1828年1月 · J. Taylor
タイラーは信用貨幣論を理解していた。
ベーコンをその文脈で引用している。
ユダヤ人への言及は重要。ただし理解は微妙。
ユダヤ人が会計方法をイギリスに教えたのに何故かユダヤを金属主義と捉えている。
例えば、
But although there appeared to be so little actual necessity for money, William seems to have been aware of its power and convenience. On this subject he had probably learnt something from the Jews whom he had brought into England.
しかし、実際には貨幣の必要性はほとんどないように見えたが、ウィリアムは貨幣の威力と利便性を認識していたようだ。この点に関して、彼はおそらくイングランドに連れてきたユダヤ人から何かを学んだのだろう。
ゾンバルトが言うようにユダヤ人こそが金属主義を超えて信用主義をイギリスにもたらしたのだ。
Tyler understood credit monetary theory.
He quotes Bacon in that context.
However, his understanding of Jews is more subtle.
It was the Jews, as Sombart says, who brought creditivism to England over metallurgy.
冒頭にユダヤ
A VIEW MONEY HISTORY OF ENGLAND.
WILLIAM THE FIRST.
When William had accomplished the conquest of England, he ordered an exact survey and valuation to be made of all the lands in the kingdom, recording their proprietors, tenures, the quantity of pasture, wood, and arable land which they contained, and generally the number of tenants, cottagers, and slaves who lived upon them. Having obtained the nation by conquest, he regarded every man as his steward, liable to render an account to him of whatever he possessed. It is also recorded that he brought the Jews from Roue n into England, and that he adopted the present method of account: viz.
イギリスの貨幣の歴史をご覧ください。
ウィリアム一世。
ウィリアムがイングランドの征服を達成したとき、彼は王国のすべての土地の正確な調査と評価を行い、その所有者、所有権、そこに含まれる牧草地、木材、耕地の量、そして一般的には土地を記録するよう命じた。そこに住んでいた小作人、小屋民、奴隷の数。征服によって国家を手に入れた彼は、あらゆる人間を自分の執事とみなし、自分が所有するものはすべて自分に報告する義務があると考えた。また、彼がルーンからユダヤ人をイングランドに連れてきて、現在の会計方法を採用したことも記録されています。
ADVERTISEMENT.
A VIEW OF THE MONEY HISTORY OF ENGLAND.
WILLIAM THE FIRST.★★
WILLIAM THE SECOND.11
HENRY THE FIRST.12
STEPHEN.16
HENRY THE SECOND.17
RICHARD THE FIRST.18
for the case, if the merchants could have got as much money
the corn in England as abroad. Richard, however, did not
enter into their views, for he ordered all the people belonging
to those vessels to be hanged.
JOHN.20
HENRY THE THIRD.21
EDWARD THE FIRST.24
EDWARD THE SECOND.28.
EDWARD THE THIRD.29
RICHARD THE SECOND.34
HENRY THE FOURTH.35
HENRY THE FIFTH.37
HENRY THE SIXTH.37
EDWARD THE FOURTH.38
HENRY THE SEVENTH.40
HENRY THE EIGHTH.41
EDWARD THE SIXTH.43
MARY.51
ELIZABETH.51
JAMES THE FIRST.62
CHARLES THE FIRST.66
OLIVER CROMWELL.71
CHARLES THE SECOND.72
JAMES THE SECOND.78
WILLIAM AND MARY.79
QUEEN ANNE TO GEORGE THE FOURTH INCLUSIVE.90
CONCLUSION.150★
広告。
イングランドの貨幣史観。
ウィリアム1世
ウィリアム2世11
ヘンリー1世12
ステファン.16
ヘンリー2世17
初代リチャード 18
この場合、商人たちがイングランドでも外国と同じだけの金
もし商人たちがイングランドでも外国と同じだけの金を手に入れることができたなら、この事件は解決したであろう。しかし、リチャードは
リチャードは彼らの意見に耳を貸さず、これらの船に所属していたすべての者に絞首刑を命じた。
を絞首刑に処した。
ジョン王.20
ヘンリー3世21
エドワード1世24
第2代エドワード 28.
3代目エドワード 29
2代目リチャード 34
4代目ヘンリー35
5代目ヘンリー 37
6代目ヘンリー 37
第4代エドワード 38
7代目ヘンリー 40
第8代ヘンリー 41
第6代エドワード 43
マリー.51
エリザベス.51
ジェームズ・ザ・ファースト.62
チャールズ1世66
オリバー・クロムウェル.71
チャールズ2世72
ジェームズ2世78
ウィリアムとメアリー.79
アン女王から第4代ジョージまで 90
結論150
"Above all things good policy is to be used, that the treasure and monies in a state be not gathered into few hands; for otherwise a state may have a good stock and yet starve; and money is like muck, no good except it be spread." Bacon.
