking nations. A good example of a successful incomes policy approach, where wages and prices growth were driven by productivity growth in certain sectors, is the so-called Scandinavian Model (SM) of inflation (see Box 17.2). This approach to wage setting was developed in Sweden and attempted to marry notions of fairness, the effectiveness of centralised wage bargaining and international competitiveness. By the late 1970s, incomes policies lost favour in most countries as a result of the rising dominance of Monetarism, which eschewed institutional solutions to distributional conflict in favour of market-based approaches involving higher unemployment. The Monetarist approach in many advanced nations combined the use of persistently high unemployment with policies designed to reduce the bargaining power of workers. This reduced inflationary pressures because workers were unable to pursue real wages growth and as a result productivity growth outstripped real wages growth. This led to a substantial redistribution of income towards profits during this period. The rise of Thatcherism in the UK exemplified the increasing dominance of the Monetarist view in the 1980s. In Chapter 19, we will introduce the concept of employment and unemployment buffer stocks in a macroeconomy and analyse how they can be manipulated by policy to maintain price stability. BOX 17.2THE SCANDINAVIAN MODEL (SM) OF INFLATION This model, which was originally developed for fixed exchange rates, dichotomises the economy into a competitive sector (C sector) and a sheltered sector (S sector). The C sector produces products which are traded on world markets, and its prices follow the general movements in world prices. The C sector serves as the leader in wage settlements. The S sector does not trade its goods externally. Under fixed exchange rates, the C sector maintains price competitiveness if the growth in money wages in its sector is equal to the rate of change in its labour productivity (assumed to be superior to S sector productivity) plus the growth in prices of foreign goods. Under this condition, price inflation in the C sector is equal to the foreign inflation rate. The wage norm established in the C sector spills over into wages growth throughout the economy. The S sector inflation rate thus equals the wage norm less its own productivity growth rate. Hence, aggregate price inflation is equal to the world inflation rate plus the difference between the productivity growth rates in the C and S sectors weighted by the S sector share in total output. The domestic inflation rate can be higher than the rate of growth in foreign prices without damaging competitiveness as long as the rate of C sector inflation is less than or equal to the world inflation rate. In equilibrium, nominal labour costs in the C sector will grow at a rate equal to the norm (the sum of the growth in world prices and the C sector productivity). Where non-wage costs are positive (taxes, social security and other benefits extracted from the employers) and possibly growing, the requirement is that per-unit variable costs grow at the rate of world prices. The long-run tendency is for nominal wages to absorb the room provided. However, in the short run, labour costs can diverge from the permitted growth path. This disequilibrium must emanate from domestic factors. The main features of the SM can be summarised as follows: •The domestic currency price of C sector output is exogenously determined by world market prices and the exchange rate. •The surplus available for distribution between profits and wages in the C sector is thus determined by the world inflation rate, the exchange rate and the productivity performance of industries in the C sector. •The wage outcome in the C sector flows on to the S sector industries either by design (solidarity) or through competition. •The price of output in the S sector is determined (usually by a mark-up) by the unit labour costs in that sector. The wage outcome in the C sector and the productivity performance in the S sector determine the change in unit labour costs. An incomes policy would establish wage guidelines, which would set national wages growth according to trends in world prices (adjusted for exchange rate changes) and productivity in the C sector. This would help to maintain a stable level of profits in the C sector. Whether this was an equilibrium level depends on the distribution of factor shares prevailing at the time the guidelines were first applied. Clearly, the outcomes could be different from those suggested by the model if a short-run adjustment in factor shares was required. Once a normal share of profits was achieved, the guidelines could be enforced to maintain this distribution. A major criticism of the SM as a general theory of inflation is that it ignores the demand side. Uncoordinated collective bargaining and/or significant growth in non-wage components of labour costs may push costs above the permitted path. Where domestic pressures create divergences from the equilibrium path of nominal wage and costs, there is some rationale for pursuing a consensus-based incomes policy. By minimising domestic cost fluctuations faced by the exposed sector, an incomes policy could reduce the possibility of a C sector profit squeeze, help maintain C sector competitiveness, and avoid employment losses. Significant contributions to the general cost level and hence prices, can originate from the actions of government. Payroll taxation and various government charges may in fact be more detrimental to the exposed sector than increased wage demands from the labour market. Although the SM was originally developed for fixed exchange rates, it can accommodate flexible exchange rates. Exchange rate movements can compensate for world price changes and local price rises. The domestic price level can be completely insulated from the world inflation rate if the exchange rate continuously appreciates (at a rate equal to the sum of the world inflation rate and C sector productivity growth). Similarly, if local price rises occur, a stable domestic inflation rate can still be maintained if a corresponding decrease in C sector prices occurs. An appreciating exchange rate discounts the foreign price in domestic currency terms. What about terms of trade changes? Terms of trade changes, which in the SM justify wage rises, also (in practice) stimulate sympathetic exchange rate changes. This combination locks the economy into an uncompetitive bind because of the relative fixity of nominal wages. Unless the exchange rate depreciates far enough to offset both the price fall and the wage rise, profitability in the C sector will be squeezed. Policy makers (particularly in Sweden) considered it appropriate to ameliorate this problem through an incomes policy. Such a policy could be designed to prevent destabilising wage movements in response to terms of trade improvements. In other words, wage bargaining, which is consistent with the mechanisms defined by the SM, may be detrimental to both the domestic inflation target and the competitiveness of the C sector and may need to be supplemented by a formal incomes policy to restore or retain consistency. Conclusion This chapter is designed to provide an introduction to the concept of inflation, to highlight that it arises due to the conflictual nature of the capitalist system and that ongoing inflation requires that the major combatants (firms and workers) continue to pursue increases in their nominal incomes. The initiating conditions for an inflationary process can be conceptualised in terms of cost push and demand pull, but in practice it is hard to distinguish between them when an outbreak of higher inflation occurs. We reviewed the Quantity Theory of Money which is based on an identity. When behavioural assumptions are introduced, the theory implies that a simple proportionate relationship exists between increases in the money supply and rises in the general price level. However, no such relationship has been found so, even if it were possible to control the money supply, there would not be a systematic impact on inflation. Incomes policies were examined, in particular the Scandinavian Model (SM) of inflation. It was noted that they have largely gone out of favour and countries have tended to rely on the use of unemployment as a buffer stock, that is, to rely on higher unemployment to address an inflation rate which is considered to be too high, irrespect-ive of the initial drivers of the inflationary process. References Devine, P. (1974) “Inflation and Marxist Theory”, Marxism Today, March, 79–92. Hume, D. (1752) “Of Money”, in D. Hume (ed.), Political Discourses, Edinburgh: Fleming. Keynes, J.M. (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, London: Macmillan, 1957 Reprint. Keynes, J.M. (1940) How to Pay for the War: A Radical Plan for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, London: Macmillan. Lerner, A. (1951) Economics of Employment, New York: McGraw-Hill. US Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2016) Money Velocity. Available at: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/32242, accessed 20 February 2016. Visit the companion website at www.macmillanihe.com/mitchell-macro for additional resources including author videos, an instructor’s manual, worked examples, tutorial questions, additional references, the data sets used in constructing various graphs in the text, and more.