「そうでなければ、国家は良い株を持っていても飢えてしまうかもしれない。お金は泥のようなもので、広がらなければ何の役にも立たない」。 ベーコン
Of Seditions and Troubles - Francis Bacon (1625)
https://youtu.be/tQLKAbYQOhQ?si=KoXajeEMwk6q3kiQ
タイトル 随筆集 シリーズ名 中公クラシックス ≪再検索≫ 著者名等 ベーコン/〔著〕 ≪再検索≫ 成田成寿/訳 ≪再検索≫ 出版 中央公論新社 2014.9 大きさ等 18cm 24,356p
随筆集
反乱と騒動について
うに流れてくるだろう。そして、よく起こることなのであるが、「仕上げが材料にまさるもので
あろう」。つまり加工と運輸が原料より価値のあるものなのである。そしていっそう国家を富ま
すものである。たとえばオランダ低地地方人に見られる著しいことなのであるが、そこの人たち
は勤勉で生産性が高く、世界第一の地面の上の鉱山をもっているともいえるのである。
なによりも、とるべきよい政策として、国家の富や金銭が少数の人の手に集まらないようにし
なければならない。というのは、そうしなければ大きな資源のある国家でも飢えるということに
なるかもしれない。そして金銭というものは肥料みたいなもので、撒き散らさないとよくない。
それをやるには主として、貪欲な商売である金貸業、買占め、大きな牧場などを圧迫するという
か、少なくとも、きつく取り締まるようにすることである。
不満というか、あるいは少なくとも、その危険を除去することに関して。どの国家〔われわれ
の知るところでは〕にも臣下に二つの部分がある。貴族階級と庶民階級である。その一つが不満
を抱いているときには危険の大きいことはない。というのは一般民衆は、上層階級に刺激を与え
られることがなければ動きののろいものである。そして、上層階級は力が少なく、ただ大衆がひ
とりでに動きやすい形になっているときが別なのである。だから危険なのは、上層階級が下層階
級の間で水の騒ぐのを待っているという状態になっており、いよいよそうなったら自分の立場を
はっきりさせようとしているようなときなのである。詩人たちの作り話に、ユピテルを縛りたい
まどんよ!
98
If you let money pile up, it starts to stink. But if you spread it around then it can do a lot of good.
Branson also credited the prominent playwright Thornton Wilder with a remark that was thematically similar. Would you please explore the history of this figurative language?
Quote Investigator: This family of expressions has a very long history that stretches back into the 1600s. The English philosopher and scientist Francis Bacon wrote a piece discussing statecraft titled “Of Seditions and Troubles” that was published in his landmark collection of essays in 1625. Bacon wrote a precursor to the expression under examination that used the word “muck” instead of “manure”. Boldface has been added to excerpts:
Above all things, good Policie is to be used, that the Treasure and Moneyes, in a State, be not gathered into few Hands. For otherwise, a State may have a great Stock, and yet starve. And Money is like Muck, not good except it be spread. This is done, chiefly, by suppressing, or at the least, keeping a strait Hand, upon the Devouring Trades of Usurie, Ingrossing, great Pasturages, and the like.
Bacon presented the core simile, but he did not extend the analogy to the olfactory organ. Yet, in 1625 Bacon also released a collection of “Apophthegmes New and Old” that included a longer expression with the word “stench” that was attributed to someone named “Mr. Bettenham”:
ADVERTISEMENT.
About two years ago the Author of these remarks published a little pamphlet, entitled, " No Trust, no Trade." It was soon afterwards out of print, and he was urged to bring out a second edition. But having found from subsequent discussions that information was wanted upon the subject, rather than argument, he has, in the following pages, incorporated the substance of his former pamphlet, in a general View of the History of English Money from the Conquest to the present time, and of its effects at various periods upon the condition of the English people. The historical facts brought forward are generally of such notoriety to the readers of English history, that he has thought it needless to encumber the work with formal references. He has only had to show the order in which certain events succeeded certain changes in the money system. For the records which more immediately relate to money, and which are not so generally known, he would refer to Tyndall's " Notes on Ra pin's History," " Historical Account of English Money," and Ru ding's "Annals of the Coinage." To the latter work he feels himself much indebted for a great number of important documents and interesting particulars.
Bake well, May, 1828.
広告
2年ほど前、この文章を書いた著者は、"No Trust, no Trade "というタイトルの小冊子を出版した。その後すぐに絶版となり、第2版を出すよう促された。しかし、その後の議論から、このテーマについては議論よりもむしろ情報が求められていることがわかったので、次のページでは、征服から現在に至るまでのイギリスの貨幣の歴史と、イギリス国民の状態にさまざまな時期に及ぼした影響についての一般的な見解に、以前のパンフレットの内容を組み込んだ。この小冊子で述べられている歴史的事実は、イギリス史の読者にとって一般的によく知られているものであるため、形式的な参考文献で著作を煩雑にする必要はないと彼は考えた。彼が示したのは、ある出来事が貨幣制度のある変化にどのような順序で引き継がれたかということだけである。貨幣に直接関係する記録で、一般にはあまり知られていないものについては、ティンダルの "Notes on Ra pin's History"、"Historical Account of English Money"、ルディングの "Annals of the Coinage "を参照されたい。後者の著作には、多くの重要な文献や興味深い詳細があり、彼は大いに恩義を感じている。
1828年5月、ベークウェル。
★★
But although there appeared to be so little actual necessity for money, William seems to have been aware of its power and convenience. On this subject he had probably learnt something from the Jews whom he had brought into England. He took especial care to extract from his subjects as much of the precious metals as he could, without quite depriving them of all inducement to get them back again; and for this purpose purveyances were gradually more and more changed into money. It is on record that they were afterwards collected by the sheriff in the following proportions: bread for one hundred men was to be commuted for with one shilling; a pasture-fed ox one shilling; a ram or sheep fourpence; provender for twenty horses fourpence. It is obvious, that as under this arrangement, in the payment of all tributes to government, a pasture-fed ox, or bread for one hundred men, and one shilling, would stand as the exact equivalent for each other, and for other things after the like proportion, so, whoever had the means of gaining possession of the silver would have the means of getting these commodities, provided the payment of tributes to government were so kept up as to make it incumbent on the people to pay the one or other of the above equivalents. William had the power within himself of accomplishing both these ends. The Doomsday survey furnished him with an exact estimate of the money it was possible to draw out of the hands of his subjects; and his absolute sway furnished him with the means of taking possession of that money by violence if he chose; but had he done this he would have destroyed the inducement which the people would otherwise have to get it again: he therefore wisely drew it from them, by making it their interest to give it to him voluntarily, as an acquittance from some obnoxious duty or more burdensome forfeiture.
しかし、実際には貨幣の必要性はほとんどないように見えたが、ウィリアムは貨幣の威力と利便性を認識していたようだ。この点に関して、彼はおそらくイングランドに連れてきたユダヤ人から何かを学んだのだろう。彼は臣民から貴金属をできるだけ多く引き出すように特に気を配ったが、その際、貴金属を取り戻すためのあらゆる誘因を完全に奪うことはできなかった。100人分のパンは1シリング、放牧牛1頭は1シリング、雄羊1頭または羊1頭は4ペンス、馬20頭分の飼料は4ペンスであった。この取り決めの下では、政府へのすべての貢納において、放牧牛、100人分のパンと1シリングが、互いに正確に等価であり、他のものについても同様の割合で等価であることは明らかである。したがって、銀を所有する手段を持つ者は誰でも、政府への貢納が維持され、上記の等価物のいずれか一方を支払うことが民衆に義務付けられるのであれば、これらの商品を入手する手段を持つことになる。ウィリアムは、この2つの目的を達成する力を自分の中に持っていた。ドゥームズデイの調査によって、彼は臣民の手から引き出すことが可能な資金の正確な見積もりを得ることができた。
OLIVER CROMWELL. Cromwell was indebted to a lucky accident for the means of fixing the powers of government absolutely in himself. Three Ham burgh ships, having 300,000/. in silver on board, had been detained upon suspicion that it was the property of the Dutch. Cromwell hearing of the silver, ordered a detachment of soldiers on board, and seized it. Having thus possessed himself of money, he was emboldened to take upon himself the right to dissolve the parliament. The grand secret of Cromwell's policy appears to have been, with money to govern the army, and with the army to govern the people; and thus governing the people by mere military power, he was provided with the means of getting money, or the material of money, wherever it was known to exist. The alienation and sale of church and other property, was also a fertile source of revenue to him; and for the few years that this system continued, there was such an increased quantity of money in circulation, as justified a remark made afterwards by Lord Lucas, that in the time of the late usurping powers, though the taxes were great, the means which people had of obtaining money were great also. But these modes of creating supplies could not last long; they would do for an emergency only, and the time would inevitably come when such summary means of making a revenue would as suddenly fail: this, however, was a state of things for which Cromwell's death saved him the necessity of providing. In the meantime, the people had seen enough of the system to make them wish for a change; and a recurrence to the laws for the protection of property was gladly hailed by all parties. CHARLES THE SECOND. No sooner was the constitution re-established by the restoration of Charles,
オリバー・クロムウェル クロムウェルは、政府の権力を絶対的に自分のものとするために、幸運な出来事に恵まれた。3隻のハムバーグの船には30万ポンドの銀が積まれており、オランダ人の所有物である疑いがあった。クロムウェルはその銀のことを聞きつけ、兵士の分遣隊を率いて船に乗り込み、銀を押収した。こうして銀貨を手に入れたクロムウェルは、議会解散権を手に入れた。クロムウェルの政策の大いなる秘密は、金で軍を統率し、軍で民衆を統率することであったようだ。こうして彼は、単なる軍事力によって民衆を統率し、金や金の材料が存在することが分かれば、どこでもそれを手に入れる手段を用意した。この制度が続いていた数年間は、貨幣の流通量が増加し、後にルーカス卿が、「簒奪された後期の権力者の時代には、税金は大きかったが、人々が貨幣を得る手段も大きかった」と述べたことを正当化するほどであった。しかし、このような物資の調達方法は長くは続かず、非常時にしか使えず、そのような収入を得るための略式手段が突然使えなくなる時が必ず来る。その間、民衆は
CONCLUSION.
The pernicious tendency of that principle of political economy which invests one species of property (gold or silver for instance) with the prerogative of determining the value of all other property, is manifested throughout the preceding narrative. This principle, it has been seen, was no sooner sanctioned by the king of England in the collection of his revenue, than the shrewder part of his subjects began to discover, that the surest way to get wealth was to accumulate that particular species of property which was then endowed with supreme authority over all the rest. This was done sometimes by the king and sometimes by his subjects, but always by the Jews.
Thus was private interest always op-= posed, and oftentimes successfully, to the public weal; which, as Lord Bacon states in our motto, requires " that the monies of the state should be prevented from being gathered into few hands: for otherwise a state may have a good stock and yet starve." In defiance of all laws this mischief was continually at work, directly or indirectly producing famine, pestilence, sanguinary executions, oppression, and rebellions.
It constituted that monster which queen Elizabeth boasted she had annihilated; but in which assertion her subsequent experience shews she was mistaken.
Indeed she only attempted to destroy one of the heads of the Hydra, consisting of that class of people who clipped and counterfeited the coin, for the monopolizer of it had her commendations.
But if the absolute money system in earlier times was thus destructive of the peace and welfare of the people, in our own it has received a character which renders it, if possible, still more pernicious ;— for whilst the circulating medium is permitted to have almost all the expansion which credit can give, it is also liable by the bill of 1819, to be suddenly contracted within metallic limits.
Under the control of this system, both late and present experience amply proves, that the power and property of England are alike liable to be sacrificed, whenever it may seem conducive to the private interests of a few to produce such an effect;—or whenever it may suit the political purposes of any rival state, which has credit enough to borrow so large a loan at one time, as, under the management of a shrewd financier, might drain the bank of England of a few millions of its gold. Under the contracting influence of this defective money system, facts have arisen, which give an appearance of truth to the arguments of those who have attempted to prove, that in order to relieve England from its distress a large portion of her cultivated soil should be restored to a state of barrenness —her mechanical operations checked—her spirit for commercial enterprise restricted — her able-bodied artisans sent to distant countries, and the reproduction of labourers checked by abolishing the poor laws.
Happily no facts can prove that which it is impossible to prove, viz. that consumers may be too numerous for the production, and the production at the same time too great for the consumers: though facts may prove, that the ox which treads out the corn may be starved to death in the midst of plenty, if due care be taken to muzzle him; and that workmen may be unclad and unfed, though their labours have filled our warehouses and stores to excess, if there be not a means devised by which their further labour may be made available to their employer, and to those to whom the employer is under money liabilities. When expedients are cherished in theory, which would go to reduce the people and the commodities of England, in a degree so as to suit them to this pecuniary money system, and the governors of our country are ready to adopt such expedients rather than take measures to enlarge the medium of exchange, we are constrained to admit that England is brought under the curse of Babylon, and that so far as the advocates of our present system are concerned, the happiness and prosperity of her people are esteemed to be less precious than the golden wedge of Ophir.
結論
ある種の財産(たとえば金や銀)に、他のすべての財産の価値を決定する特権を与えるという政治経済学の原則の悪質な傾向は、前述の物語を通して明らかにされている。この原則は、イングランド王が歳入を徴収する際に承認されるやいなや、その臣下の聡明な者たちが、富を得る最も確実な方法は、他のすべての財産に対して最高の権威を与えられている特定の種類の財産を蓄積することであることを発見し始めた。これは、王によって行われることもあれば、臣下によって行われることもあったが、常にユダヤ人によって行われていた。
ベーコン卿が標語の中で述べているように、「国家の資金が少数の手に集まるのを防ぐ必要がある。あらゆる法律を無視して、この弊害は絶えず活動し、直接的または間接的に飢饉、疫病、悲惨な処刑、弾圧、反乱を引き起こした。
エリザベス女王が絶滅させたと自慢したあの怪物を構成していたのである。
実際、エリザベス女王はヒドラの頭の一つを破壊しようとしたに過ぎなかった。ヒドラは、硬貨の切り抜きや偽造を行う人々で構成され、硬貨を独占する人々を称賛していたからである。
しかし、以前の時代における絶対的貨幣制度が、このように人々の平和と福祉を破壊するものであったとすれば、現代においては、可能であればさらに悪質なものとなるような性格を帯びている。
この制度のもとでは、イングランドの権力と財産は、少数の私利私欲のためにそのような効果をもたらすと思われるときはいつでも、あるいは、抜け目のない金融業者の管理のもとで、イングランドの銀行から数百万ドルの金を流出させるような多額の融資を一度に借り入れるだけの信用を持つライバル国の政治的目的に適うときはいつでも、犠牲になりやすいということが、過去と現在の経験から十分に証明されている。この欠陥のある貨幣制度の収縮の影響の下で、イングランドを苦境から救うためには、イングランドの耕作地の大部分を不毛の状態に戻し、イングランドの機械的作業を抑制し、イングランドの商業的企業精神を制限し、イングランドの有能な職人を遠国に送り出し、貧困法を廃止して労働者の殖産を抑制すべきだと証明しようとした人々の主張に真実味を与えるような事実が生じた。
幸いなことに、どんな事実も、証明不可能なことを証明することはできない。消費者が生産量に対して多すぎ、同時に生産量が消費量に対して多すぎるということは、事実が証明することはできないが、トウモロコシを踏みつぶす牛が、口輪をはめるのに十分な注意を払えば、豊かさの中で餓死することはありうる。理論上、イングランドの人々や商品を、この貨幣制度に適合する程度に減少させるような方便が主張され、わが国の知事たちが、交換手段を拡大する措置を取るよりも、そのような方便を採用する用意があるとき、イングランドがバビロンの呪いの下に置かれていることを認めざるを得ず、現在の制度の支持者たちに関する限り、イングランドの人々の幸福と繁栄は、オフィールの黄金のくさびよりも貴重ではないとみなされている。
JOHN TAYLOR, Warren B. Mosler #MMTさんのツイート
The Mystery of Money Explained: And Illustrated by the Monetary History of England, from the Norman Conquest to the Present Time
お金の謎を解明: ノルマン・コンクエストから現代までのイングランドの貨幣史による図解
1862
本当の出典
お金の謎を解明: ノルマン・コンクエストから現代までのイングランドの貨幣史による図解
1862
A VIEW
oF THE
MONEY SYSTEM OF ENGLAND,
FROM THE CONQUEST;
WITH PROPOSALS FOR
ESTABLISHING A SECURE AND EQUABLE
CREDIT CURRENCY.
BY JAMES TAYLOR.
" Above all thinga good policy is to be used, that the treasure and mõnies in
a state be not gathered into few hands; for otherwise a state may have a good
stock and yet starve; and money is like muck, no good except it be spread.
BACON.
LONDON:
PRINTED FOR JOHN TAYLOR,
Boskseller and Bublisher to the Anibersity of Lonbon;
30, UPPER GOWER STREET,
AND SOLD BY J. DUNCAN, PATERNOSTER ROW; HESSEY, FLEET STREET ;
AND HATCHARD & SON, PICCADILLY.
1828.
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and hence many of these selfish, clever, but narrow- minded men have been frequently tempted to enrich themselves without any regard to the sufferings of others, or to the punishment which the reaction of their selfish policy has in the end brought on themselves. But our monetary measures have not always possessed this un- happy tendency. There have been some intervals wherein our monetary- regulations have been such as to make it the interest of these selfish individuals to seek their private gain, by pursuing a line of policy which has at the same time had a tendency to promote rather than thwart the public welfare; and though these intervals have not been frequent or of long duration, they have been sufficiently frequent and prolonged to show that a system of Money having this beneficial tendency may be attained, if the people and their rulers are really desirous of obtaining it.
A VIEW
oF
英国のマネーシステム。
征服から
のための提案を持って
安全で衡平なシステムの構築
CREDIT CURRENCY.
ジェームス・テイラー
" 何よりも、良い政策が使われていること、それは、宝とムニュイの
寡聞にして国に集まらず
金は泥のようなものだ 撒く以外には役に立たない
バコン
ロンドン
ジョン・テイラーのために印刷された
ロンボンのアニバーサリーにボスクセラーとブリッシャー
アッパーガワー通り30番地
J.ダンカン、パターノスター・ロウ、ヘッシー、フリート通りで販売。
とHATCHARD&息子、PICCADILLY。
1828.
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そのため、利己的で賢いが心の狭い人たちの多くは、他人の苦しみや、利己的な政策の反動が最終的に自分たちにもたらした罰を気にすることなく、しばしば自分たちを豊かにしたいという誘惑に駆られてきたのである。しかし、我々の貨幣政策は、常にこのような幸福でない傾向を持っていたわけではない。われわれの金融規制が、公共の福祉を妨げるのではなく、むしろ促進する傾向がある政策路線を追求することによって、利己的な個人の私利私欲のために利益を求めるようになった時期がいくつかありましたが、これらの時期は、頻繁に行われたわけでも、長期間続いたわけでもありませんが、国民とその支配者が本当にそれを得ることを望むならば、このような有益な傾向を持つ貨幣制度が達成される可能性があることを示すために、十分に頻繁に行われ、長く続いてきました。

as a consequence, money was made extremely scarce in Ireland ; so that, though the nominal amount of taxation was very small, viz., two shillings a year for Hearth-tax, the pressure of it upon the people was very great. With a view to mitigate this pressure, he said: " It may be
" considered, whether the taxing of those cabins (wherein " the people lived) with Hearth-money be proper, but " rather with day's labour; the former being scarce pos- “ sible for them to have, but the latter most easy : inso- " much as 'tis more easy for them to give forty-nine days' " labour per annum, at seasonable times, than to pay two “ shillings in silver at a pinch, and just when the collectors " call for it." Of course, no man in his senses can sup- pose, that the intrinsic value of these two shillings could ever be naturally of equal value with forty-nine days' labour; but the poor people being liable, by law, to pay two shillings in the king's coin, as a tax to the Crown, while it was scarcely possible for them to get the money; and as, in default of payment, they were liable to dis- traint, these two shillings were made to possess a 'legal value, very far greater than their natural value. The case
which it is made; but the essential characteristic of " Tribute-money" is, the legal authority of the impression affixed to the material. In the former case, uncoined gold or silver may be money; in the latter case, they are not money until they are coined, although, of course, they may be, and are, money's worth. Tribute-money may be made of gold, silver, or copper; or, as we know from experience, it may be made of wood or paper, or of any other commodity, which is comparatively worthless in itself-the sign affixed to it, by the ruling power, consti- tuting its value as a legal tender, for the payment of a definite amount of national taxes, or any other credit engagement within the realm: but this tribute-money is no further valuable to the merchant, who wants to take his money for expenditure in a foreign nation, than for the amount of gold or silver it may contain, or for the amount of these, or any other valuable commodities which he can obtain for it, in the nation to which this tribute- money belongs. The gold or silver, or other valuable commodities thus obtained, in exchange for this tribute- money, is that money which is meant by " money current “ with the merchants," in their transactions between dif- ferent nations.
Camden speaks of money being coined for the purpose of paying taxes. He says: "I have thought that, in old " time, there was a certain sort of money coined´on pur- “ pose for this use; seeing, in Scripture, it is called " tribute money; and I am the more confirmed in this opinion, because, in some of the British pieces, there is “ the Mint Master stamping the money with tascio, which, But “ among the Britons, signifies a tribute penny." Dr. Henry asserts, in opposition to Camden's idea, " that money coined for the sole purpose of paying tribute, “ is a thing unknown in the history of mankind" ; yet Dr. Henry afterwards tells us, in allusion to the coins of Cunobeline, " that they were probably struck by Roman “ artists, and that one design of them was, to pay the " duties on merchandise to the Roman publicans.' This accords with Mr. Camden's idea; for, though he thinks a certain kind of money was coined for paying tribute, he also thinks it afterwards came into common use in com- mercial transactions.
その結果、アイルランドではお金が非常に乏しくなった。そのため、名目上の課税額は非常に少額であり、 竈税は年間2シリングであったが、国民への圧力は非常に大きかった。この圧力を軽減するために、彼は次のように述べている。"この圧力を軽減するために、彼は次のように述べている。
次の書籍のコンテンツと一致: – 66 ページ
Early Manuscripts to the International Marcello Musto. the numerous works that
Marx read and excerpted were: A History of Prices (1838) by Tooke, A View of the Money System of England (
1828) by
James Taylor [1788–1863], History of Money ...
次の書籍のコンテンツと一致: – 316 ページ
...
James Mill, Selected Economic Writings, ed. Donald Winch, pp. 205—6. 5 These early notes on Mill's Elements are ...
1828 version of the 'Notes and Dissertations', the references here are to the textually very similar version which dates ...
次の書籍のコンテンツと一致:
...
Marx's and Engels's notebooks, which are held at the International Institute of Social History (Amsterdam), is available at: www.iisg.nl/archives/en/files/m/ARCH00860full.php#N11241 B 42 ...
James Taylor, A Letter to ... the Duke of appendix.
次の書籍のコンテンツと一致:
...
Marx reproduz de modo abreviado a explicação feita por Lauderdale nas páginas 140-4 de Recherches sur la nature et l'origine de la richesse publique, cit. [148]
James Taylor ...
1828). [149] Jean-Charles Sismondi, Études sur l'économie ...



It is right also to keep in mind that the lenders of money never lend it merely because the borrower wants to borrow, as Daniel Hard castle's reasoning would imply; but, because in their judgment the security he offers is an adequate security. The poverty of England is of this kind, for though the mortgages upon the estate have greatly increased, yet the productive powers of the estate have fully kept pace with the debt upon it. Apply then to the case of England the same rule which governs individuals in their private transactions, and we shall find that her increased ability to borrow money is proof, that in the judgment of the lenders she has increased means of payment for the use: and the greater then the national debt, the greater is the proof of the national wealth, if the lenders form part of the commonwealth. But it must always be kept in mind, that the truth of this argument rests upon the admission, that property in general (by which is meant every thing which can conduce to the comfort and advantage of man) is entitled to represent value equally with money.
Limit the representation of value solely to gold or silver, according to the Jewish system, and the reverse of the above argument will be true. The truth of the statement would also be taken away if government were themselves to become the issuers of a paper currency, for then the relation of the borrower to the lender would be reversed, and government might borrow without regard to the judgment of the lender; and as the government could not be dis trained upon for their promissory notes, those notes would be what French assigns were, mere tax-paying paper. Under the bank restriction act the credit currency of England was doubtless in great danger of being brought into this state; nevertheless, the experience of even that period shows that the expenditure of one loan before another was borrowed, had such a beneficial effect upon the productive powers of England, that the government (greatly embarrassed as it sometimes was) did always find the monies interest prepared voluntarily to lend a new loan ; and the discretion with which the bank directors managed their affairs under such novel circumstances, when from the necessities of the state they might have increased their issues, had they chosen, until bank notes were in the relation of 10/. to the ounce of gold, shows the utility, even under the bank restriction act, of having the issuers of credit currency in a body distinct from the government. It also shows that the bank directors were, during the war, well aware in practice of that which has been shown in theory, viz. that no profit is to be obtained to their establishment by-issuing notes to an amount so large as to diminish the value of them in relation to the precious metals. In London (where the people derive all the benefit of a local circulation from the bank of England notes and bankers' cheques) it is quite easy for a writer, who is ambitious to be distinguished as " the great enemy of the paper-money system," * to persuade half the people into a belief that local notes are worthless rags, and of no more value than the slip of paper upon which they are written; though, if some of these worthless rags, representing ten pounds' worth of the credit of the Gurneys of Norwich, or Smiths of Nottingham, or of a hundred others that might be named, were to fall into that person's hands, he would doubtless find means to extract ten golden sovereigns from them, or the value of ten sovereigns in any other commodity, as effectually as from a cheque representing so many pounds' worth of the credit of Mr. Drummond of C haring Cross. * Cobber says of himself — "There is a general understanding throughout the country that I am the great enemy of the paper money system, and that government is its great friend; that is all I want to be understood. I know that I shall see it fall, and without any impatience I anticipate my mighty triumph." Gobbet's Register, Dec. 22, 1827. Page 819.
Consistent as it may be in Mr. Cobber, who boasts of being the uniform opponent of the credit system of England in all its branches, to spare no pains to decry the local credit currency, it seems difficult to discover on what principle a noble lord, the coadjutor of Mr. Pitt, and lately at the head of the treasury> should have joined Mr. Cobber in the hue and cry against country bankers and the country banking system. Lord Liverpool, however, and Mr. Cobber, are not the only parties of public notoriety who have unconsciously or wilfully fallen into great misapprehension concerning country bankers, and concerning the nature and value of a country bank note. Mr. Took e, alluding to the local currency of England, has the following remark: "But if there is (see pp. 122, 123) any object more important than another for which the government of every state has been invested with the exclusive privilege of coining money, it is that of protecting the lower classes of society, who are little competent in this particular to protect themselves from the risk of loss in receiving their stipulated wages, or other payments. And this function of the sovereignty of issuing coin, which, under the strongest sanction, certifies to every member of the community the weight and fineness of the money which he may be entitled to receive, is justly guarded against the interference of private individuals, by the severest penalties. But, by a strange inconsistency, while such care is manifested to secure the community from being imposed upon by metallic money of less than standard value, every adventurer who chooses to follow the trade of a banker, is allowed to issue a spurious paper money, which, having neither intrinsic value, nor any adequate security for eventual convertibility, is, in too many instances, neither more nor less than a fraud: a fraud of which the most numerous, and most helpless classes, and those who can least bear the loss, are most commonly the victims." Amongst other misconceptions contained in this paragraph, it is obvious that Mr. Took e has quite overlooked an important distinction betwixt the cases of an issuer of counterfeit money, and of this spurious paper money, as he calls it. A person who signs his own name to a promissory note, issues it for what it is, viz. for his own promissory note; and, however worthless his credit is, if it circulates at all, it circulates upon the strength of that credit: but one that issues counterfeit coin pays it for what it is not, viz. for the coin of the realm. Therefore, Mr. Toke's argument can only apply to one that issues a forged promissory note, and for that offence the penalty of the law is as severe as against the issuer of counterfeit coin. Whenever the people have discovered the means of relieving themselves from the difficulties which state necessities have imposed upon them, it has rarely happened that they been benefited by the interference of government; but if such an interference has not done good to the public, it has frequently done injury. Queen Elizabeth's reign, and the rood immediately succeeding it, supply us with a fact strongly illustrative of this truth. From the time that the value of money was increased by Elizabeth, there became a growing necessity for coins of smaller value than the smallest silver piece; this was a natural consequence of making that which had once passed for twelve pence, come down to twopence farthing. For some time tradesmen issued farthing and halfpenny tokens, which they pledged themselves to take back at the value at which they were issued. The use of these tokens furnished a grand subject for popular clamour. It was alleged that the poor experienced great loss from this system, as such tokens were only to be repaid at the same shop whence they were first issued. In the following reign of James the First, Sir Robert Cotton estimates that in London there were then upwards of three thousand tradesmen who issued this small money, and that one with another they issued about five pounds each, making a gross sum of 15,000/. This was considered an enormous amount, and a case was thought to be made out for the interference of government. The crown, therefore, took upon itself to provide this small money. But mark the consequences. In the next reign, that of Charles the First, those who had the royal patent for issuing this small money, issued not merely to the amount of 15,000/., but as much as 200,000/. worth of it, and the poor people at last could not find even one shop where they could pay a farthing of the money. The patentees were bound to take it back when tendered to them; but, on the alleged plea that a great deal of it was counterfeit, they refused, and the loss fell upon the holders. Thus, to save the community from a possible loss of a portion of 15,000/., a loss to ten times the amount was imposed upon them, by giving them the benefit of money coined with the sanction of the government, and under the pretence too of " protecting the lower classes of society from the risk of loss in receiving their stipulated wages." It is doubtless the duty of government to make laws for the due payment of stipulated wages; but it is also incumbent upon them to afford every facility to enable the lower classes of society first to make the stipulation. The evil which presses upon them in these latter days is, that they are unable to obtain a stipulation for wages adequate to their subsistence, and not that they are unable to get paid when they ■have obtained the contract, and done the work. If it were a fact that the function of issuing money, being wholly vested in the crown, had secured the lower classes of society from risk of loss in receiving the amount of their stipulated wages, it might furnish a reason why that power should continue to be solely vested in the crown. But our history abundantly shows that it was by the crown that the specific value of our money was so greatly diminished, from the reign of Edward the Third to that of Henry the Seventh, and so wretchedly debased, as well as diminished, during the reigns of Henry the Eighth and Edward the Sixth. And though Elizabeth partially restored it, that is, the silver part of it, (to do which she inflicted great hardships upon the bulk of the people), yet, before the conclusion of her reign, she herself began to tamper again with the money, and her successor, James, considerably diminished the specific weight of the gold part of the coinage. His son Charles was prevented merely by want of power from again reducing the worth of our silver money to one-fourth of the value to which Elizabeth had restored it; although, as we have seen by his reply to the Scotch remonstrance, he was as indignant as Mr. Took e can be, at his subjects daring to interfere with the crown in its exclusive privilege of issuing money. To say nothing of the manner in which James the Second exercised his kingly power of coining money in Ireland, by which, on the success of his sonic-law, the lower classes of society were compelled to take one farthing for that which had been paid to them as one shilling; it has been seen that, in the time of William the Third, the crown was for a long time compelled to sanction the currency of money, by receiving it in taxes, which was enormously below the standard; and that the evil was only at last surmounted by investing a company of merchants and bankers with the privilege of issuing their credit as currency, and by the king not merely granting to his subjects the power of issuing money, but by his absolutely surrendering for a time his own power of continuing the coinage of gold. Lastly, under the operation of the bank restriction act, the lower classes of society were compelled to take a bank note in payment for twenty shillings in wages, when the metallic value of it was not more than thirteen or fourteen shillings. This, »it will perhaps be said, arose from the misconduct of the bank of England. But they who would lay the fault upon the bank, know not, or have not regarded, the circumstances which led to the bank restriction act. The necessities of the bank of England (though made the stalking-horse for obtaining that act) were in fact a secondary cause; the necessities of the government were the primary one: and had not the bank of England been ready to stand betwixt the government and the public at that time, in the issues of credit money, there is every reason to believe that a paper currency would have been issued directly from the English government, like that of the French government; and English money would have shared the same fate as the French assigns; in which case the people, instead of losing six or seven shillings in the pound, would probably have lost twice that sum. The same error relative to the nature of our local currency which is observable in the foregoing extract from Mr. Toke's pam
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